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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
Speaking Purely Logistics:
Not all log. There are a few edge cases, ammo and postal (perhaps), where total numbers and numbers employed would make no sense to split elements. Ammo has one or two working for the air force, one or two strictly for the Navy. If you count coastal depots, there's maybe 30.

Solutions?
 
I’m not sure the CAF is large enough to effectively run Element separated courses for certain things.

I’m a firm believer in One Station Training (Recruit/Basic, Initial Trade Training), but it requires a throughput volume that the CAF tends not to have.

I’m also not sure that some of the fundamental skills are there for some of the Elements to produce quality instructors in certain areas. I say that from seeing some of the drill and weapons skills that many trades NCO’s simply lack.


However I think that vaporizing St Jean would be an excellent start.

I would instead opt for 3 regional schools.
West Coast, Central and East Coast.

To run a ~40 Candidate Platoon through Recruit/Basic for 10 weeks (picked to make a relatively easy number) You need a Course Officer Lt/Capt and a Course WO, 3 Section Commanders and 3 2I/C’s an Adm NCO/Swing Instructor and a Driver/Storesman.
1 Lt/Capt
1 WO
4 Sgt
3 MCpl
1 Cpl
Ideally that Cadre will be teaching together for 1 year in a consistent manner (let’s say 4 courses a year.
So 160 Candidates for their efforts.
Ideally there isn’t just one course running and every two weeks there is another running.

So 5 Platoons
5 Lt/Capt
5 WO
20 Sgt
15 MCpl
5 Cpl

A Major, CSM (as CI as well as SgtMaj) and the other aspects for a Training Company require.

I say two weeks simply to be able to pickup those recourses that fall out of training at various stages, as well to separate the courses from each other to allow for some facilities needed at certain points to not alll be in demand at once.

That is only 800 Recruit Candidates annually / Training Center so 2,400 for all three. Not really a large number at all.

So you most likely need a Training BN at min each facility

1 LtCol
4 Maj
15 Lt/Capt
15 WO
100 Sgt
75 MCpl
15 Cpl
Per Facility

So
3 LtCol
12 Maj
12 MWO
45 Lt/Capt
45 WO
300 Sgt
225 MCpl
45 Cpl
And that’s not counting the Coy and BN admin staff as well.

That only gets you to 7,200 Recruits a year, for the Reg Force.

I suspect you need triple that to train the needed Reg Force and allow for summer leave and Holiday gaps and to consider PRes intake and training.

So we are now at:
9 LtCol
36 Maj
36 MWO
135 Lt/Capt
135 WO
900 Sgt
600 MCpl
135 Cpl

Just as cadre to run Recruit courses for the CAF, not including the other admin requirements in terms of facilities and PY.

This doesn’t even start to dig into the needs to training those recruits to DP1, nor does it deal with leadership course etc.

In short you need at minimum a Brigades worth of Officers and NCO’s solely for training Recruits.

When you look to Leadership courses and the DP1 requirements across the CAF (just simplifying here) you probably need another Bde worth of Officers and NCO’s.
 
Certainly: was thinking "lower end" as in "junior/underpaid enough that CoL is a problem," whether that's MS and SLt and below or CPO1 and LCdr, or wherever else that line might be drawn.
It's not just about CoL, it's about "Why should I stay in an organization that expects more of me, but pays me about the same as the people I am responsible for?". Just thinking in terms of CoL is what got us here right now.

Another consideration is that CFHD scales down to zero. As a CPO 2 in Ottawa I don't get it. A CPO 2/MWO living in Gagetown has a lower cost of living, particularly if they have been posted there as while. How do you get them to move to a high cost of living area when there is no longer any compensation for it? Why give up a lower mortgage/high QoL in Gagetown(Pet, Shilo, etc.) just to do a boring/soul crushing staff job in Ottawa?
 
It's not just about CoL, it's about "Why should I stay in an organization that expects more of me, but pays me about the same as the people I am responsible for?". Just thinking in terms of CoL is what got us here right now.

Another consideration is that CFHD scales down to zero. As a CPO 2 in Ottawa I don't get it. A CPO 2/MWO living in Gagetown has a lower cost of living, particularly if they have been posted there as while. How do you get them to move to a high cost of living area when there is no longer any compensation for it? Why give up a lower mortgage/high QoL in Gagetown(Pet, Shilo, etc.) just to do a boring/soul crushing staff job in Ottawa?

