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Thinking about the Infantry Attack

PPCLI Guy: thanks for that inside view on the BTE: I didn't know much about it. How was it?

Here in CJTF76, just about everything at CJTF level (approximately Div equiv but in some ways more like Corps) is FRAG'd off an initial OPORD. FRAGOs are usually two, maybe three pages max. (But the OPORD is a beast). At the level of the TFs (roughly Bde-size TFs, but again more complex than that) one page graphics are quite widely used. A JOG or other map graphic product is overlaid with tac symbols, phase lines, etc. A few text boxes overlaid on the margins give key portions of the FRAGO, and that's it. The product is posted to a SECRET webpage  for all higher and lower to view.

In general a Cdn staff officer would have little trouble fitting in here: I believe we are equally competent, although we would require a bit of terminology immersion (the US dont seem to like using any NATO terms...)

Cheers.
 
There's a thread that offers some recent historical perspective on our section tactics here    worth taking a look at. http://army.ca/forums/threads/20878.0.html

During the walk down memory lane while I was thinking op my comments there I remembered my first exposure to MILES and as it was brought up earlier I thought it relevant. It was in the middle 1980's in Gagetown. Several officers and NCOs were brought out to see a demo (I guess we were there for AMA /LFAA Concentration.)

An average section (can't recall if they were regulars or reserves and really doesn't matter) began to ATC across a field towards a tree line. In the tree line, or somewhere near I never did find out where, was the enemy. As far as I know there was only guy, equipped with an FNC1.

The section were moving in standard arrowhead when they came under effective enemy fire. In this case that was the first guy getting hit. It wasn't the section commander. He had enough sense not to be at the apex of the formation, waving his arms about or otherwise drawing attention to himself. That saved him for all of one or two minutes.

The section went to ground using normal drills, double tap, dash, down, crawl, observe fire etc, and slowly shook themselves out into extended line. Then it fell apart. Of course no one could see where the shots had come from. The grass was about knee high and the section commander got on one knee to better observe and control and direct his section, and bang bang that was him gone.

I can't remember if the 2ic was the third of fourth guy to get it, but after half of them were casualties they kind of lost interest in the attack and things came to a screeching halt. They still hadn't located where the enemy was, and for all I know after he dropped the fourth guy he pulled out of there.

One guy, not a sniper, just one rifleman with an ordinary wpn and less than a full mag expended and he had effectively taken out a section in a matter of minutes. Half of them were casualties and the others for obvious reasons were really not effective. If that had been for real they probably and understandably would have remained there, trying to dig into the ground, or gone mad stood up and tried to charge the enemy in vengence and been cut down.

When we got back to the lines I did a lot of thinking re our drills. I was a Pl 2ic and my Pl Comd and the Section Comds had seen the demo too and were equally affected. We began to think about it and how to counter it, and that lead to working with the troops. The OC and CO had also seen it and let us and the other platoons run with it.

We began throwing in all sorts of curves over the next couple of days in our section attacks. Section Comd â Å“killedâ ? at the beginning, and 2ic not in a position to take over. Could the Number 1 rifleman take over and fight the section until the reorg? Did he have the basic skills? What happens if the initial enemy fire takes out 30 or 50% of the section? A lot of practice, lots of sitting around after an attack and talking through scenarios and what ifs. A lot of â Å“free playâ ?.

Overall I think it brought our skill set up a level. Almost every rifleman could take over as Section 2ic or Comd if needed. A lot of communications in the attacks and reactions to different scenarios became the norm. Aw also moved away from the set piece standard exercise enemy of one or two CSS sitting under the one tree/bush in the field who stays put until you overrun him. The sections were being hit on the flanks as they moved past and forced to react, enemy pulling out after one or two rounds and forcing the lead section to deploy and stuff like

I took that with me when I switched units a few years later and tried again to get it across to my new unit. Not quite as successful overall I think in retrospect, but in Gagetown we had a really good CO who encouraged all troops to become proficient at our bread and butter and think outside the box.

You have to start with the basics, and that is why we have set piece drills. Hey it's been over ten years since I last saw let alone led a section attack, but I still remember how. Once you get those basics down though you have to build on it, and that includes as pointed out here some free play and developing initiative at the lowest level. We're talking working with trained troops here right, not recruits.

It's like drill. You don't hand some new recruit fresh in the door a pace stick and say go plan and execute a ceremonial parade. You teach him the basics like standing at attention and marching first and then over the years he/she learns the more complex stuff that builds on that.
 
