Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[markppcli]

Lets use the data available. The factors most likely to contribute to success of an assault from the simulations were enemy morale and finding and suppressing the enemy (locating position and fire control). We can't really do much about the first one but we can measure the second one to some extent.

There was a good article posted here before on suppression in combat.

https://carlos.excaliba.de/Diverses/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf

If you could utilize some sort of instrumentation to make a decent measure of "enemy is suppressed" you could create some metrics to objectively score an assault.

How long is the target up vice down (more time down is better)
How much ammo does the section/platoon have left after the assault (more is better)

A section or platoon completes an assault with the targets down most of the time, but with as much of its ammo preserved, to me it represents effective fire control and suppression, giving the assault element the best opportunity of getting on the objective. If the assault element lags, then ammo supplies will begin to go down.

Qualifying the assault is tougher. The other two factors on the higher side of successful assaults (covered positions and fire and movement) represent the movement of the assault element. This would be harder to measure - perhaps there is some sort of way a UAS could track the movement of the assault element and correlate its line of advance to intervisibility from the enemy position to give a readout on what amount of time it was vulnerable? When combined with the measurement of the firebase, you could have some objective metrics with which to assess the quality of the components of the attack.

I guess the more relevant part of the question would be “and would it be of much value”

During training would not reaching the objective with out any broken bones, enough ammo to defend the trench and cover your flanks, no one lost a magazine, weapons sight, pair of NVGs, mg barrel, or left their rifle behind be deemed successful?

I don’t be the eye roll emoji frankly; I think there’s a lot to be said for our AAR process but being able to really break down and see / assess how units are actually performing is always a good thing in my mind. Just showing up and going through the motions is never going to get anyone any better. Challenging training, with good assessments of performance to drive soldiers to do better is the job of the army in peace time.

To use your, let’s face it low, standard the section could have never suppressed the enemy, have ran through each others arcs, and made no use of cover. Great attack guys.

From my perspective what the videos from Ukraine seem to be showing is a suppressing amount of fire to keep the enemy's head down so they don't toss a grenade at them. So the friendlies can toss their grenades in a safe manner. Seems like a win to me. Accurate fire is fire that keeps the enemy from shooting me.

Ukrainian first person videos are snap shots with heavy editing. Often showing the assault and rarely the approach.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Lets use the data available. The factors most likely to contribute to success of an assault from the simulations were enemy morale and finding and suppressing the enemy (locating position and fire control). We can't really do much about the first one but we can measure the second one to some extent.

There was a good article posted here before on suppression in combat.

https://carlos.excaliba.de/Diverses/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf

If you could utilize some sort of instrumentation to make a decent measure of "enemy is suppressed" you could create some metrics to objectively score an assault.

How long is the target up vice down (more time down is better)
How much ammo does the section/platoon have left after the assault (more is better)

A section or platoon completes an assault with the targets down most of the time, but with as much of its ammo preserved, to me it represents effective fire control and suppression, giving the assault element the best opportunity of getting on the objective. If the assault element lags, then ammo supplies will begin to go down.

Qualifying the assault is tougher. The other two factors on the higher side of successful assaults (covered positions and fire and movement) represent the movement of the assault element. This would be harder to measure - perhaps there is some sort of way a UAS could track the movement of the assault element and correlate its line of advance to intervisibility from the enemy position to give a readout on what amount of time it was vulnerable? When combined with the measurement of the firebase, you could have some objective metrics with which to assess the quality of the components of the attack.

I wonder if there is actually any good data on how close/often a small arms bullet has to land to keep an average soldier suppressed? If the number was, say, 1 rd within 1 metre every 5 seconds, you could build a range with an intelligent scoring system that would expose a Fig 11 every 5 seconds, if you did not achieve that. If you actually hit the target, it could be programmed to stay down.

I like the idea of counting remaining ammo on the re-org. Sections/platoons/Companies that achieved the objective with the fewest rounds fired, would “win”.

 

[markppcli]

I wonder if there is actually any good data on how close/often a small arms bullet has to land to keep an average soldier suppressed? If the number was, say, 1 rd within 1 metre every 5 seconds, you could build a range with an intelligent scoring system that would expose a Fig 11 every 5 seconds, if you did not achieve that. If you actually hit the target, it could be programmed to stay down.

I like the idea of counting remaining ammo on the re-org. Sections/platoons/Companies that achieved the objective with the fewest rounds fired, would “win”.

I think there’s value in that. Too often we do attacks and want to impress the Boss with how violent we are. By which I mean we expend as much ammunitions as possible and go as fast as we can. I don’t think running LAVs dry is a great training objective frankly.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I think there’s value in that. Too often we do attacks and want to impress the Boss with how violent we are. By which I mean we expend as much ammunitions as possible and go as fast as we can. I don’t think running LAVs dry is a great training objective frankly.