For the record, I spent much of my employed life as a junior manager or sales engineer. A lot of my time was spent training and supervising employees who earned two and three times a much as I did once various bonuses had been figured in.
 
For the record, I spent much of my employed life as a junior manager or sales engineer. A lot of my time was spent training and supervising employees who earned two and three times a much as I did once various bonuses had been figured in.
But I’d suggest that isn’t a good analogy for the CAF. There needs to be QoL offsets for certain postings simply to create a fair and equitable environment for the CAF.
 
Yes I would sacrifice some Army PY for a better equipped Navy, but only if the PRes was made viable like the ARNG down here.
I was about to agree with you and then I stopped to do some ballpark math.

The army has appx 22,500 RegF members. With establishments at roughly 4,500 per CMBG and let's conservatively say 3,000 in 6 CCSB, that puts appx 16 - 17,000 RegF in operational units for appx 70-75% of the army in operational units.

The Navy has or plans for 15 Rivers (@210), 6 AOPS (@45), 12 MCDV (@45), 2 JSS (@200) and 4xsubs (50) or 4,680 billets out of a total of 8,400 PYs. That's a ratio of 56% of the navy in operational units assuming every ship has a complement and all PYs filled.

I'm not sure to what extent the navy's need for on-shore support PYs differs from the army's base support structure. Nor am I sure of the amount of civilian support added in to each organization. Notwithstanding this, before I'd commit any of the army PYs to the navy, I'd want a better in-depth explanation of the disparity.

As to the concept of reducing the army's PYs if there was a ARNG-like capability in the ARes, I can say that I've run a few models. You've seen my basic two div hybrid model. I've tried running the same using a RegF strength reduced by one CMBG (roughly -4,500 PYs). It's tough to do without abandoning the two div model and/or some of the key operational roles. This is principally because I'm adhering to the 30/70 concept which I think will be necessary for at least a decade or two to maintain even modest readiness capabilities and to build the competence of the ARes to the point where it can operate even 10/90 brigades, much less 0/100 ones.

I’m a firm believer in One Station Training (Recruit/Basic, Initial Trade Training),
Me too.

but it requires a throughput volume that the CAF tends not to have.
It works if you combine the RegF and ARes DP1 training and move much of it to where the big cities where the bulk of the ARes resides. Concurrently you need to firmly apply a training cycle to the RegF which includes Sep to Apr as collective RegF trg and May to Aug as combined individual RegF and ARes trg with reduced, but not zero, manning during July and Aug for leave and APS.

I think that your manning chart is a) very generous; and b) not necessary on a full-time, year-round basis. You are 100% correct that a very large training burden needs to be met not just to fix the shortfall, but also on a steady-state basis. You're right that the CAF cannot dedicate the numbers that you put forward as a permanent establishment. Other solutions are needed, and the better "time-sharing" within units is required. That's why, for example, I allocate appx 10 RegF pers to each ARes coy in a 30/70 bn. Yes, they lead and administer the ARes coy during their monthly trg weekends, but they are also a pool of 20-30 pers who are the individual training teams for DP1 and 2 courses being run by the unit on a year round basis on behalf of the whole CAF. In my models there are a total of appx 160 10/90 companies of various trades. That equals 1,600 RegF personnel across the country with shared duties of administering their 10/90 companies and providing individual training year round to both RegF and ARes personnel. (many of these can already be found within our administrative div, CBG and RSS structures. If those are augmented by other RegF and ARes part-timers during the summer training surges, and the overarching school structures one should be able to meet both a steady state demand as well as a fluctuating surges.

🍻
 
I was about to agree with you and then I stopped to do some ballpark math.

The army has appx 22,500 RegF members. With establishments at roughly 4,500 per CMBG and let's conservatively say 3,000 in 6 CCSB, that puts appx 16 - 17,000 RegF in operational units for appx 70-75% of the army in operational units.

The Navy has or plans for 15 Rivers (@210), 6 AOPS (@45), 12 MCDV (@45), 2 JSS (@200) and 4xsubs (50) or 4,680 billets out of a total of 8,400 PYs. That's a ratio of 56% of the navy in operational units assuming every ship has a complement and all PYs filled.
I was thinking more of a larger Navy with something like 18 River class, 3 Wasp class ships, 24 Multi Mission Corvettes and 4-5 JSS.


I'm not sure to what extent the navy's need for on-shore support PYs differs from the army's base support structure. Nor am I sure of the amount of civilian support added in to each organization. Notwithstanding this, before I'd commit any of the army PYs to the navy, I'd want a better in-depth explanation of the disparity.

