U.S. fighter pilot Harry Schmidt talks about the friendly fire that ended his...

[rocky1fac]

With all respect he followed the procedures, please explain to me which one he didnt?
Again it is important your response to H **** with the FAC means no lesson was learned here and we are doomed to repeat it.
If we all dont want this repeated then I say again were was the FAC? 

 

[Blakey]

I say again were was the FAC?

So, your telling us that if a FAC was present with the Coy in question this FF wouldn't have happened?, as well this FAC would have comms with every and all aircraft fixed wing and rotary in the skies over Afghanistan?

 

[Baloo]

With all respect he followed the procedures, please explain to me which one he didnt?
Again it is important your response to H **** with the FAC means no lesson was learned here and we are doomed to repeat it.
If we all dont want this repeated then I say again were was the FAC? 

When he was considered to be "engaged" by the forces on the ground, instead of confirming that the targets he was seeing were enemy, he got even closer, and claimed something along the lines of "rolling in, in self-defence". The, he failed to obey an order NOT to drop the bombs on the targets.

To me, that is failing to follow procedures.

 

[GO!!!]

Procedures and presence of certain people aside, I think alot of hard feelings could be tempered somewhat with a sincere apology and acknowledgement of the lives that have been ruined. Men dead. Crippled.

Schmidt has not done this. It would'nt require him to admit anything, but he still wont do it.

That tells me he doe'snt feel all that bad, and he still can't take responsibility.

May his life be as miserable as those left behind.

---OUT---

 

[rocky1fac]

Yes almost exactly.

Not comms with any and all but comms with all fighters that would be in the area. If a fighter strayed into the area comms could have been coord through MAJIC or AWACs in seconds. More importantly the FAC could call the fighter off through the AWAC if comms could not be established.
A good FAC would have been out on deployment and would have all the codes a freqs for the night and sitting on his veh enjoying the nght air would be monitoring the net AWACS MAJIC and Air HQ he  would be listening to the sky. First jet to loiter too long over head would cause the FAC to call AWAC or MAJIC if not able to speak direct to jet.  

Most important is that the FAC would have carried the grid for the ex to the G3 air and ensured that it was in the computors and on the daily brief log. With that in hand he would have all the codes and freqs to speak to most air craft. And on field deployment would have sent his grid to the air side to ensure they knew were he was and his unit to keep FF problems from occuring. Just as you would deploy to the field and call O on the net and advise were you are and when you are goign live the FAC does the same on the air net to keep the pilots aware of the location of the friendly forces.
This same issue occured on other ops but FACs were present and ensured no conflicts. Were was the FAC to coord all this to ensure it would not happen. As a FAC I know it would not have happened on my or other FACs watches. I still dont know were the FAC was.

 

[rocky1fac]

To Baloo,
  As for the rolling in and the direction to hold the AWAC as I said before has no authroity to hold off a fighter only a FAC can call off a fighter (or lead). The AWAC is only support not control. The person who could have stopped the fighter was himeslf the lead or the FAC.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I still dont know were the FAC was.

We get the idea...

 

[Acorn]

Rocky, one wonders if you really know what you're talking about. AWAC can't call off a fighter? What orifice do you pull that from? You do know that the "C" in "AWAC" stands for don't you? In fact, if you bother with the transcripts of the incident in question, you'll see that the AWAC DID order the figher off. Not even a FAC can countermand self defence, which is what Schmidt invoked. And, just so I'm perfectly clear, AWAC DO hold authority to call in or call off fighter aircraft - same as a FAC.

The ex grid was passed up the chain by the Canadian battlegroup. It should have been in the ACO, which should have been briefed to the pilots. It looks as if there was some breakdown in the Air Force chain, but even so, Schmidt had no bloody reason to drop a bomb.

The came into the area at 20K feet. Ground fire IS NOT A THREAT to fighters at that altitude, yet they DESCENDED and ENGAGED an UNIDENTIFIED target.

Frankly, Schmidt deserves every word of the reprimand he recieved. From what I saw of him in the interview he's still not convinced he holds any responsibility.

Acorn

 

[rocky1fac]

Not to raise the tempo but IMHO you are right on the issue of him not owning the mistake that is obvious.
As for AWAC and self def As the lead instructor for the NATO FAC school over seas that taught all allied forces and cerified them for combat ops in the mid 90s (when we did lots of combat FAC ops) I would suggest I may know something, not alot but just enough.

