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Saving NATO II

E.R. Campbell said:
But what now? According to the article, For "Kori Schake, a Bush-administration defence official now at the Hoover Institution ...  the answer to deterring Russia is simple: “We must be inflexible on Article 5, but it is no good half-caring about countries that are part-way Western.”"
Dovetailing with the bit in yellow, here's what NATO's SG said after his meeting with the U.S. President for mastication and rumination:
....  I welcome the steps that the United States has taken in response to Russia’s reckless and illegal military actions in Ukraine. Clearly collective defence of our Allies is a core task for NATO and I join you in your call for additional measures to enhance our collective defence including updated and further developed defence plans, enhanced exercises, and appropriate deployments.

Our commitment to the defence of our Allies is unbreakable and at the same time we are firm in our support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will intensify our military cooperation with Ukraine including helping the Ukrainians to modernise their armed forces. As we prepare for our next summit in Wales later this year, we will review the viability of our relationship with Russia, we will enhance cooperation with our partners, we will further strengthen our collective defence and we will reinforce the transatlantic bond. NATO is a force for peace but also unmatched militarily. We do not seek confrontation but we will not waver if challenged.  And our Alliance is more than just a military Alliance, we are a community of values that also brings hope for all people seeking freedom and peace. 

E.R. Campbell said:
We, America, Britain, Canada, France, Germany and so on, must commit, fully, to safeguarding the new, Eastern European and Baltic members ... we may have to reconsider the current post-Afghanistan peace dividend. For Canada, maybe it is time for a six pack of CF-18s to deploy, for a few weeks, maybe even a few months, to Europe.
That said, how confident are you all the NATO horses will line up in the harness and pull in the same direction on this one?
 
milnews.ca said:
... That said, how confident are you all the NATO horses will line up in the harness and pull in the same direction on this one?


My guess is that Supreme Leader Putin has scared the bejeezus out of Cameron, Holland, Merkel, Obama et al and the (few) hard liners, led by Prime Minister Harper, will have some but not too may problems in getting them to pull, sort of together, in roughly the right direction.

But I think Prime Minister Harper has to do a bit more than buss Chancellor Merkel's cheek ...

harper_merkel.jpg.size.medium2.promo.jpg


... that's why I think now is the time to say "We'll send a six pack of CF-18s to help out, just for bit." Finance will hate the idea, but ...


Edit: typo/capitalization  :-[
 
E.R. Campbell said:
... that's why i think now is the time to say "We'll send a six pack of CF-18s to help out, just for bit." Finance will hate the idea, but ...
Just to get the ball rolling, so to speak.  I think Finance will win, so I wait with bated breath.
 
Canada's commitment to Korea started with 3 destroyers from the RCN and the RCAF contributing to an air bridge.  That was followed up by a single battalion of "light" infantry (2 PPCLI) created from whole cloth which formed a composite brigade with the Brits, Aussies and Kiwis.

Concurrently 2 additional "light" battalions were raised and within 6 months a Canadian brigade was formed in a Commonwealth Division.
 
Kirkhill said:
Canada's commitment to Korea started with 3 destroyers from the RCN and the RCAF contributing to an air bridge.  That was followed up by a single battalion of "light" infantry (2 PPCLI) created from whole cloth which formed a composite brigade with the Brits, Aussies and Kiwis.

Concurrently 2 additional "light" battalions were raised and within 6 months a Canadian brigade was formed in a Commonwealth Division.


I doubt the 2014 model Army staff in Ottawa could design, recruit, train and equip a single rifle section, much less, as the Canadian Army did, circa 1950, expand from one infantry brigade to four in the space of just a few years.

/rant
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I doubt the 2014 model Army staff in Ottawa could design, recruit, train and equip a single rifle section, much less, as the Canadian Army did, circa 1950, expand from one infantry brigade to four in the space of just a few years.

/rant

Probably right .... you know the players a lot better than me .... but it can be useful to set a benchmark.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
For Canada, maybe it is time for a six pack of CF-18s to deploy, for a few weeks, maybe even a few months, to Europe.
I think that Vilnius can accomodate that.  So long as we can continue to counter Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms that may decide to come say hello to us on our back yard.


