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Question for (Rtd) Lt Gen Dallaire

Gunner,

I agree that the under strength Para's may not have stopped it -- a little bit of death and carnage may have acheived bringing the world's eyes to bear.  Maybe it would have done nothing other than cause more Para deaths (I am unconcerned about Hutu militia deaths BTW) However the dead would have have died in vain - unarmed and butchered.

My biggest disappointment with D is he toes the party line -- IF he really felt his mission and men where in danger he should have grandstanded like Mac - form a press conference and lash out - maybe not the 100% professional image - but effective.






 
OK, so I've pulled out my copy of Shake Hands to see what the General himself had to say - and what he has to say, I believe; the man is an absolute straight shooter whose harshest critic is himself.

Page 239:

"I accept responsibility for every decision I made that day, on the days previously, on they days after - for my conduct on the entire mission. I will try to tell the story so that you understand that this was not a day of one or two isolated incidents and a few decisions. It was a day that felt like a year, where there were hundreds of incidents and decisions that had to be made in seconds.

I didn't raise the issue of the Belgian soldiers [who he has just learned have been captured and are being tabasser ] because I wanted to discuss it with Bagosora alone. I needed to asess its impact on the entire mision, and because I wanted to talk to the senior [Rwandan] army leadership, who I hoped might be able to save the situation. It was that decision, in part, that contributed to the deaths of ten soldiers under my command. I wanted to proceed by negotiation, as I realized that I  could not use force without the certainty of more casulties. I did not have the offensive force to take on a dug-in garrison of more than a thousand troops. I considered a rescue mission irresponsible. If we used force against the RGF compound, we were then a legitimate target and would become a third beligierent. My aim that morning was to avoid a confrontation, regain control of the rogue units in Kigali, and keep the dialogue and the prospects of the peace accord alive."

That's not "appeasement", that's a cold hard unflinching assessment of the situation on the ground. If he negotiates, he still has some influence on the course of events. He retains his freedom of action. He holds out some hope of being able to save some people, not least of whom are his mostly Belgian peacekeeper force, plus all the expats who are still in country. If he fights, then every blue beret and expat is a target throughout the entire country, plus, with him dead, they are leaderless.

Remember - the Belgians are being blamed for the presidential assasination that touched off the genocide. It is only the neutrality of the blue beret and his own constant diplomatic efforts that is keeping the wholesale slaughter from engulfing the peacekeepers as well.

But he WANTS to fight! Dallaire is a hold-em-by-the-nose, kick-em-in-the-ass soldier. He has assesed his military options. Page 241:

"To have any success at storming a well-fortified camp, I'd need several hundered men [which would only make him outnumbered 2:1] supported by light armour and mortars. My Quick Reaction Force was still woefully inadaquate. Most of the Ghanian contingent was in the demilitarized zone far away to the north, without any heavy weapons or vehicles, never mind ammunition. They too, were vulnerable. The Ghanians we had moved into the city were dispersed on protection jobs all over Kigali. They and the Tunisians at the CND guarding the RPF were lightly armed, possesed no transport, and already had essential duities. The Belgians were also spread all over town. Any attempt at taking the camp or even part of it would be an irresponsible mission. Even if we had been able to assemble an intervention force, fight our way through several roadblocks, and get into and out of camp with our men, we would then have to withdraw through the city, past more roadblocks, and gain the airfield, as we had no place of retreat where we could realistically withstand the inevitable RPF counterattacks and the bombardments from their 105mm and 122mm guns.

I thought of Mogidishu, where a few months earlier the Americans - the most capable military force in the world - had botched the abduction attempt of a couple of aides to a Somalli warlord, and  had suffered 18 dead and more than 70 wounded. The Malaysian and Pakistani peacekepers who tried to rescue the American troops took 90 casulties - and those forces were large, well-trained, and well equipped."

Note too that the RPF wasn't just a bunch of thugs. It may have been thugs with machetes carrying out the genocide, but the primary opponent Dallaire faced was a trained military force of over a thousand men (the Presidential Guard and elements of the Recce Battalion and the Para-Commando battalion.

FACT: NOBODY was getting in there with the UN forces on hand

FACT: Any attempt would have resulted in open season on peacekeepers and non-tribal civillians alike

FACT: An alive Dalllaire was able to provide leadership and to negotiate a withdraw of the UN force

FACT: Dallaire's force consisted of 1100 useless Bangladeshis (who sabotaged their own vehicles and weapons) 800 solid Ghanians (spread throughout the DMZ with no transport) and 450 Belgians, wit no stocks of ammo or other essential combat supplies. He had 15,000 civillians sheltering in his compounds.