It is a terrible idea. In reality, there will almost always be a counter-attack and logistics are a real thing.

 

[Fabius]

The question about how to go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied is very interesting. I am not sure that we can get to a completely objective place as there is likely to be some subjectivity.

I have some specific criteria that I would look at but I would offer a couple more generic thoughts on how the Canadian Army currently evaluates Section Attacks and honestly most collective training up to include the Battle Group.

1. Training should differentiate between that aimed at training TTPs, SOPs and drills and that aimed at training decision making. I am of the firm belief that the two are not the same and many of our people don’t realize that.

2. Live Fire is good at validating TTPs, SOPs and drills but it cannot effectively train decision making as even advanced target arrays don’t replicate the full capability offered by a properly employed human OPFOR. The Canadian Army views Live Fire as the ultimate test and validation and is what the Canadian Army uses to actually validate ready forces at the sub unit and below levels NOT actual force on force scenarios.

3. The Canadian Army through the Weapons Effects Simulation system ran by CUBIC in Wainwright, Gagetown, Pet and Valcartier offers the Canadian Army the ability to fully instrument both a blue and red force to at least Pl or Coy level and then measure their combat effectiveness against hard metrics. We can do this today, whereas the ability to instrument any kind of live fire to the same degree does not exist for the Canadian Army.

4. Employing an OPFOR is more complex and needs more thought than many would expect. To properly use an OPFOR I believe you need to approach it as follows at minimum:

- What do you want to test the blue force on in terms of decision making within the scenario?

- How do you need to position the OPFOR and what must they achieve in order to create the situation necessary to force the blue force decision? When do we as trainers want the commander faced with that decision. What level of information and clarity do we want him to have?

- What are the possible choices that the blue force commander would have? Why would they be good or bad? What would make him choose which one? How do we want the OPFOR to react to each choice?

Bottom line is that I think an OPFOR is an amazing tool for force on force scenarios but just letting the OPFOR go with no clear understanding of what the training goal is for the blue force is a mistake and a waste of our collective time. Often in these situations we end up with the OPFOR trying to “win”and not employing realistic TTPs etc.



How would I go about evaluating a Section Attack with metrics? First, we evaluate it through OPFOR enabled force on force NOT live fire. Second, my though is we first break it down by using the Canadian Army’s war fighting functions as our base. Some items would be enabled by CUBIC WES and would be hard numbers, other items would be based on hard yes or no questions derived from our doctrinal processes. How effective each item under a yes or no answer would be subjective and therefore why it would be hard to measure other than a simple yes or no.

Command

• Time from 1st Contact until En position engaged with effective fire.
• Time from 1st Contact until full contact report sent to higher.
• Was a GRIT issued?
• Was an H hour set?
• Were control measures issued?
• Where there any blue on blue casualties? (Speaks to both control measures and blue SA by soldiers and leaders)

Sense

• Who saw who first? (Speaks to balancing speed vs security in advance, section movement formations etc.)
• What did blue forces think they were engaging vs what the En strength actually was?

Act

• Hit % by weapon system during three phases: Initial contact, direct fire plan by fire base, assault force engagement after the ceasing of fire base support
• Did the fire base meet the direct fire plan timings? (Speaks to both time and space considerations as well as ammo consumption rates)
• Total En rounds fired by OPFOR during blue force direct fire plan (Speaks to effectiveness of suppression)
• % of time moving force were not under cover from En observation and fires. Broken out for both Fire base and assault forces.

Shield

• What % of the Section is KIA at consolidation (speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
• What % of the Section is WIA at consolidation (speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
• Overall En % for the number of rounds OPFOR fired vs Bluefor casualties.
• % of Section ammo left upon consolidation
• Were soldiers sited and given defensive ARCs upon culmination of the attack?

Sustain

• Time from soldier receiving wounds to buddy aid being applied?
• Were key weapons systems and/or ammo redistributed from KIA/WIA upon consolidation

I am sure there are other metrics we could come up with that would be enabled by both WES and an OPFOR properly controlled.

 

[childs56]

I guess the more relevant part of the question would be “and would it be of much value”


I don’t be the eye roll emoji frankly;

That was suppose to be the thinking emoji

I think there’s a lot to be said for our AAR process but being able to really break down and see / assess how units are actually performing is always a good thing in my mind. Just showing up and going through the motions is never going to get anyone any better. Challenging training, with good assessments of performance to drive soldiers to do better is the job of the army in peace time.