1024px-Tupolev_Tu_95_USAF.jpg



 
Kirkhill said:
Canada's commitment to Korea started with 3 destroyers from the RCN and the RCAF contributing to an air bridge.  That was followed up by a single battalion of "light" infantry (2 PPCLI) created from whole cloth which formed a composite brigade with the Brits, Aussies and Kiwis.

Concurrently 2 additional "light" battalions were raised and within 6 months a Canadian brigade was formed in a Commonwealth Division.
Actually the complete brigade group had been recruited, but the Inchon invasion and subsequent collapse of the North Koreans suggested the war would be over very quickly. The decision was made to continue with the plan to concentrate and train the brigade group in Fort Lewis and the Patricias were selected for a show the flag mission in Korea. The Chinese then intervene and the rest, as they say, is history.

 
E.R. Campbell said:
I doubt the 2014 model Army staff in Ottawa could design, recruit, train and equip a single rifle section, much less, as the Canadian Army did, circa 1950, expand from one infantry brigade to four in the space of just a few years.

/rant

Don't forget to include the recruiting and individual training system when engaging in verbal abuse. The area personnel depots were able to process including medicals, are you nuts tests and the M score testing and enrol recruits in less than a week. In 1957 it took me three days from walking in the door to swearing in as a Gunner (Recruit) and that was not unusual.
 
Old Sweat said:
Don't forget to include the recruiting and individual training system when engaging in verbal abuse. The area personnel depots were able to process including medicals, are you nuts tests and the M score testing and enrol recruits in less than a week. In 1957 it took me three days from walking in the door to swearing in as a Gunner (Recruit) and that was not unusual.


Ditto for me just a couple of years later ... I think I walked in on a Monday and I was enrolled on Friday morning. And there were several of us processed at the same time ... a Personnel Selection Officer (military psychologist) and MO were on staff and at work. At the same time as they were enrolling several of us they were releasing several others. There were no computers and the message system was s l o w ~ authority and responsibility were delegated to local people, who, sometimes, made mistakes and, one hoped, learned from them without there being crises at several HQs up the chain. It, recruiting, was a fairly simple, rule based system that NCOs, with Grade VIII educations, could understand and operate.
 
C. 2002-2003 it took me ~18 months from walking in the door to swearing in. Blatchford recently commented that it takes an average of something like 156 days to recruit a troops. Somehow I would not be surprised if the number of mistakes/problems were just about the same.
 
Technoviking said:
I think that Vilnius can accomodate that.  So long as we can continue to counter Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms that may decide to come say hello to us on our back yard.

Tu-95s, Yes. Tu-22Ms - No. Tu-160s - ?.
 
Notwithstanding my (sometimes) skepticism about NATO's capabilities and leadership, it is appropriate to wish it a very happy 65th anniversary and to congratulate it on succeeding in its mission: to keep the West safe from Soviet (now Russian) aggression.

2942.jpg
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Financial Times is an interesting inforgraphic on NATO defence spending over the past decade (the numbers in brcakets show changes from 2000 to 2012).

BkxnPkwIMAAaFhQ.png:large


The US, UK, Estonia, Norway and Poland have all increased their defence expenditures, but not by anything like the rate 126% increase over 12 years) in Russia.
 
Didn't the RCAF rotate in fighters to NATO's Baltic air policing mission at one point? Or am I confusing that with the Iceland rotation?

Defense News

Baltics To Hike Budgets, Pursue Permanent NATO Troop Presence
Apr. 26, 2014 - 10:11AM  |  By GERARD O’DWYER

HELSINKI — With nervous Baltic governments urging the US and NATO to establish a permanent “force presence” in the region, against the backdrop of Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine, Lithuania has responded to a NATO call for increased defense spending by promising to double its military budget to more than $800 million by 2020.

The beefed-up budget will bolster the Lithuanian armed forces’ procurement capacity to strengthen core areas of defense, including air policing, radar surveillance, armored units and modernized artillery systems.

The regional threat posed by Russia in Ukraine has also caused Lithuania’s fellow NATO-aligned Baltic neighbors Latvia and Estonia to enhance their defense spending ambitions. All three states are linking the size of their spending to a commitment by NATO to establish a stronger and permanent US-led “force presence” on the Baltic Sea.



(...EDITED)
 
Turkey- the weak link for NATO in this current round of posturing?