FACT: By keeping his cool and negotiating his ass off, Dallaire was able to negotiate a truce so that he could evacuate 650 expats on 10 flights (page 290)

FACT: He pleaded for re-enforcements from the UN on a daily basis, so that he COULD realistically switch to offensive operations to halt the genocide. He was repeatedly refused.

FACT: He stayed at his post, doing everything he could, right until the bitter end. He never took the easy way out and ran.

FACT: Daillaire, AGAINST ORDERS, relaxed the ROE to allow disarming of beligerants and the firing of warning shots to disperse crowds. He was never (so far as I can tell) ordered not to attempt a rescue operation, he came upon that decision after performing his own combat estimate.

FACT: When Dallaire arrived on the scene and discovered that the 10 Belgians had been captured, he saw two of them down and was told that they had already been beaten. It is very possible that they were already dead, making the whole discussion moot.

I think he absolutely did the right thing. Unquestionably. He accepted the military reality of the situation, and had the moral courage to keep trying to stop the genocide by the only realistic means at his disposal. He could have run, but he did not. He could have retired into obscurity, but he did not.

What more do we want out of our commanders?

KevinB, you want grandstanding? How about page 417:

"I spent almost an hour with the international media, accusing them fairly candidly of dropping the ball. As far as I was concerend, their mission was to report the truth and emabrass their fence-sitting political leaders witout reserve, to never let them off the hook for the Rwandan Genocide"

Hell, how long has his book been on the best-seller's list? How many times has the movie played on CBC? I say he's doing a far better job of getting his word out than any other general in Canadian history....

DG
 
Kevin,

I agree with you on Dallaire "Shaking hands with the Devil" again but this time in the form of the Liberals.  Having said that, it didn't come as surprise given his comments echoing Lloyd Axworthy's soft power agenda in the 90s.  

As far the the Mackenzie grandstanding in front of the media...people don't care about Africa unless it involves a cocktail party and the being seen as a humanitarian.  I spent six months in Sierra Leone and the UN, in my opinion, only accomplishment was setting the conditions for another civil war.  As one of my predecessor's stated: "Third World Countries, employing Third World Soldiers, obtaining Third World results".  My six months there was one of the best times of my life and I would go back to Africa in a heartbeat.  Not because of the allure of working for the UN but the experience of Africa is one that you will never forget and you will want to experience it again.

DG-41 - good post.
 
GO!!! said:
History has not been kind to such poor commanders as those who oversaw Islandhwana and Gallipolli. Why is RD so different - because he administrated a school and you got hammered with him?

I am not arguing that he is a really nice guy - you have unique insight on that matter. Only that he is a poor leader and commander who should not be made out to be a hero. He failed, at great cost to many people - there is no way he should have any say in how our nation is run.

I think I'm toeing this line in general - as Gunner has pointed out, there is no reason to call him a coward or an idiot, but I believe that he will be put next to Chelmsford and Ian Hamilton in the panthon of generalship (ie: What not to do).  Although I'm not eager to kick sand in the guy's face, I'm not to keen on the apparent effort to immortalize him in Canada as some icon.
 