Ack.  I don't dispute drills as foundation.  But, in my experience, we never tended to take the Section attack past the "drills" stage.  In your own example, they used all of the drills, it would appear, and we see where it got them.  The problem was probably crossing the open field of knee high grass to begin with.  Perhaps the only solution available to them at that point was to go firm and get the pl or coy comd use manoeuvre and/or fire/smoke to extract them or take another COA, rather than launching into the entirely orthodox set of section battle drills of the day.  The best that that little scenario, with MILES, was going to do was show how incapable a single section is of manoeuvering effectively on open ground, unsupported and alone.  If the enemy in your example had had a sniper rifle or a larger automatic wpn, there may very well have been NO way for that section to effectively engage, even if they had known where the bad guy was.

For teaching the basic drills, fine.  In such a case, MILES is a good way of showing soldiers who aren't adopting good fire positions, using proper cover/concealment, etc. the error of their ways.  But at some point, the teaching has to go past the drills, and do two things:

-teach soldiers, and especially leaders, to think critically and constantly and seek innovative ways of approaching tactical problems; and
-incorporate the rest of the battle, including the remainder of the pl and coy, the fire sp components, etc.

Only in a very restricted setting (woods, urban and similar) is a section likely to actually have to manoeuver on its own, and then the ranges and intervisibility would be far more equal.  Mind you, I've seen some impressive virtual slaughter in that sort of scenario as well (a single rifleman virtually obliterating one of my platoons on URBAN RAM, for instance), but it's not NECESSARILY as one-sided as the lone section in the open field.
 
dglad

The problem was probably crossing the open field of knee high grass to begin with.  Perhaps the only solution available to them at that point was to go firm and get the pl or coy comd use manoeuvre and/or fire/smoke to extract them or take another COA, rather than launching into the entirely orthodox set of section battle drills of the day.

A buddy of mine who went through RESO ph2 and 3 at Gagetown in the 80's before me earned himself the nickname of CE for following your advice.  In similar situation to that described by Danjanou he was leading a platoon in advance to contact. He had one section and his wpns det go firm while he led the other two sections out of the field, past the trees, over the road and up the enemy's flank before moving forward to a new FUP and launching a classic assault followed by a text book reorg.

He was sent back to the original startline to do it all over again with some very weary and pissed-off coursemates.

He had left the bounds of manoeuvre available to him as a platoon commander.  Doing what he did could very well have put him into a flanking Pl/Coy/Bn/Bde area of operations. 

He had to work within the terrain assigned and come up with a workable plan, or decide the attack wasn't workable at all. 

By the way CE stands for "Corps Envelopment".

If he is monitoring this site, apologies if this brings up embarassing memories mate ;D :salute:

Cheers.
 
dglad,

I agree, In that scenario probably would have been better off to set up as firebase and call up the Pl to take him out, however the drill at the time didn't give him the flexability to make that call I guess. Or better yet not cross that field in the first place unless as kirkhill suggests it was the only way to go without crossing into some other units area of operations.

Funny how you only remember stuff that goes really good or horribly wrong. I was a section comd on a TQ1/QL3 Infantry a few years before that MILES incident and had a similar experience.  We were out iaround Carbonear Nfld doing Pl ATC and  practicing section quick attacks each section taking it in turn as point and , and getting bumped. I'm in the lead and we're crossing some fairly open rolling hills, not a loyt of cover, just some gorse and heather, small folds and the occaisional clump of trees. Naturally we come under fire and we go through the drills , get the guys into a "good" fire position in fold in the ground and locate the eneny.

The enemy had a really good commanding position on a knoll and to get to them by a frontal fire and movement would have disastrous. So would have breaking off and coming at them form the flank. They had excellent fields of fire on three sides as I remeber and probably a good covered escape route on the fourth.

Where I was we had a good fire position that could have supported a Pl attack and that's what I suggested to the Pl Comd over the radio. His response was that we were practicing section attacks that morning, not platoon ones and to go ahead. I did and had it been for real I probably would have lost the whole section including moi.

The Pl Comd, normally a good guy and good commander I'll admit was so fixated on a set training schedule that there was no room for deviation (that may have come down form on high too). He also seemed (at least then) to not trust/believe that his subordinate commanders were capable of making good calls. I mean some snot nosed 22 year old M/Cpl (Me) who hasn't been through RESO Ph2 can actually read ground and formulate simple tactics. ::)

As far as I was concerned that attack was a waste of time effort and ammo, and no real training value and my troops were well aware of it. And to be honest then, as I'm sure now, ammo, and training time were at a premium and not to be squandered. Probably why it like the MILES thing still sticks in my mind years later.