As to the concept of reducing the army's PYs if there was a ARNG-like capability in the ARes, I can say that I've run a few models. You've seen my basic two div hybrid model. I've tried running the same using a RegF strength reduced by one CMBG (roughly -4,500 PYs). It's tough to do without abandoning the two div model and/or some of the key operational roles. This is principally because I'm adhering to the 30/70 concept which I think will be necessary for at least a decade or two to maintain even modest readiness capabilities and to build the competence of the ARes to the point where it can operate even 10/90 brigades, much less 0/100 ones.
Agreed, but I think the Cdn idea of 4 maneuver units in a Bde is overly lofty - and would opt for 3, 3 Inf in the Light Bde’s and 2 Inf and an Armor in the Heavy Bde’s.
It works if you combine the RegF and ARes DP1 training and move much of it to where the big cities where the bulk of the ARes resides. Concurrently you need to firmly apply a training cycle to the RegF which includes Sep to Apr as collective RegF trg and May to Aug as combined individual RegF and ARes trg with reduced, but not zero, manning during July and Aug for leave and APS.
I heavily dislike teaching being centered in areas without ranges.
I’m unsure if BMQ still do section attacks - but I hope they do, as well as C7/8, C9, C6 and Grenade training as well as Gas Hut and some other basic NBCW.

I think that your manning chart is a) very generous; and b) not necessary on a full-time, year-round basis. You are 100% correct that a very large training burden needs to be met not just to fix the shortfall, but also on a steady-state basis. You're right that the CAF cannot dedicate the numbers that you put forward as a permanent establishment. Other solutions are needed, and the better "time-sharing" within units is required. That's why, for example, I allocate appx 10 RegF pers to each ARes coy in a 30/70 bn. Yes, they lead and administer the ARes coy during their monthly trg weekends, but they are also a pool of 20-30 pers who are the individual training teams for DP1 and 2 courses being run by the unit on a year round basis on behalf of the whole CAF. In my models there are a total of appx 160 10/90 companies of various trades. That equals 1,600 RegF personnel across the country with shared duties of administering their 10/90 companies and providing individual training year round to both RegF and ARes personnel. (many of these can already be found within our administrative div, CBG and RSS structures. If those are augmented by other RegF and ARes part-timers during the summer training surges, and the overarching school structures one should be able to meet both a steady state demand as well as a fluctuating surges.

🍻
I’m willing to unload some DP1 training on operational units - but I think the Training System actually to work needs dedicated personnel for the Recuit/BMQ and Leadership courses. Or else you are constantly robbing Peter to pay Paul.

For OSUT to work you’d need to have BN level training centers at pretty much every CAF base around the country and a throughput vastly larger than what the CAF currently takes in, IVO of 30-40k a year of recruits, and there aren’t the bodies for that anyway both for Instructional Cadre or Recruits.

The Navy probably could get away with 2 locations, East and West Coast
The AirForce won’t work due to the way it’s designed, but using Winnipeg might be the best solution. The Army could probably work with 5-6 (Edmonton, Shilo, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown) but then that doesn’t really help the PRes.

I’m going to do some fun with numbers aspect for a Napkin CAF to see what I can try to accomplish later.
 
For the record, I spent much of my employed life as a junior manager or sales engineer. A lot of my time was spent training and supervising employees who earned two and three times a much as I did once various bonuses had been figured in.
Sounds like you were in the wrong line of work then... 😉

The people who do the job, but also supervise others doing it, should be compensated in relation to their skills and their responsibilities. If a Cpl makes about as much as a Sgt on pay day, why would they bother taking on the responsibilities of a Sgt?

Before anyone chimes in with "but the pension", most people 7 years into the job aren't thinking about what happens 18 years down the road with their pension.
 
I’m not sure the CAF is large enough to effectively run Element separated courses for certain things.

I’m a firm believer in One Station Training (Recruit/Basic, Initial Trade Training), but it requires a throughput volume that the CAF tends not to have.

I’m also not sure that some of the fundamental skills are there for some of the Elements to produce quality instructors in certain areas. I say that from seeing some of the drill and weapons skills that many trades NCO’s simply lack.


However I think that vaporizing St Jean would be an excellent start.

I would instead opt for 3 regional schools.
West Coast, Central and East Coast.

