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Saving NATO II

E.R. Campbell said:
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail is an article – the “lead” for its weekly Focus section – about NATO at 60:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090327.wfocuscover28/BNStory/International/home

I will quibble with one point Saunders makes when he switches from fair comment to the institutionalized anti-Harper bias that is so deeply ingrained in most of the mainstream Canadian media that the majority of journalists cannot bring themselves to believe that Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada actually won a free and fair election and really, really are the legitimate governing party. Saunders says: ” … the United States, backed aggressively by Stephen Harper's government, was pushing to expand NATO far eastward, by inviting the former Soviet colonies of Georgia and Ukraine to be members — a move that antagonized Russia and deeply divided Europe.” The American led Drang nach Osten began while George HW Bush and its was supported, with about the same level of “aggression,” by Liberal and Conservative governments alike, led by Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper.

The central point, however, that NATO is a worthless hulk, is worth considering.

Caveat lector: I opposed the expansion of NATO - beginning with the decision to admit the Baltic states and the former Warsaw Pact members. My rationale was that, with the demise of the USSR, per se, NATO needed to be contracted rather than expanded and the best role for the former Russian satellites was to serve as a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia.

NATO is a tightly structured, formal alliance. It was a good, even great idea sixty years ago. Canada played useful, even important roles in its creation and implementation – until 1969 when, 20 years too early, we decided there was no Soviet threat. NATO provided the essential security umbrella beneath which Western Europe sheltered, in relative safety, able to devote its resources to reconstruction rather than defence. NATO, by its very existence, obliged the USSR (Russia in particular) to make difficult and, ultimately, wrong choices. A combination of pride and second rate strategic thinking led the USSR into an arms race a resurgent West. We (the American led West) won - decisively.

Fifteen years ago, in 1994, NATO did find a useful role – as Europe’s military agent in the Balkans. But NATO was ill suited for the task because it was, as it still is, an Atlantic alliance and so Europe failed because the Balkans was/is a European problem which Europe ought to be able to solve by itself, without American and Canadian help and because it is now perceived, by the world, including Europe, that Europe is unable to clean up messes in its own back yard. Do you think the US will welcome or even allow Spain, a NATO members, to engage in Mexico? Not bloody likely.

The French were right – even France has to right once a century, or so, and they were desperately wrong, time after time after time, throughout the first 90 years of the 20th century – Europe need its own military alliance, not NATO, to do Europe’s bidding in Europe and the adjacent regions.

So, in 1994 we made the wrong decision. We preserved and then expanded NATO rather than having a huge victory bash on its 45th anniversary and then folding our tents and disbanding the alliance.

Saunders is right, I think: Afghanistan will destroy NATO. It has exposed too many deep divisions – cracks that will not be papered over. “Why the hell,” Canadians might ask, “do we need so-called ‘allies’ who are too gutless to send their well equipped soldiers to help us when our men and women are fighting and dying?” (No knock on the individual Germany or Italian soldier, I’m guessing they aren’t “gutless” but Merkel and Berlusconi are certainly not the ‘allies’ we need in a fight, are they?)

But the whole world now knows that the UN cannot run Chapter 7 peacekeeping operations on its own. No one (at least no one who matters) trusts it to do so and the UN, itself, has admitted that it cannot manage its own operations as well as it must. This, to be the UN’s trusted “hard power” sub-contractor, is the role upon which NATO seized to perpetuate its existence. It’s a valid role – for some body.

I will not go an, yet again, about why we need a loose, informal alliance coalition of like-minded and militarily interoperable nations that can organize and manage complex, “hard power” operations for the UN – but we do need just that. The problem with NATO is that the members are anything but “like-minded.”

HMCS Winnipeg is off to a NATO mission in the Indian Ocean. That’s commendable – for NATO and Canada, because there’s lots of good naval “work” to be done in Indian Ocean region – but SNMG1 should have ships from e.g. Australia, China, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, too. In other words it should be a coalition force rather than just a North Atlantic Treaty force operating “out of area.”

It is time to rethink NATO; maybe it’s time to bury it. We would not have to wait long for a replacement to appear. Perhaps it can morph into a European Security Alliance able to make contributions to “hard power” operations led by a coalition.


Whereas, five years ago, when it turned 60, I thought NATO had just about outlived its usefullness, I am now wondering if Putin/Russia has breathed new life into the alliance, giving it an new opportunity to fill its only useful role: defending the West, Europe, from the East, Russia.

I remain convinced that NATO is the wrong tool of the UNSC to use to conduct "out of area" military operations.* There needs to be something better ~ global, smaller, more nimble and so on ~ a coalition of powers that I have, elsewhere described as being globalist (America, Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, etc ... and I should never list countries because someone will say "Why did you leave ____ and ____ off the list?" The answer is: "idleness") and who are prepared to establish and staff a small planning HQ and to build upon already established interoperability matters.