DG-41 said:
FACT: NOBODY was getting in there with the UN forces on hand
FACT: An alive Dalllaire was able to provide leadership and to negotiate a withdraw of the UN force
FACT: Dallaire's force consisted of 1100 useless Bangladeshis (who sabotaged their own vehicles and weapons) 800 solid Ghanians (spread throughout the DMZ with no transport) and 450 Belgians, wit no stocks of ammo or other essential combat supplies. He had 15,000 civillians sheltering in his compounds.
FACT: He pleaded for re-enforcements from the UN on a daily basis, so that he COULD realistically switch to offensive operations to halt the genocide. He was repeatedly refused.
And, I would argue, at this point in time, being fully aware of the inadequate resources and lack of support by the heirarchy, that any Commander worth his salt should have immediately attempted to pool his resources and protect his men. Being on the ground and more aware than anyone of what situation he was actually in should have led to a command decision at this point in time that the mission was indeed in jeopardy, despite his hopes to the contrary. Admittedly, by his own words, RD has acknowledged the fact that he did not have adequate resources, had he pulled his forces together at this point in time as a defensive means and then acted as a formed group, he quite possibly could have drawn the attention to the Rwandan conflict that was so desperatly required and instigated some much required action at the stagnant UN. Force the issue.
I'd argue, that knowlingly admitting that you did not have the required resources to accomplish the assigned task/mission, should have been one very LARGE hint to abort it. By immediately making the command decision to abort that task until provided with adequate capabilities, in the interest of Force Protection, the following points would be moot as the situation would not have occured:
DG-41 said:
FACT: When Dallaire arrived on the scene and discovered that the 10 Belgians had been captured, he saw two of them down and was told that they had already been beaten. It is very possible that they were already dead, making the whole discussion moot.
I think he absolutely did the right thing. Unquestionably. He accepted the military reality of the situation, and had the moral courage to keep trying to stop the genocide by the only realistic means at his disposal. He could have run, but he did not. He could have retired into obscurity, but he did not.
DG-41 said:
What more do we want out of our commanders?
I would want my Commander to immeditely realize when a situation was hopeless due to inadequate resources (as he did) and actually take action to ensure Force protection was paramount immediately upon this realization (which he did not) to force the hand of his masters.
I would also want him to drop the "but that would make us 'legitimate targets' routine" as he was well aware that his troops were being targeted "illegitimately" and at that point in time, I guarantee his ROEs gave him the authority and all other UN personnel there the right to immediately defend themselves and to fight for the safety of 10 Belgian soldier's. I also guarantee you that those 10 Belgian's expected a rescue attempt and deserved one. And I believe that is a soldier's only honourable option under the circumstances. This is why we fight and die, we do it for our fellow soldiers. I inherently expect my Commander is going to back me up and assist in that matter above all else. That is what a Commander does. He can lead me into battle and I will go willingly, but do not expect me to lay back for needless slaughter when you as my Commander are fully aware that the mission is doomed to failure, for then I will not follow you, therefore you are not a leader.


 
And, I would argue, at this point in time, being fully aware of the inadequate resources and lack of support by the heirarchy, that any Commander worth his salt should have immediately attempted to pool his resources and protect his men. Being on the ground and more aware than anyone of what situation he was actually in should have led to a command decision at this point in time that the mission was indeed in jeopardy, despite his hopes to the contrary. Admittedly, by his own words, RD has acknowledged the fact that he did not have adequate resources, had he pulled his forces together at this point in time as a defensive means and then acted as a formed group, he quite possibly could have drawn the attention to the Rwandan conflict that was so desperatly required and instigated some much required action at the stagnant UN. Force the issue.
I'd argue, that knowlingly admitting that you did not have the required resources to accomplish the assigned task/mission, should have been one very LARGE hint to abort it. By immediately making the command decision to abort that task until provided with adequate capabilities, in the interest of Force Protection, the following points would be moot as the situation would not have occured:

Armyvern, I think you are glossing over Dallaire's Force Commander responsibility to the mission.  The killings had not begun and he felt there was still a chance of preventing the country from decending into chaos. This was his responsiblity to do even it he thought it would probably not succeed.  Moreover, a commander has to weigh force protection responsibilities with his overall mandate coupled with national constraints on his mission.  As a Commander, he did not have free reign in how he utilizes his forces, just as we don't give free reign to foreign commanders when we place Canadians under their command in an operational theatre.  I don't believe your suggestion (guess?) that a defensive posture by the UN in Rwanda would have had any bearing on the situation other than speeding the process up. 

I would want my Commander to immeditely realize when a situation was hopeless due to inadequate resources (as he did) and actually take action to ensure Force protection was paramount immediately upon this realization (which he did not) to force the hand of his masters.
I would also want him to drop the "but that would make us 'legitimate targets' routine" as he was well aware that his troops were being targeted "illegitimately" and at that point in time, I guarantee his ROEs gave him the authority and all other UN personnel there the right to immediately defend themselves and to fight for the safety of 10 Belgian soldier's. I also guarantee you that those 10 Belgian's expected a rescue attempt and deserved one. And I believe that is a soldier's only honourable option under the circumstances. This is why we fight and die, we do it for our fellow soldiers. I inherently expect my Commander is going to back me up and assist in that matter above all else. That is what a Commander does. He can lead me into battle and I will go willingly, but do not expect me to lay back for needless slaughter when you as my Commander are fully aware that the mission is doomed to failure, for then I will not follow you, therefore you are not a leader.

