Of the 288 "Light" Rifle Coys, all 288 are organized to put full sections on the ground to fight. 216 have no dedicated transport of their own at the Coy level (Marines, Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Mountain) and rely on Battalion HMMWVs to bring in the heavier weapons and logistics. 72 (including 18 that have been/will be found from re-roled Armored Cavalry Regiments) dismount full Army sections of 9 men and are capable of operating as Light Units without retasking their Stryker crews - they are additional items to the TOEs of the Light role infantry.
In other words, of the 288 light coys 216 are dedicated ground pounders but the other 72 are ground pounders with a transport section so that they can either revert to their boot roots or keep up with the heavies.
The heavies of the Army comprise 64 Abrams coys of 14 tanks which are accompanied by 64 Bradley coys of 14 ICVs. Based on Bolger's comments above those Bradley troops are capable of meeting their NTC training objectives with as few as 3 dismounts in the back of each vehicle.......because the vehicle is the weapon and not the section. The role of the heavies is to close and destroy - but more in the sense of disrupt than eradicate. As demonstrated by 3ID in Iraq, the American intervention in Kuwait and Patton's runs across France armour does a great job of busting the line and disrupting the rear - but it doesn't have a great track record in eliminating the threat. (but I'm digressing again....with a purpose though).
The Marines bring another 12 Tank Coys to the fight.
The LAV-25s present a particular point of interest.
They are manned in the same fashion as the Bradleys with the emphasis being on the 3 man crew with a small 3 man dismount team. They are utilized by the Marines in conjunction with armed HMMWVs as recce forces and as part of QRFs because of their speed and firepower. At various times commanders have considered them assault vehicles (perhaps because they had nothing heavier available?) and at other times recce vehicles that do best when kept at a distance from the Close Combat battle.
My own decision to include them with the heavies finally came down to the fact that they were first and foremost Fighting Vehicles and only in a secondary fashion could they be considered Infantry Carriers. The success of a LAV operation, for the Marines, depends less upon the dismounts than the turret crew. In my view that put them broadly into the camp of the heavies.
The Strykers are clearly transport for Infantry Sections. They can be used by the Infantry Section to assist it in patrols in certain environments, perhaps can even be used in assaults in certain environments, but their primary role is to deliver a full section to the Area of Operations where the section, full, complete and entire, can get out and close with the enemy face to face.
Again, in my view, the LAV-25 falls between the two stools of the Infantry Carrier and the Tank Escort. It is too light for the Heavy force (with mobility issues due to the lack of tracks if I understand the original rationale for the CCV). It is too small to be able to dismount a full infantry section - and in any event its value does not rely on having a full section of dismounts.
**1013G 17 DEC 1993 RIFLE COMPANY, INFANTRY BATTALION, INFANTRY....
3. MISSION AND TASKS.
TO LOCATE, CLOSE WITH, AND DESTROY THE
ENEMY BY FIRE AND MANEUVER, OR TO REPEL HIS ASSAULT BY FIRE AND
CLOSE COMBAT.
.....
4. CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL
B. FIREPOWER.
IN ADDITION TO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, THE ORGANIC
FIREPOWER OF THE RFLCO CONSISTS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS,
LIGHT MORTARS, LIGHT ANTITANK WEAPONS, SHOULDER LAUNCHED
MULTIPURPOSE ASSAULT WEAPONS AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS.
C. MOBILITY.
THE RFLCO IS PRIMARILY FOOT MOBILE; BUT THE
COMPANY IS READILY TRANSPORTED BY TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES AS
WELL AS HELICOPTERS, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS AND CRAFT, AND TACTICAL AND
STRATEGIC AIR TRANSPORTATION.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/To1013g.htm
The rest of the Marine TOEs can be found here http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/index.html
Edit: Having said all of that about the Marines LAVs - ultimately they only represent 12 Coys. Regardless of whether they are counted in amongst the heavies, the lights or taken off the board completely and counted amongst the proliferation of RSTA Coys that I intentionally excluded from the discussion, the overall trend of the numbers isn't skewed significantly.