Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[dglad]

Quick question for PRR and FRS users: are you formally training your troops in veiled speech, where and when to use the radios etc. or is this evolving through experience on exercise and deployment?

Well, we didn't have PRR when I was in an inf unit, only FRS (which we're not supposed to be using, I'm pretty sure).  There was nothing formal about it.  They were used in a completely ad hoc way, mostly as an adjunct to the military VHF radios, for when they failed.  And it's hard enough trying to achieve and maintain a decent level in regular radio VP, much less then allowing tps to drop back into veiled/normal speech.  It's obviously a topic area we, as an army, need to consider more carefully and wrap some rigour around.

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting feedback on the "real life" use of 521, FRS and PRR. It reminds me of an article I read (sorry, forgot the reference) of a USMC exercise, where the use of "high tech" actually increased the casualty rate. Typical example: the platoon commander being picked off by a sniper when he opened his laptop in low light situations....

I read that too; it was called "They Died at their Keyboards" or something like that.  It was a FIBUA ex; much of the fancy communications went down due to buildings causing interference.

Since this discussion has moved to technology in the section attack, I'll attempt to drag it up.

PS:  I used the PRR on a training ex with the British and I thought they were the cat's meow (Except for Dutch soldiers trying to sing wrap lyrics over them....)/

 

[a_majoor]

Sorry about getting "technocentric", but the integration and use of technology does change things. I have been around long enough to remember 11 man sections and "C2 group right!", just the introduction of assault rifles and LMGs totally changed the character of the section attack.

I think much of what has been said about the layout of a section and different tactics for sections needs to be properly tested in Wainwright using WES so we can see what works, I am interested in thinking through the communications aspect (which also needs to be tested in Wainwright, BTW)

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I think much of what has been said about the layout of a section and different tactics for sections needs to be properly tested in Wainwright using WES so we can see what works, I am interested in thinking through the communications aspect (which also needs to be tested in Wainwright, BTW)

You know, I have heard a number of briefings about CMTC, and the topic of conducting scientific tests of TTPs has never come up.  Definitely something to think about.  Maybe Devil 39 or Mark C can shed some light?

 

[a_majoor]

Now I really regret a big houscleaning I did some years ago. There was an article in the old Infantry Journal which described a section attack by rebel Rwandan troops, but I don't remember the edition and title anymore.

The Rwandans used a combination of tactics and psycology to mentally unhinge the Hutu soldiers facing them, rather than relying on the shock effect of direct assaults on the position.

The gist of this article was the Rwandan section was a 12 man unit broken into three parts, a support group with RPK's and an RPG, and two four man assault groups armed with rifles. While the support group fixed the enemy, each assault group would atempt to flank the enemy position...on each side!

Moving on either side of the position, the Rwandans were attempting to outflank the position and cover any potential escape routes by fire as well. This required superb training and fire dicipline (single aimed shots), otherwise the two assault groups could end up destroying each other. Faced with accurate fire coming from three sides, and the threat of being outflanked, the Hutu soldiers would normally loose their nerve and attempt to escape, only to be gunned down by the concentrated fire of the assault groups.

This is a great example of attacking enemy morale (and if the Hutus were brave or stupid enough to stay put, they could be bypassed, putting them out of the battle anyway, or dug out by bringing up bigger guns, like jeep mounted HMGs), with a potentially much lower cost to the attacking side in terms of manpower, casualties and logistics (single aimed shots). An eight man Canadian section might be a bit small for this tactic, but perhaps nine (3 X 3man groups) would fit into a LAV, or the LAV itself would be the "support group", slowly picking apart the bunker with single 25mm rounds while the two assault teams moved in left and right....

If anyone has that article and could post it somehow, I think it would be very interesting to readers of this thread.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The Infantry Journal articles were accessible online a while back (c 1998-99) but then apparently someone became coy.

 

[Infanteer]

Some thoughts on technology and the Section Attack:

Two items that come to mind are those fancy Heads-Up Displays on the windshields of Cadillacs and the stupid glowing hockey puck that they tried for TV audiences in the US.

I see something good coming from some of the items that A Majoor has brought up.   The Rwandan tactic sounds familiar; I remember reading that the Zulu Impis under Shaka used the three way envelopment to great success (they had some animal name for it) to destroy the linear forces of other opponents.

It makes sense.   The more angles you attack an opponent from, the more confusion will be sown and the more panic will spread; this is why encirclement is regarded as disastrous.   In fact, on the mental level, an attack from multiple directions can so thoroughly defeat the cohesion of an enemy that physical force is not required - they simply breakdown as a fighting unit, either offering scattered and ineffective resistance or surrendering.

