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Canada asks for Chinook design changes; military expert worry about delay

So that's why we're getting four C-17s.

I do agree with a single sqn in a single location for the Chinooks - it's cheaper, and given the number of hours pilots need at the yoke to stay proficient, having them fly to and from other training locations actually works out well.
 
Dapat: You can never equate helicopters with fixed wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft fly willingly. They even look like birds. Helicopters on the other hand look like exactly what they are ---thousands of parts bolted together---all fighting with each other. http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/video/Ground_Resonance_Rear_View.mpg
 
beenthere said:
Dapat: You can never equate helicopters with fixed wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft fly willingly. They even look like birds. Helicopters on the other hand look like exactly what they are ---thousands of parts bolted together---all fighting with each other. http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/video/Ground_Resonance_Rear_View.mpg

Shame on you, beenthere!  You're scaring the youngin's...  ;D

G2G
 
Good2Golf said:
Shame on you, beenthere!  You're scaring the youngin's...  ;D

G2G

He need to think of beautifully colored dragonflys, wonderful acrobatics, etc......just natural helicopters.....
 
Let's face it, a helicopter looks like a bus that's suddenly found itself airborne & is trying to find a slightly less painful way of landing VS full frontal  nose plant
 
geo said:
Let's face it, a helicopter looks like a bus that's suddenly found itself airborne & is trying to find a slightly less painful way of landing VS full frontal  nose plant

OK you owe me a large Timmes and a ne keyboard!!!!
 
beenthere said:
Loachman. We've already proved that four Chinooks in one unit is the exact number that won't do anything other than cause problems.

Same with any other helicopter - Cormorant, Griffon...

I agree completely.

Notice that I did not say the four approximately equal chunks should be in different places - except for the approximately equal chunks actually deployed.
 
There must be some kind of fetish for chunking things in the Tac Hel world. I've seen lots of references over the years where individual squadrons are earmarked or identified for various deployments. I've never seen the plan or heard anything about the logic but it would look like an awful lot of training and preparation goes on before individual units rotate into operational roles. Has anyone considered that deploying a composite unit with crews from all of the operational squadrons and associated components of the organization would fulfill the commitment with less impact on individual units in Canada.
 
It would make sense to station what little we have in one location, along with the troops that they support and make an Airmobile Bde. 
 
Here I am wide awake in the middle of the night, long since retired , with no dog in the race , nothing to lose other than what little remains of my sanity and I find myself wondering how all of these helicopter purchases come about and just who or what decides where they will go and how they will be used. Actually last nights dinner is what has me wide awake and when I'm awake in the middle of the night I usually have lots of time to think.
Obviously the decision to buy Chinooks is a good one as they are the ideal helicopter and as the whole issue comes from the top I applaud the man at the top for having the right stuff to make it happen. However every thing that has followed the initial decision seems to have degenerated into the usual pattern of bumbling and indecision that we have learned to expect. As I have stated previously someone has spent a lot of time laying out all of the details regarding just what this new helicopter must be capable of doing but there is no plan to verify that it will do these things. The bureaucrats who are involved in these issues are usually so far removed from reality that if they had to come out of their warm offices to go for a ride in one they would have to get someone to do their seatbelt up for them. The people in headquarters won't rock the boat over issues for fear of losing their jobs and having to find real ones and of course there's always those who see a bright second career with Boeing when this acquisition project winds down. It happened before, when we bought the CH-113 helicopters.
These people hide in some closet in headquarters until the deal is inked and after it's done we'll never see them and they will never be held responsible for their decisions.
Some combination of polotics and the personal wishes of officers to get more toys in their boxes will determine the placement of the units that are going to operate the helicopters and the result will no doubt be something that will look like a dogs breakfast.
There is still time to get a grip on this thing and get it right but some day soon it's going to be too late and when these people make their announcements they back them up with the best logic that they can invent and there's no going back.
 
Beenthere I want to note how much I appreciate your input on Air Force topics.
There are few voices that are prepared to speak on this site with your knowledge and background in this area.

Per Ardua Per Astra

http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/hist/tradg_e.asp
 
Thanks Baden. I have always had a particular intrest in the CH-113 and Chinook. We were both young together. I started as a tech on CH-113s in 1965 when they were new and eventually became a tech crewman and then moved on to Chinooks as a flight engineer/tech when we bought them. I did acceptance checks on a couple of Chinooks and helped bring them home. I used to know them very well as some of the original flight engineers and pilots were the only people who knew them. We had to learn from experience as the courses that were given were much less than adequate. It was a great experience with great people.
 
beenthere said:
There must be some kind of fetish for chunking things in the Tac Hel world. I've seen lots of references over the years where individual squadrons are earmarked or identified for various deployments. I've never seen the plan or heard anything about the logic but it would look like an awful lot of training and preparation goes on before individual units rotate into operational roles. Has anyone considered that deploying a composite unit with crews from all of the operational squadrons and associated components of the organization would fulfill the commitment with less impact on individual units in Canada.