Most of us are on the same page in this discussuion, which is a good thing. Question what is the next step?
 
Only in a very restricted setting (woods, urban and similar) is a section likely to actually have to manoeuver on its own, and then the ranges and intervisibility would be far more equal.

I'm not sure I buy this.   Looking at the plethora of historical examples provided in some of the literature I've got concerning section level tactics, countries which adopted section level maneuver within their doctrine used it to great success throughout a variety of situations.   The weapons of a section include grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, grenades, and cold steel if need be; as such, a section is clearly capable of utilizing a combined arms approach to an enemy threat.   The key of a combined arms is not that different systems are used in concert, but that they are combined in both time and space to present multiple and yet different threats to the enemy in such a manner that to adequately deal with one he must expose himself to the other.

In the scenario that Danjanou presented above, the lone rifleman hiding in the grass is clearly able to counter the threat posed by the section advancing across the grassy field because the section tactics were used in a the fashion of "supporting arms"; each group within the section took turns at presenting a threat to the enemy in the form of a smattering of rifle fire and LMG bursts.   However, properly concealed and with a good firing position, the enemy was clearly able to deal with the each individual threat (1 Group or 2 Group) in succession and was not very vulnerable in his position to the equal firepower presented by either group - end result, his superior position and a poor use of tactics resulted in clear defeat of a superior force (8 - 1).

A lone rifleman should not be a platoon sized objective.   Looking at it from the standpoint of a combined arms approach by a maneuverable section, the situation may have panned out differently.   Rather then fanning out in arrowhead en masse and moving together across the field, the section, in an unequal, two-element format as described in the first post in this thread, leapfrogs its assault group and its support group across the field.   When effective enemy fire is encountered, the section commander quickly assesses the situation and determines the course of action.

The support group, armed with two LMGs and two Grenade Launchers, is capable of putting down a high degree of suppressive fire.   Even if it cannot determine the exact location, the indirect nature of machine gun bursts and 40mm grenades lobbed in the general direction of the enemy should provide an appropriate threat to the enemy.   The assault element, with three or four men armed with grenades (offensive and defensive) and rifles, is quick and mobile and relies on its ability to quickly close distance and assault as its threat.

In this situation, the support group may go firm and start flinging down some ordinance in the direction of the enemy fire.   The assault group may pull back and attempt to skirt around the position.   Even if the assault group cannot determine the exact position of the enemy, by the fact that it is quickly moving into the enemies rear should provide a good psychological effect on him due to the fact that his rear has suddenly become his flank.

The combined arms approach is utilized perfectly.   If the enemy rifleman moves to escape the firepower of the support section or to suppress it somehow, he leaves himself open to the quick moving riflemen of the assault section.   If he attempts to ward off the assaulting rifleman, he risks encroachment by the fire of the support section.   In this situation, the platoon commander may elect to come up with the Platoon Marksmen, presenting a third form of threat (long range, accurate fire) to the enemy and making his position even more untenable.

The key is to give section commanders the capabilities and the leeway to figure out what solution will work best.   Saying that "section boundaries will always be X meters" or "this tactic will probably only be used in close terrain" acts to limit the usefulness of a technique and the creativeness of a commander.   It assumes that we will always engage the enemy on our terms.

Clearly, each tactical situation is unique and as such demands its own approach for success.   I believe the key to doing this is to train section commanders to use good judgement and to train them to be unorthodox if they have to; their overall goal is to defeat the enemy.   Since they are the sharp end of the spear, they will often have a good idea on how to do so if they are adequately prepared, tactically and doctrinally, before going into battle.   The section level battle (and these do exist, there are many examples in this thread), like any other battle, is won by the creativity and boldness of the commanders, not by the breadth and depth of manuals, PAMs, and drill solutions.

Danjanou said:
Most of us are on the same page in this discussion, which is a good thing. Question what is the next step?

Good point Danjanou.   We can all state our positions until the cows come home, but unless we propose solutions, we are just "spinning our tires in the mud."

