Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[Infanteer]

The defensive stuff was moved off to its own thread.

To keep this one going, a doctrinal debate from the 1950s/60s on where mechanized infantry locate themselves during the attack. The American view was to move behind the vehicles (keep the big piece of steel between you and the enemy) while the German point of view was to only dismount if necessary, and to spread out. The latter implicitly allows the infantry to afford better protection to the vehicles.

 

[markppcli]

The defensive stuff was moved off to its own thread.

To keep this one going, a doctrinal debate from the 1950s/60s on where mechanized infantry locate themselves during the attack. The American view was to move behind the vehicles (keep the big piece of steel between you and the enemy) while the German point of view was to only dismount if necessary, and to spread out. The latter implicitly allows the infantry to afford better protection to the vehicles.

If I understand correctly though that was because the US expected their infantry to move behind the tanks directly while the Germans, with much better protected vehicles, would stay in their Half Tracks and later the HS 30.

That over the top dismount is something else though.

 

[Infanteer]

That over the top dismount is something else though.

You mean that thing we tell platoon commanders to do?

 

[Infanteer]

If I understand correctly though that was because the US expected their infantry to move behind the tanks directly while the Germans, with much better protected vehicles, would stay in their Half Tracks and later the HS 30.

This raises the issue of what infantry configuration best ensures protection of the armoured vehicles to create a combined arms synergy. If they are lumped up behind the tank, are they really protecting the tank? If they are nowhere near the tank and lumped up behind the IFV, what are they achieving?

 

[markppcli]

You mean that thing we tell platoon commanders to do?

I think it actually states they’re supposed to swap with the LAV Sgt in the attack position ? I’ve only seen the PL come out the. Ack, which is still a stupid drill but I digress.

This raises the issue of what infantry configuration best ensures protection of the armoured vehicles to create a combined arms synergy. If they are lumped up behind the tank, are they really protecting the tank? If they are nowhere near the tank and lumped up behind the IFV, what are they achieving?

I don’t know if I see the positions of the dismounts is the critical piece, the important part is that they protect the tank by clearing the places the tank can’t go. To me that means the actual job of infantry in a combat team is less section attacking beside LAVs and more woods clearing in defile drills (ask your LAV Sgt’s when the last time they did those were), clearing defensive positions, and clearing out urban areas. I suppose that can be summarized as clearing complex terrain to enable offensive maneuver, and conducting assaults of positions.

 

[Infanteer]

I don’t know if I see the positions of the dismounts is the critical piece, the important part is that they protect the tank by clearing the places the tank can’t go.

I would rephrase this differently by stating the important part is that the protect the tank by clearing the threats that the tank can't see.

The certainly can't do this from behind a tank or by hanging around their IFV.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If I understand correctly though that was because the US expected their infantry to move behind the tanks directly while the Germans, with much better protected vehicles, would stay in their Half Tracks and later the HS 30.

That over the top dismount is something else though.

The HS 30 was utterly despised by their Panzerjagers, uncomfortable, very unreliable and as you mention the exiting plan left a lot to be desired. A good idea poorly done.

 

[markppcli]

I would rephrase this differently by stating the important part is that the protect the tank by clearing the threats that the tank can't see.

The certainly can't do this from behind a tank or by hanging around their IFV.

That’s fair and I agree. I think when we talk about training that attack there’s actually two distinct tasks that should be looked at.

1. The section attacking an isolated position as the assault element of a platoon. Key points to drive are identifying and suppressing the enemy and maintaining suppression on the advance. The primary goal is developing command and control and decision making by small unit commanders.
2. Clearing those blind spots. This is the trench clearing, woods clearing, defile drill stuff. It’s really about infantrymen working in pairs / groups and ensuring good comms and drills. Section and platoon commanders are more managing man power that direction their soldiers. Could realistically be ran as pairs / group ranges.

 

[Kirkhill]

What is the stand-off distance for an ATGM team in Ukraine these days?

 

[Kirkhill]

I was alerted to this publication of the Russians analyzing the Ukrainian assaults and how to counter them.

Apparently the Russians perceive the Ukrainians as advancing in column of teams with each team made up of 5 troops and a column consisting of four teams.

