Thinking about the Infantry Attack
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So a common theme developing here is that our leaders--particularly our officers--need to adopt the attitude that:
-the basic sect attack, composed of its essential battle drills, is a useful trg tool, but only represents a foundation or start-state;
-that sect comds need to be given the latitude to explore newer, more innovative ways of using fire, manoeuvre, info ops and C3 in their sects;
-that sect comds need to be familiar with the conduct of ops two up (i.e. coy), so they understand, even while being innovative and imaginative, their role in the bigger picture (even if they do end up conducting an independent sect op unsupported by pl or higher, because of terrain, etc., they have to do so in a way that supports the higher intent i.e. msn comd is just as important at this level as any other)
On top of this, we really need a way of capturing best practices from other armies around the world that have more and different experience than us, sharing it amongst our sect comds, and then likewise sharing our own best practices and lessons amongst ourselves.
A lot of the above sounds like what we would like to believe is our basic doctrine, with the sect-level innovation added in. Truly, though, it's not; I think it's been amply demonstrated that there's a lot of inertia in the trg system that makes many leaders want to stay in their comfort zones.
This sounds, actually, like a good topic to propose for discussion at the Canadian Infantry Association, perhaps with a view to pushing it into LFDTS.
-the basic sect attack, composed of its essential battle drills, is a useful trg tool, but only represents a foundation or start-state;
-that sect comds need to be given the latitude to explore newer, more innovative ways of using fire, manoeuvre, info ops and C3 in their sects;
-that sect comds need to be familiar with the conduct of ops two up (i.e. coy), so they understand, even while being innovative and imaginative, their role in the bigger picture (even if they do end up conducting an independent sect op unsupported by pl or higher, because of terrain, etc., they have to do so in a way that supports the higher intent i.e. msn comd is just as important at this level as any other)
On top of this, we really need a way of capturing best practices from other armies around the world that have more and different experience than us, sharing it amongst our sect comds, and then likewise sharing our own best practices and lessons amongst ourselves.
A lot of the above sounds like what we would like to believe is our basic doctrine, with the sect-level innovation added in. Truly, though, it's not; I think it's been amply demonstrated that there's a lot of inertia in the trg system that makes many leaders want to stay in their comfort zones.
This sounds, actually, like a good topic to propose for discussion at the Canadian Infantry Association, perhaps with a view to pushing it into LFDTS.
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Hmm I guess I can out from under my rock now. 
Glad to see that some of what we used to call the â Å“high priced helpâ ? no offense meant BTW) who are in a position to use this are reading it and realising that things ain't perfect and therefore need to be if not fixed at least tweaked a bit.
Where I work now I see on a daily basis the results of mediocre or poor leadership on getting the job done, or not, and no one is shooting at us here (well at least not most days)
A lot of what I noted in my previous ramble re innovations and "training up" was from personal experience. I was fortunate enough in my career to belong to two units that took the concept of soldier seriously. To me this is not a job, P/T or F/T it is something that must take seriously. If not I suggest you may a wrong career choice and should instead be looking at the joys of the fast food industry. Basically my thoughts on the matter were/are similar to a certain younger former Cpl soon to be junior officer know to more than one on this forum.
My first unit (Seaforths) taught me how to be a soldier and rather well I thought. We had high standards. Later in the second unit I could build on that base (1st RNFLDR) and was again fortunate to learn how to be a fairly good small unit (sect/pl) commander (IMHO) and even implement some of my ideas on training for war (thinking out side the box).We had a CO who fostered ( pun intended for those from LFAA) that kind of thinking in his young subordinate commanders ( officers and NCOs) and I think it paid off. Despite the limitations imposed on reservists ( time money) we were pretty damn good at our job.
The reality was a I was in a section comander position as a Cpl long before my courses and by the time I got to take them I had most of it through hard won OJT. I was far from the exception to the rule either as I remember M/Cpl Pl 2ic at one point, and even one as Pl Comd.
I think once, maybe twice after making Sgt was I employed as section commander (what I was officially trained to do) And that was for special exercises where we hand picked a platoon for the company ( my "section" was the cream of th crop from my platoon and included the section commanders and 2ics). Don't remember screwing the pooch too many times either and if I had i'm sure it would have been pointed out to me.
By the time I made WO I knew I could run a rifle platoon pretty comfortable and that meant leading it if needed. By the time I made MWO I was sure that if the need arose I could fight a Company. I may not have have been the best CSM in the army ( far from it) but I could do the job.
Later as I went up in rank and hit my last unit (Toronto Scottish) I was actually in a position to begin to implement these ideas on training especially the development of leadership. Naturally I begin to hit the proverbial brick wall of the old guard re this, but I think some of the message got through. Had things been different and I been able to stay longer who knows.
A majoor, interesting point on the innovation. A tradition amongst Canadian troops throughout history. Runners still work eh, and I have to remember that trick with the digital camera.
BTW Westie if that WO is who I think it is I'm more than familiar with him. I had the privilege of serving under him in the Seaforths and he's part of the reason regarding that high standards I speak of. Bumped into him again on our MWO's were his experiences were invaluable.
Glad to see that some of what we used to call the â Å“high priced helpâ ? no offense meant BTW
) who are in a position to use this are reading it and realising that things ain't perfect and therefore need to be if not fixed at least tweaked a bit.Where I work now I see on a daily basis the results of mediocre or poor leadership on getting the job done, or not, and no one is shooting at us here (well at least not most days)
A lot of what I noted in my previous ramble re innovations and "training up" was from personal experience. I was fortunate enough in my career to belong to two units that took the concept of soldier seriously. To me this is not a job, P/T or F/T it is something that must take seriously. If not I suggest you may a wrong career choice and should instead be looking at the joys of the fast food industry. Basically my thoughts on the matter were/are similar to a certain younger former Cpl soon to be junior officer know to more than one on this forum.
