Our North - SSE Policy Update Megathread

[suffolkowner]

Creeping up to 48 tones, but may have better protection than either vehicle.

its a step above with an autoloading 120mm

 

[markppcli]

The Japanese Type 10 is in the neighbourhood

Famous arms exporter Japan

 

[IKnowNothing]

Despite my opposition to the M10 (on the grounds that it is one more vehicle type to maintain and can be seen as a "tank" by people who don't know better) and the MGS (due to its technical problems) I'm not adverse to a DFSV. I'm not fond of the Centauro 2, for the same reason as the M10 (one more vehicle type.) but not adverse to the Centauro 2 turret if it could be mounted on a LAV chassis in order to standardize the fleet. From a distance it may be doable albeit the Centauro seems to have a bit more mass and a stronger engine than the LAV6.

Re: Centauro 2, I only bring it up (continually) to highlight what is possible in the platform - to try and shake the memory of the Cougar/MGS. A high velocity 120mm and all around STANAG level 6 is a completely different beast

I agree with you about the drawbacks of adding a completely new vehicle type (though the the prospect of a quick MOTS purchase with the R&D done makes one stop to think). But rather than use Centauro turrets I'd hope to go a step further and see if GDLS can keep it all in house, namely by seeing if either theGriffin I turret with the XM360 was viable or the Booker turret could be upgunned with the 360, and if either is viable on a LAV.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Unpopular question: Given you deficiency in lift capability, why do we need a heavy armoured capability in Canada? If we can’t deploy it in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion, why do we need to maintain that capability?

 

[dimsum]

Unpopular question: Given you deficiency in lift capability, why do we need a heavy armoured capability in Canada? If we can’t deploy it in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion, why do we need to maintain that capability?

With our own lift, or using friends?

But as for the idea of not maintaining stuff we can’t use right now, ask the RAF how they liked the years of not having a Maritime Patrol capability after the Nimrod was scrapped.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Unpopular question: Given you deficiency in lift capability, why do we need a heavy armoured capability in Canada? If we can’t deploy it in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion, why do we need to maintain that capability?

Outsider Answer: because we do need and do have that capability deployed elsewhere (and should be trying to expand it), and its hard to generate trained tank squadrons without them having been on a tank before arriving in theatre.

That being said, we should be striving to have as many tanks as we can crew and maintain forward deployed, with few as a absolutely possible to generate those trained crews kept domestically.

 

[FJAG]

Re: Centauro 2, I only bring it up (continually) to highlight what is possible in the platform - to try and shake the memory of the Cougar/MGS. A high velocity 120mm and all around STANAG level 6 is a completely different beast

I agree with you about the drawbacks of adding a completely new vehicle type (though the the prospect of a quick MOTS purchase with the R&D done makes one stop to think). But rather than use Centauro turrets I'd hope to go a step further and see if GDLS can keep it all in house, namely by seeing if either theGriffin I turret with the XM360 was viable or the Booker turret could be upgunned with the 360, and if either is viable on a LAV.

I was being a bit tongue in cheek in my previous post. The problem that I see is that the Canadian Government - especially this Canadian government - has little or no appetite to equipping the Canadian Army. If you parse the details of our "brigade in Latvia" it becomes clear that we are committing little more than we did before on a full time basis; basically a mech rifle coy, a tank squadron an artillery battery. We're adding a bde HQ and maybe an arty regt HQ and some odds and sods. The rest of the eFP battlegroup are international contributors.

The major additional commitment comes from the Danes and Swedes in the way of mech bn and a Canadian flyover light battalion.

If you read the tea leaves again, the new equipment is UOR based ATGMs, C-UAV systems, and a VSHORAD troop. There's a project for two GBAD batteries and that's essentially it. There's nothing new for recce/cavalry - just the ongoing Long Range Surveillance System - and not even a breath about new tanks - including replacements for the ones we sent to Ukraine. IMHO, we don't need a training tank. We need spare parts and mechanics for the tanks we have. That's more than sufficient to meet out Latvia commitment.