But: Ukraine is on NATO's frontier. Russia is flexing its military muscle in NATO's back yard. Crimea is NOT "out of area." NATO is here for a reason, one reason, and Russia/Putin has just reminded us of what it is.

It is time for NATO to shake off its political lethargy and to do a wee, tiny bit of sabre rattling of its own. NATO is massively more powerful than Russia ... or it would be if it chose to be. My sense is that Putin/Russia judges Cameron, Harper, Hollande, Merkel, Obama, Rutte and Thorning-Schmidt to be timid and tired of war. If Putin is right then NATO is done; if NATO wants a useful role then it must bestir itself .. and that will require two things in its leaders: some "bottom" or gravitas, if you like, and several spines.

_____
* And Russia/Putin will never allow the UNSC to declare that anything involving Russia is a proper matter for UN action, so ...
 
While the aforementioned heads of government may be concerned about the war-weariness of their populations I believe the greater issue is how do these people and their populations perceive the situation:

Thorning-Schmidt, Rasmussen, Solberg, Ansip, Straujuma, Butkevicius, Tusk, Radicova, Sobotka, Orban, Ponta, Oresharski, Bratusek, Milanovic, Erdogan and Samaras. 

As well as these non-NATO names:

Reinfeldt, Katainen, Leanca, Tymoshenko, Klitschko.

The further east you go the fewer material goods there are to lose and the rawer the memories.  Freedom is not just another word over there.

Moldova presents an interesting case study - The Moldovans want to remove a  WW2 monument to their "Liberators" from Russia.  The grand-kids of the liberators, that never left, insists the monument stays.  Those folks have a majority position in Transdniestr and also insist they wish to become Russians again.

NATO could split along roughly the same lines as the EU with Germany, as ever, being the wild card.

Edit: Forgot a non-NATO name - Garibashvili

Re-Edit:

Another point I wanted to make is that while I agree that it was unwise from an RealPolitik point of view to expand NATO and the EU I do not see what the alternative was.  The reason the Russians built the Iron Curtain was not to keep the west out. It was to keep the east in.  The wall was not pushed down by westerners. It was pushed down by easterners.

The problem that both Washington and Moscow face is the loss of control of people and events.  They can't solve problems with one phone call.  They must now react to events like everybody else.
 
Would the EU come to the defense of a member if they were threatened by the Russians ? Will NATO defend Estonia ? If Russia wants to reconstitute the USSR I don't see NATO stopping Putin.This is what started WW2,Sudentland,Austria ect.
 
tomahawk6 said:
Would the EU come to the defense of a member if they were threatened by the Russians ? Will NATO defend Estonia ? If Russia wants to reconstitute the USSR I don't see NATO stopping Putin.This is what started WW2,Sudentland,Austria ect.

I have my doubts about the EU or NATO doing much of anything.  I think that you may see some of the Eastern countries coming to each others aid, to the extent they can. 

Bigger problem for Putin though, would be now having all those demonstrators, "neo-nazis" and Tatars with Chechen tendencies inside his borders.

He may see himself as heir to Lenin and Stalin but would Russia be Putin up with that again?
 
He sees himself not as premier of a resurgent USSR, but rather as a new Czar.  IMHO
 
Technoviking said:
He sees himself not as premier of a resurgent USSR, but rather as a new Czar.  IMHO


There was a joke making the rounds, in London, in the 1980s, that the British Admiralty had secretly arranged a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) to Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina because he saved the Royal Navy by starting the Falklands War. Mrs Thatcher had her beady little accountant's eyes focused on the carriers ... until Galtieri's blunder.

Maybe we need to reserve a similar gong for Putin ... for saving NATO.
 
Technoviking said:
He sees himself not as premier of a resurgent USSR, but rather as a new Czar.  IMHO

The problem with Putin is he spends to much time looking into the past and trying to resurrect the former glories of the Russian/Soviet empires. This is, after all, the man who thinks that the worst disaster to befall Russia in the 20th century was the fall of the Soviet Union, which I'm sure some  survivors of "The Great Patriotic War" might think differently.

What Putin should have been doing is looking to the future and trying to improve relations with the West.

 
Im not too sure I understand all thats being said here with the exception of;

1. Putin is now the big bad wolf?
2. NATO is an old outdated arrangement that needs a serious update?
3. We need another war to stimulate economies?

To be honest, UN is the more outdated one, look at the fact that someone charged with WAR crimes picks their court dates, and sometimes doesnt even have to show up. The UN is the schoolyard bully stuck in the sandbox and can only hurt people that step into the box.