My first unit (Seaforths) taught me how to be a soldier and rather well I thought. We had high standards. Later in the second unit I could build on that base (1st RNFLDR) and was again fortunate to learn how to be a fairly good small unit (sect/pl) commander (IMHO) and even implement some of my ideas on training for war (thinking out side the box).We had a CO who fostered ( pun intended for those from LFAA) that kind of thinking in his young subordinate commanders ( officers and NCOs) and I think it paid off. Despite the limitations imposed on reservists ( time money) we were pretty damn good at our job.
The reality was a I was in a section comander position as a Cpl long before my courses and by the time I got to take them I had most of it through hard won OJT. I was far from the exception to the rule either as I remember M/Cpl Pl 2ic at one point, and even one as Pl Comd.
I think once, maybe twice after making Sgt was I employed as section commander (what I was officially trained to do) And that was for special exercises where we hand picked a platoon for the company ( my "section" was the cream of th crop from my platoon and included the section commanders and 2ics). Don't remember screwing the pooch too many times either and if I had i'm sure it would have been pointed out to me.
By the time I made WO I knew I could run a rifle platoon pretty comfortable and that meant leading it if needed. By the time I made MWO I was sure that if the need arose I could fight a Company. I may not have have been the best CSM in the army ( far from it) but I could do the job.
Later as I went up in rank and hit my last unit (Toronto Scottish) I was actually in a position to begin to implement these ideas on training especially the development of leadership. Naturally I begin to hit the proverbial brick wall of the old guard re this, but I think some of the message got through. Had things been different and I been able to stay longer who knows.
A majoor, interesting point on the innovation. A tradition amongst Canadian troops throughout history. Runners still work eh, and I have to remember that trick with the digital camera.
BTW Westie if that WO is who I think it is I'm more than familiar with him. I had the privilege of serving under him in the Seaforths and he's part of the reason regarding that high standards I speak of. Bumped into him again on our MWO's were his experiences were invaluable.
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Danjanou - you are probably right in wondering who that WO (now CWO)was. I credit him with the way I turned out. He had a bit of a rough time this summer with the army and it's too bad really. Right now he is doing what he loves someplace hot! Anyway I too am glad that some senior type officers are reading this, it's high time for some changes. The funny thing is, my WO would teach us what worked during a sect type assault and we would do it. He learnt the hard way, under fire, many times. When our unit or NCO's would go on course or callout, we would be told in no uncertain terms that we were f****d and that's not the way it's done! Some of the battalions (reg) have have been forward thinking for a few years now but as you know that wasn't always the case! One thing I always liked about the reserves, at least my unit, is there was more latitude (most of the time) with kit and training. We should be trying evrything and deciding what works for us. The conventional sect attack is a great learning tool, fire control, target indication, fire and movement, comms, etc. But the fact remains, we need to move to the next levels. Especially with the new three block war concept.
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Just another example from another army of how flexibile organizations can be and possibly still be effective.
Apparently in the German Army all Infantry (All Non-Armoured that is - Para, Mountain, Line (equipped with the Fuchs WAPC)) is organized with the same 10 man section.
Using the Fuchs Model that means a driver, a Section Leader, 2 MG gunners, a marksman and 5 Riflemen. The section can also deploy a Panzerfaust anti-tank weapon.
Three sections are commanded by a Platoon HQ which has addiitional support.
When mounted the sections leave the driver and one of the MG gunners on the vehicle and dismount the Section Leader, one of the MG gunners with one of the MGs, the marksman and the five riflemen. Based on the fact they only dismount the one MG that seems to suggest they fight the section as a section and not as a pair of teams.
However when conducting the FIBUA battle the entire platoon goes through a complete restructuring.
2 sections lose both their MG gunners and their marksmen. These are grouped in the 3rd section along with the 3rd sections MG gunners and its marksman. The 3rd section loses its riflemen and they are divided between the other two sections. The Platoon has now gone from 3 equal sections to 2 assault sections and a support section.
The assault sections then regroup into three teams of three, all armed just with the service rifle and one team per section having a grenade launcher.
The support section is regrouped with the Pl HQ and two other dets are formed. One 3-man det, presumably from existing HQ personnel effectively becomes a Sapper det, responsible for blowing holes using charges and possibly one of the Panzerfausts. Another det is formed, probably from the drivers to act as a combat supply det (large pack fraimes, lots of ammo, a ladder and a sledgehammer - was it Scharnhorst that said every infantryman should carry a sledgehammer in case they have to knock down a door?)
As in all other operations this force can be augmented from higher but the interesting point here, with respect to this discussion is the demonstration of how one organization, the platoon, can be radically reorged to fit the situation. And this goes far beyond even the section or the brick but right the way down to the individual.
I have no way of knowing what effect this flexibility has on cohesion or how effective the troops are in battle. I just post the example for consideration and to add to your discussion.
(Cork reinserted)
Apparently in the German Army all Infantry (All Non-Armoured that is - Para, Mountain, Line (equipped with the Fuchs WAPC)) is organized with the same 10 man section.
Using the Fuchs Model that means a driver, a Section Leader, 2 MG gunners, a marksman and 5 Riflemen. The section can also deploy a Panzerfaust anti-tank weapon.