Judging from the report it looks as if the Ukrainians are treating each advance to contact as a meeting engagement.

Lead team advances covertly and makes contact, goes firm and establishes fire base.
Second team, following closely, moves out to the flank to assault the position.
Third team, following in depth is prepared to dig in and consolidate wherever the advance permits. That could be on or past the enemy position or on the line of march if the two assault elements are forced to retire.
Fourth team is deep and acts as a reserve to reinforce or counter-attack.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1697292450094600531

I think Shaka would recognize the formation.

 

[Kirkhill]

Hiding under your aerial?

BELFAST— Swedish manufacturer Saab has launched ... a new variant of the company’s Barracuda Ultra-Lightweight Camouflage Screen (ULCAS) — ....

Saab says its newly announced ULCAS will be capable of concealing soldiers from enemy surveillance radar but allow them to send and receive GPS and VHF band communications, through the use of Frequency Selective Surface (FSS) technology.

“We heard from our users that [soldiers] sitting under their nets with radio devices, might have poor signals and have to move out of their tents, making them vulnerable,” said Johan Jersblad, senior development engineer at Saab Barracuda.

“So what we have done is made a material that provides protection against enemy surveillance, meaning the incoming radar waves are absorbed by the net….but where we have the [friendly] GPS devices and RF communication devices, we have made a window for those frequencies.”

Saab unveils new naval operator workspace concept and camouflage system - Breaking Defense

“I would consider any partner that will step up and say that ‘we're really interested in this’ because that would probably accelerate our process," said Saab's Johan Hagg of the workstation.

breakingdefense.com

Barracuda MCS | Saab

Modern military vehicles must be inconspicuous and adaptable to beat threats. This is where our Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) comes in.

www.saab.com

 

[markppcli]

I was alerted to this publication of the Russians analyzing the Ukrainian assaults and how to counter them.

Apparently the Russians perceive the Ukrainians as advancing in column of teams with each team made up of 5 troops and a column consisting of four teams.

Judging from the report it looks as if the Ukrainians are treating each advance to contact as a meeting engagement.

Lead team advances covertly and makes contact, goes firm and establishes fire base.
Second team, following closely, moves out to the flank to assault the position.
Third team, following in depth is prepared to dig in and consolidate wherever the advance permits. That could be on or past the enemy position or on the line of march if the two assault elements are forced to retire.
Fourth team is deep and acts as a reserve to reinforce or counter-attack.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1697292450094600531

View attachment 79970

View attachment 79971

I think Shaka would recognize the formation.

I sure hope the Ukrainians are attempting to flank both sides at once…

 

[KevinB]

I would rephrase this differently by stating the important part is that the protect the tank by clearing the threats that the tank can't see.

The certainly can't do this from behind a tank or by hanging around their IFV.

Doctrine down here is all sorts of disjointed.
A lot of the CAB ‘doctrine’ never has been updated.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32974-ATP_3-90.5-000-WEB-1.pdf

Movement is pretty much left to the Commander.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The defensive stuff was moved off to its own thread.

To keep this one going, a doctrinal debate from the 1950s/60s on where mechanized infantry locate themselves during the attack. The American view was to move behind the vehicles (keep the big piece of steel between you and the enemy) while the German point of view was to only dismount if necessary, and to spread out. The latter implicitly allows the infantry to afford better protection to the vehicles.

Good little video there - thanks for sharing! Watching guys mounting and dismounting from moving AFVs gave me a few starts.

As a tanker I certainly practiced assaults during combat team attacks with infantry stacked up behind me and sometimes there was even somebody on the tank telephone. As intimate support you know that must conform to the infantry's movement rate etc, but I wonder sometimes just how much protection they would have back there. Something hits my tank and then what? Now, having infantry behind but shook-out me to shoot enemy that pop up to my rear and flank with hand-held AT is helpful. But right behind? Not so sure.

To Markppcli's point about defiles etc, I was thinking last week how a short defile clearance could make a good "section attack" range for a LAV-based section live fire. It is a somewhat feasible example of a section operating on its own yet part of something bigger. You could even have the "Charlie" tank at the entrance of the short defile to practice low-level tank-infantry cooperation. A short defile might be something that a section gets sent into, but of course this could also a platoon drill.