To run a ~40 Candidate Platoon through Recruit/Basic for 10 weeks (picked to make a relatively easy number) You need a Course Officer Lt/Capt and a Course WO, 3 Section Commanders and 3 2I/C’s an Adm NCO/Swing Instructor and a Driver/Storesman.
1 Lt/Capt
1 WO
4 Sgt
3 MCpl
1 Cpl
Ideally that Cadre will be teaching together for 1 year in a consistent manner (let’s say 4 courses a year.
So 160 Candidates for their efforts.
Ideally there isn’t just one course running and every two weeks there is another running.

So 5 Platoons
5 Lt/Capt
5 WO
20 Sgt
15 MCpl
5 Cpl

A Major, CSM (as CI as well as SgtMaj) and the other aspects for a Training Company require.

I say two weeks simply to be able to pickup those recourses that fall out of training at various stages, as well to separate the courses from each other to allow for some facilities needed at certain points to not alll be in demand at once.

That is only 800 Recruit Candidates annually / Training Center so 2,400 for all three. Not really a large number at all.

So you most likely need a Training BN at min each facility

1 LtCol
4 Maj
15 Lt/Capt
15 WO
100 Sgt
75 MCpl
15 Cpl
Per Facility

So
3 LtCol
12 Maj
12 MWO
45 Lt/Capt
45 WO
300 Sgt
225 MCpl
45 Cpl
And that’s not counting the Coy and BN admin staff as well.

That only gets you to 7,200 Recruits a year, for the Reg Force.

I suspect you need triple that to train the needed Reg Force and allow for summer leave and Holiday gaps and to consider PRes intake and training.

So we are now at:
9 LtCol
36 Maj
36 MWO
135 Lt/Capt
135 WO
900 Sgt
600 MCpl
135 Cpl

Just as cadre to run Recruit courses for the CAF, not including the other admin requirements in terms of facilities and PY.

This doesn’t even start to dig into the needs to training those recruits to DP1, nor does it deal with leadership course etc.

In short you need at minimum a Brigades worth of Officers and NCO’s solely for training Recruits.

When you look to Leadership courses and the DP1 requirements across the CAF (just simplifying here) you probably need another Bde worth of Officers and NCO’s.
Those training companies sound remarkably like the. Regimental Depots we had in the CA when we had a 45,000+ strong regular army.

I think three might be too few, but, let's say five for a 75,000 regular force, all 'managed' by a colonel in Ottawa. One in, say, Wainwright, another in, say, Borden, one, in Petawawa, one in Valcartier, and one in Gagetown. Each of those bases should be able to accommodate a small training centre without too much of an additional adm-and-log burden.
 
Those training companies sound remarkably like the. Regimental Depots we had in the CA when we had a 45,000+ strong regular army.

I think three might be too few, but, let's say five for a 75,000 regular force, all 'managed' by a colonel in Ottawa. One in, say, Wainwright, another in, say, Borden, one, in Petawawa, one in Valcartier, and one in Gagetown. Each of those bases should be able to accommodate a small training centre without too much of an additional adm-and-log burden.
I guess the first step is figuring out what the CAF wants/expects to recruit annually, and what they think is a required cushion above that.

Given the hole in the CAF currently, I think that 9 Trg BN’s being able to put through 15k regular force and probably another 15k PRes annually isn’t off what the mark should be

I had believed that was the original point of the whole CAF ‘Reconsitutionalizing’ or whatever the theoretical operation slow down was cause was to allow for numbers to be grown and training to be stabilized.
 
Sounds like you were in the wrong line of work then... 😉
You're not wrong... :D
The people who do the job, but also supervise others doing it, should be compensated in relation to their skills and their responsibilities. If a Cpl makes about as much as a Sgt on pay day, why would they bother taking on the responsibilities of a Sgt?

Before anyone chimes in with "but the pension", most people 7 years into the job aren't thinking about what happens 18 years down the road with their pension.
 
Sounds like you were in the wrong line of work then... 😉

The people who do the job, but also supervise others doing it, should be compensated in relation to their skills and their responsibilities. If a Cpl makes about as much as a Sgt on pay day, why would they bother taking on the responsibilities of a Sgt?

Before anyone chimes in with "but the pension", most people 7 years into the job aren't thinking about what happens 18 years down the road with their pension.
shouldn't it depend upon whether the instructor is simply instructing or is involved in day to day supervision as well. An individual who has elected to go non-ops and simply teach should not be paid equivalent to a qualified individual who is doing the work. They have elected to go into a non-op category at a guess so they can stay at home more with the family instead of off-shore postings, sea time, air time or whatever. That is their bonus. For the person doing the work an ops. bonus should be automatic.
 
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