From my understanding of history, following the development of the section in WWI, there were three paths taken.   The French Army looked on the section as an indivisible whole; the lowest level of independent action was to be the Platoon.   The Germans were the opposite.   The Section was the lowest level of tactical maneuver; as such, they were always attempting to use maneuver to successfully exploit the notion of combined arms (like the pincers quote I put above).   The British took a middle road, and this is the path we naturally followed and inherited.

As Michael O'Leary so clearly points out in his essay, our Army has left this notion and gravitated to the path that the embodied the tactics of the French Army.   The Canadian Infantry section is not seen as an independent unit of maneuver, but rather an indivisible block that is used by the platoon commander.   All the section commander does it determine at what level and pace the section advances forward at.

I believe this is the wrong approach to tactics.   As I quoted before, there are two types of tactics "good tactics" and "bad tactics".   Reducing a section to only being able to advance in extended line upon the enemy is as foolish as ordering a platoon commander to line his sections up and attack frontally in every scenario.   Not only does the historical record show that section level manever often leads to more effective platoons (in the case of German and Israeli infantry tactics), but the ever increasing diffusion of the modern battlefield as a response to modern firepower makes the likelihood of the section level battle even more pronounced.   Here are a few examples that come off the top of my head:

- An urban scenario in which the platoon is fragmented among different buildings
- Difficult terrain, in which the immediacy of a battle and the possibility of a platoon flanking may be impossible due to terrain realities
- The advance may be so fast that to deploy a platoon in a hasty assault may waste valuable time in taking out a lone enemy that the section is capable of defeating if employed correctly (using combined arms).   Likewise, a section may be scouting or patrolling and find itself required to defeat an enemy on its own.
- Even in more simple terrain (like the plains of Wainwright) the Platoon commander may be faced with more then one threat, as a result his section commander must deal with the lone position while the Platoon commander takes his support and the other sections to face a more immediate threat.   Battle on open terrain will not always be laid out according to standard Canadian practice like so:

                                                                      Y - lone enemy position
 
                                                                    X - support section

                   X   X - flanking sections

The tactical situation becomes completely different when the following is inserted

                                                                    Y - lone enemy position

                                                                    X - support section
   Y - flanking enemy fireteam    X X - flanking sections

(In this case, the Platoon may have advanced into a "cauldron", effective platoon level tactics breakdown in the face of multiple threats and company level tactics may be unavailable in the near future)

To me, the solution starts with the idea that tactical training should be based upon instilling the notions of tactical understanding, sound judgement and decisive action upon section commanders.   The current approach is to ground repetitive procedure, methodical textbook approach, and checklist solutions to tactical training.   Although, like we have all agreed, this is useful for developing an elementary understanding of section level tactics, it quickly becomes irrelevant to a more advanced appreciation of the topic.

There should be no right or wrong methods of utilizing the section in battle; the validity of one's method can be judged by its results (for which WES like MILES are very helpful).   If a section commander failed to check off all the boxes in the evaluation and yet kills the enemy without a casualty, he passes; likewise someone who personifies school-defined standards and gets high grades for the school solution and yet has his entire section destroyed should be considered a failure.

As well, section tactics should be taught and evaluated using a variety of enemy postures.   Enemies will not always be dug in on a hill by themselves.   Enemies should counterattack, withdraw, attack, cover eachother, etc, etc - just like we would fight.   Some may argue that this reduces the objective nature of evaluations in that some may get harder tests then others, but if structured properly, a good commander who thinks should be able to consistently come out successful while a poor commanders lack of tactical ability will become apparent, no matter how easy a fight he is given.

One method I've seen constantly pop-up in literature on tactical training is the notion of the "staff ride".   Not even requiring troops or enemies, the instructor takes his troops into the field and walks through the terrain.   Throughout the walk he will put a student on the spot.   "What would you do a lone enemy started firing from this direction.", What would you do if you heard enemy tanks on that ridgeline".   Students are timed and must make spot decisions.   As scenario's develop, the instructor can throw "curve balls" in to assess how the student will adapt to friction and sudden changes in a fluid battle.   "You've moved to attack and encounter a minefield, what do you do now?"

The purpose of such training is to evaluate and refine the capabilities for judgement within the aspiring commanders.   As a course moves into actual exercises with troops, weapons and WES, and enemy forces, the focus on the judgement of the leader will still remain formost in what the instructors should evaluate, only now the scenario has become much more demanding with confusion, casualties, and a thinking enemy who reacts to ones decisions.