To use your, let’s face it low, standard the section could have never suppressed the enemy, have ran through each others arcs, and made no use of cover. Great attack guys.

Ukrainian first person videos are snap shots with heavy editing. Often showing the assault and rarely the approach.

There are lots of videos of their approach, where they drive up to the trench line, disembark and start their process. It will prove interesting when they perform their assessments when things settle down, and they do their lessons learned process. I heard they already have started the purpose.

 

[KevinB]

The question about how to go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied is very interesting. I am not sure that we can get to a completely objective place as there is likely to be some subjectivity.

I have some specific criteria that I would look at but I would offer a couple more generic thoughts on how the Canadian Army currently evaluates Section Attacks and honestly most collective training up to include the Battle Group.

1. Training should differentiate between that aimed at training TTPs, SOPs and drills and that aimed at training decision making. I am of the firm belief that the two are not the same and many of our people don’t realize that.

2. Live Fire is good at validating TTPs, SOPs and drills but it cannot effectively train decision making as even advanced target arrays don’t replicate the full capability offered by a properly employed human OPFOR. The Canadian Army views Live Fire as the ultimate test and validation and is what the Canadian Army uses to actually validate ready forces at the sub unit and below levels NOT actual force on force scenarios.

3. The Canadian Army through the Weapons Effects Simulation system ran by CUBIC in Wainwright, Gagetown, Pet and Valcartier offers the Canadian Army the ability to fully instrument both a blue and red force to at least Pl or Coy level and then measure their combat effectiveness against hard metrics. We can do this today, whereas the ability to instrument any kind of live fire to the same degree does not exist for the Canadian Army.

4. Employing an OPFOR is more complex and needs more thought than many would expect. To properly use an OPFOR I believe you need to approach it as follows at minimum:

- What do you want to test the blue force on in terms of decision making within the scenario?

- How do you need to position the OPFOR and what must they achieve in order to create the situation necessary to force the blue force decision? When do we as trainers want the commander faced with that decision. What level of information and clarity do we want him to have?

- What are the possible choices that the blue force commander would have? Why would they be good or bad? What would make him choose which one? How do we want the OPFOR to react to each choice?

Bottom line is that I think an OPFOR is an amazing tool for force on force scenarios but just letting the OPFOR go with no clear understanding of what the training goal is for the blue force is a mistake and a waste of our collective time. Often in these situations we end up with the OPFOR trying to “win”and not employing realistic TTPs etc.



How would I go about evaluating a Section Attack with metrics? First, we evaluate it through OPFOR enabled force on force NOT live fire. Second, my though is we first break it down by using the Canadian Army’s war fighting functions as our base. Some items would be enabled by CUBIC WES and would be hard numbers, other items would be based on hard yes or no questions derived from our doctrinal processes. How effective each item under a yes or no answer would be subjective and therefore why it would be hard to measure other than a simple yes or no.

Command

• Time from 1st Contact until En position engaged with effective fire.
• Time from 1st Contact until full contact report sent to higher.
• Was a GRIT issued?
• Was an H hour set?
• Were control measures issued?
• Where there any blue on blue casualties? (Speaks to both control measures and blue SA by soldiers and leaders)

Sense

• Who saw who first? (Speaks to balancing speed vs security in advance, section movement formations etc.)
• What did blue forces think they were engaging vs what the En strength actually was?

Act

• Hit % by weapon system during three phases: Initial contact, direct fire plan by fire base, assault force engagement after the ceasing of fire base support
• Did the fire base meet the direct fire plan timings? (Speaks to both time and space considerations as well as ammo consumption rates)
• Total En rounds fired by OPFOR during blue force direct fire plan (Speaks to effectiveness of suppression)
• % of time moving force were not under cover from En observation and fires. Broken out for both Fire base and assault forces.

Shield

• What % of the Section is KIA at consolidation (speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
• What % of the Section is WIA at consolidation (speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
• Overall En % for the number of rounds OPFOR fired vs Bluefor casualties.
• % of Section ammo left upon consolidation
• Were soldiers sited and given defensive ARCs upon culmination of the attack?

Sustain

• Time from soldier receiving wounds to buddy aid being applied?
• Were key weapons systems and/or ammo redistributed from KIA/WIA upon consolidation

I am sure there are other metrics we could come up with that would be enabled by both WES and an OPFOR properly controlled.

The major issue with electronic style force on force in the training environment is that one cannot truly validate the use of explosives and ‘shock value’ on a defender (or attackers). Furthermore the physical and mental effects of battle (adrenaline etc) are not injected into the troops.

I think it’s a great tool for larger level training, but not ideal for small element training.