Anyhoo.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Good little video there - thanks for sharing! Watching guys mounting and dismounting from moving AFVs gave me a few starts.

As a tanker I certainly practiced assaults during combat team attacks with infantry stacked up behind me and sometimes there was even somebody on the tank telephone. As intimate support you know that must conform to the infantry's movement rate etc, but I wonder sometimes just how much protection they would have back there. Something hits my tank and then what? Now, having infantry behind but shook-out me to shoot enemy that pop up to my rear and flank with hand-held AT is helpful. But right behind? Not so sure.

To Markppcli's point about defiles etc, I was thinking last week how a short defile clearance could make a good "section attack" range for a LAV-based section live fire. It is a somewhat feasible example of a section operating on its own yet part of something bigger. You could even have the "Charlie" tank at the entrance of the short defile to practice low-level tank-infantry cooperation. A short defile might be something that a section gets sent into, but of course this could also a platoon drill.

Anyhoo.

If there's one takeaway from the current conflict it seems to be the armoured vehicles don't spend alot of time up with the Infantry, which I assume is to avoid them being destroyed by drones etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

If there's one takeaway from the current conflict it seems to be the armoured vehicles don't spend alot of time up with the Infantry, which I assume is to avoid them being destroyed by drones etc.

Infantry carriers of all sorts seem to attract as much attention as tanks and howitzers relatively speaking. 1 tank, 2 armoured carriers and 1 gun.

 

[CBH99]

What is the stand-off distance for an ATGM team in Ukraine these days?

Assuming they still have access to Javelin ATGM's I'm thinking roughly 2.5km-ish...

 

[KevinB]

Assuming they still have access to Javelin ATGM's I'm thinking roughly 2.5km-ish...

Nothing under 6km is safe, and depending on what folks have, the unsafe area could be 15km plus away for NLOS systems.

 

[Haligonian]

If there's one takeaway from the current conflict it seems to be the armoured vehicles don't spend alot of time up with the Infantry, which I assume is to avoid them being destroyed by drones etc.

That is a good observation.

Patience seems to be a virtue in fighting through the posn. Lead with HE, compel the defender to break from cover and then shoot him down as he runs. Probably helps convince the others to surrender.

Just going through Watling's newest report. Russians are blowing the lead portions of trenches while Ukrainians are fighting through as they withdraw from the posn instead of striking it with pre-registered arty. Reinforces out practice of not consolidating on the posn but also bring my observation on patience into question. One cannot be so patient as to provide an easy target for an innovative enemy using reserved demolitions on their own posns....

 

[markppcli]

Good little video there - thanks for sharing! Watching guys mounting and dismounting from moving AFVs gave me a few starts.

As a tanker I certainly practiced assaults during combat team attacks with infantry stacked up behind me and sometimes there was even somebody on the tank telephone. As intimate support you know that must conform to the infantry's movement rate etc, but I wonder sometimes just how much protection they would have back there. Something hits my tank and then what? Now, having infantry behind but shook-out me to shoot enemy that pop up to my rear and flank with hand-held AT is helpful. But right behind? Not so sure.

To Markppcli's point about defiles etc, I was thinking last week how a short defile clearance could make a good "section attack" range for a LAV-based section live fire. It is a somewhat feasible example of a section operating on its own yet part of something bigger. You could even have the "Charlie" tank at the entrance of the short defile to practice low-level tank-infantry cooperation. A short defile might be something that a section gets sent into, but of course this could also a platoon drill.

Anyhoo.

I agree as well. I really don’t like how often in training we “trade security for speed” which 9/10 means “we can be bothered to do these drills. I keep harping on this point but these drills are two fold: infantry soldiers doing their jobs clearing enemies out of dense terrain while the actual time it takes to move safely helps develop planning considerations.

If there's one takeaway from the current conflict it seems to be the armoured vehicles don't spend alot of time up with the Infantry, which I assume is to avoid them being destroyed by drones etc.

Proliferation of anti tank weapons in general, along with small elements operating relatively isolated leaves them vulnerable.