Battle is a form of human interaction.   As such, it is not a "science" that can be taught and formulated through concrete laws; as a form of human interaction it is made up of a multitude of psychological, social, cultural, political, moral, and physical factors which give every battle its own unique nature.   Our teaching of tactics at any level should reflect this idea.
 
Good post.  In part, and as suggested, we're in complete agreement...keeping sect-level trg at the level of a series of battle drills, a recipe, as it were, for battle, is a fundamental error in our approach.  Drills are useful for teaching new soldiers the essential framework.  However, we rarely advance beyond that point.  We have to start doing as you suggest--teaching our section comds and their soldiers to think and act in unorthodox and innovative ways.  I actually believe the sp ground concept is a good one; I learned sect attacks in the days of the "C2 Group", which manoeuvred around under the Sect 2ic more or less independently of the aslt gp.  Having said that, I'm not convinced that your suggestions for dealing with the threat of the lone rifleman were the best ones (well, maybe they were, once the sect had got itself into that situation)...the problem was the sect crossing the open grd to begin with.  Unless there was a good tactical reason to do so (making time, maybe), why would you?  Again, we don't put enough emphasis on teaching our jnr ldrs to read and use ground as the tool it is; instead, we teach them to adapt their formations to the ground (so the ground becomes the driver).  It's all part of the same malaise--sect tactics as rote drills.

The area I'm not so quick to agree on is the section as independent manoeuvre element.  I maintain that, except in specific circumstances, the sect lacks the C2, firepower and sustainment to function truly independently.  Yes, today's section has the firepower of, say, a WW2 pl.  But that applies to the en as well.  Your point about combined arms is well-taken, but the actual combined arms effects a section can produce independently are fairly limited.  Perhaps the solution to this lies at pl and coy level, where tactics are, to a certain extent, also treated as drills.  If the pl comd is taught to focus on the effects his sects are to achieve on the en and that those effects are coordinated, he can free up his sect comds to pursue their own solutions to their specific tactical problems.  I would go so far as to say that, in the end, we can't really talk about the sect attack in isolation; we have to consider the whole continuum, at least up to coy level, because changing the approach at one level will have impacts at the others.
 
In part, and as suggested, we're in complete agreement...keeping sect-level trg at the level of a series of battle drills, a recipe, as it were, for battle, is a fundamental error in our approach.   Drills are useful for teaching new soldiers the essential framework.   However, we rarely advance beyond that point.   We have to start doing as you suggest--teaching our section comds and their soldiers to think and act in unorthodox and innovative ways.   I actually believe the sp ground concept is a good one; I learned sect attacks in the days of the "C2 Group", which manoeuvred around under the Sect 2ic more or less independently of the aslt gp.

Yep.   We are in agreement here.

Having said that, I'm not convinced that your suggestions for dealing with the threat of the lone rifleman were the best ones (well, maybe they were, once the sect had got itself into that situation)...the problem was the sect crossing the open grd to begin with.   Unless there was a good tactical reason to do so (making time, maybe), why would you?   Again, we don't put enough emphasis on teaching our jnr ldrs to read and use ground as the tool it is; instead, we teach them to adapt their formations to the ground (so the ground becomes the driver).   It's all part of the same malaise--sect tactics as rote drills.

I presented the solution simply as an alternate example of how to deal with the threat.   It may have been as inappropriate as a straight out frontal assault; the purpose was to merely to highlight that their are other options available and these should not be constricted by a narrow-sighted doctrine.

Obviously, as you stated, terrain is a big player in the unique nature of every tactical engagement and perhaps in this situation the best course would be to call in a quick mortar or arty strike to blow the lone gunman sky-high.   A smart and well trained commander should be taught how to make the judgement based on the conditions on the ground rather then the scripture of the PAM.

(As well, I really agree with your statement on the nature of terrain.   Many of the excerpts on tactical training I've seen put much emphasis on mapwork, conceptualization, and terrain appreciation.   Every good Machine Gunner is taught to look for Defilade...)

The area I'm not so quick to agree on is the section as independent manoeuvre element.   I maintain that, except in specific circumstances, the sect lacks the C2, firepower and sustainment to function truly independently.   Yes, today's section has the firepower of, say, a WW2 pl.   But that applies to the en as well.   Your point about combined arms is well-taken, but the actual combined arms effects a section can produce independently are fairly limited.    Perhaps the solution to this lies at pl and coy level, where tactics are, to a certain extent, also treated as drills.   If the pl comd is taught to focus on the effects his sects are to achieve on the en and that those effects are coordinated, he can free up his sect comds to pursue their own solutions to their specific tactical problems.   I would go so far as to say that, in the end, we can't really talk about the sect attack in isolation; we have to consider the whole continuum, at least up to coy level, because changing the approach at one level will have impacts at the others.