 

[Fabius]

The major issue with electronic style force on force in the training environment is that one cannot truly validate the use of explosives and ‘shock value’ on a defender (or attackers). Furthermore the physical and mental effects of battle (adrenaline etc) are not injected into the troops.

I think it’s a great tool for larger level training, but not ideal for small element training.

True, and I think we need both live and force on force. They validate or train different things, live ranges in my experience very rarely validate much in terms of decision making by Comds in relation to force on force and obviously they are usually heavily scripted in terms of manoeuvre options.

I agree that familiarity with explosions and their effects is valuable but that can be covered in the live fire practice of drills, ie breaching either as a mech cbt team with MICLIC or a 4 man stack with a explosive door breach.

Unfortunately the use of HE munitions during attack ranges has been relatively limited in my experience. Cement and chalk warheads are more common.

 

[Ludoc]

The other issue with WES, is we are so bad at procurement that we let the contract run out. CUBIC is currently prepping all the equipment for storage and all their pers are leaving to find new jobs. If we are lucky, when the new contract is signed, CUBIC (or whomever) can hire back enough contractors with experience using the kit to get us back up and running quickly.

I am a big proponent of the WES system and think we should use it way more often. Any time a company plus is doing force on force (especially in Wx) there is no reason not to be using the system. But it is useless without people to run it. For the next year, or so, it is just a bunch of kit taking up space in a warehouse.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Yanks have a pretty good online resource with 'standards' identified for each battle drill. We've got similar products I believe.

In reality, things will always be situation dependent, but at least it's a place to start from...

Battle Drill 2A: Conduct a Squad Assault (07-4-D9515)​

CONDITIONS:​

The squad is moving as part of the platoon conducting a movement to contact or an attack. The enemy initiates direct fire contact.

CUE:​

This drill begins when the enemy initiates direct fire contact.

STANDARDS:​

The squad locates and suppresses the enemy , establishes supporting fire , and assaults the enemy position using fire and maneuver. The squad destroys or causes the enemy to withdraw , conducts consolidation and reorganizes.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES​

1. The team in contact immediately returns well-aimed fire on known enemy position(s) and assumes the nearest covered positions. Soldiers receiving fire take up nearest positions that afford protection from enemy fire (cover) and observation (concealment).

2. Soldiers in contact assume the nearest position that provides cover and concealment.

1. a. Fire team Soldiers in contact move to positions (bound or crawl) where they can fire their weapons, position themselves to ensure that they have observation, fields of fire, cover, and concealment. They continue to fire and report known or suspected enemy positions to the fire team leader.b. The team leader directs fires using tracers or standard fire commands.c. The fire team not in contact takes covered and concealed positions in place, and observes to the flanks and rear of the squad.d. The squad leader reports contact to the platoon leader and moves toward the fire team in contact.

3. Lead team locates the enemy:

1. a. Using sight and sound, the fire team in contact acquires known or suspected enemy positions.b. The fire team in contact begins to place well-aimed fire on suspected enemy positions.c. The squad leader moves to a position to observe the enemy and assess the situation.d. The squad leader requests, through the platoon leader, immediate suppression indirect fires (normally 60-mm mortars).e. The squad leader reports the enemy size and location, and any other information to the platoon leader. (As the platoon leader comes forward, he completes the squad leader's assessment of the situation.)

4. Team in contact suppresses the enemy.

1. a. The squad leader determines if the fire team in contact can gain suppressive fire based on the volume and accuracy of the enemy fire.b. If the answer is YES, the fire team leader continues to suppress the enemy:
   1. (1) The fire team destroys or suppresses enemy crew-served weapons first.(2) The fire team places smoke (M203/320) on the enemy position to obscure it.(3) The fire team leader continues to control fires using tracers or standard fire commands. Fires must be well-aimed and continue at a sustained rate with no lulls.(4) Buddy teams fire their weapons so that both are not reloading their weapons at the same time.
2. c. If the answer is NO, the squad leader then deploys the fire team not in contact to establish a support-by-fire position. The squad leader reports the situation to the platoon leader. Normally, the squad becomes the base-of-fire element for the platoon. The squad continues to suppress the enemy and responds to orders from the platoon leader. (The platoon leader, radio telephone operator, FO, one machine gun team, squad leader of the next squad, platoon sergeant, and the other machine gun team are already moving forward according to Battle Drill 2, Platoon Assault.)

5. The unit leader maneuvers the assault elements into the assault.

1. a. Squad leader adjusts fires (both direct and indirect) based on the rate of the assault element movement and the minimum safe distances of weapons systems.b. Once in position, the squad leader gives the prearranged signal for the supporting fire team to shift direct fires to the opposite flank of the enemy position.c. The assaulting fire team assumes and maintains effective fires throughout the assault. Handover of responsibility for direct fires from support element to the assault element is critical to prevent fratricide.d. If available, unit leader directs the forward observer to shift indirect fire (including smoke) to isolate the enemy position.