This idea can be applied to the section level.   Obviously the main weakness of the frontal section attack, which has doctrinally become the only trick up our sleeve, is that it is linear and only represents one threat to an enemy, that of an extended line of troops utilizing differing levels of fire and movement.   A good foe, utilizing combined arms (instead of supporting arms), using superior tactics or having a better grasp on terrain and defensive positions will be able to easily dispatch with a single threat.   When the section approaches its objective, even when operating withing a platoon or company level tactical situation, the more opportunities for attack that exist can lead to a more flexible approach, thus increasing chances of success while reducing chances of casualties.

Where does technology come in?   As A Majoor mentioned earlier, superior information flow can allow for "swarm" tactics to exist while reducing the danger of friendly fire due to a non-linear section attack.   Perhaps two simple technologies could aid in this development.

1)   The PRR, which allows for quick, informal communications amongst the section through a light, simple and reliable radio.

2)   The second element (referring to the hockey puck) would be some sort of simple, clear display that a soldier would wear (perhaps a set of goggles or ballistic glasses).   Within the glasses would be a small HUD.   Whenever one looks at their sectionmates, they give off a "glow".   This can allow soldiers to instantly identify where their fellow soldiers are when approaching an objective from multiple directions.   It is simple, like the HUD on a Cadillac, which offers information without distracting the user from their main focus (in this case; driving.   As well, it provides information and situational awareness at the section level in a simple and effective manner.

Of course, this is a whimsical and may be completely unworkable due to technology constraints.   As well, it could be a disadvantage if the enemy is able to use the same technology, easily exposing infiltrating infantryman in a night raid into a bunch of glowing blobs.

Anyways, just some thoughts on how to incorporate technology and tactics to multiply the combat power of a section.

Cheers,

Infanteer

 

[PPCLI Guy]

BAsically you are talking about improving Situational Awareness to the point of Battlefield Visualization,  From TRADOC Pam 525-70: https://134.11.61.26/CD8/Publications/TRADOC/TRADOC Pam/TRADOC Pam 525-70 19951001.pdf

Battlefield Visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of the current state of all forces and the environment, envisions a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently  visualizes the sequence of activity that moves  the commander's force from its current state  to the end state.

The US considers this to be primarily of use for Commanders and Brigade and higer, but the tenets can certainly be applied at the section level.

To be successful in battle, the commander must apply experience and intuition to sort through the myriad of information available on the battlefield. Determining critical information requires focus on three aspects of the commander's vision.
(1) The first is understanding the current state of friendly and enemy forces. This knowledge extends beyond the physical location of forces, environmental factors, and combat readiness (equipment and supplies). It also includes human factors such as fatigue, morale, and the decision-making processes and information requirements of both forces.
(2) The second aspect of the commander's vision is the ability to clearly discern a desired end state. Initially, this involves foreseeing a feasible outcome to the operation which results in mission success and leaves the unit postured for the next mission.
(3) The third aspect of visualization is the ability to see and understand the dynamic relationship between the opposing forces as the commander leads forces through the sequence of activity from current situation to final end state. This includes envisioning possible enemy moves and counters to those moves to defeat or destroy the enemy force. The commander decides when to shift the main effort, when to change priorities, when to reinforce, when to request additional forces, or when to disengage. During the execution
of the mission, the commander continually assesses the envisioned end state to ensure
that it is still desired and achievable.

If one were to apply the criteria above to your ideal HUD, then I would add in the location and movements of the enemy, as well as the section members.  We have all been on attacks that have foundered with "locating the enemy", and on ones that have "lost track" of the enemy whilst making an approach or flanking manoeuvre.  This is about fusing the different types of Situational Awareness, or SA.  At the higher levels, Brown SA (georeferenced data) is critical - it would be less so at the section level.  Blue SA is obviously critical - and is covered by your "glowing puck" analogy, showing location of own troops.  Red SA would add in the enemy location, once identified (and the technological challenge of putting that into your HUD on the fly would be significant.  Finally, some (Gen Nordick is a big proponent) have suggested that we need to consider White SA as well, which refers to non-combatant information - location of refugees and non-combatants, a big glowing X over the mosque etc.

With the combination of SAS (Situational Awareness Suite) and ATS (Athene Tactical System), we are very close to being able to fuse Brown, Blue and Red SA in a single display, with "icons" for each vehicle (and icons can obviously be grouped).  The limitation on displaying individual soldier icons is quite frankly weight - I know that SAS has been deployed on individual soldiers recently, but the kit (think GPS and a radio, along with a display screen, all lashed to your body) is heavy and unwieldy.

Havind said that, I am sure that weights will come down.  Once that is the case, it is simply a matter of having information processed higher, and transmitted (digital capacity of the tactical net is obvioulsy an issue) to the indicidual HUDs.

What you are proposing may not be all that far off - and will obviously have a significant impact on our TTPs.