Point 1 - A self defense call by a fighter can be called off by a FAC with the right code. That is how a fighter is called off a target when it is attacking a friendly that it has mistaken.
Point 2 - The C in AWAC  does not mean combat fighter ground attack control it means control for air space. The AWAC passes the fighters off to tasks and duties and keeps all the zoomies from running into each other. Not to let out any classified stuff but in a single mission you may have many and I mean many planes inbound and in theatre. All have different tasks only a few have combat ground roles the AWAC keeps them all in sink. FACs get passed the jets from MAJIC who gets the tasked  jets from the AWAC think of them as the airport tower but over the battle area. The call to the AWAC was for help to clear up a conflict not to get permission to drop.

All that said he dropped and he was wrong. But it still stands the FAC was missing a direct failure by our command and if you dont want it to occur again ensure we learn from this terrible accident...FACs on all Ops.

 

[Enzo]

Rocky,

You're focusing on one aspect of this incident and let's face it, it's a weak defense on your part. The responsibility for the deployment of ordnance rests solely with the PIC (Pilot in Command). Period.

Schmidt as the pilot did not identify his target. He released his munitions without identifying the target. Period.

Good men died needlessly that day. Period.

Schmidt hasn't acknowledged responsibility for his actions and continues to blame others. He was fined a month's pay and won't fly for the Guard again. IMHO, he is fortunate that it was only his career and some pay that were effected. The same cannot be said for the families of those men and the other men who were wounded that day. Families that have gaping holes in their lives that cannot be simply overlooked in this matter. These men:

Sgt. Marc D. Leger, 29, of Lancaster, Ontario

Cpl. Ainsworth Dyer, 25, of Montreal, Quebec

Pvt. Richard A. Green, 22, of Edmonton, Alberta

Pvt. Nathan Smith, 27, of Tatamagouche, Nova Scotia

If as you say Schmidt is genuflecting his grief in private, then how is anyone (both American and Canadian) supposed to accept his position and work to restore confidence in joint operations? He had his time to speak, and he didn't step up, hence the negative reaction to his televised interview. Redemption requires admiting his culpability in this matter. There are questions as to the authorized use of dextroamphetamine, whether an operational pilot should be informed of training by allied forces in a known training area and the right to self-defense.

Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd said the "questions obviously would be: If it is indeed a training area that's regularly used, are the pilots briefed on this before takeoff? Are there positive controls for dropping bombs in that area?" But the "one overriding principle," he said, is that U.S. forces have "the right to defend themselves ... if they feel they're in danger and being shot at."

Self-defense? See this link: http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Reports/Tarnak_Farms_Report.htm

i.  Necessity.  Numerous F-16 pilots interviewed by the Board stated that if they had found themselves in similar circumstances to those confronted by COFFEE flight on the evening of 17 April 2002, their immediate course of action would have been to accelerate to greater airspeed, climb in altitude, and leave the immediate area to evade and avoid the threat. COFFEE flight took none of these actions.  Neither COFFEE 51 nor COFFEE 52, both of whom stated they believed they were being targeted at some point by the ground fire, aggressively maneuvered their aircraft in the face of what they presumably believed was a surface-to-air threat.  Throughout the entire engagement, COFFEE 51 maintained a slow rate, level right-hand turn approximately five miles from the source of the ground fire, almost completely circling the Tarnak Farms range.  COFFEE 52 turned back toward the SAFIRE and descended below recommended altitude to take a mark.  Later, he turned back toward the SAFIRE again and slowed to well below tactical airspeed.  He never appeared to maneuver defensively.  Finally, both COFFEE 51 and 52 stated they believed the ground fire was burning out around 10,000 feet AGL, well below their initial transit altitude, they later stated their belief that projectiles continued to climb after burn out.  COFFEE 52 descended close to what he perceived to be the burn-out altitude and remained there during the entire sequence.

The pilot always retains the right of self-defense and the defense of other friendly assets unable to protect themselves. This right, however, should not be used as a planned work-around for solving poor tactics and decision trees. The F-16 pilot must make a conscious decision that the immediate threat outweighs the risk of fratricide.  In situations where there is not an immediate threat, i.e., outside of abort range or nobody is spiked, or when SA on friendly positions is unknown, maintain a conservative, defensive approach to the situation until certain of compliance with the ROE.

vi.  ROE restrictions.  COFFEE 52 descended and slowed his aircraft in the vicinity of the SAFIRE site and requested permission to fire on the site with his 20mm cannon, a request denied by AWACS in the form of a reply, â Å“Stand byâ ? and subsequently, â Å“Hold fire.â ?  The employment of the 20mm cannon would have placed COFFEE 52 in greater jeopardy due to the descent to lower altitude and closer approach to the suspected SAFIRE site this move would require.  In addition, this action would have required COFFEE 52 to descend well below the altitude floor imposed by the ROE.  In addition, OEF SPINS directed that aircraft should not descend into the lethal range of a AAA system firing well below them in order to attack in self-defense.