CBC

Ukraine crisis: Why Turkey is silent as NATO operations ramp up

NATO is hunkering down in central and eastern Europe for its mission to reassure allies this week, just as Ukraine saw a major escalation of the rebellion when forces backing Russia opened fire on police in the east.

The violence prompted the ever-vigilant U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to call the troops to arms, saying these events are a "wake-up call" to NATO allies — because the West believes Russia is fomenting the unrest and the rebels in Ukraine.

But one ally is curiously keeping its distance — Turkey, a NATO member state since 1952 and Russia's neighbour across the Black Sea with the potential to wield much influence with Moscow.

In fact, Turkey recently agreed to increase its energy supply from Russia
, while other countries are talking about scaling back.

To be fair,Turkey has echoed the prevailing Western sentiment, calling for a diplomatic situation to the crisis and for Ukraine's territorial integrity to be respected — but that was before the Crimean referendum, which directly impacted the Tatar minority (ethnically related to the Turks).

The indigenous Tatars, which make up 12 per cent of the population in Crimea, have a history of strained relations with ethnic Russians in the region. They were expelled from Crimea by Joseph Stalin after the Second World War and only allowed to return in the 1960s.

They fiercely opposed the annexation of Crimea, fearing a return of Russian rule. The Tatars boycotted the referendum, which ultimately resulted in the Crimean peninsula being parcelled off to Moscow.

Since then, Turkey has kept tight-lipped, largely due to domestic reasons, according to experts.

"We’ve seen the Turkish government be very quiet on this because Russia's a very important trade partner,”
said Bessma Momani, an associate professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo in Ontario.

Russia is Turkey's main import source —about $26 billion worth in 2012, with natural gas alone accounting for about $12 billion of the total. Russia also supplies nearly 60 per cent of Turkey's energy demand. Last week, Turkey agreed to bring in more Russian gas through its Blue Stream pipeline, which enters via the Black Sea.

Turkey, already fraught with domestic woes, including Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdogan's​ failed Twitter ban to silence a corruption scandal that spawned a rash of violent protests, has enough on its plate, with the presidential election looming in August. Any disruption of energy supplies or cost at the behest of the West could have serious political implications.

(...EDITED)
 
In an essay, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Foreign Affairs website, Jan Joel Andersson of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, argues that NATO should be further enlarged to include Finland and Sweden:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato
foreign-affairs-logo.jpg

Nordic NATO
Why It's Time For Finland and Sweden to Join the Alliance

By Jan Joel Andersson

APRIL 30, 2014

Andersson_NordicNATO.jpg

Putin on the Prowl: the Russian president in a submersible off the coast of Finland, July 15, 2013.
                                                                                  (Aleksey Nikolskyi / Courtesy Reuters)


Russia’s annexation of Crimea has upended fundamental assumptions about European security in the post­–Cold War era. The use of force, violent nationalism, and land grabs are back in style, and a lengthy confrontation between East and West suddenly seems much closer at hand.

Apparently stunned by Russian belligerence, the United States and its European allies have been scrambling to find a way to deter further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, including through warnings and limited economic sanctions. Few believe, however, that these will have any significant effect on Russian behavior. They will neither cause Putin and his government to withdraw from Crimea nor change Russia’s willingness to use military force to “protect fellow Russians abroad,” wherever they may be. In fact, the West’s befuddled response has only played into the Kremlin’s hands; the Kremlin looks powerful while Washington and Brussels appear impotent and divided.

With no good short-term options available for pushing the Russians out of Crimea or even preventing further incursions into Ukraine, the West would do well to consider a more robust long-term option to deter Russia from moving deeper into Europe. NATO should offer membership to Sweden and Finland, and Sweden and Finland should accept. These two countries are the most active members in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Since the initiation of the program in 1994, both Sweden and Finland have participated in its full range of activities, including joint exercises, disaster management training, and cooperation on science and environmental issues. In the operational field, both countries have contributed troops and resources to several NATO-led missions, including in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Libya. Both countries, too, have long been considered prime candidates for NATO membership, but historical and domestic factors -- including long-standing policies of military nonalignment -- have prevented them from taking the plunge, and NATO has not insisted.   