Three sections are commanded by a Platoon HQ which has addiitional support.
When mounted the sections leave the driver and one of the MG gunners on the vehicle and dismount the Section Leader, one of the MG gunners with one of the MGs, the marksman and the five riflemen. Based on the fact they only dismount the one MG that seems to suggest they fight the section as a section and not as a pair of teams.
However when conducting the FIBUA battle the entire platoon goes through a complete restructuring.
2 sections lose both their MG gunners and their marksmen. These are grouped in the 3rd section along with the 3rd sections MG gunners and its marksman. The 3rd section loses its riflemen and they are divided between the other two sections. The Platoon has now gone from 3 equal sections to 2 assault sections and a support section.
The assault sections then regroup into three teams of three, all armed just with the service rifle and one team per section having a grenade launcher.
The support section is regrouped with the Pl HQ and two other dets are formed. One 3-man det, presumably from existing HQ personnel effectively becomes a Sapper det, responsible for blowing holes using charges and possibly one of the Panzerfausts. Another det is formed, probably from the drivers to act as a combat supply det (large pack fraimes, lots of ammo, a ladder and a sledgehammer - was it Scharnhorst that said every infantryman should carry a sledgehammer in case they have to knock down a door?)
As in all other operations this force can be augmented from higher but the interesting point here, with respect to this discussion is the demonstration of how one organization, the platoon, can be radically reorged to fit the situation. And this goes far beyond even the section or the brick but right the way down to the individual.
I have no way of knowing what effect this flexibility has on cohesion or how effective the troops are in battle. I just post the example for consideration and to add to your discussion.
(Cork reinserted
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I don't think there is anything wrong with the Section Battle Procedure we use.
I just question the way in which we train and how inflexible we are with the formations. Let the ground and situation dictate.
Someone else mentioned earlier the "thinking rifleman" I think we are at the same point as the Experimental Rifle Corps were in the 1800s . Alot of senior people then used to believe a soldier could only fight if he was in a column and the sergeants were in the rear with pikes.
Imagine skirmishing with soldiers, allowing them to use camouflage and cover...How unsporting!
I just question the way in which we train and how inflexible we are with the formations. Let the ground and situation dictate.
Someone else mentioned earlier the "thinking rifleman" I think we are at the same point as the Experimental Rifle Corps were in the 1800s . Alot of senior people then used to believe a soldier could only fight if he was in a column and the sergeants were in the rear with pikes.
Imagine skirmishing with soldiers, allowing them to use camouflage and cover...How unsporting!
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As some people have attested, there are still "Bosses" who are thinking in terms of the proverbial thin red line and Sergeants with pikes waiting in the supernumerary position behind the line.
Restating the obvious, the only reason people can get away with this is there is no imperative to change (i.e. rounds snapping past your head). Using MILES gear or WES in "free play" exercises for unit evaluations is really the only practical way to jump-start evolution for most of our units and leaders. A unit which ends the BTE being mown down in a series of frontal assaults should have a thorough housecleaning of the leadership.When planning exercises and training scenarios, we really do need to fast forward past "Genforce" and their like (Hey, we WON the Cold War back in 1989!), and start putting in realistic enemy forces; "technicals" driving across the range in pick-up trucks mounting GPMG or HMG's in the back; suicide bombers; snipers concealed in crowds...
Training "two up" is very much more important than I thought at first, thinking about it I realized that unless the section commanders understand what is going on in all "three blocks" of a complex operation, they may inadvertently screw up the higher plan. Horizontal communications for enhanced SA is also more important to operate under these scenarios.
I am also thinking the "mental" aspects of combat should be added to section commander training. If we focus on how and why people are motivated, savvy commanders can gear their techniques to demoralizing the enemy rather than defeating them through shock action at the point of a bayonet (which might be less costly in terms of our casualties and logistics as well).
Pl comd do need to be given a good shake so they do not fall into the "two up, one back" mind set. Once again, all the things we are talking about here are totally applicable to all leaders
Restating the obvious, the only reason people can get away with this is there is no imperative to change (i.e. rounds snapping past your head). Using MILES gear or WES in "free play" exercises for unit evaluations is really the only practical way to jump-start evolution for most of our units and leaders. A unit which ends the BTE being mown down in a series of frontal assaults should have a thorough housecleaning of the leadership.When planning exercises and training scenarios, we really do need to fast forward past "Genforce" and their like (Hey, we WON the Cold War back in 1989!), and start putting in realistic enemy forces; "technicals" driving across the range in pick-up trucks mounting GPMG or HMG's in the back; suicide bombers; snipers concealed in crowds...
Training "two up" is very much more important than I thought at first, thinking about it I realized that unless the section commanders understand what is going on in all "three blocks" of a complex operation, they may inadvertently screw up the higher plan. Horizontal communications for enhanced SA is also more important to operate under these scenarios.
I am also thinking the "mental" aspects of combat should be added to section commander training. If we focus on how and why people are motivated, savvy commanders can gear their techniques to demoralizing the enemy rather than defeating them through shock action at the point of a bayonet (which might be less costly in terms of our casualties and logistics as well).
Pl comd do need to be given a good shake so they do not fall into the "two up, one back" mind set. Once again, all the things we are talking about here are totally applicable to all leaders
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Thats one of the problems holding back the evolution of the offensive 'drills'. People think of it as 'free play' It isn't its the use of the ground and situation.