The problem is, I could go on and on. There is a chain of responsiblity here that the pilots have to accept. Maj.Umbach has done so. He failed as a wingman that night and has been admonished for it. Maj. Schmidt needs to stop being a victim. This may seem to be a harsh position and to you I am sorry since you have chosen to be his defender. Your administration trumpets a zero tolerance policy towards attacks upon its soldiers and if I could quote a fratricide incident where Canadian personnel took the life of an American in combat recently, I would. But the British and Canadians share a similar position.

"I think we spend a lot more time on recognition training than the Americans do," said Chris Foss, land editor of Jane's Defence Weekly.

Journalist and military historian Max Hastings wrote that "many British officers believe that Americans place too great reliance on technology, and not enough on the need for foot soldiers to get in there and mix it with the enemy on the ground.

"The British have always had to do this, because we do not possess equipment to do it any other way."

Do you see the difference in philosophies? Do you see why people are upset not only by this incident, but other fratricide incidents against members of the British, Bulgarin, Italian and even the US Forces themselves to name a few? Do you see why civilians in combat zones are incensed when something such as this occurs to them?

Fratricide happens. It's awful and due to the success of US Forces in combat, the numbers seemed higher than previously noted. But when the problem here is that clearly Maj. Schmidt had other options available to him. And he CHOSE to exercise his misguided belief that he was under threat. He did not prove his position and needs to accept that.

That is my opinion and my position on this matter. I hope that you have taken something from this.

Cheers.

 

[rocky1fac]

If you read what I said you would note that I have not defended him nor have I supported or agreed with his self rightous approach in public.

I simple wanted to let youy all know what he said in private.
I dont want it to happen again so I advised on our errors in the accident.

You have obviously got very good points but they are not about what I said.

I fear by the failure to under stand our failures in the accident we are doomed to repeat it. We will never be able to change the US forces so we must focus on what we can do or what we did not do so it never happens again.
This is my point and focus and I fear I have failed in my attempt to educate and protect future forces. I tried to get this sorted while I was still in but retired before I could make an impact.
Im done no sense trying to help when non wanted. Next time it happens remember my words.

Cheers to all
Rocky out 

 

[Acorn]

I can see Rocky has been shown the door. I'm not sure why yet. Oh well. This is not intended to kick him while he's down.

The argument that there should have been a FAC present would be valid if the troops in question were conducting Ops. Rocky seems to suggest that the Canadian contingent didn't have FACs at all (a systemic failing), something I'm pretty sure is not true, and we have enough members here who were on Apollo who can confirm or deny that.

There should be no reason to have a FAC (a limited resource) attached to a sub-unit training ex unless the ex involves CAS. The Airspace Control Order (ACO) should reflect all of the NOTAMed areas, including AD fans and Friendly Ex Areas. ACOs are complex, however, and I get the feeling the USAF was playing a bit fast and loose with plotting/briefing them - which is all the more reason Schmidt should have chosen the prudent course and waited a minute or two for the AWAC's response.

Finally, I won't argue the fine details of Rocky's points about FAC employment (and I was wrong - a FAC can call off an attack, unfortunately it's usually after the fact). However, in the absence of a FAC the AWAC is in control, and has the power to prohibit any attack other than self-defence (which they did in this case). Targets of opportunity MUST be identified before attack, and the USAF has some issues with that (witness a couple of weddings bombed, as well as the NATO helo shot down a few years ago). Perhaps they train too much agression and too little control. I don't know.

There may be some blame to share (i.e. systemic problems within the USAF CofC) but Schmidt had choices, and made bad ones. If his example serves to teach the right lessons to current and future USAF pilots those deaths will not be in vain. Unfortunately, for the lesson to really take he'd have to stand up and admit his failing.

Acorn

 

[Bartok5]

The argument that there should have been a FAC present would be valid if the troops in question were conducting Ops. Rocky seems to suggest that the Canadian contingent didn't have FACs at all (a systemic failing), something I'm pretty sure is not true, and we have enough members here who were on Apollo who can confirm or deny that.

There should be no reason to have a FAC (a limited resource) attached to a sub-unit training ex unless the ex involves CAS. The Airspace Control Order (ACO) should reflect all of the NOTAMed areas, including AD fans and Friendly Ex Areas.