Once again, he had a responsibility to use every means at his disposal to accomplish his mission and where there was the possibility of success, he had to take it. I think you are also dismissing the UN impartiality in which the mandate was operating under.  Remember why UNAMIR was there in the first place.  By siding with one side or another you risk complicating your neutral role. I think his legitimate target concern was justified.  You are confusing the larger mandate of UNAMIR with the situation with the 10 Belgians.  I again argue that Dallaire had a larger concern when he sped by the 10 Belgians, particularly as he knew the Belgian Battalion were aware they were being held. 
 
Has anyone addressed the claims that RD was the initiator of the "surrender your weapons order" that the Belgians received?

Secondly - no-one is getting me to surrender my weapon -- odds are the persons wants to do something to you that they would/could not do when you where armed.


DG - you should his aide... or at least publicist.  RD admits attacking the media, never a good idea even when they are RTFO, as they are the control measure to get the message out.  Lashing out at the media for not doign their job-- if he wanted NEWS - he shoudl have started lashing out at the CDN Gov't, the UN etc.  You know the media woudl have had a field day with him on a rant about weak kneed sissies, in gov't...

The aspect of being targeted is a ludicrious defence.  His pers had already been targeted and here was evidience of more - specifically the Hutu's knowning that they coudl intimidate and kill the UN forces and the General woudl only attempt to mollify or appease their commanders.  At best he is in league with Neville Chamberlain and "Peace in Our Time..." 



 
Gunner said:
Armyvern, I think you are glossing over Dallaire's Force Commander responsibility to the mission.  
I'm quite sure that I'm not glossing over anything. RD also had a responsibility to his men, He failed in that respect.
Gunner said:
The killings had not begun and he felt there was still a chance of preventing the country from decending into chaos. This was his responsiblity to do even it he thought it would probably not succeed.  
Exactly, and at this point in time, his responsibility should have immediately switched to his personnel, after all he was their Commander, not a miracle maker.
Gunner said:
Moreover, a commander has to weigh force protection responsibilities with his overall mandate coupled with national constraints on his mission.   As a Commander, he did not have free reign in how he utilizes his forces, just as we don't give free reign to foreign commanders when we place Canadians under their command in an operational theatre.   I don't believe your suggestion (guess?) that a defensive posture by the UN in Rwanda would have had any bearing on the situation other than speeding the process up.  
As a Commander he is EXPECTED to make proper decisions based on actual on-ground occurances and with his operational capabilities foremost in his mind, not to put lives needlessly at risk in the hopes that a face to face meeting in a rapidly deteriorating situation would solve his troubles. There comes a time when one must admit one is incapable of handling the situation and then do one's damndest to get the hell out of the situation. As a Commander he is expected to adapt and utilize his Forces in an appropraite manner. He does have that authority, especially when lives of his forces are at risk, they should have come first, and I guarantee you that was well within his ROEs. I would argue that if we had a copy of his ROEs you would find that defending oneself and your fellow soldiers comes listed above the protection of others, as they have been on every mission I've been on.
Gunner said:
Once again, he had a responsibility to use every means at his disposal to accomplish his mission and where there was the possibility of success, he had to take it. I think you are also dismissing the UN impartiality in which the mandate was operating under.   Remember why UNAMIR was there in the first place.   By siding with one side or another you risk complicating your neutral role. I think his legitimate target concern was justified.   You are confusing the larger mandate of UNAMIR with the situation with the 10 Belgians. I again argue that Dallaire had a larger concern when he sped by the 10 Belgians, particularly as he knew the Belgian Battalion were aware they were being held.  
I fail to be impartial when my personal security is at risk, or the security of my fellow soldiers. That is my RIGHT. It is also a RIGHT while serving with the UN. And, it should be a very important RESPONSIBILITY of my Commander to back up that right above all else. If the walls come tumbling down, as a Commander your fiduciary duty is to ensure that you exercise your Command responsibilities to your soldier's and their rights to self-defense, support and re-inforcements. Even the UN would have backed him up on that point, had he put his soldier's in the proper priority that is.
 
Good points, I to am wondering who ordered the weapons down. I have never heard a good line out of RD on the issue, any other comments Ive heard always point to the Belgian Col, it sounds like a command at the top decision to me.