Remember 'Select and maintain the aim" I got away from the so-called frontal only by saying whatever way I was facing was my front. It's not important where your Delta team is as long as it is being effective!!
btw IMO drills are what you do on a parade square and when conducting IAs. not when fighting an enemy that doesn't know where you want them to be.
Remember 'Select and maintain the aim" I got away from the so-called frontal only by saying whatever way I was facing was my front. It's not important where your Delta team is as long as it is being effective!!
btw IMO drills are what you do on a parade square and when conducting IAs. not when fighting an enemy that doesn't know where you want them to be.
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Butting in again folks but I just came across this interview of General Schoomaker, the US Army Chief, the SOF type that was pulled out of retirement to take over. He has some interesting comments on leadership, training, structure and doctrine as they pertain to transformation.
You might find some of it interesting.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/102904nj1.htm
You might find some of it interesting.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1004/102904nj1.htm
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I found it ALL very interesting, but especially this:
"So I've been most impressed with the adaptability of our leaders and soldiers, especially the ability of relatively junior leaders to take on roles that were far beyond the traditional scope of a company or battalion commander. Those officers are running towns in Iraq, helping organize and working with civic leaders, making tough decisions day and night, even while conducting combat operations around the clock. Much of that goes beyond the normal portfolio of these officers. I think that kind of adaptability and sophistication is something we need to fold back into the batter here as we think about shaping the future Army.
My larger point is that transformation is not about equipment. It's about intellect; it's about judgment; it's about the development of leaders and soldiers. You've got to make that intellectual transformation before you can make the visible transformation. "
And the General sums it up quite well. In Ancient Mycenaean warfare, warriors were equipped with bronze armour, thrusting spear, sword and tower or circular shield, and celebrated combat as a series of individual duels between champions with a crowd of attendants who could form a shield wall to protect their man between duels. About 800 years later, the same people, using much the same language, culture and military equipment fought in organized bodies of troops, and knew success or failure was totally dependent on everyone maintaining their place in the phalanx during contact. Individuals who broke away to duel as individuals were not only likely to get killed, but fatally weaken the phalanx as well.
Once we can get the mental transformation well underway, the "how" we use troops, ground and kit will be thouroughly changed. When writing training scenarios:
"Because of what we've learned in combat, we're now putting people through training scenarios where there's no solution. In the past, you were measured on how you complied with doctrine and used it to organize and accomplish your objective. Today, we're designing training scenarios that put people in a continual zone of discomfort. If they start getting comfortable, perhaps because they're very good at certain tasks, then we ratchet up the pressure so that they're back in the zone of discomfort. That's where we want them. That's how you stretch yourself. And that's the kind of organization we want the Army to be. We want an adaptive organization full of problem solvers. We want them to know how to think, not just what to think."
"So I've been most impressed with the adaptability of our leaders and soldiers, especially the ability of relatively junior leaders to take on roles that were far beyond the traditional scope of a company or battalion commander. Those officers are running towns in Iraq, helping organize and working with civic leaders, making tough decisions day and night, even while conducting combat operations around the clock. Much of that goes beyond the normal portfolio of these officers. I think that kind of adaptability and sophistication is something we need to fold back into the batter here as we think about shaping the future Army.
My larger point is that transformation is not about equipment. It's about intellect; it's about judgment; it's about the development of leaders and soldiers. You've got to make that intellectual transformation before you can make the visible transformation. "
And the General sums it up quite well. In Ancient Mycenaean warfare, warriors were equipped with bronze armour, thrusting spear, sword and tower or circular shield, and celebrated combat as a series of individual duels between champions with a crowd of attendants who could form a shield wall to protect their man between duels. About 800 years later, the same people, using much the same language, culture and military equipment fought in organized bodies of troops, and knew success or failure was totally dependent on everyone maintaining their place in the phalanx during contact. Individuals who broke away to duel as individuals were not only likely to get killed, but fatally weaken the phalanx as well.
Once we can get the mental transformation well underway, the "how" we use troops, ground and kit will be thouroughly changed. When writing training scenarios:
"Because of what we've learned in combat, we're now putting people through training scenarios where there's no solution. In the past, you were measured on how you complied with doctrine and used it to organize and accomplish your objective. Today, we're designing training scenarios that put people in a continual zone of discomfort. If they start getting comfortable, perhaps because they're very good at certain tasks, then we ratchet up the pressure so that they're back in the zone of discomfort. That's where we want them. That's how you stretch yourself. And that's the kind of organization we want the Army to be. We want an adaptive organization full of problem solvers. We want them to know how to think, not just what to think."
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So in the end it comes back to leadership, not a set play book of tactics or drills but the ability to think and resolve a situation quickly using some set basic drills as a baseline tool. Who here didn't see that coming.
Westie47 the freedom or latitude to do what you want in the Reserves that you note isn't really that. I know( knew) of more than one reserve unit that was shall we say a bit too structured in their in their way of doing things (form square), and regular Bns that are more open to change. What it is most likely is the simple fact that Reserve Infantry units often have to make do with less (time, money, and troops) than their Regular counterparts and have become through necessity masters of improvisation.
For example how many times is a Section, Platoon, or company have it's full TOE for weekend exercise? Say some Cpl or M/Cpl finds himself with a total of 5 troops in the section including him,/her and due to another shortage only 1 C9.
The bad leader might look at the situation and say â Å“the book states I need 8 persons and 2 C9s to do the job, and we don't have it so why bother, lets call it a day and go for a beer.â ?