Acorn has hit the nail squarely on the head.   There was zero requirement for FAC presence during a routine company range practice located at an established live-fire facility in close proximity to the major coalition base in Southern Afghanistan.   The range was used ona 24/7 basis by all Coalition forces located at KAF.   All appropriate authorizations were granted for A Coy's range practice and all applicable safety measures were in place (eg.   range marking lights, personal IR strobes, comms with the KAF Control Tower, etc).   Continual radio comms with the tower were necessary because firing frequently had to cease (riccochet danger) whenever aircraft were incoming or outgoing along the airfield flight path.  

Further to the above, there was no reason whatsoever for fixed-wing CAS to be flying in proximity to the busiest Coalition airfield in Southern Afghanistan.   KAF was lit up like 100 football stadiums at night and would have been clearly visible in the middle of a dark desert - even from 20,000' AGL.   CAS never (to our knowledge) operated in close proximity to KAF as there was no need and simply too much scope for danger to friendly defensive patrols operating within a 6 km radius around the perimeter.   The Tarnak Farms range complex was located approximately 4 km from KAF, and was well within the "defensive bubble".   Schmidt and Umbach simply had no business being there.   If aerial support were required proximate to KAF, it was readily and rapidly available in the form of AH-64 Close Attack from the co-located Apache AH battalion integral to TF Rakassan.   The Apaches were far better suited to precision, direct support of ground operations than any fixed-wing "fast-mover" CAS could be.   There were always a couple of AH-64's on QRF status, and they could deploy to incident sites (which they frequently did in support of our patrols) in under 20 minutes from the time of the first call.   Unlike USAF assets, AH-64 support did not require the intervention of "specialists".   They spoke directly to the supported ground tactical commander on the ground unit's frequency, using plain language to coordinate their actions.   Everyone in the F Ech of 3 PPCLI BG knew how to talk to the Apaches and coordinate Close Attack support (a very simple procedure).

The fact of the matter is that even had their been a FAC capability deployed with A Coy for their range practice, it is highly doubtful that the outcome would have been any different.   As I said, the presence of fixed-wing CAS in close proximity to KAF was never a consideration.   As a result, the airstrike was completely unexpected.   There was no "warning", as nobody even heard the aircraft prior to the bomb's impact.   Live-firing will tend to mask the faint sound of high-altitude jet aircraft.   So just what exactly would have "twigged" a co-located FAC to the inconceivable notion that a bomb was about to be dropped in "self defence" within 4000m of the coalition base?    No doubt "Rocky1FAC" could have told us all about the omniscient powers of FAC-qualified Gunners if he hadn't managed to get himself banned.    :

A final point of interest worth noting is that the Canadian FOO/FAC teams with 3 PPCLI BG never performed the FAC function in-theatre.   Why not?   Simply because their much-vaunted STANAG FAC qualification was not recognized by the USAF.   Nor were the American FACs within TF Rakassan authorized to control USAF ground-attack assets.   At the time, the ony personnel in theatre (aside from SOF) authorized to control fixed-wing aircraft were USAF "Enlisted Tactical Air Controllers" (ETAC).   ETACs were attached to 3 PPCLI BG for every operation that we conducted away from KAF.   When operating around KAF, there was no CAS assigned, and therefore no requirement for ETAC/FAC capability.   Full-stop.

"Rocky1FAC's" insinuation that A Coy's lack of FAC capability at Tarnak Farms was a critical enabler for Schmidt's reprehensible actions is completely out to lunch.   Furthermore, his comment that the lack of FAC presence is somehow indicative of a leadership failiing within 3 PPCLI BG is outright insulting.   I was going to address this issue yesterday, but was sufficiently pissed-off that I would have said something entirely inappropriate.   Better to cool off and post a dispassionate, FACTUAL response to "Rocky1FAC's" completely false assumption-based allegations.

Being proud of your specific training and qualifications (eg. FAC) is all well and good, if a tad tiresome to others.   Where people like "Rocky1FAC" run into problems is when they presume to apply their "expert opinions" to specific situations that they clearly know nothing about.   And the problems get worse when they run off at the mouth and extrapolate their erronious presumptions to make negative remarks about the people who were actually on the ground (eg. 3 PPCLI leadership).   Wrong move on a discussion board that is frequented by people who were actually there and know the facts.   I don't know what "Rocky1FAC" did to get himself banned from this site so quickly, but his utter lack of tact, "audience awareness" and judgement in regards to this particular post suggest to me that his days were inevitably numbered.        

For what it's worth....  

(Edited to correct a few typos)

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Thank you, Mark C.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Anyone cut and paste and emailed Mark Cs comments to Rocky1Fac yet?