I will and do agree that the rest of NATO needs to step up their contribution game. The major players have been fighting hard for over a decade now.

Canada will need that NATO agreement should things go south with Russia, we are bang in the middle, of the shortest path. WE have already raped and pillaged the budget taking away readiness levels, affecting our ability to respond to immediate threatsm, and it is goint to get worse.

Alot of talk about the EU, someone want to elaborate? and dumb it down? 

 
upandatom said:
Im not too sure I understand all thats being said here with the exception of;

3. We need another war to stimulate economies?
Where does that understanding come from?
 
Read somewhere yesterday that the US has quietly been withdrawing troops and is now under 70,000 in Europe.
 
Im not too sure I understand all thats being said here with the exception of;

3. We need another war to stimulate economies?
Where does that understanding come from?

Wars increase government spending, which will increase real GDP.  The increase in GDP increases disposable income, which will further increase GDP growth.  Works pretty well for the victors, especially when the war is fought on foreign soil, but only if you're using domestic equipment.  The downsides: you're running a deficit, and you're at war!

Not exactly a great foreign or economic policy, if you ask me...

Edit: Spelling
 
Just came across this....

It seems to nicely describe the West in general, and NATO in particular these days:

THE SLEEPY SENTINEL

Faithless the watch that I kept: now I have none to keep.
I was slain because I slept: now I am slain I sleep.
Let no man reproach me again; whatever watch is unkept—
I sleep because I am slain. They slew me because I slept.

http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_epitaphs.htm
 
Griffon said:
Wars increase government spending.....
Thank you for acting as interpreter for upandatom and reaffirming my understanding of Economics 101; it's been a while.  However, the poster said that needing another war to stimulate economies was "being said here" -- I apparently missed that sidebar discussion, and was wondering where his "understanding" came from.
 
However, the poster said that needing another war to stimulate economies was "being said here" -- I apparently missed that sidebar discussion, and was wondering where his "understanding" came from.

I see your point...now.  ;D
 
Griffon said:
I see your point...now.  ;D

If I may interject here, I took basic economics 30+ years ago. While a war may stimulate the economy for a period of time, once that war is ended.....what happens?
What do we want...guns? or butter?
 
The Economist shares its views on whiter NATO? in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that journal:

The_Economist_logo.png

The future of NATO
First principles

Russia’s annexation of Crimea has given NATO renewed purpose

Mar 26th 2014, 17:42 by The Economist

LAST November, in their biggest live-fire exercise since 2006, NATO forces repelled an imaginary attack on Estonia by a fictitious country called Bothnia. Steadfast Jazz 2013 was partly a response to huge and deliberately intimidating Russian exercises since 2009 that had caused jitters in Poland and the Baltic states. (One ended with a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw.) It was also intended to mark a return to the 65-year-old alliance’s original priority of collective territorial defence as its combat mission in Afghanistan winds down. At the time, despite surging Russian defence spending and belligerent pronouncements from the Kremlin—including threats to attack a modest European missile-defence system under construction—NATO was searching for relevance because most Europeans had never felt safer.

Four months on, thanks to Vladimir Putin, NATO no longer has to justify its existence. The new revanchist Russia is not the existential threat that the Soviet Union was during the cold war. But as Mr Putin made chillingly clear on March 18th in his announcement of the annexation of Crimea, it is willing to use military force in support of coercive diplomacy when it feels its interests are jeopardised. The events in Crimea are tragic for Ukraine, and it is deeply disturbing for central and eastern European countries with significant numbers of Russian-speakers that Mr Putin claims the right to intervene on their behalf whenever he chooses. But the crisis has breathed life into the Atlantic partnership.

On March 26th, after an emergency meeting of the G7 to agree on new sanctions against Russia, Barack Obama arrived in Brussels, where NATO has its headquarters, bent on rededicating the Article 5 vow by alliance members to regard an attack on one as an attack on all. Nobody is yet talking about a return to the cold-war days when NATO was Europe’s bulwark against a foe with the armed might to back up an expansionist ideology. But Mr Putin has stripped NATO’s cosily secure members in western Europe of their illusions and the alliance’s next summit, in Cardiff this September, will be charged with new purpose and urgency.

NATO’s attempts since the 1990s to enlist Russia as a security partner through bodies such as the NATO-Russia Council now lie in tatters. “We see Russia speaking and behaving more as an adversary than as a partner,” says Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the alliance’s outgoing secretary-general. “Transdniestria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and now Crimea. What connects those crises is one big country unilaterally deciding to rewrite international rules.” The hope, especially strong in Germany, that the zero-sum geopolitics of hard power no longer had any place in Europe has been dashed. Mr Obama’s attempt to “reset” America’s relations with Russia after the 2008 war in Georgia is also over. So too, surely, is the belief he expressed in early 2012 that there was a “strategic opportunity to rebalance [ie slash] the US military investment in Europe”. Out of the 6,000 forces committed to the Steadfast Jazz exercise, only 300 were American.