  Same incident occurred in Yugo in 95. Small force into it with the local war lords gets encircled and threatened with overwhelming firepower and numbers to surrender. Canadian command orders the surrender in the interest of lowering tensions. (known to the Cdn command at the time was two captured one wounded 2 MIA and an un known number surrendered Cdn forces as for other forces several KIA 100plus captured 50 MIA) Difference is in this case of the 10 Belgians were not slain in vein as this group refused the order because of what happened in Rwanda months before. The commander threatened everthing including courtmartial. At one point the PMs office was relaying orders to surrender and be taken POW with a promise that Canada would negotiate a release. The orders were refused and the Canadian commander refused to assist the trapped force they fought for another 3 weeks without help from Canada until they won the day themselves and the waring factions withdrew from the battle field. 
  Obviously no lesson learned here by the leadership.
 
KevinB said:
Secondly - no-one is getting me to surrender my weapon -- odds are the persons wants to do something to you that they would/could not do when you where armed.

No kidding - it happened a couple times in Yugo with us, no?  Reinforcing the "fighting spirit" or "warrior mentality" is needed to discourage this folly.
 
Britney, the questions was oversimplified and dramatic.  The point was Dallaire could have personally intervened at Camp Kigali and tried to free the Belgians, this goes back to my comments about being delays, being killed, etc.  He chose to continue on to meet with the Hutu's trying to diffuse the situation and obtain their release.

I was not passing judgement on LGen Dallaire, or second guessing his judgement at all. He's got a few more years in than I do. I am merely pointing out that all things being equal, the idea that he faced a simple choice between stopping the genocide or saving those 10 soldiers is not realistic. The militias did not present him with such an option. Saying that he sacrificed those 10 to save 500,000 isn't true because 1) he didn't, and 2) it would never have worked anyway, because these kind of things just don't work out that way. How many lives do you reckon those 10 Paras saved by dying that day?

WRT your comments on a massacre being decided upon by the whim of a few people - explain to me how many people were responsible for the destruction of 6 million Jews in Europe?

Not that its of any relevence, but I would venture quite a few Germans, Poles, Russians, French, and others had a pretty big part in the Holocaust. How many Jews did Hitler or Goering personally kill?

Britney, I don't think anyone understood this fact (eventhough Colin Powell had articulated the Powell Doctrine years previously) until IFOR in 1996.  The UN was not up to the challenge of the post cold war world and the security council was more interested in the peace dividend.

I'd like to think that we would have had enough Balkan experience at that point to have known. But then, perhaps I should stick to discussing events that actually happened during my own lifetime.......
 
3rd Horseman said:
Good points, I to am wondering who ordered the weapons down. I have never heard a good line out of RD on the issue, any other comments Ive heard always point to the Belgian Col, it sounds like a command at the top decision to me.

  Same incident occurred in Yugo in 95. Small force into it with the local war lords gets encircled and threatened with overwhelming firepower and numbers to surrender. Canadian command orders the surrender in the interest of lowering tensions. (known to the Cdn command at the time was two captured one wounded 2 MIA and an un known number surrendered Cdn forces as for other forces several KIA 100plus captured 50 MIA) Difference is in this case of the 10 Belgians were not slain in vein as this group refused the order because of what happened in Rwanda months before. The commander threatened everthing including courtmartial. At one point the PMs office was relaying orders to surrender and be taken POW with a promise that Canada would negotiate a release. The orders were refused and the Canadian commander refused to assist the trapped force they fought for another 3 weeks without help from Canada until they won the day themselves and the waring factions withdrew from the battle field. 
  Obviously no lesson learned here by the leadership.

I've never heard of this incident.  Might you provide a source or something so I could read more about it?
 
I'm quite sure that I'm not glossing over anything. RD also had a responsibility to his men, He failed in that respect.

Armyvern,  :argument:  You are looking at the whole situation with a very narrow view.  Did 10 Belgians (and others) die under Dallaire's watch?  Yes. Was it a result of Dallaire's incompetence or negligence?  It would be simplistic to say it was and it would imply that that the capture of 10 Belgians was the only incident on on 7 Apr 94.  It wasn't.

Exactly, and at this point in time, his responsibility should have immediately switched to his personnel, after all he was their Commander, not a miracle maker.
 

You are taking a very black and white view of Command.  It doesn't work that way.