I can see what your getting at here and I agree with you.   I am not trying to advocate that we make the section independent in the sense that the section commander will do a recce and give orders and launch deliberate attacks on positions on his own; rather I'm trying to illustrate the fact that often in the heat of   battle the situation can break down to section level fighting and you want to make sure you give your Section commanders maximum flexibility when commanding their battlespace within the larger Platoon and Company context.

The Section Commander must be prepared to fight if an immediate threat comes up or if he radios a contact report up to his Pl Commander and gets the response "We are tied down with a pillbox 50 meters this way, you'll have to deal with it yourself."   Look at the Sgts of the 3rd Ranger Battalion who fought section level engagements in Mogadishu; they had to do this within the larger fight of the Ranger Company due to the complex urban terrain.

Simply teaching our section commanders to line up for a full frontal is inappropriate and dogmatic, it'll only lead to failure (This is something I know you and me have already agreed upon).   Hence we must give them the ability to breakdown their section and provide superior, combined arms fire and maneuver if required.

I am not sure if you've read it before, but I'd highly recommend reading our very own Col. John English's On Infantry; this book discusses the theories of employment of the infantry platoon and section from WWI on.   He gives extensive arguments on the idea of the section as a unit of maneuver.
 
Like so many people posting on this board, I can think of many exercises where we would all have been wiped out through the unthinking use of battle drills. The primary problem is most people won't "think out of the box", and will walk blindly into the enemy kill zone even if they suspect it is there. Trying to invent something new, explaining it to your section/platoon on the fly (or under fire), then executing without any testing or rehersals is a recipie for disaster as well.

The short answer for me (and the many leadership candidates I taught through the years) was to change the wording slightly to open up new possibilities. Instead of insisting a section attack was frontal, I taught a "section attack is conducted AS IF it was a frontal". Once the candidates figured out what I ment, the change was amazing. They would use some means to fix the enemy (anything from a detached C-9 team to requesting the platoon's GPMG), then manouevre closer to the enemy position using cover if possible. The only real stipulation was they should hit the enemy in an extended line formation, if they came in from the covered flank, then so be it...

Future section attacks will be different though. I like many of the suggestions for revamping the section, and I hope some of them are going to be seriously tested in the new MTC in Wainwright. I would like to offer another wild-card thought on what will change things: individual and section level comms.

Imagine a platoon where every leadership position down to section 2I/C has something like a GARMIN RINO. Each leader will have a digital map on the display, and can locate all his comrades whenever they transmit. In this environment, the flow of information will be mostly "horizontal", with Section commanders being more interested in the location and disposition of the flanking sections, and the 2I/C's looking to the location of the assault groups (in today's terminology). Once contact is made, everyone will have a visual sense of where the rest of the platoon is, and can use this information to spontaniously "swarm" the enemy. Individual team members being able to talk to each other will be "iceing on the cake" in this scenario.

There will still be "battle drills" after a fashion, perhaps with soldiers being trained to advance to protect the flanks rather than move towards the enemy if certain conditions are met (i.e. "If your team is inside of the weapons effect arc, advance towards the enemy, outside of the weapons effects arc, move forward on the axis of advance").

The two nice things about this vision are:

a. It can be tested right now using off the shelf FRS type radios, and;
b. This brings high levels of situational awareness at the platoon level without being bogged down with the complexities of higher level command and control systems.

I would actually go so far as to say a totally "ground up" command and control system (Platoon commanders using a "RINO+" to keep in touch with the other platoons while the Company Commanders have RINO++ and so on) might be simpler and more robust than the current idea of "Top down" command and control systems.

If anyone has been trying this idea, or some variation, I would be interested to hear how it worked

 
Seems to me I recognize our last poster's name from INFANTRY JOURNAL, or perhaps the DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BULLETIN?  Nice to see another "heavy thinker" among us, looking forward to reading more of you!
 
a_majoor said:
Future section attacks will be different though. I like many of the suggestions for revamping the section, and I hope some of them are going to be seriously tested in the new MTC in Wainwright. I would like to offer another wild-card thought on what will change things: individual and section level comms.

