Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[Rifleman62]

Watching the Ukranian GoPro videos of their Inf Aslts, lots of SA ammo down range, especially in trench clearing.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Watching the Ukranian GoPro videos of their Inf Aslts, lots of SA ammo down range, especially in trench clearing.

Which is something we learned in AFG. The 4 mag/ 2 grenade Tac Vest was obsolete before it was manufactured.

 

[Infanteer]

Which is something we learned in AFG. The 4 mag/ 2 grenade Tac Vest was obsolete before it was manufactured.

Actually, that's false. We observed in Afghanistan that untried small units would blast a lot of ammo off, making lots of noise. After experience, small units would consume far less ammo in engagements, and that carrying massive amounts of small arms ammunition just added weight to the soldiers load. Save that energy for the crew served weapons ammo.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Well trained and blooded soldiers use their personal weapons remarkably infrequently, if you study the historical record.

As Infanteer alludes, the big killers are elsewhere. Artillery and crew served weapons being the leaders.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Actually, that's false. We observed in Afghanistan that untried small units would blast a lot of ammo off, making lots of noise. After experience, small units would consume far less ammo in engagements, and that carrying massive amounts of small arms ammunition just added weight to the soldiers load. Save that energy for the crew served weapons ammo.

So, #5 then?

Ten Commandments of the Parachute Rifleman

1. You are the elite of the German Army. For you, combat shall be fulfillment. You shall seek it out and train yourself to stand any test.
2. Cultivate true comradeship, for together with your comrades you will triumph or die.
3. Be shy of speech and incorruptible. Men act, women chatter; chatter will bring you to the grave.
4. Calm and caution, vigor and determination, valor and a fanatical offensive spirit will make you superior in attack.
5. In facing the foe, ammunition is the most precious thing. He who shoots uselessly, merely to reassure himself, is a man without guts. He is a weakling and does not deserve the title of parachutist.
6. Never surrender. Your honor lies in Victory or Death.
7. Only with good weapons can you have success. So look after them on the principle—First my weapons, then myself.
8. You must grasp the full meaning of an operation so that, should your leader fall by the way, you can carry it out with coolness and caution.
9. Fight chivalrously against an honest foe; armed irregulars deserve no quarter.
10. With your eyes open, keyed up to top pitch, agile as a greyhound, tough as leather, hard as Krupp steel, you will be the embodiment of a German warrior.

 

[markppcli]

A great series of small articles by Brendan McBreen on the squad (section) assault hosted on Bruce Gudmundsson's substack. Worth the read - Part 4 is a great summary of computer simulated analysis of an attack.

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6

Part 5's list of most important factors in the assault (enemy morale, finding the enemy's position, and friendly fire control) and least important factors (squad size, speed of assault, and use of smoke) all make sense. Finding and enemy's position and controlling fire on it will lead to quicker suppression (most important) while squad size, speed, and smoke don't matter as the enemy will shoot up any sized element that rushes in without proper fire support, and smoke doesn't provide cover.

I very much agreed with 2.2 as I was reading through. In my time I think I’ve been presented only once with multiple options for the direction and avenue of attack. It should be the norm to give small unit leaders a series of options, less follow the formula and more here’s the problem solve it. Not that formulas and drills are bad of course, they develop rapid and correct reactions, just a time and a place.

Editing to add thoughts as I read through during my morning coffee. The data seems to indicate that all things being equal 100m it’s a solid goal post for a section to being it’s approach. If I were to be designing my ideal section attack range / scenario, I’d put it in the platoon context with a weapons det supporting and the option presented to the section commander of a frontal vs a flank ( C Coy 1 VP did this during our winter indoc last year). This has added benefits to Wpn Det Comds being able to see an assaulting force and adjust fire as the approach happens. We have to trust that MCpl or Sgt to make a good decision in training if we expect them to do it in war.

Shooting more, first, and being more accurate is good data. However the possibility exists that soldiers will simply shoot more. Often, and I speak from my experience, the impression given is that a good attack is one that is fast and loud. If we can instead focus on having accuracy parameters, be that via targe feed back or a OCT assessment, then we can shift that perspective. Targets that can drop when hit, or simply having a balloon that will pop when hit to simulate a suppressed enemy, is a good option. Firing M203s in section attacks must be the norm.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Well trained and blooded soldiers use their personal weapons remarkably infrequently, if you study the historical record.