6. The assaulting element(s) fight through enemy position(s) using fire and movement.

1. a. Team leader controls the movement of the team.b. Team leader assigns specific objectives for each buddy team and designates a base maneuver element.c. Base-of-fire elements maintain visual contact of the near flank of the assaulting element.d. The assault element conducts fire and movement based on volume and accuracy of enemy fires against his element and the amount of cover afforded by the terrain.
   1. (1) Assault element leader designates a distance and direction for the assault element and moves with that element.(2) Soldiers maintain contact with team members and leaders.(3) Team leaders direct Soldiers to move as individuals or teams.(4) Soldiers fire from covered positions. Soldiers move using 3- to 5-second rushes or the low or high crawl techniques, taking advantage of available cover and concealment.(5) Soldiers time their firing and reloading in order to sustain their rate of fire.(6) Team leaders maintain contact with the unit leader and pass signals to element members.(7) If the assault element cannot continue to move, the unit leader deploys the element(s) to suppress the enemy and reports to higher headquarters.

7. The squad consolidates and reorganizes.

1. a. Squad leaders establish local security.
   b. The squad leader signals for the base-of-fire element to move up into designated positions.
   c. The squad leader assigns sectors of fire for each element.
   d. The squad leader positions key weapons to cover the most dangerous avenue of approach.
   e. The squad leader begins coordination for ammunition resupply.
   f. Soldiers establish hasty fighting positions.
   g. Squad leader develops a quick fire plan.
   h. Squad leader place out observation posts to warn of enemy counterattacks.
   i. Reestablishes the chain of command.
   j. Redistributes and resupplies ammunition.
   k. Mans crew-served weapons, first.
   l. Redistributes critical equipment such as radios; CBRN; and night vision devices.
   m. Treats and evaluates wounded.
   n. Fills vacancies in key positions.
   o. Searches, silences, segregates, safeguards, speeds, and tags detainees.
   p. The unit leader consolidates ammunition, casualties’ and equipment reports.

8. Squad leader reports situation to platoon leader.

https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/doctrinesupplement/atp3-21.8/

 

[KevinB]

The Yanks have a pretty good online resource with 'standards' identified for each battle drill. We've got similar products I believe.

In reality, things will always be situation dependent, but at least it's a place to start from...

Battle Drill 2A: Conduct a Squad Assault (07-4-D9515)​

CONDITIONS:​

The squad is moving as part of the platoon conducting a movement to contact or an attack. The enemy initiates direct fire contact.

CUE:​

This drill begins when the enemy initiates direct fire contact.

STANDARDS:​

The squad locates and suppresses the enemy , establishes supporting fire , and assaults the enemy position using fire and maneuver. The squad destroys or causes the enemy to withdraw , conducts consolidation and reorganizes.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES​

1. The team in contact immediately returns well-aimed fire on known enemy position(s) and assumes the nearest covered positions. Soldiers receiving fire take up nearest positions that afford protection from enemy fire (cover) and observation (concealment).

2. Soldiers in contact assume the nearest position that provides cover and concealment.

1. a. Fire team Soldiers in contact move to positions (bound or crawl) where they can fire their weapons, position themselves to ensure that they have observation, fields of fire, cover, and concealment. They continue to fire and report known or suspected enemy positions to the fire team leader.b. The team leader directs fires using tracers or standard fire commands.c. The fire team not in contact takes covered and concealed positions in place, and observes to the flanks and rear of the squad.d. The squad leader reports contact to the platoon leader and moves toward the fire team in contact.

3. Lead team locates the enemy:

1. a. Using sight and sound, the fire team in contact acquires known or suspected enemy positions.b. The fire team in contact begins to place well-aimed fire on suspected enemy positions.c. The squad leader moves to a position to observe the enemy and assess the situation.d. The squad leader requests, through the platoon leader, immediate suppression indirect fires (normally 60-mm mortars).e. The squad leader reports the enemy size and location, and any other information to the platoon leader. (As the platoon leader comes forward, he completes the squad leader's assessment of the situation.)