Expanding NATO to Sweden and Finland would achieve several important aims. From a political standpoint, it would bring the NATO border ever closer to Russia, demonstrating that military aggression in Europe carries major geopolitical consequences. Sweden and Finland’s nonalignment has offered Russia a comforting buffer zone along its northwestern border ever since the end of World War II. If Sweden and Finland were to join NATO now, that buffer would be gone, and the alliance would gain two of the world’s most democratic, politically stable, and economically successful countries. NATO would also pick up two very active proponents of transatlanticism that have consistently argued for strong U.S. involvement in Europe.     

From a military standpoint, Sweden and Finland would add technologically sophisticated and well-equipped armed forces to the alliance. Over the past 15 years, the Swedish military has gained international respect for its ability to deploy well-trained and professional soldiers that can easily integrate with U.S., NATO, and European forces. Meanwhile, Finland's recent acquisition of airborne cruise missiles and modern battle tanks makes the Finnish armed forces among the best-equipped in northern Europe. At any rate, although relatively small in numbers, the Swedish and Finnish armed forces are already more NATO-compatible than the forces of many current NATO members. Even more important, Sweden and Finland’s formal inclusion in the alliance would finally allow NATO to treat the entire Arctic-Nordic-Baltic region as one integrated military-strategic area for defense planning and logistical purposes, which would make the alliance much more able to defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania against Russia.

For Russia, the loss of Sweden and Finland to NATO would represent a serious geostrategic blow, one that would outweigh any gains made from the annexation of the Crimea. It would place NATO forces within arm’s length of Russia’s strategic nuclear submarine bases located on the Kola Peninsula. It would also turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, one through which much of Russia’s vital trade and energy exports would have to transit. Indicating Moscow’s level of concern about NATO expanding to the North, Russian Prime Minister and former President Dimitri Medvedev stated in June 2013 that any expansion of NATO to Sweden and Finland would upset the balance of power in Europe and force a Russian response. 

The historical significance of Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO would not be lost on the Russians, either. Sweden and Finland are more than just two small and peaceful neighbors along Russia’s northwestern periphery. Sweden is a historical enemy that fought Russia for control of the Baltic region for centuries before being dealt a decisive defeat by Russian forces in 1809. After that, Sweden formulated its policy of military nonalignment, now 200 years old, which kept it out of both World Wars and on the sidelines of the Cold War. However, in more recent times, Sweden’s very active promotion of independence for the three Baltic Republics in the 1990s and their later inclusion in NATO and the EU has not been forgotten in Russia, although Sweden itself has remained outside NATO. 

Finland, in turn, is the country that got away, even though it is now a close trading partner of Russia. Taken from Sweden and annexed by Russia as an Imperial Grand Duchy in 1809, Finland declared independence in the turmoil of the 1917 Russian Revolution. Facing Soviet aggression in 1939, Finland was the only country in Eastern Europe to fight off the invading Soviet Red Army, reaching a very bloody stalemate with it in the Winter War of 1939–40. Finland subsequently joined Nazi Germany in an ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Ultimately defeated but never occupied by the Soviet Union, Finland acquiesced in 1948 to signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with its neighbor, an arrangement that became known as Finlandization. In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finnish foreign policy and Finland itself were at last truly independent. Finland joined the EU in 1995, but chose not to join NATO to avoid provoking Russia. 

Although Moscow views both countries with a certain wariness born of a history of complicated geopolitical engagement, it is a history that has mostly favored Russia: both Sweden and Finland have long been careful not to openly challenge their bigger neighbor. From a Russian perspective, Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO would rewrite this past and would throw uncertainty into the future geopolitical relationship among the three countries.                   

Given the upsides, bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO seems like a no-brainer. But the two countries have to agree to it. To outside observers, their general unwillingness to join NATO might seem odd. During the Cold War, both pursued a combination of relatively strong territorial defense and foreign policy nonalignment aimed at reducing tensions between the superpowers. In Finland, this policy was rooted in the experience after World War II of successfully balancing living next to the Soviet Union while preserving a democracy and liberal market economy. In Sweden, the policy was more the result of its citizens’ idea that their country's golden post–World War II years of economic prosperity and international moral standing were closely tied to armed neutrality -- the notion that Sweden alone stands between the East and the West as an upholder of world peace. So far, none of the two countries’ big political parties have been willing to challenge these historical legacies. And, not surprisingly, both publics are staunchly opposed to NATO membership.