Conversely the good leader is going to turn around and say; â Å“Well I know what the book states, but this is what I have to work with and odds are if it were for real this is all I may have then too. Therefore lets try and figure out how to do it with the resources at hand. Ruck up guys and follow me.â ?
A mild exaggeration, yes but it gets my point across. And yes I realise that there probably times when Regular Bns are in a similar situation and (hopefully) react the same way.
Good point though re the importance of combat experience. Nothing makes the troopies sit up and pay attention more than someone who's been there, done that for real. During the Cold War the Infantry in this country had few soldiers with actual combat experience still serving from say the 1960s to the 1990's. There may have been a couple of crusty old Korea Vets floating about, we had an RSS WO in the 1980's in Nfld, and a few members of the CAR who were in Cyprus when the Turks invaded but that's it.
Most of the Infantry though in this period and for that matter all Combat Arms types had little or no time on the two way range. Your either served in Canada or in W Germany with 4 CMBG. It was even possible to miss a UN tour as with 14 Combat Arms Units ( 8 Inf Bns, 3 Armd Regts, 3 Arty) rotating through Cyprus that added up to in theory a unit going on tour once every 7 years. Mind transfers and attachments to CSS and Sigs units etc did account for more UN tours in this period.
Ironically during this time you were more opt to find someone with combat experience in a Militia unit than a Regular one, the CAR in the mid 1970s excepted. Some of the older Korea vets may have finished their 20 and stayed in uniform on a P/T basis. Also especially in larger cities one often found all sorts of interesting characters who either went a soldiering in far off places and or had just returned from same, in some Militia Units. The Vancouver garrison was full of guys like this in the late 1970's early 1980s including the WO you noted and a few others if memory serves me.
The Rifle Coy I was CSM of in Toronto in the early 1990's seemed to have a larger than average percentage of older than average recruits in it. Most were 1st generation Canadians and many had previous military service in their country of origin. Some of those countries were in a continual state of war, so it was easy to confirm that more than a few during their 1-2 years National Service had â Å“seen the elephant.â ?
The end of the Cold War changed all that though. Now while unfortunate from a world diplomacy point of view, but fortunate for training, we have Infantry soldiers with current combat experience, Medak, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and unfortunately will continue to have so for the near future I would guess.
We need to continue to exploit this valuable training resource at all levels, collectively and individually, and by that I don't mean we bump everyone who has heard had rounds crack over their heads to Sgt and transfer them to the Infantry School to go over old copies of 309(3). AS we been continually stating here training has to be innovative and that should include the use of our living breathing training aids.
Westie47 you said in your post that learning from that particular WO was easy because of his experience. You also mentioned you were at Medak I would hope that means that you use what you learned the hard way there to teach your troops.
We should not automatically dismiss drills per say. I think the negative connotation comes from the term drill which we most often equate with the Parade Square. One of the purposes of Drill as we all know is to ensure immediate automatic response to a word of command and/or situation (weapons handling drills). Something that we would consider of value when the rounds are whipping past your head.
It's been a bit, as I said, since I was in uniform but I can assure you from personal experience that automatic responses to certain critical situations are still there. Pavlov should have given up on dogs and experimented on old grunts. For further examples I suggest you check out the old vets at the Cenotaph. Some of them learned drill over 50 years ago. Most probably also stopped doing it on a regular basis a few years after that. However, when the someone yells â Å“Parade.... Parade Attentionâ ? there is no hesitation there.
The problem is thinking that drills are the end result and not the means to an end. A tool that is used to build on as we've been saying here.
I've given a lot of thought to the concept of too much information pushed down to the Section Commander since we started this debate and would like to put forward a theory as to why we have been reluctant to do so in the past and therefore limit their ability to think and plan independently.
We inherited a lot from the Brits, regimental traditions and the like, fortunately we did not also inherent their class system as it applied to the military, well at least not to the extent that it existed there until it bled to death at the Somme and Ypres. You know the theory that officers and leaders were surplus scions of the aristocracy and born to it, while the troops were the wretched scum of the earth.
That said there was however until very recently, say 10-20 years ago, an unofficial system here mainly based on formal education. Officers came from the middle and upper middle classes in this country and went to higher reading and writing school either RMC or a Civy university. Troops and therefore NCOs, (sorry I'm a dinosaur and therefore have the privilege of choosing not to use NCM which sounds like an appendage on a soldier that has not received a pretty piece of paper signed by the Queen) only required â Å“Grade 8" from Newfoundland or Cape Breton or wherever to be an infanteer and the edujumucated types were looked at in a funny and suspicions manner.â ?
Well that may have been true then it is not the case now. First the advanced technology that has come into use over the past 30-50 years has meant that the poor dumb grunt must not only be at least functionally literate but more often possessed of some technical skills too.
We have seen a shift in our NCO cadre in regards to both age and formal education over this past generation or so. Look around the board or your unit and you will see that now Sgts and Cpls and even Ptes with some sort of post secondary education are becoming increasingly the norm rather than the exception.
Now I am not automatically equating a formal post secondary education with good leadership skills, in fact far from it. Where I work a basic baccalaureate is the minimum entry level requirement here and many of my colleagues have gone well past that to the point where their business cards have veritable whole alphabets after their names. Most of them, including those nominally in supervisory positions, I wouldn't trust leading themselves to the bathroom along a cleared path marked with glow sticks, let alone a section of 031s on the two way range.
That said there is something to be said about education helping the human mind to process raw data. Even for those without a set of post nominal letters there is another factor. The information revolution we have recently experience as forced us especially the younger generation to absorb more information than ever before and at a faster pace, satellite TV, and the Internet being the most prevalent examples.