I will throw in one last quote from the pam:

c. The successful future commander must possess an intuitive feel for combat developed through repetitive training, experience, and exposure to experienced mentoring and leadership. This intuition is based on a timely and accurate view of the battlefield if the unit is to be successful in battle.

This is about raising the bar when conducting section attacks while training - simply repeating the drill over and over again addresses none of the points listed above.

 

[Kirkhill]

I see something good coming from some of the items that A Majoor has brought up.  The Rwandan tactic sounds familiar; I remember reading that the Zulu Impis under Shaka used the three way envelopment to great success (they had some animal name for it) to destroy the linear forces of other opponents.

Chaka envisualized the force as a bull in three parts horns (out flank and encircle - recce in force?) head (heavy vanguard to try the line and find or create weaknesses) body (main body/reserve to exploit opportunity and destroy the enemy in place)  - David Clammer "The Zulu War".  The one big difference between the Zulus and the Rwandans is that the Zulus on the 1820s didn't have to worry about fire discipline. They had no projectile weapons. The Stabbing Spear (assegai) was the primary weapon.

By the time Cetewayo clashed with the Brits in the 1870s some of the Zulus had rifles and muskets (considerably more after Isandhlwana) but fire discipline was not perceived as a problem.  A contributory factor here could have been the "medicines" that were administered before battle that convinced the Zulus that bullets would bounce off.  If the bullets didn't bounce off at least the didn't "hurt" them.  I would venture that many Zulus died "feeling no pain".

Just as a sidebar here with respect to mobility and what is possible. Zulus with no kit to speak of (1 shield, 2 assegais, maybe a knobkerry or club and a monkey skin blanket) routinely marched 50 miles a day, moving faster than the cavalry of the day.

And now back to the main thread

 

[a_majoor]

I like the idea of an SA display in each soldier's visor, sort of what Heinlien described in "Starship Troopers". Top down systems like SAS and ATS are fine for higher level formations, but the "techno centric" section should only be tied into a "platoon net" to keep the system simple and fast (imagine the latency if the section commanders movement is passed up to the Bde level ATS, then back down the chain to the section 2I/C).

That said, for the soldiers display, there should be a very simple overlay on what he sees in front of him: a blue icon for friendlies in his field of veiw, red and yellow icons for threats and potential targets, a pipper for where his weapon is currently aimed at and maybe a set of "arc markers" input by the section commander at the start of the trace. In an urban ops environment, this might just be stripped down to "blues" and the pipper.

The section commander and 2I/C should have the options to pull down map displays or other graphics to assist in orientation and command and control, with maybe a miniature projector to display the map on a suitable piece of ground or the back of an FMP when required.

The other thing the display should be capable of is displaying text messages (i.e. sitreps or other updates, and which the section commander can use to compose messages.)

Most of these things are available now, although not in a singular package which is lightweight, rugged and "soldier proof", and unless derived from som existing COTS system like the GARMIN RINO mentioned earlier, would probably cost a fortune. Simulation and testing should be very interesting and I think the results would be unexpected.

I think there are now two parallel threads here, one about actual tactics, and the other about how technology may drive tactics. Should we start a new thread?

 

[Pikache]

IIRC, the Brits version of sect attack is mini version of our pl attack with a firebase and the riflemen trying to flank the enemy to the best of terrain/effective en fire allows.

If we are to adopt something like a flank attack for our section attack, the C9s will need to be more effective and put more accurate hail of lead down the range.
I was shocked that a basic battle load for C9 is only 2 boxes according to doctrine. (Unless I'm wrong) For the amount of emphasis we put on that MGs are the most important wpn, we don't see to allow them to have much ammo...

 

[Kirkhill]

I think there are now two parallel threads here, one about actual tactics, and the other about how technology may drive tactics. Should we start a new thread?

I'm just watching you discuss this issue.  The two threads, although parallel, appear to be so intertwined that I wonder if you are not better to keep considering the two together?

 

[PPCLI Guy]

IIRC, the Brits version of sect attack is mini version of our pl attack with a firebase and the riflemen trying to flank the enemy to the best of terrain/effective en fire allows.

Hmmm.  Let's not forget that they do that without a useful section support weapon (basically they have a C2), and with out grenade launchers (at least when I served with them 96-98).  Moreover, the Pl has no integral fire support assets - all of the GPMGs are grouped at the Bn level.

the organisation and equipping of our sections and platoons make them infinitely more lethal than those of many of our Allies.

 

[Kirkhill]

Hmmm.  Let's not forget that they do that without a useful section support weapon (basically they have a C2), and with out grenade launchers (at least when I served with them 96-98).  Moreover, the Pl has no integral fire support assets - all of the GPMGs are grouped at the Bn level.