<snip>

If anyone has been trying this idea, or some variation, I would be interested to hear how it worked

A few years ago, as a coy comd, I let the sect comds draw and deploy with the small 521 radios, thus enabling comms to sect level.  The ex was an adv to contact, designed to practice dismounted sect offensive ops as a foundation for later pl and coy ops.  Two things became immediately apparent:

1. The sect comds couldn't properly manage the flow of information; the combined inputs of visual, external auditory and electronic auditory information were overwhelming; and

2. Our radio voice procedure sucks.

Point 2 is, unfortunately, almost universal.  It is rare to work with a non-Sig whose voice procedure is decent to begin with, and particuarly someone whose voice procedure doesn't collapse completely when the adrenaline starts flowing.  I think this is an under-trained and under-exercised skill throughout the army.  But that's probably another thread.

Point 1 was very interesting.  At the risk of sound a little Luddite-ish, I'm leery of any attempt to push more information at our leaders, without carefully considering what the information is going to be used for.  In the case above, it was voice only, no data; the result was fine while the pls were advancing, because it allowed the rather leisurely exchange of information about ground, formations, etc. and did what you suggested--it gave the sect comds better overall SA.  However, they had to use the coy frequency because we didn't have additional ones allocated, so frequency management became a problem, exacerbated by the generally poor voice procedure and radio discipline.  Once we had contact, however, things went to s**t completely.  The flood of information--most of which was superfluous (I was listening in on the net)--actually degraded the performance of the sect comds.  I'm not sure what the addition of visual/data input would have done, but I doubt it would have led to anything good.

Okay, this was hardly a rigorous experiment.  But it did underscore some important points regarding any sort of CIS at the lowest tactical levels:

-training.  It is absolutely essential that ind trg be designed to incorporate not just the use of the hardware, but also the management and use of information
-interface.  The audio-only interface is a surprisingly poor way of communicating information rapidly and efficiently (considering how much we depend on it), probably because every user has a different frame of reference.  It's much better for communicating information that requires minimal interpretation.
-discipline.  Related to training above; users have to be rigorous in their use of the technology, to avoid filling the medium with useless "white noise" or, worse, information that is wrong or misleading
-frequency management.  The more we rely on communication by RF means, the more of the frequency spectrum we have to use.  There are already a lot of users of the RF spectrum in the battlespace, so we would have to decide who would share frequencies and who would have their own (does everyone use the coy net?  Are there pl nets?  Section nets?)

Finally, I have a few general qualms about CIS at the ind or low tactical levels:

-interface (again).  Visual interfaces have to be well-designed.  Current small displays tend to be difficult to use in many light conditions without backlighting; they use much more power with backlighting and present light discipline issues.  Moreover, map-view type interfaces at these levels aren't necessarily all that intuitive.  Much better for a member of a section would be a "heads-up" display that displays, only brightly enough to see given ambient light, the locations of key objects (comd, other sect members, pl HQ, whatever) superimposed over his field of view.  Such a thing is hardly COTS, however, and is probably on the bleeding edge of military-style human interfaces;
-power.  Everything that needs power needs batteries, which have to be replaced or recharged, and often don't function well in temperature extremes.  Newer battery technology is on the way, which should help.
-signatures.  More EM radiation from all this kit, plus possible thermal and visual signatures, depending on the technology
-security.  Will these devices operate in the clear, introducing COMSEC concerns, or will they be secure, adding overhead to both the technology and its administration?
-reliability.  Signals degrade in built-up or particularly rugged areas of close country, just the sort of terrain in which you would most want this sort of capability.
-default.  As always, how dependent do we want to become on this kit?  The more alternatives and fall-backs we introduce, the higher the training bill

I think the future is coming, but I'd like us to approach this sort of thing with careful consideration and LOTS of field testing by the troops.  And, frankly, we should be prepared to decide, if the evidence suggests it, that it doesn't work.
 
we played with some of those very items, in similar manner, down in "Jawja". They're mostly testing prototypes, but they do open up some very interesting doors. (Although, I don't like the fact that it tends to make people rely on technology -which can fail- instead of skill.)