4. Team in contact suppresses the enemy.

1. a. The squad leader determines if the fire team in contact can gain suppressive fire based on the volume and accuracy of the enemy fire.b. If the answer is YES, the fire team leader continues to suppress the enemy:
   1. (1) The fire team destroys or suppresses enemy crew-served weapons first.(2) The fire team places smoke (M203/320) on the enemy position to obscure it.(3) The fire team leader continues to control fires using tracers or standard fire commands. Fires must be well-aimed and continue at a sustained rate with no lulls.(4) Buddy teams fire their weapons so that both are not reloading their weapons at the same time.
2. c. If the answer is NO, the squad leader then deploys the fire team not in contact to establish a support-by-fire position. The squad leader reports the situation to the platoon leader. Normally, the squad becomes the base-of-fire element for the platoon. The squad continues to suppress the enemy and responds to orders from the platoon leader. (The platoon leader, radio telephone operator, FO, one machine gun team, squad leader of the next squad, platoon sergeant, and the other machine gun team are already moving forward according to Battle Drill 2, Platoon Assault.)

5. The unit leader maneuvers the assault elements into the assault.

1. a. Squad leader adjusts fires (both direct and indirect) based on the rate of the assault element movement and the minimum safe distances of weapons systems.b. Once in position, the squad leader gives the prearranged signal for the supporting fire team to shift direct fires to the opposite flank of the enemy position.c. The assaulting fire team assumes and maintains effective fires throughout the assault. Handover of responsibility for direct fires from support element to the assault element is critical to prevent fratricide.d. If available, unit leader directs the forward observer to shift indirect fire (including smoke) to isolate the enemy position.

6. The assaulting element(s) fight through enemy position(s) using fire and movement.

1. a. Team leader controls the movement of the team.b. Team leader assigns specific objectives for each buddy team and designates a base maneuver element.c. Base-of-fire elements maintain visual contact of the near flank of the assaulting element.d. The assault element conducts fire and movement based on volume and accuracy of enemy fires against his element and the amount of cover afforded by the terrain.
   1. (1) Assault element leader designates a distance and direction for the assault element and moves with that element.(2) Soldiers maintain contact with team members and leaders.(3) Team leaders direct Soldiers to move as individuals or teams.(4) Soldiers fire from covered positions. Soldiers move using 3- to 5-second rushes or the low or high crawl techniques, taking advantage of available cover and concealment.(5) Soldiers time their firing and reloading in order to sustain their rate of fire.(6) Team leaders maintain contact with the unit leader and pass signals to element members.(7) If the assault element cannot continue to move, the unit leader deploys the element(s) to suppress the enemy and reports to higher headquarters.

7. The squad consolidates and reorganizes.

1. a. Squad leaders establish local security.
   b. The squad leader signals for the base-of-fire element to move up into designated positions.
   c. The squad leader assigns sectors of fire for each element.
   d. The squad leader positions key weapons to cover the most dangerous avenue of approach.
   e. The squad leader begins coordination for ammunition resupply.
   f. Soldiers establish hasty fighting positions.
   g. Squad leader develops a quick fire plan.
   h. Squad leader place out observation posts to warn of enemy counterattacks.
   i. Reestablishes the chain of command.
   j. Redistributes and resupplies ammunition.
   k. Mans crew-served weapons, first.
   l. Redistributes critical equipment such as radios; CBRN; and night vision devices.
   m. Treats and evaluates wounded.
   n. Fills vacancies in key positions.
   o. Searches, silences, segregates, safeguards, speeds, and tags detainees.
   p. The unit leader consolidates ammunition, casualties’ and equipment reports.

8. Squad leader reports situation to platoon leader.

https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/doctrinesupplement/atp3-21.8/

Part of the problem with standards, is that for peacetime training it is hard to properly assess some aspects.

The squad and platoon attack need to be viewed as more training aberrations than expected routines. Very few enemy positions will be occupied solely by an enemy fire team or squad. Realistically a company position will be the minimum enemy force.
Now yes sometimes one will find isolated pockets of enemies, either due to locations, attrition or whatnot.

Enemy Crew Served weapons, are often ignored in training scenarios, a well dig in Coy with ATGM, AGM, and MG’s is very tough to suppress with organic fire from even a BN, and if it is equipped with supporting vehicles…

Most scenarios I’ve seen down here and in Canada often wish those aspects away, or have enemy vehicles in the open, so they can be easily targeted on the advance.

——
I’ve often wished that even if it is a bit contrived that a permanent defensive position was built with enemy dug in vehicles etc (for purposes of this ex they can be old hulls)
The position is then shelled by Artillery to damage the position, and the vehicles (or some of them) destroyed in place.

One can sweep the site for UXO, to ensure clear access in keeping with peacetime safety standards.
Then one can conduct either live or FoF assaults - one can contrive enough damage to certain locations that the site can be used for Sect/Squad attacks, up to BN.

 

[NavyShooter]

I'll jump in on the OPFOR point above.

Trg Coy from my unit has been the OPFOR for our unit's fall exercise (November-ish) for the past 2 years. Each time, as Trg Coy CSM, I've learned and improved. This fall's ex will be even better.