I'm trying to find it, but I can't.  Over on ARRSE (Army.ca's UK counterpart) one character who went by the name of "Gravelbelly" was extolling the virtues of the LSW.  Essentially he was arguing that its high single-shot accuracy, and ability to supply automatic fire made it a great system for low intensity warfare like Northern Ireland.  It basically combined some of the characteristics of the C7CT and the C9 in one weapon, sharing a common ammunition supply with the rest of the "brick".  Now for high intensity conflict it has its severe limitations.  To that end the Brits have aquired the Minimi (C9) and have been using it at "brick" level in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Its used by all infanteers in theatre including the RAF regiment.

As to grenade launchers, I am less sure about those but I believe those have been issued as well.

As to the Pl fire support that appears to be one of those things that Brit CO's are given some flexibility in. 
http://www.army.mod.uk/devonanddorset/org.htm

This site on the Devon's and Dorsets indicates that they at least have devolved the GPMGs down to Platoon.

The organization they describe is a 4 section Platoon with the 4th section being 2 GPMGs

They have 3 Platoons to the Rifle Company with each Company having a permanently attached  8 man section of Engineers and a 4 man section of "snipers" (their words Kevin) presumably armed with the Lapua LRR.

In addition they have a Mortar Platoon (which I believe has 9x 81mm tubes), a Medium Range Anti-Tank Platoon with Milan (currently being replaced with Javelin) and a Recce Platoon equipped with about 8 unarmoured,  open top Land Rovers fitted with the WMIK frame for mounting heavy weapons.

Generally speaking, as I understand it, Light Role Battalions can be assigned light vehicles according to task assigned.

Cheers.

 

[Brad Sallows]

>IIRC, the Brits version of sect attack is mini version of our pl attack with a firebase and the riflemen trying to flank the enemy to the best of terrain/effective en fire allows.

If memory serves, the article about the section attack in Africa struck me as a criticism of the loss of fire and movement (manoeuvre) skills at the section level in our own army.

I have heard a few infantry officers lament the death of F&M at the section level.  What is the truth of the situation?

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I like the idea of an SA display in each soldier's visor, sort of what Heinlien described in "Starship Troopers". Top down systems like SAS and ATS are fine for higher level formations, but the "techno centric" section should only be tied into a "platoon net" to keep the system simple and fast (imagine the latency if the section commanders movement is passed up to the Bde level ATS, then back down the chain to the section 2I/C).

Fair enough - I was looking for a simple way to input RED and White SA.   AS to latency - filters are definitely the answer - along with the discipline to use them.

That said, for the soldiers display, there should be a very simple overlay on what he sees in front of him: a blue icon for friendlies in his field of veiw, red and yellow icons for threats and potential targets, a pipper for where his weapon is currently aimed at and maybe a set of "arc markers" input by the section commander at the start of the trace. In an urban ops environment, this might just be stripped down to "blues" and the pipper.

That sounds very clean.   There are no doubt many studies on the amount of information that a human can process, especially while in a sensory rich environement (it is one thing to be in a cockpit at 20,000 ft - another to be walking, smelling, hearing, feeling - and leading.

The section commander and 2I/C should have the options to pull down map displays or other graphics to assist in orientation and command and control, with maybe a miniature projector to display the map on a suitable piece of ground or the back of an FMP when required.

Agreed

 

[a_majoor]

Going back to Rwanda for a moment, a "Canadian" version could have the C-9s and the 2I/C as the support base, the section commander rifleman and grenadier in one assault group, and a senior corporal/qualified MCpl, rifleman and grenadier in the other (3 X 3 man groups). This section should fit a LAV, and not unduly strain the existing system in terms of new kit etc.

The Sgt and his senior corporal lead with the flanking groups not only to engage the enemy, but also to be far enough forward to see the next bound. The 2I/C controls the fire, but should also be able to direct the flanking sections if they are going off course by virtue of his observation position.

Add-ons: PRR for the reasons discussed in previous posts, and maybe a supply of M-72s or better to the fire base to deal with those annoying hardened bunkers and light armour. It might even be worth investigating a C-6 instead of 2 X C-9 for the fire base, given the greater range and penetration.

This would be interesting to try out in Wainwright

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Sort of echoes the rule of three as well

 

[a_majoor]

Continuing the thought process; If the three section support groups are heavily armed with C-6 and some sort of "bunker buster" rocket launcher to support the flanking assault groups, then it follows the platoon 's employment in battle will also change.

Will the platoon have another GPMG in the weapons det? Will the platoon commander/2I/C's job shift more to supplying fire support with bigger and better weapons in the weapons det (ERYX today; Javelin or Gill/Spike tomorrow, plus improved 60mm mortar rounds) and vectoring in Coy and above assets?

Almost all of the posts have looked at the section by itself (guilty, guilty guilty), without taking the next logical step...

 

[Pikache]

I'm thinking you're talking in terms of mech inf?

What about poor sods in light infantry?