Instead of 521 radios (*coughJUNK!cough*) we're starting to get a smaller, and vastly better, personal radio, right down to the individual troop. We used them on Roto 0, in Kabul. I loved them. My troops and I didn't bother with radio procedure, we simply talked the way you would if you were face-to-face. I was originally concerned that it would lead to 'clogging up' the net, but the troops know when to talk and when to shut up. They were really handy when I would go into a building to talk with some honcho (be it KCP, a mullah, or local gangster). My security dude and myself could radio our location to the rest of the section outside, and they could keep me info'd on events out there. When we actually did some interesting things, it made for far better comms, and far better execution of plans since you could make stuff up on the fly, and the entire Platoon would know and respond accordingly.

They caused a kind of mini-revolution in the section attack. The flow of info made the attack faster and let you react quicker as a section.

my two pennies
 
I would like to see persoanl radios (esp between the section commander and 2 i/c) with throat mikes.  A problem we faced when doing a combined attack with the tankers is that the were on the same freq as us and the platoon commander couldn't get any info up to the OC and vice versa.  Those tankers love to talk.
 
CFL said:
..... Those tankers love to talk.

It depends on the Unit.  I have found the opposite to be true......Infantry tying up the Net with incessant yammering.

GW
 
Rounder said:
The most important weapon in the infanrty section is the radio.

DS answer to that...it depends on the situation  ;D

Actually, the point about dispensing with voice procedure is an interesting one.  I think that passing information in "plain talk" is actually more efficient, because it's more naturally in accordance with the way people process information.  At the level of the Personal Role Radio (yeah, the 521 is less than stellar, but it was all we had to play with at the time), dumping strict voice procedure and just talking may be the better way to go--OPSEC isn't as big an issue and the radios generally have a pretty weak EM signature.  At higher tactical, and operational levels, where response times don't necessarily have to be measured in seconds, stricter VP is probably desirable from an OPSEC and EMCON point of view.  There's still the matter of frequency management, of course.

The closest I've come to a PRR is using a COTS FRS which, actually, we're not supposed to do (I think there's a CANLANDGEN or CANFORGEN saying that somewhere).  Being hand-held  with no mike or headset made them too cumbersome to use during, say, an attack, but they offered a lot of flexibility and generally improved SA.
 
At the level of the Personal Role Radio (yeah, the 521 is less than stellar, but it was all we had to play with at the time), dumping strict voice procedure and just talking may be the better way to go--OPSEC isn't as big an issue and the radios generally have a pretty weak EM signature.


Well Sir let's not forget about encryption too. Your with SFOR... Good luck, wish I was there.
 
yeah, at first, my 2I/C and myself were worried about not using VP, but then we realized that the section use so much 'street slang' mixed with 'official army talk',and 'army slang', that no way would anyone not in the CF understand what we were saying. Also, we had certain key words that were only used for Real Situations, eg. instead of using STOP or HALT, we would use "Ya wanna hold up a second?" or some such, reserving shorter commands for emergencies, (ie. scary man with gun).

Someone saying "GO" would immediately cause a rapid desertion of the area, but someone saying "Let's roll" would just mean 'everyone in this jeep is ready, we can leave whenever you are, and by the way you forgot your helmet in our jeep again and if the RSM sees you in a veh without your helmet once more he's going to charge you, stupid'.

Using plain speech was quicker in that, troops, (especially the brand new ones - which was the majority) wouldn't have to pause to think about what they wanted to say. Then, I would have the new guys practice their VP while in the camp, so that they could talk on the 522s and get the required results. The biggest thing was just making sure your troops understood when they could chat amongst themselves, and when to shut up, what points were relevent in a Real Situation, and what points were irrelevent.
 
Rounder said:
Well Sir let's not forget about encryption too. Your with SFOR... Good luck, wish I was there.

Thanks!

Re encryption, understood.  However, it does add overhead, both technical and administrative.  More radios with encryption mean more radios in which crypto has to be installed, updated, etc.  As is usual in life, you don't get something for nothing.
 
Interesting feedback on the "real life" use of 521, FRS and PRR. It reminds me of an article I read (sorry, forgot the reference) of a USMC exercise, where the use of "high tech" actually increased the casualty rate. Typical example: the platoon commander being picked off by a sniper when he opened his laptop in low light situations....

It seems with what we have in the here and now, the main issue is training (VP, when to talk and when to zip it), followed by frequency management. Future issues would include Crypto, EMCON (EMissions CONtrol for the uninitiated) and information interface.

Quick question for PRR and FRS users: are you formally training your troops in veiled speech, where and when to use the radios etc. or is this evolving through experience on exercise and deployment?

Looking forward to your feedback
 
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