Almost nobody connected with NATO believes that the crisis created by Russia’s appropriation of Crimea will quickly fade. “We have learned to read Putin’s speeches,” says François Heisbourg, the chairman of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “He says what he does and he does what he says. His proposed Eurasian Union of post-Soviet states is a new empire. East Ukraine cannot be allowed to be part of the West because there is no Eurasian space without it. We have entered a long-lasting, deeply antagonistic relationship with Russia.”

The challenge for NATO is now to get all 28 members to agree on the nature of the threat posed by Russia to Europe’s security, and to decide how to respond. It must first live up to its commitment under Article 4 to reassure members who feel immediately threatened. Already, America has sent 12 F-16 fighters to Poland and ten F-15s to the Baltic states for air-patrols. They will be joined by four British Typhoons in April. NATO has also dispatched Boeing E-3As to monitor Eastern European airspace.

Further ahead, it seems almost certain that NATO will resile from the declaration in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that it has “no intention, no plan and no reason” to place significant military assets in countries that joined the alliance after the Soviet Union collapsed. As Kori Schake, a Bush-administration defence official now at the Hoover Institution, a think-tank, says: “The ‘three no’s’ were a contingent restraint. Those considerations no longer apply.” But few would advocate moving NATO’s much-diminished arsenal of short-range nukes nearer to Russia. They were originally intended to compensate for its weaker conventional forces if the Warsaw Pact launched a blitzkrieg attack on Europe, and are now seen as a dangerous anachronism. These days it is a relatively weaker Russia that regards battlefield nuclear weapons as a necessary force multiplier.

On March 23rd NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US Air Force General Philip Breedlove, said the alliance would have to rethink how to respond to aggressive Russian troop movements carried out under cover of legitimate military exercises. NATO could reposition military forces and carry out exercises that would reassure allies, he suggested. A bigger question is whether America will emphasise its strategic commitment to the newly insecure Europe by permanently basing some of its ground forces in a front-line state, perhaps Poland.

Reboots on the ground

NATO will struggle to calibrate deterrence in conditions very different from those of the cold war, and to decide how much military aid to offer countries, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, that Russia is determined to prevent becoming alliance members. It could help Ukraine modernise its forces by providing training and selling it weapons on easy terms, says the previous SACEUR, now-retired Admiral James Stavridis, and share intelligence and offer logistical support. “Would that be inflammatory?” he asks. “Compared to what?”

As for deterrence, it is clear what Mr Putin wants. He is out to restore Russia’s great-power status by forging a Eurasian union based on conservative values and dependent on Russia for its economy and security, by coercion if necessary. He is pumping up Russia’s military budget by 40% over the three years from 2013, according to SIPRI, a research institute. The aim is not offensive operations against NATO, but to be able to make swift, focused interventions in Russia’s “near-abroad”, backed up by the threat of nuclear escalation.

After years of squeezed defence budgets and counter-insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the West’s technological superiority is no longer as overwhelming as it once was. But its capabilities still far outstrip Russia’s. For Ms Schake, the answer to deterring Russia is simple: “We must be inflexible on Article 5, but it is no good half-caring about countries that are part-way Western.”

Mr Putin wrongly believes that NATO has never ceased to be an American-dominated alliance aimed at keeping Russia down. In fact, it has proved highly adaptable and has tried hard to enlist Russia as a partner. NATO may not yet know how to handle the threat posed by Mr Putin’s Russia. But it has overcome greater challenges before.


As the article says, "Russia ... made chillingly clear on March 18th [that] it is willing to use military force in support of coercive diplomacy when it feels its interests are jeopardised," and "NATO’s attempts since the 1990s to enlist Russia as a security partner through bodies such as the NATO-Russia Council now lie in tatters."

But what now? According to the article, For "Kori Schake, a Bush-administration defence official now at the Hoover Institution ...  the answer to deterring Russia is simple: “We must be inflexible on Article 5, but it is no good half-caring about countries that are part-way Western.”"

What does that mean?

We, America, Britain, Canada, France, Germany and so on, must commit, fully, to safeguarding the new, Eastern European and Baltic members ... we may have to reconsider the current post-Afghanistan peace dividend. For Canada, maybe it is time for a six pack of CF-18s to deploy, for a few weeks, maybe even a few months, to Europe.
 
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