A key factor from my perspective is that the OPFOR must ensure that the training goals are actually met for the attacking force before 'injecting' things that throw the plan to the wolves.

For example, consider a scenario where an Infantry company must assault onto an objective, the attached Pioneer section must conduct a breach against a building, find the HVT and the information file/pack in the building, then the Company consolidates the entire compound area.

If the OPFOR interrupts the breach, then this interrupts this evaluation as a part of the unit's training plan, meaning either the assault must be re-done, or this portion of the unit's skillset is not properly assessed. On a weekend EX, there is not time to re-do, and a reserve unit's training plan seldom has the opportunity to fit another weekend EX in.

Understanding this as OPFOR meant that I understood exactly when I could 'inject' my reserve troops' attack with the C-6, smoke grenades and Arty-sims.

I think that in a Reserve organization such as I belong to, that the leadership of the OPFOR must be tied into the Orders delivery phase for the Assault force so that the OPFOR response can be properly tailored to suit the circumstances.

In larger scale (ie Maple Resolve) size exercises, the OPFOR should probably be given more free-flow opportunities.

In smaller scale limited exercises, the role of the OPFOR needs to be specifically tailored and planned into the event so that training goals are met, and the OPFOR doesn't overstep their role.

 

[markppcli]

I'll jump in on the OPFOR point above.

Trg Coy from my unit has been the OPFOR for our unit's fall exercise (November-ish) for the past 2 years. Each time, as Trg Coy CSM, I've learned and improved. This fall's ex will be even better.

A key factor from my perspective is that the OPFOR must ensure that the training goals are actually met for the attacking force before 'injecting' things that throw the plan to the wolves.

For example, consider a scenario where an Infantry company must assault onto an objective, the attached Pioneer section must conduct a breach against a building, find the HVT and the information file/pack in the building, then the Company consolidates the entire compound area.

If the OPFOR interrupts the breach, then this interrupts this evaluation as a part of the unit's training plan, meaning either the assault must be re-done, or this portion of the unit's skillset is not properly assessed. On a weekend EX, there is not time to re-do, and a reserve unit's training plan seldom has the opportunity to fit another weekend EX in.

Understanding this as OPFOR meant that I understood exactly when I could 'inject' my reserve troops' attack with the C-6, smoke grenades and Arty-sims.

I think that in a Reserve organization such as I belong to, that the leadership of the OPFOR must be tied into the Orders delivery phase for the Assault force so that the OPFOR response can be properly tailored to suit the circumstances.

In larger scale (ie Maple Resolve) size exercises, the OPFOR should probably be given more free-flow opportunities.

In smaller scale limited exercises, the role of the OPFOR needs to be specifically tailored and planned into the event so that training goals are met, and the OPFOR doesn't overstep their role.

Conversely if your plan collapses because you took contact during a breach it is probably not a very good plan. It goes to what we’ve said about canned training where the enemy is built to be so incompetent that they’re so exposed as to be standing in plain sight, or are unrealistically vulnerable. OPFOR should be there to provide a challenge, but the balancing act for you as the commander of that OPFOR is to assess if the suppression being applied on your troops is effective and having them react accordingly, even if it is less fun.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Opfor should be able to simultaneously steal your lunch while doing your wife ....until you get it right.

 

[Fabius]

Controlling an OPFOR does not have to mean that they present a weak unrealistic threat. It does mean that, as indicated above by NavyShooter, the controller must clearly understand the training objectives and the skill level of the blue force.
You can and should use the OPFOR to exploit blue force errors in geometry, positioning, timing etc. and reinforce learning.

Often our OPFOR is no better trained than our blue force and usually given more junior leadership making it difficult for them to be effective training tools by themselves.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Part of the problem with standards, is that for peacetime training it is hard to properly assess some aspects.

The squad and platoon attack need to be viewed as more training aberrations than expected routines. Very few enemy positions will be occupied solely by an enemy fire team or squad. Realistically a company position will be the minimum enemy force.
Now yes sometimes one will find isolated pockets of enemies, either due to locations, attrition or whatnot.

Enemy Crew Served weapons, are often ignored in training scenarios, a well dig in Coy with ATGM, AGM, and MG’s is very tough to suppress with organic fire from even a BN, and if it is equipped with supporting vehicles…

Most scenarios I’ve seen down here and in Canada often wish those aspects away, or have enemy vehicles in the open, so they can be easily targeted on the advance.

——
I’ve often wished that even if it is a bit contrived that a permanent defensive position was built with enemy dug in vehicles etc (for purposes of this ex they can be old hulls)
The position is then shelled by Artillery to damage the position, and the vehicles (or some of them) destroyed in place.