It's not a fetish, but the best compromise and, yes, consideration has been given to pretty much every way imaginable.

There are reasons for and against both options.

Composite units will still take key personnel from other units, so somebody's left without a CO, somebody else with no DCO, etcetera, or else we haul them out of HQs and spend time and effort getting them recurrent/requalified. Wherever they come from, holes will be left somewhere unless we maintain a holding pool of plug-and-play bosses. Then there's the whole "team" thing - without having had the opportunity to work as one for an extended time pre-deployment, there should be no expectation that a bunch of people hastily thrown together will function adequately.

The Australians and New Zealanders provided a helicopter unit to the MFO in the Sinai prior to being replaced by us in the mid-eighties and our planners identified many organizational, currency/qualification, morale, (safety, and disciplinary problems within it as a result of that approach. A conscious decision was therefore made to deploy contingents based on established Squadrons with some augmentation as needed - less at first, but more with each subsequent roto. It worked.

That also made pre-deployment training simpler, as it was done locally. With composite units, all of the personnel would have to be grouped into one common location for it. We do not have the facilities and quarters etcetera to do that, and it would put a lot more strain on members and their families with extra time away.

During the Bosnia effort, Squadrons were given the task for one year and a lot of flexibility to deploy personnel within that time. Key people still had to do six months for obvious continuity reasons, but others could do month-long rotations. The latter was intended to increase reserve participation who could do one or more according to their circumstances, but was also an option offered to many regular members who would do six such month-long stints. It was also an attempt to avoid almost completely stripping each brigade of its helicopter support for extended periods.

Of course, we did not have the personnel shortages that we have now, and 1 Wing Squadrons are forced to be far more interoperable than they were back in the Good Old Days as we juggle crews and machines and groundcrew to support major exercises and operations. We do far more intermixing than we used to and some of the aforementioned problems would not be as significant as they would have been in earlier days.

We are using a semi-composite approach for TUAV ops. Flights are based upon a Squadron with varying augmentation (400, 438, and 444 Squadrons being much smaller than 408 and 430 Squadrons) and a sizeable contingent from 4 AD Regiment. Both the hel and AD personnel can do their individual training at home, but have to come together for the collective training (TUAV operations, maintenance, preparation), final exercise (Maple Guardian in Wainwright), and another two weeks in Pet. That represents four months away from home as it is, and considerable expense in flying groups back-and-forth and housing them. We just finished five weeks in the Ramada in Edmonton due to the lack of on-base accommodation. The remaining time (except for the two weeks in Pet) will be in Wainwright - oh, joy.

Our individual stuff (ranges, first aid, BFT, and other assorted activities) was done during a two-month period in Borden. Not bad for those of us living there, but it sucked for the out-of-towners who joined us - six months away preparing for a six-month deployment for them. Some personal inconvenience is unavoidable and is part of the job, but it needn't be made any worse for any more people than absolutely necessary.

Note that the Army does not routinely form composite units for operational deployment either.

A single Chinook Squadron in one location with a deployed element wherever would appear, to me, to be the best option to meet operational requirements.
 
I spent my career split (not evenly) with the first years in the brown helicopter world which in the first years was Army and then 10 TAG and the last years in Air Transport Group. Obviously as an NCO I had nothing to do with the structure and organization of units. It is probably due to the relatively simple role that ATG or what ever it's called now plays but composite units are used for most CC-130 operations.
I'm sure there's a standard procedure in the books but I've never seen it so I'll give my example version for a couple of deployments that we ran in Kenya and Djibouti. This is my best recollection of a three aircraft deployment. The makeup is simple and flexable. Three aircraft. Two fly with one spare.  A L Col. or Major pilot from anywhere in the the CC-130 system in charge of crews that come from any of the squadrons that operate CC-130s. Servicing and maintenance personnel are provided in numbers sufficient to operate two shifts with most personnel coming from one of the two main bases--Trenton and Winnipeg. A couple of supply techs, an admin person/officer, MO and medic and sometimes a couple of int. and mp types. Crews fly one day and have one day off. One dedicated crew runs operations . Any member of the ops crew can be pulled to fill in for a crewmember who comes down sick.
That's the basic configuration for a deployment and it can be enlarged or modified as necessary. All crews operate by one standard as per normal. No special training required before deployment. Crews and aircraft are rotated regularly with a new crew bringing a fresh aircraft from Canada about once per month and an old crew returning an out of hours aircraft to Canada for inspection. Maintenance and servicing personnel rotate about every six weeks. Other crews rotate on scheduled CC-150 flights or commercial flights. Typical crew rotation is about one month duration 100+ flying hours. This provides a seamless operation. Nothing is firm and always subject to change but mostly everything follows the schedule. Operations like this have gone on for several months with no problems.
I'm not suggesting that any or all of it would work for anyone else . Just providing some insight.
 