Yet in Sweden’s case, the official interpretation of the Cold War is not the whole story. Official armed neutrality was complemented by secret bilateral cooperation with the United States and select NATO countries that guaranteed Western support in case of a war with the Soviet Union. That duality worked for a long time, and Sweden’s political elites have been comfortable seeking security through informal bilateral ties to the United States and other European countries, rather than through official membership in NATO. Finland’s proximity to Russia and its strong tradition of self-sufficiency made its options more limited than Sweden’s.

Yet Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia rattled many countries, including Sweden and Finland. Still determined to stay outside NATO, the Swedish government unilaterally issued a solidarity declaration in 2009 stating that Sweden would support its Nordic and EU neighbors in case of disaster or armed attack. Sweden declared that it would expect similar support under similar circumstances. At the time, the declaration was received with skepticism, if not downright ridicule, and then largely ignored. But the Russian invasion of the Crimea has reignited Sweden’s concerns, which have not been helped by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s repeated warnings that although Sweden is NATO’s most active and most capable partner, it cannot count on assistance in the event of an attack -- after all, the alliance’s Article 5 security guarantee extends only to members of NATO. And the fact that Ukraine, similar to Sweden and Finland, is a long-standing member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace but did not receive any meaningful help in countering Russian aggression vividly underscores the upside of joining NATO. This message has not been lost on Finland either. The Finnish prime minister recently declared support for an open debate on NATO, indicating how seriously the Finnish political elite views the situation.

In other words, more than ever, both countries might be willing to join the alliance. Many in the political and military establishments in Sweden and Finland have grown increasingly positive about the idea. The sticking point is the general public, which remains more skittish. For this reason, it is unlikely that membership applications from Sweden and Finland will arrive tomorrow -- or even next week -- at NATO headquarters in Brussels. But, given the importance of all three joining forces, Western leaders should start booking flights to Stockholm and Helsinki to make the case that Sweden and Finland would not only be most welcome in NATO but that the countries have a responsibility to their own citizens -- as well as to the citizens of neighboring countries -- to become part of a long-term solution to counter Russia in Eastern Europe. The leaders of Sweden and Finland should listen carefully and should finally shed the legacies of the past in the pragmatic fashion that is the Nordic way. 


I would support adding both Finland and Sweden to NATO, despite having been quite mildly opposed, to adding Spain in 1982, and to keeping Greece in (after the colonels' coup) and, being much more strongly, opposed to the 1999, 2004 and 2008 expansions.
 
S.M.A. said:
Didn't the RCAF rotate in fighters to NATO's Baltic air policing mission at one point? Or am I confusing that with the Iceland rotation?

Defense News
Don't know about the Baltic Air Policing before this latest round, but they have sent CF-18's to the Iceland gig.

A bit more evidence of "Turkey marching to own drummer within NATO" ....
'Maddening' mission: Keeping NATO's interoperability on track
By Nancy Montgomery, Stars and Stripes
Published: May 2, 2014

Just a year after standing up its new Allied Land Command in Izmir, Turkey, NATO learned last fall that the Turkish government was planning to purchase a new missile defense system — from China.

That was problematic, because the Chinese manufacturer was under U.S. sanctions for supplying missiles to Iran and Syria. Even worse from NATO’s perspective were the cyber-security concerns raised by the new system.

NATO top diplomats warned Turkish officials that the Chinese system was a no-go. So did top U.S. NATO commanders.

“I took every opportunity, I had a duty, to reinforce the message from the SACEUR (NATO supreme allied commander) that there’s no way a Chinese-manufactured system is going to be allowed to integrate with NATO’s integrated air defense system,” Lt. Gen. Frederick “Ben” Hodges, the head of Allied Land Command, said in an interview Thursday with Stars and Stripes.

Although choosing a weapon system is a national decision, NATO has often emphasized that any such items must be able to operate together with similar systems in the inventory of other alliance members, and that Turkey would have to comply with that requirement.

Turkey, under intense pressure from Western allies, now appears to be backing away from buying the Chinese anti-aircraft missiles, which analysts say are cheaper than comparable Western systems.

But the matter illustrates the difficulties inherent in maintaining a security alliance of 28 countries with diverging national interests and political concerns, Hodges said ....
 
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