Ancient footnote time.
Dad was a WW2 vet and our neighbors from the time I can remember were German. Mr Sivers was a German soldier, and one of the things he told my Father was that morale was higher when the US or Brits were "out there" because bullets were flying, but this meant they didn't know where you were.
He said they hated when it was the Canadians because it was quiet, but when someone moved for a piss/smoke, bang!....then it was in your head that they knew and were just waiting.
So you didn't move....

 

[KevinB]

I very much agreed with 2.2 as I was reading through. In my time I think I’ve been presented only once with multiple options for the direction and avenue of attack. It should be the norm to give small unit leaders a series of options, less follow the formula and more here’s the problem solve it. Not that formulas and drills are bad of course, they develop rapid and correct reactions, just a time and a place.

Editing to add thoughts as I read through during my morning coffee. The data seems to indicate that all things being equal 100m it’s a solid goal post for a section to being it’s approach. If I were to be designing my ideal section attack range / scenario, I’d put it in the platoon context with a weapons det supporting and the option presented to the section commander of a frontal vs a flank ( C Coy 1 VP did this during our winter indoc last year). This has added benefits to Wpn Det Comds being able to see an assaulting force and adjust fire as the approach happens. We have to trust that MCpl or Sgt to make a good decision in training if we expect them to do it in war.

Shooting more, first, and being more accurate is good data. However the possibility exists that soldiers will simply shoot more. Often, and I speak from my experience, the impression given is that a good attack is one that is fast and loud. If we can instead focus on having accuracy parameters, be that via targe feed back or a OCT assessment, then we can shift that perspective. Targets that can drop when hit, or simply having a balloon that will pop when hit to simulate a suppressed enemy, is a good option. Firing M203s in section attacks must be the norm.

Reactive targets are a must for any useful training to occur at the smaller element levels.
This is as true for precision clearance for HR work or the platoon in field firing.

Shooting to neutralize the threat needs to be ingrained in all shooters, as well as not simply blowing through ammunition needlessly.

Aim more, shoot less…

There also needs to be better work on locating the enemy, as despite Infantry BattleSchools best efforts for years, an enemy location is highly unlikely to be an extremely visible location.
Without the ability for the small unit to be able to get a bird a eye view via Recce UAS the most likely indication of an enemy position will be taking effective enemy fire and casualties that also need to be dealt with.
Which is another reason that Grenade Launchers shouldn’t be weapon mounted and the ammunition easily detachable from the Grenadier so if they go down, the GL and Ammo can be easily recovered and used by the element, the same goes for MG’s and their ammo.

 

[WLSC]

Which is something we learned in AFG. The 4 mag/ 2 grenade Tac Vest was obsolete before it was manufactured.

In fairness, our first line for the C7 as always been 300 cartridges. We were only issued 5 mags, the rest was supposed to be in bandoliers.

Actually, that's false. We observed in Afghanistan that untried small units would blast a lot of ammo off, making lots of noise. After experience, small units would consume far less ammo in engagements, and that carrying massive amounts of small arms ammunition just added weight to the soldiers load. Save that energy for the crew served weapons ammo.

Yes but I still prefer to cry a bit more than to short for my confort.

 

[WLSC]

Firing M203s in section attacks must be the norm.

I always like the NM-72 for that exact reason. It was an SOP in my section and later platoon to fire the LAW before the attack. Then came the M-203.

 

[markppcli]

Reactive targets are a must for any useful training to occur at the smaller element levels.
This is as true for precision clearance for HR work or the platoon in field firing.

Shooting to neutralize the threat needs to be ingrained in all shooters, as well as not simply blowing through ammunition needlessly.

Aim more, shoot less…

There also needs to be better work on locating the enemy, as despite Infantry BattleSchools best efforts for years, an enemy location is highly unlikely to be an extremely visible location.
Without the ability for the small unit to be able to get a bird a eye view via Recce UAS the most likely indication of an enemy position will be taking effective enemy fire and casualties that also need to be dealt with.
Which is another reason that Grenade Launchers shouldn’t be weapon mounted and the ammunition easily detachable from the Grenadier so if they go down, the GL and Ammo can be easily recovered and used by the element, the same goes for MG’s and their ammo.

Are you suggesting the enemy may not be at the base of a lone tree?

 

[KevinB]

Are you suggesting the enemy may not be at the base of a lone tree?

Heresy I know.

 

[OldSolduer]

Are you suggesting the enemy may not be at the base of a lone tree?

Red Barn you mean….

 

[markppcli]

@Infanteer how would you go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied? Do you think it could ever be to a point where it was scored?