As a Commander he is EXPECTED to make proper decisions based on actual on-ground occurances and with his operational capabilities foremost in his mind, not to put lives needlessly at risk in the hopes that a face to face meeting in a rapidly deteriorating situation would solve his troubles. There comes a time when one must admit one is incapable of handling the situation and then do one's damndest to get the heck out of the situation. As a Commander he is expected to adapt and utilize his Forces in an appropraite manner. He does have that authority, especially when lives of his forces are at risk, they should have come first, and I guarantee you that was well within his ROEs. I would argue that if we had a copy of his ROEs you would find that defending oneself and your fellow soldiers comes listed above the protection of others, as they have been on every mission I've been on.

One again your are taking a black and white view of the situation and the Belgian capture was not the only thing going on. Situations don't change in 1 day, they deteriorate over time.  Dallaire worked towards trying to stem that deterioration.  Commander's mitigate (not eliminate) risk to their soldiers in order to achieve their mission.  This is not an ROE issue at all.

I fail to be impartial when my personal security is at risk, or the security of my fellow soldiers. That is my RIGHT. It is also a RIGHT while serving with the UN. And, it should be a very important RESPONSIBILITY of my Commander to back up that right above all else. If the walls come tumbling down, as a Commander your fiduciary duty is to ensure that you exercise your Command responsibilities to your soldier's and their rights to self-defense, support and re-inforcements. Even the UN would have backed him up on that point, had he put his soldier's in the proper priority that is.

We are not tallking about you or your personal security.  We are talking about whether Dallaire is a coward or is he incompetent.  You have painted a black and white scenario based on a very complex situation.  Life isn't that simple...

I was not passing judgement on LGen Dallaire, or second guessing his judgement at all. He's got a few more years in than I do. I am merely pointing out that all things being equal, the idea that he faced a simple choice between stopping the genocide or saving those 10 soldiers is not realistic. The militias did not present him with such an option. Saying that he sacrificed those 10 to save 500,000 isn't true because 1) he didn't, and 2) it would never have worked anyway, because these kind of things just don't work out that way. How many lives do you reckon those 10 Paras saved by dying that day?

Dallaire (page 239) - "I didn't raise the issue of the Belgian soldiers in tat speech because I wanted to discuss it with Bagosora alone.  I needed to assess it simpact on the entire mission, and I wanted to talk to the senior army leadership, who I hoped mihgt be able to save the situation.  It was that decision, in part, that contributed to the deaths of ten soldiers under my command.  I wanted to proceed with negotiation, as I realized i could not use force without the certainty of more casualties.  I did not have the offensive force to take on a dug-in garrison of more than a thousand troops.  I considered a rescue option irresponsible.  If we used force against the RGF compound, we were then a legitiamate target and we would become a third belligerent.  My aim that morning was to do everything in my power to avoid a confrontation, regain control of the rogue units in Kigali and keep the kialogue and the prospects of the peace accord alive."

I would say he chose the right decision based on the factors at hand but was not able to succeed against the odds.

Not that its of any relevence, but I would venture quite a few Germans, Poles, Russians, French, and others had a pretty big part in the Holocaust. How many Jews did Hitler or Goering personally kill?

Britney, you stated "The massacare of close to a million people isn't something that's just decided on a whim by a few people." To which I replied that the genocide of 6 Million Jews was based on the whim of a few people.  Would the genocide during WW2 have occurred with or without the support of key members of the Nazi hieirarchy?  That to me is the "whim" of a few people and any influence you use of them, can obtain result.

I'd like to think that we would have had enough Balkan experience at that point to have known. But then, perhaps I should stick to discussing events that actually happened during my own lifetime.......

You and me both brother (sister)....
 
Let me amplify that.

The primary responsibility of a commander is the success of the mission. The mission comes before all else.

Part of the success of the mission may require, and usually does require, having the maximum possible number of live soldiers on hand once the mission is complete. But depending on the wider context of the mission, keeping troops alive may be more or less subordinate the the rest of the mission's goals. The more critical the mission, the more likely losses can become acceptable.

No commander plans to have losses. With very, very, VERY few exceptions, nobody ever "sacrifices" troops. Instead, you place troops in situations with varying amounts of personal risk. The more critical the mission, the greater the risk one is normally prepared to assume. That is the "bargin" that commanders strike with their troops - if I ask you to assume a large amount of personal risk, such that the probability of becoming a casualty is fairly high, then the reward associated with that risk is equally high.