The problem as I see it as that like so many other things our doctrine has failed to keep up with these social changes. Whoever penned the old 309(3) and probably did so on parchment in Sanscrit, failed to foresee a time in the future when the average young Cpl would be as informed and educated as a 2/Lt if not more so. Hence the presumption that while a Platoon or Company Commander can think and react to changes in a tactical situation, a Section Commander was not.
Time to rewrite or at least update the whole darn book.
darn I see I almost hit the 200 word mark again. Time to crawl back under my rock.
Westie47 the freedom or latitude to do what you want in the Reserves that you note isn't really that. I know( knew) of more than one reserve unit that was shall we say a bit too structured in their in their way of doing things (form square), and regular Bns that are more open to change. What it is most likely is the simple fact that Reserve Infantry units often have to make do with less (time, money, and troops) than their Regular counterparts and have become through necessity masters of improvisation.
For example how many times is a Section, Platoon, or company have it's full TOE for weekend exercise? Say some Cpl or M/Cpl finds himself with a total of 5 troops in the section including him,/her and due to another shortage only 1 C9.
The bad leader might look at the situation and say â Å“the book states I need 8 persons and 2 C9s to do the job, and we don't have it so why bother, lets call it a day and go for a beer.â ?
Conversely the good leader is going to turn around and say; â Å“Well I know what the book states, but this is what I have to work with and odds are if it were for real this is all I may have then too. Therefore lets try and figure out how to do it with the resources at hand. Ruck up guys and follow me.â ?
A mild exaggeration, yes but it gets my point across. And yes I realise that there probably times when Regular Bns are in a similar situation and (hopefully) react the same way.
Good point though re the importance of combat experience. Nothing makes the troopies sit up and pay attention more than someone who's been there, done that for real. During the Cold War the Infantry in this country had few soldiers with actual combat experience still serving from say the 1960s to the 1990's. There may have been a couple of crusty old Korea Vets floating about, we had an RSS WO in the 1980's in Nfld, and a few members of the CAR who were in Cyprus when the Turks invaded but that's it.
Most of the Infantry though in this period and for that matter all Combat Arms types had little or no time on the two way range. Your either served in Canada or in W Germany with 4 CMBG. It was even possible to miss a UN tour as with 14 Combat Arms Units ( 8 Inf Bns, 3 Armd Regts, 3 Arty) rotating through Cyprus that added up to in theory a unit going on tour once every 7 years. Mind transfers and attachments to CSS and Sigs units etc did account for more UN tours in this period.
Ironically during this time you were more opt to find someone with combat experience in a Militia unit than a Regular one, the CAR in the mid 1970s excepted. Some of the older Korea vets may have finished their 20 and stayed in uniform on a P/T basis. Also especially in larger cities one often found all sorts of interesting characters who either went a soldiering in far off places and or had just returned from same, in some Militia Units. The Vancouver garrison was full of guys like this in the late 1970's early 1980s including the WO you noted and a few others if memory serves me.
The Rifle Coy I was CSM of in Toronto in the early 1990's seemed to have a larger than average percentage of older than average recruits in it. Most were 1st generation Canadians and many had previous military service in their country of origin. Some of those countries were in a continual state of war, so it was easy to confirm that more than a few during their 1-2 years National Service had â Å“seen the elephant.â ?
The end of the Cold War changed all that though. Now while unfortunate from a world diplomacy point of view, but fortunate for training, we have Infantry soldiers with current combat experience, Medak, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and unfortunately will continue to have so for the near future I would guess.
We need to continue to exploit this valuable training resource at all levels, collectively and individually, and by that I don't mean we bump everyone who has heard had rounds crack over their heads to Sgt and transfer them to the Infantry School to go over old copies of 309(3). AS we been continually stating here training has to be innovative and that should include the use of our living breathing training aids.
Westie47 you said in your post that learning from that particular WO was easy because of his experience. You also mentioned you were at Medak I would hope that means that you use what you learned the hard way there to teach your troops.
We should not automatically dismiss drills per say. I think the negative connotation comes from the term drill which we most often equate with the Parade Square. One of the purposes of Drill as we all know is to ensure immediate automatic response to a word of command and/or situation (weapons handling drills). Something that we would consider of value when the rounds are whipping past your head.
It's been a bit, as I said, since I was in uniform but I can assure you from personal experience that automatic responses to certain critical situations are still there. Pavlov should have given up on dogs and experimented on old grunts. For further examples I suggest you check out the old vets at the Cenotaph. Some of them learned drill over 50 years ago. Most probably also stopped doing it on a regular basis a few years after that. However, when the someone yells â Å“Parade.... Parade Attentionâ ? there is no hesitation there.
The problem is thinking that drills are the end result and not the means to an end. A tool that is used to build on as we've been saying here.
I've given a lot of thought to the concept of too much information pushed down to the Section Commander since we started this debate and would like to put forward a theory as to why we have been reluctant to do so in the past and therefore limit their ability to think and plan independently.
We inherited a lot from the Brits, regimental traditions and the like, fortunately we did not also inherent their class system as it applied to the military, well at least not to the extent that it existed there until it bled to death at the Somme and Ypres. You know the theory that officers and leaders were surplus scions of the aristocracy and born to it, while the troops were the wretched scum of the earth.