 

[daftandbarmy]

@Infanteer how would you go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied? Do you think it could ever be to a point where it was scored?

If you happen to be on a course at CTC Gagetown, you carefully notice what the DS like to see and you copy that or else you get the 'Red Chit' of doom

 

[SeaKingTacco]

If you happen to be on a course at CTC Gagetown, you carefully notice what the DS like to see and you copy that or else you get the 'Red Chit' of doom

So, lots of noise and frequent use of “knife hand”?

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, lots of noise and frequent use of “knife hand”?

Pretty much, as I recall.

Being treated like condemned men, and in perpetual survival mode, we studied our enemy carefully and noticed their patterns.

It didn't take long for us to figure out that the DS who had the most influence over who passed or failed were the experienced WOs who, of course, usually favoured the 'Old Yeller' leadership style. The dreaded Red Chits would fly fast and furious for those who were unwise enough to show what might be described as more quiet and lower profile leadership styles while operating in the Sect/ Pl Comd roles. Swearing seemed to help alot.

There was a mutual understanding that our peers, when operating in command roles, would have to treat us all like shit to do well, so we all played our parts accordingly like good actors.

God forbid if you tried anything resembling a 'frontal' or, even worse, somehow managed to screw up the Pl 2IC role, which we noticed were the main things that most of them really cared about.

There was some sort of assessment sheet though, which we were not privy to, and it made a brief appearance during the one way debrief of your command role, marked up with various Xes and Ohs etc.

I therefore assume that there were some objective metrics in place that the DS could use when making their case to the Inf School Comd for getting rid of people, which seemed to be their main effort... unless you were fortunate enough to be MilColl or Franco of course

 

[Infanteer]

@Infanteer how would you go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied? Do you think it could ever be to a point where it was scored?

Lets use the data available. The factors most likely to contribute to success of an assault from the simulations were enemy morale and finding and suppressing the enemy (locating position and fire control). We can't really do much about the first one but we can measure the second one to some extent.

There was a good article posted here before on suppression in combat.

https://carlos.excaliba.de/Diverses/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf

If you could utilize some sort of instrumentation to make a decent measure of "enemy is suppressed" you could create some metrics to objectively score an assault.

How long is the target up vice down (more time down is better)
How much ammo does the section/platoon have left after the assault (more is better)

A section or platoon completes an assault with the targets down most of the time, but with as much of its ammo preserved, to me it represents effective fire control and suppression, giving the assault element the best opportunity of getting on the objective. If the assault element lags, then ammo supplies will begin to go down.

Qualifying the assault is tougher. The other two factors on the higher side of successful assaults (covered positions and fire and movement) represent the movement of the assault element. This would be harder to measure - perhaps there is some sort of way a UAS could track the movement of the assault element and correlate its line of advance to intervisibility from the enemy position to give a readout on what amount of time it was vulnerable? When combined with the measurement of the firebase, you could have some objective metrics with which to assess the quality of the components of the attack.

 

[childs56]

@Infanteer how would you go about establishing the qualifiers for successful section attacks in a way that can be objectively applied? Do you think it could ever be to a point where it was scored?

During training would not reaching the objective with out any broken bones, enough ammo to defend the trench and cover your flanks, no one lost a magazine, weapons sight, pair of NVGs, mg barrel, or left their rifle behind be deemed successful?

From my perspective what the videos from Ukraine seem to be showing is a suppressing amount of fire to keep the enemy's head down so they don't toss a grenade at them. So the friendlies can toss their grenades in a safe manner. Seems like a win to me. Accurate fire is fire that keeps the enemy from shooting me.

 

[KevinB]

During training would not reaching the objective with out any broken bones, enough ammo to defend the trench and cover your flanks, no one lost a magazine, weapons sight, pair of NVGs, mg barrel, or left their rifle behind be deemed successful?

From my perspective what the videos from Ukraine seem to be showing is a suppressing amount of fire to keep the enemy's head down so they don't toss a grenade at them. So the friendlies can toss their grenades in a safe manner. Seems like a win to me. Accurate fire is fire that keeps the enemy from shooting me.

Experienced troops don’t suppress easily.
They will continue to return fire, and actively maneuver against ineffective fire. The degree that suppressive fire is effective depends on the enemy morale and experience unless it is actually striking enemy combatants.

Most of the videos coming out of Ukraine are of very limited value. Most are short clips that only show success. For longer ones they predominantly consist of poor tactics and fire control, and the resultant win is due to either enemy incompetence, or focused mass on a limited objective.