It can be the mark of a poor commander to expose troops to levels of risk that far exceed the rewards if they are successful. It can equally by the mark of a poor commander to refuse to expose his troops to ANY risk, even when the rewards for that risk are high. The two imperitives are constantly on the mind of any commander. "How much risk can I reasonably assume, given the nature of the mission?" "Is mission success worth casulties? If yes, how many?"

Dallaire clearly felt, and I agree with him, that his larger mission had the overwhelming priority. He was there to keep the peace. When the peace suddenly and unexpectedly degenerated into active genocide, his mission was to attempt to stop it, or at least mitigate it as best he could - to save as many people as possible given the forces on hand.

Those 10 Beligians were captured. crap happens. Once he realized that the capture had occurred, he was forced to weigh the risks associated with an attempt at a rescue (with a reward of saving up to 10 lives if successful) against the risks of the subsequent fallout wih regards to the overall mission as a whole. His conclusions from the mission analysis were that his probability at being able to carry out the rescue at all was very low, and that even if a miracle occurred and he was able to carry it out successfully, that abandoning his neutral position would both needlessly endanger the people in his command, plus meant failure of the larger mission as a whole.

Dear God what a shitty place to be in. I hope none of us are ever placed in a similar situation and are forced to make the same analysis. But ultimately, I think he made the right decision - and it is tragic that it did not bear fruit, at least as far as those 10 soldiers were concerned. As far as the main mission and the safety of the other people under his command though, that decision DID bear fruit.

How would we be discussing him if he had attempted a suicide mission that got his entire command killed?

DG 
 
One thing that strikes me as odd is all the back seat arm chair commanders here. I would have done this and that, I would have done a show of force and broken those 10 soldiers out and risked the sacrifice of hundreds more of my men.
We all had limited ammo, some may not even had any at all. I had a very small well trained force but most of them had a hard time grouping together as they were dispersed all over the country side. I also had many more soldiers who had very limited training and even less equipment.
Honestly do you actually think that the Belgium government were acting in the best intrest of the mission. (Not referring to the soldiers them selves but their country). They had other motives to be their.

Do you think honestly with all your in depth military training that the General could have affected the out come of those 10 soldiers lives. With out the sacrifice of a large majority of the remainder of his forces.

Why didn't the Belgium's send in their own QRF to quell this capture. Their intell was much better then any one else's in the area. Their was a total different intrest in the area. Face it the Belgium Government sacrificed a few of their own soldiers for their own intrest. They had lots of time and money invested in that region. Not to mention political clout. They probely figured that by sending in a small force they could say that they helped to quell the up rising of one of their Former Colony's, or if that failed they could place the blame on some one else(UN). They helped caused most of the problems their along with a few other country's. Yet they sent soldiers into the situation with little to no support. I think their government and others new the score. Hence why they didn't want to send any sizable force or expensive equipment into the area. The Belgium's had already lost troops in that region over the past years. They new the overall score, With out a sizable force that was well equipped, the mission was to fail. At least they could wash their hands of the whole situation.

To stand here and insult the General and call him names and say you wouldn't follow him into battle is absurd. I bet you the majority of the men whom served under him in Rwanda would follow him any day. Troops on the ground know the score, They new very well what would have happend had they stormed that compound. I bet you inside of those soldiers they thanked the General for not doing it. I know I would have. Is that cowardice, or shamefullness, no it is called common sense.

We get taught in our military training never to attack a trench unless you have a section, to back you up, never attack a section unless you have a platoon, and it keeps going. The General had a those odds stacked against him. Although he was a trench worn down already low on ammo attacking a company.

Unless he had some form of special forces group whom had their own airlift in and out of the compound along with some pretty amazing fire power  his hands were tied.
Face it we are Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen who's lives are at the whim of our Country. Even if that means being on some god forsaken mission in some dirt spot on the other side of the world. We serve to sacrifice, and sacrifice we must.

We weren't their, but if we are going to poll our opinions and our own professional views we need to look out side of the General and his direct actions on the mission. We need to look much further into all the factors involved into the whole mission. This includes the country's directly involved in the mission, The UN, and the warring factions themselves. The death of those Belgium's soldiers had nothing to do with the mission. It had to do with what happend between the Factions and the Belgium Government.
 
DG-41 said:
How would we be discussing him if he had attempted a suicide mission that got his entire command killed?

Certain parts of what we as soldiers are indoctrinated in, and train with the assumption of, must be taken as fundamentals.