A significant difference between Transport and Tac Hel is the level of involvement in the supported operation.

Tac Hel is and needs to be actively involved in it, and works more closely with its "customer".

To be effective, we have to know those with whom we work, the terrain in which we work, and the threat that we must consider and counter intimately.

This is why Canadian brigade groups have, and have had for over thirty-five years, an attached Tac Hel Squadron (notwithstanding 427 Squadron's re-alignment with CANSOFCOM).

Typical major deployments involve around eight helicopters (Bosnia) or so (nine for MFO/Sinai). Monthly rotations wouldn't cut it, as they wouldn't for an Infantry rotation either, so they are the standard six months.

Pre-deployment training is tailored for the mission. We have qualified all of our people on pistol, C7, C6, C9, shotgun, grenade, and (sim in Meaford only) M72, Carl Gustaf, and M203. We will be doing pairs fire-and-movement in Pet in June. We have all done standard and combat first aid and will be putting some on the TCCC course. This is necessary because any number of us could leave the wire for an AV recovery, convoy duty (air sentry), or deployed Ground Control Station. That level of training was not needed for the Sinai or Bosnia.

It's also a lot harder to rotate aircraft back to Canada for major inspections.

Tac Hel is more Army than Air Force in nature and reality, Canadian politically-driven alignments notwithstanding.
 
Interesting. That makes it easy to understand the training required as you're working right up and personal with the troops. Thanks for the explanation. I've got a much better perspective now.
One of the first differences that I noted when I moved to ATG was that there was a sense of management rather than leadership. I also noted that the lifestyle and accommodations were different. It took a while but I adjusted to both. ;D
 
Loachman said:
Note that the Army does not routinely form composite units for operational deployment either.

I'm certain that many other Army types laughed a good laugh at reading that line.  Let's just say that while the goal may be to deploy units, in actual fact it isn't happening.
 
dapaterson said:
I'm certain that many other Army types laughed a good laugh at reading that line.  Let's just say that while the goal may be to deploy units, in actual fact it isn't happening.

I realize that there are few or no "pure" units, but the major units deploying are based upon a core pre-existing unit with augmentation. Units are not thrown together from a collection of individuals who've never seen each other before and fired overseas.
 
and the line grows


Link

Boeing Awarded U.S. Army Contract for 11 New CH-47F Chinook Helicopters
 
 
(Source: Boeing Co.; issued Feb. 27, 2008)
 
 
 

This latest order brings to 59 the number of new CH-47F Chinooks on order for the US Army. (US Army photo)ST. LOUIS --- The Boeing Company has been awarded a $280.5 million U.S. Army contract for 11 new CH-47F Chinook helicopters, increasing the number of new Chinooks on contract to 59. Aircraft deliveries under this award will begin in 2011. 

"This new contract award represents a long-term commitment to supporting our warfighters," said Ken Eland, Boeing CH-47F program director. "Our commitment is to continue the high level of quality and performance we established in 2007." 

Since Boeing unveiled the aircraft at its Ridley Township, Pa., production facility in June 2006, the new Chinook has successfully completed all evaluations, including airworthiness, functional and operational testing at Fort Campbell, Ky. Units also have completed more than 1,000 flight hours, including Joint Readiness Training Center training and a wide range of night-vision-goggle training exercises that simulated air assault, combat resupply and transport operations. 

The CH-47F helicopter features a newly designed, modernized airframe, a Rockwell Collins Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) cockpit and a BAE Digital Advanced Flight Control System (DAFCS). 

The CAAS cockpit greatly improves aircrew situational awareness, while DAFCS provides dramatically improved flight control capabilities through features such as "hover hold," "altitude hold" and "beep down" that improve performance and safety in brownout situations as well as the entire flight envelope. 

Advanced avionics also incorporate improved situational awareness for flight crews with an advanced digital map display and a data transfer system that allows storing of preflight and mission data. Improved survivability features include Common Missile Warning and Improved Countermeasure Dispenser Systems. The entire suite of improved cockpit capabilities will apply to other H-47 models. 

Powered by two 4,868-horsepower Honeywell engines, the new CH-47F can reach speeds greater than 175 mph and transport more than 21,000 pounds. The CH-47F, with the Robertson Aviation Extended Range Fuel System, has a mission radius of more than 400 nautical miles. 


 
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