That said there was however until very recently, say 10-20 years ago, an unofficial system here mainly based on formal education. Officers came from the middle and upper middle classes in this country and went to higher reading and writing school either RMC or a Civy university. Troops and therefore NCOs, (sorry I'm a dinosaur and therefore have the privilege of choosing not to use NCM which sounds like an appendage on a soldier that has not received a pretty piece of paper signed by the Queen) only required â Å“Grade 8" from Newfoundland or Cape Breton or wherever to be an infanteer and the edujumucated types were looked at in a funny and suspicions manner.â ?
Well that may have been true then it is not the case now. First the advanced technology that has come into use over the past 30-50 years has meant that the poor dumb grunt must not only be at least functionally literate but more often possessed of some technical skills too.
We have seen a shift in our NCO cadre in regards to both age and formal education over this past generation or so. Look around the board or your unit and you will see that now Sgts and Cpls and even Ptes with some sort of post secondary education are becoming increasingly the norm rather than the exception.
Now I am not automatically equating a formal post secondary education with good leadership skills, in fact far from it. Where I work a basic baccalaureate is the minimum entry level requirement here and many of my colleagues have gone well past that to the point where their business cards have veritable whole alphabets after their names. Most of them, including those nominally in supervisory positions, I wouldn't trust leading themselves to the bathroom along a cleared path marked with glow sticks, let alone a section of 031s on the two way range.
That said there is something to be said about education helping the human mind to process raw data. Even for those without a set of post nominal letters there is another factor. The information revolution we have recently experience as forced us especially the younger generation to absorb more information than ever before and at a faster pace, satellite TV, and the Internet being the most prevalent examples.
The problem as I see it as that like so many other things our doctrine has failed to keep up with these social changes. Whoever penned the old 309(3) and probably did so on parchment in Sanscrit, failed to foresee a time in the future when the average young Cpl would be as informed and educated as a 2/Lt if not more so. Hence the presumption that while a Platoon or Company Commander can think and react to changes in a tactical situation, a Section Commander was not.
Time to rewrite or at least update the whole darn book.
darn I see I almost hit the 200 word mark again. Time to crawl back under my rock.
- Reaction score
- 33
- Points
- 560
Leadership first, last and always.
I do not thinks "Drills" are bad, per se, but the underlying assumptions behind the drills. If wars are fought by enemies who always dig in section minus groups, and who never pull back or react in any way except to fight to the death, then the current set of drills and methodology of training is probably sufficient.
A casual newspaper reader, or someone watching TV will quickly realise wars are not fought that way (if they ever were), and wonder why we are training that way. So, for any high ranking readers who can make this happen, outfit your troops with MILES or WES, and give the enemy "free play" to raise the discomfort level as high as possible. After the troops are mown down using the seven battle drills, start experimenting with organizations and techniques.
We need to discover ways to unhinge the enemy and collapse their ability to fight without getting ourselves killed or trusting in some technological "magic bullet" which might not be available when we need it.
I do not thinks "Drills" are bad, per se, but the underlying assumptions behind the drills. If wars are fought by enemies who always dig in section minus groups, and who never pull back or react in any way except to fight to the death, then the current set of drills and methodology of training is probably sufficient.
A casual newspaper reader, or someone watching TV will quickly realise wars are not fought that way (if they ever were), and wonder why we are training that way. So, for any high ranking readers who can make this happen, outfit your troops with MILES or WES, and give the enemy "free play" to raise the discomfort level as high as possible. After the troops are mown down using the seven battle drills, start experimenting with organizations and techniques.
We need to discover ways to unhinge the enemy and collapse their ability to fight without getting ourselves killed or trusting in some technological "magic bullet" which might not be available when we need it.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 410
Here is a related comment.
Last night, I started the first of a series of interviews with US Infantry junior leaders in preparation for a piece I'm hoping to do on the evolution in their tactical leadership as a result of experiences in combat and SASO ops here in Afgh. After a very interesting couple of hours with a Pl Sgt (SFC) and two team leaders (Sgts), I have collected a few salient points that might surprise Canadian readers:
-they stressed the importance of training everybody "two up" and making sure that everybody is, at a minimum, ready to do the job of the person above them. This includes riflemen acting as Team or even Squad Leaders (=Section Commander);
-the vital need for cross training on weapons and vehicles. They stressed that everybody(all ranks) in the platoon must be a HMMVW driver, and all drivers must have a good grounding in basic vehicle mechanics;
-the ability to accept specialist attachments at platoon and even squad levels; and
-the importance of training Inf soldiers in some basics of what we would call CIMIC (= US "CA).
Alot of other things were discussed, and I had a great insight into the mind of the US Infantry NCO that I had not previously encountered. I think that we may be in for the death of some of our fondest stereotypes of US soldiers, as the US Army learns and changes in Afgh and Iraq. Cheers.
Last night, I started the first of a series of interviews with US Infantry junior leaders in preparation for a piece I'm hoping to do on the evolution in their tactical leadership as a result of experiences in combat and SASO ops here in Afgh. After a very interesting couple of hours with a Pl Sgt (SFC) and two team leaders (Sgts), I have collected a few salient points that might surprise Canadian readers:
-they stressed the importance of training everybody "two up" and making sure that everybody is, at a minimum, ready to do the job of the person above them. This includes riflemen acting as Team or even Squad Leaders (=Section Commander);
-the vital need for cross training on weapons and vehicles. They stressed that everybody(all ranks) in the platoon must be a HMMVW driver, and all drivers must have a good grounding in basic vehicle mechanics;
-the ability to accept specialist attachments at platoon and even squad levels; and
-the importance of training Inf soldiers in some basics of what we would call CIMIC (= US "CA).