One can sweep the site for UXO, to ensure clear access in keeping with peacetime safety standards.
Then one can conduct either live or FoF assaults - one can contrive enough damage to certain locations that the site can be used for Sect/Squad attacks

You usually start off with less complex targets then move up to more complex, of course.

I've been part of live fire attacks, using indirect fire, without sweeping anything for UXOs before closing on the position. There will be people here who know alot more about the safety stuff though...

 

[NavyShooter]

I've done poor OPFOR. I'm trying to do better OPFOR now. My first kick at the cat we were literally doing the 'almost in plain sight unrealistic threat' level. This year will be much better than the last few. We have plans.

I agree - the attack plan must be flexible enough to deal with arisings - otherwise it's not a good plan. That said, doing things deliberately to cause a training failure is not the right way to do it either.

There is a balance, and as the CSM Trg Coy, I have to balance things - and as a sailor now in the Army Reserves, I've had a steep learning curve.

Tying in directly with the Orders Delivery for the attack enabled me to understand the plan, recognize the key points that I could not futz with to enable training objectives to be met, and then figure out where the OPFOR FUCXERY INJECT would best fit.

Picture troops advancing onto an objective to bring the Pioneer element in. On the way in, they defeat the 'defenders' who, politely, play dead. Then, instead of being able to fully clear the compound, the infantry skirmish line has to stop just past the pioneer 'task' site because of a 'simulated' IED. They hold in place, the pioneers do their Breach/enter/sieze of the building with the infantry holding the line just short of the IED. Then, when the primary/assessed pioneer task is done and their initial objective is complete, they turn to look at the IED (not part of the primary/assessed task) and that's when my C-6 team opens up and the Arty-Sims/smokes start flying.

Then the infantry has to flank/fight their way up to the C-6 site, while the Pioneers deal with the IED.

That's what worked last time...except that the C-6 was jamming a lot.

This next time around? I've got a couple of extra ideas that we are adding to the mix. Again - I'll be attending the Orders delivery and coordinating with the higher-ups to ensure that the key mission tasks are not futzed with, but once those are accomplished, we'll be having some fun, and I think the troops will enjoy it.

 

[markppcli]

Controlling an OPFOR does not have to mean that they present a weak unrealistic threat. It does mean that, as indicated above by NavyShooter, the controller must clearly understand the training objectives and the skill level of the blue force.
You can and should use the OPFOR to exploit blue force errors in geometry, positioning, timing etc. and reinforce learning.

Often our OPFOR is no better trained than our blue force and usually given more junior leadership making it difficult for them to be effective training tools by themselves.

No it shouldn’t mean they are dumbed down. And to NavyShooters point they shouldn’t take away from training g objectives. Controlling OPFOR means they need to employed sensibly, and they need to. Respond to stimulus appropriately - Blank Rounds don’t suppress terribly well so that stimuli needs to be imposed by the controller.

 

[dapaterson]

No it shouldn’t mean they are dumbed down. And to NavyShooters point they shouldn’t take away from training g objectives. Controlling OPFOR means they need to employed sensibly, and they need to. Respond to stimulus appropriately - Blank Rounds don’t suppress terribly well so that stimuli needs to be imposed by the controller.

Sleep deprived officers on phase training in the defensive running out of blank rounds ordering "Fix bayonets!" is a good time for positive control and an orderly withdrawal of OPFOR.

 

[KevinB]

You usually start off with less complex targets then move up to more complex, of course.

I've been part of live fire attacks, using indirect fire, without sweeping anything for UXOs before closing on the position. There will be people here who know alot more about the safety stuff though...

Canada and the UK are a lot more relaxed about UXO from Artillery than down here I have noted over the last few years. Range areas down here where I have had no qualms about moving through in a light vehicle or by foot, have been off limits due to UXO concerns.
But generally even Canada and the UK cordon off certain areas so troops don't get vaporized by explosions during the attack.

No it shouldn’t mean they are dumbed down. And to NavyShooters point they shouldn’t take away from training g objectives. Controlling OPFOR means they need to employed sensibly, and they need to. Respond to stimulus appropriately - Blank Rounds don’t suppress terribly well so that stimuli needs to be imposed by the controller.

TBH I prefer a mix of SIM and MILES (or WES for y'all) - while the Sims dont work well a long range, they do give some discomfort in close so one can effectively suppress an enemy. For those FoF situations, I prefer to allow the OPFOR a relatively free hand - generally there is a numerical disadvantage already, so they should be encouraged to be intelligent and creative in order to give them a shot a winning as well.
Far often too many exercises are scripted to a point that the OPFOR is just stuck in a canned hunt.