Same for artillery. Yes the arty is looking at an SPs but if I were a betting man I wouldn't expect more than a battery plus another (maybe two if we're really lucky) for training in Canada. And my guess is that the four-gun battery will be around for a long time (because Canada is cheap) HIMARS - maybe.

So here's my take on a training tank and the Cougar in particular. I was around when they rolled those out. We thought the Grizzly with a MG turret was a step up from the M113 except when you went close to a muddy field. The Cougar, on the other hand, was recognized as a practical joke by everyone except some black hats who considered they made a worthwhile recruiting tool. You do not need an ersatz "tank" for training. You could learn recce skills in a jeep and tank tactics in a 5/4 with a plywood turret and a gun made out of 4" PVC pipe and a thunderflash. (Don't laugh. It's essentially what most western armies did in the 1930s) It works, but only if there is a real armament program to build the real tanks in a reasonable time. Until then you need just enough extra real tanks to train your new and replacement crews (and to be spares when war finally breaks out)

If we're going to spend money then let's spend it on what we need to equip and sustain our force in Latvia - that means more tanks and IMHO, IFVs and SPs. (and a lot of other things like VSHORAD, ATGMs, drones, EW, cyber, digital comms etc etc) We don't need an DFSV like Centauro - before that what we need are mortars and ATGMs under armour, and a few more serviceable Leo 2s. Enough to equip our force and a reasonable training stock.

There's a fundamental flaw in how Canada does defence. Canada focusses on limiting expenditures on what we need to meet today's commitments rather than building a future force that gives the country some flexibility in how it meets security challenges that are reasonably foreseeable in the future. The current policy is based on a viewing defence equipment expenditures as discretionary. You have a large fixed payroll for personnel and infrastructure but equipment and O&M can be dicked around with in various ways. O&M affects the country's near and mid term future security and equipment its long term future security. Canadian governments typically spend as little on the mid to long term as possible in exchange for immediate vote getting projects.

Unpopular question: Given you deficiency in lift capability, why do we need a heavy armoured capability in Canada? If we can’t deploy it in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion, why do we need to maintain that capability?

It's not an unpopular question but its one used to deflect the real issue. The solution to rapid deployment is quite simple. Our NATO commitment is Latvia. Latvia is a heavy armour (and all kinds of other things) commitment. Preposition the equipment and the ammo stocks in Latvia in secured bunkers and deploying equipment becomes a minor matter. The RCAF can easily airlift the additional personnel needed to round out the brigade.

Deploying to places other than Latvia is a problem for Canada for anything but the lightest of light infantry and not just a heavy force. Light infantry is of limited value unless you can back them up quickly with something heavier and for Canada that would mean at a minimum a LAV-based force. That too is a challenge for Canada's limited airlift capability.

 

[lenaitch]

Or did you just watch several minutes of Patriot launchers at a train crossing?

Lockheed Martin Launches Patriot Missile From VLS in First-Ever Test - Naval News

Lockheed Martin vertically launched a PAC-3 MSE for the first time in a test that downed a cruise missile target.

www.navalnews.com

The discussion was about bringing ships into Ottawa, and by inference, other Canadian cities, to supply air defence. This was made possible by adding Mk70 PDS Sea Cans to the decks of the ships.

Or you could forget the ships and shunt trainloads of Mk70 PDS Sea Cans around the country by rail.

One hundred rail cars = one hundred launchers with 400 cells.

Cells with SM2s, SM3s or SM6s or CAMMs or ESSMs (4 per cell). And now Patriots.

Other options include Tomahawks and NSMs for Coastal Defence.

Militarizing our two Class 1, publicly-held railroads might be a challenge but perhaps a boon to operating crews come contract time.

 

[FJAG]

Militarizing our two Class 1, publicly-held railroads might be a challenge but perhaps a boon to operating crews come contract time.

No militarization needed. Just an OiC under the Emergencies Act once an International or War Emergency is declared. One simply needs to expropriate the required engines and container cars required and a manual on how to operate an engine.

It would, however, be a lot simpler if there actually was a war plan prepared, discussed and exercised with the railroads in question in advance.