Alot of other things were discussed, and I had a great insight into the mind of the US Infantry NCO that I had not previously encountered. I think that we may be in for the death of some of our fondest stereotypes of US soldiers, as the US Army learns and changes in Afgh and Iraq. Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 33
- Points
- 560
Very interesting indeed.
My own (limited) experience with the US Army had convinced me thier approach was to deal with problems using progressively bigger hammers, and MArines were more flexible and innovative. Please fwd your piece when it is done. I will be most interested to read it.
My own (limited) experience with the US Army had convinced me thier approach was to deal with problems using progressively bigger hammers, and MArines were more flexible and innovative. Please fwd your piece when it is done. I will be most interested to read it.
Being a recruit right now basically, and nearing the end of my SQ course here in Meaford I'd have to agree with the assessment of many of the more experinced guys here. To myself I've often wondered what would happen if the Enemies we're fighting intelligently and efficiently. My section commander keeps telling me just to focus on the execution and the battle drills for the attacks, and "not to worry about the bigger picture just yet" But the simple fact is, the section attack would sink in better if they encorporated more information pertaining to the bigger picture. IE: Platoon level/company level/ battalion level attacks. I'm glad there are guys out there who agree that the steam rolling method seems more like a war of attrition. But then, its more geared to WW2/1 type combat then todays situations where FIBUA is more of a prime concern.
Must go, I have field Ex's tomorrow and a whole shit load of section attacks to do through tank ruts...
Must go, I have field Ex's tomorrow and a whole shit load of section attacks to do through tank ruts...
ArmyRick
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 1,997
- Points
- 1,010
Thaedes, I will say my bit here. We teach you guys at M-ford to do drills in a BASIC manner to introduce you to the concept. As I have said before the current section attack doctrine is perfect for teaching SQ/BIQ. Once you get to an operational unit then you can focus on "thinking outside the box". In a BN, you can then do more focus (using SATS, simunition, live, etc) on instinctive shooting, reaction to attacks on patrols during security ops, etc...
I think you should gain some expirience before you pipe up here.
I think you should gain some expirience before you pipe up here.
Forgive me, I did not intend to sound like a ignorant arse. I realize the point of how it is being taught in the SQ/BIQ level. From my own observation, if you threw in anymore material in these courses you would quite easily overwhelm some of the guys. The concept of teaching the basics before going into progressively larger and more difficult areas is not unique to the military, and as such does not require military experince for insight.
The only problem I have with the teaching method, is that more often then not even when you demonstrate the ability and interest to progress, it is squelched rather rapidly. Unique thinking is not at all encouraged, we must always work as a "team" and function as a "collective". For reasons of efficiency and discipline this is a must have, but again it leads to areas of stagnancy. As you more experinced fellas have pointed out, the cookie cutter section attack has its flaws, and I'm sure unique thoughts are a must when dealing with an adaptive and ingenuitive enemy.
Just my thoughts anyways.
The only problem I have with the teaching method, is that more often then not even when you demonstrate the ability and interest to progress, it is squelched rather rapidly. Unique thinking is not at all encouraged, we must always work as a "team" and function as a "collective". For reasons of efficiency and discipline this is a must have, but again it leads to areas of stagnancy. As you more experinced fellas have pointed out, the cookie cutter section attack has its flaws, and I'm sure unique thoughts are a must when dealing with an adaptive and ingenuitive enemy.
Just my thoughts anyways.
- Reaction score
- 33
- Points
- 560
The Army is not the Borg collective, but it really does help to have some experience under your belt before trying out "unique thoughts". We have the collective experience of over 5000 years of written military history to draw from, and down at your level, you are probably dealing with at least one NCO who has been on an operational tour and seen how things work "for real". Trust them, they know what they are talking about.
This is the time for you to learn the basic techniques, keep notes and think about what you are doing and why things work the way they do. As you progress in rank and experience, these thoughts, notes and experiences you have will be the basis of how YOU will approach and solve problems. Stay at it, your day will come.
This is the time for you to learn the basic techniques, keep notes and think about what you are doing and why things work the way they do. As you progress in rank and experience, these thoughts, notes and experiences you have will be the basis of how YOU will approach and solve problems. Stay at it, your day will come.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 410
Thades,
Please don't think that everyone is piling on you here. I'm sure it's quite the contrary. A new Infanteer such as you are who appears to be switched on and interested in what will be the bread and butter of his profession is something to nurture and develop.
That said as pointed out throughout this thread no one is advocating tossing out all the 5000 yrs of collective cookie cutter training because as we continually noted it is the best method we have for teaching you the basics, if only that. Check out the profiles of those who are discussing thinking outsdide the bos and leadership styles here. You'll see individually and collectively we have literally decades of expereince and expertise.
Your ideas are valid and keep them in the back of your head as you learn the basics. Odds are someday you'll have your own section and then you can take to heart some of the ideas floating around here.
Please don't think that everyone is piling on you here. I'm sure it's quite the contrary. A new Infanteer such as you are who appears to be switched on and interested in what will be the bread and butter of his profession is something to nurture and develop.
That said as pointed out throughout this thread no one is advocating tossing out all the 5000 yrs of collective cookie cutter training because as we continually noted it is the best method we have for teaching you the basics, if only that. Check out the profiles of those who are discussing thinking outsdide the bos and leadership styles here. You'll see individually and collectively we have literally decades of expereince and expertise.
Your ideas are valid and keep them in the back of your head as you learn the basics. Odds are someday you'll have your own section and then you can take to heart some of the ideas floating around here.
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