For example, I trust, that if a General in charge of my mission/operation, saw me face down in the dirt, having been captured by the enemy, he would leave only long enough to muster what resources he had, before returning to rescue my sorry a$$. Regardless.

So don't go spewing this BS that "the situation had to be properly evaluated" and "there are other factors at play" and "everything is not black and white"

I still challenge any one of you leaders to go to work tomorrow and tell your men that you would leave them behind to protect a dubious peace, or for that matter - any reason. But you won't - will you - because you know it to be wrong  - and you know exactly what your troops (and your bosses for that matter) would say.

So keep defending Senator for life Dallaire - then go tell your troops that you would follow his lead  - I dare you.
 
Daidalous said:
Alright I have a ticket to go see(Rtd) Lt Gen Dallaire   in Trenton    on Nov 3rd.   I have been trying to think of a question to ask him if they do a Q&A   period,   but I can not come up with anything.    So this is where I ask you guys if you have any questions you would like to ask.   I will not ask any question that will prevent me from getting my book signed.

Why don't you just ask him how he's doing, how does he deal all the critics from all the people from all over the world, either be military or civilians. Poeple that says, ''If I would have being there, I would have done this or I would have done that'' Well you know what?? This is C***, Pretty easy to sit behind a keyboard a criticize someone.........As far as I'm concern, this men was sent there with not one hand, but two hands tied behind his back. Nobody can assumed how they would have dealt with this situation because I don't think nobody would have been ready for this type of situation, I don't care the type of training you have, if you don't have the resources you need, there's is not much you can do. Lt Gen Dallaire was sent overthere blindfolded with no back up from the UN or anyone else.

This is part of history now and in some people's opinion, Lt Gen Dallaire is categorized with the worst kind. You mention the name Gen Dallaire to the general population and the first thing that comes to mind is the genocide in Rwanda and this is what he has to live with for the rest of his life. To all the critics out there, would you be able to live with that for the rest of your life??????? To me, this man wakes up every morning with not only 10 belgium soldiers on his minsd but also, the 800,000 victims of the genocides. How does he still go on?? Probably because, he's one of the few with a clear conciense because he knows what really happened overthere and he knows he's not the one to blame. He wasn't one of the suits at the UN headquaters making all the decisions. He was in the middle of all this mess trying to do the best he could with what he had, which was nothing, thanks to the UN. Anybody with a few peacekeeping tours under his belt would know that, don't matter if you're a Pte or a Gen, if there's noboby to help you or provide you with the resources, what can you do??

Anyway, myself, I have a lot of respect for the man and to me, this is just like the old saying ''you can't fight cityhall'' and this is what he had to face. This was all politics with people in suits sitting at Headquaters telling him to fix the problem so they can look good and dispite all the warnings, they just ignored him and he was left all by himself with all this mess....

Just my 2 cents.....

Cheers...
 
I was in Kigali, Rwanda in 96,   not much had changed... the civil wars and killings were still going on, Zaire was also having a civil war, border clashes with Rwanda and Republic of Congo,   Uganda was having border clashes with Rwanda, Kenya and Sudan.   I had spent some time in Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda in later 96, it was an eye opener.

My Questions to ask would be:

Why to this day has the United Nations let the genocide and wars continue without interjection?, is it a case of out of sight, out of mind?    Why is so little being done,   Europe has turned it back, most of the free world has turned their backs, why has everyone turned their backs?

I was in the very area where the Belgique troops were massacered, It was an uneasy experience.   I know I have my personal opinion about it.
 
Popurhedoff said:
My Questions to ask would be:

Why to this day has the United Nations let the genocide and wars continue without interjection?, is it a case of out of sight, out of mind?     Why is so little being done,   Europe has turned it back, most of the free world has turned their backs, whay has everyone turned their backs?
My question to you would be: "How long do we have to intervene?"   They have been murdering each other since the late 1940's and perhaps longer.   The Belgium Congo, as it was once known, saw exactly the same thing happen in the 1950s as we have seen in the last ten years.   These people haven't changed.   The UN sends in Troops and UMOs, etc., and tries to settle the populace down, bring in aid, medicine and education, and once they leave the locals go back to their old ways.   Corruption and War Lords are a fact of life in Africa. Most of the Western World has probably thrown up their arms in frustration at their attempts of bring Peace to a part of the World that may not be ready for it.
Time and better Education will bring about some change.....but it will take a lot of Time.   Foreign Aid and other charities don't seem to have any beneficial effects.
 
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