 

[SupersonicMax]

With our own lift, or using friends?

But as for the idea of not maintaining stuff we can’t use right now, ask the RAF how they liked the years of not having a Maritime Patrol capability after the Nimrod was scrapped.

How many tanks can we bring per C-17 chock? How long does it take to get sealift across the ocean?

I don’t see us ever deploying heavy armour fast enough and in big enough numbers to be relevant. I’ll also argue that if we need rapid deployment of assets, so do our allies and it won’t be available when we need it most.

Outsider Answer: because we do need and do have that capability deployed elsewhere (and should be trying to expand it), and its hard to generate trained tank squadrons without them having been on a tank before arriving in theatre.

That being said, we should be striving to have as many tanks as we can crew and maintain forward deployed, with few as a absolutely possible to generate those trained crews kept domestically.

We know that pre-positioning them is probably a pipe dream. You need a permanent presence in that location and while Latvia is it now, it probably won’t be in the long term. I just find the lack of agility to deploy heavy armour from theater to theater. Made sense in the 80s when we were in Germany. Doesn’t make much sense now, other than keeping a semblance of capability.

 

[IKnowNothing]

So here's my take on a training tank and the Cougar in particular. I was around when they rolled those out. We thought the Grizzly with a MG turret was a step up from the M113 except when you went close to a muddy field. The Cougar, on the other hand, was recognized as a practical joke by everyone except some black hats who considered they made a worthwhile recruiting tool. You do not need an ersatz "tank" for training. You could learn recce skills in a jeep and tank tactics in a 5/4 with a plywood turret and a gun made out of 4" PVC and a thunderflash. (Don't laugh. It's essentially what most western armies did in the 1930s) It works, but only if there is a real armament program to build the real tanks in a reasonable time. Until then you need just enough extra real tanks to train your new and replacement crews (and to be spares when war finally breaks out)

Ok. Accepted.
Assumptions/Assertions:

• There is no/very limited training value in spending to make the domestic tank stand ins more tank like, therefore TAPV's are fine
• The LRSS does not provide any kind of novel armoured (no gain in firepower, mobility, or protection) capabilty relative to the LAV Bn's, and the new cavalry doctrine is not suited to take advantage of its surveillance capabilities, therefore it should find a new home
• The juice is not worth the squeeze wrt to the medium cavalry capability represented by 30-40 tonne DFSV's

Conclusion: The best use of RCAC dollars is to get the biggest fleet of standardized, not worn out, combat grade MBT's possible, such that we can have as many as possible pre positioned in Latvia, leaving just enough in Canada to provide conversion training / workups to TAPV riding armoured units so thst enough are current to man the tanks in Latvia.

Could we field a 59 regiment in this manner with the 82 tanks we started with, if they were a homogenous fleet of combat grade tanks? Would 23 meet the domestic requirements?
Q

If we're going to spend money then let's spend it on what we need to equip and sustain our force in Latvia - that means more tanks and IMHO, IFVs and SPs. (and a lot of other things like VSHORAD, ATGMs, drones, EW, cyber, digital comms etc etc) We don't need an DFSV like Centauro - before that what we need are mortars and ATGMs under armour, and a few more serviceable Leo 2s. Enough to equip our force and a reasonable training stock.

There's a fundamental flaw in how Canada does defence. Canada focusses on limiting expenditures on what we need to meet today's commitments rather than building a future force that gives the country some flexibility in how it meets security challenges that are reasonably foreseeable in the future.

With respect, there's an undeniable irony in these para's being back to back.

 

[FJAG]

Could we field a 59 regiment in this manner with the 82 tanks we started with, if they were a homogenous fleet of combat grade tanks? Would 23 meet the domestic requirements?

I'm a 44-tank regiment guy but what would I know, I'm not a tanker. All that I know is that tankers around the world have been having the argument about the size and structure of the size and organization of a tank company for decades. A lot have settled on the 14-tank coy, 3 coys per bn + 2 command tanks.

With respect, there's an undeniable irony in these para's being back to back.

Yeah. I could have said "At best Canada focuses ..." or even "Canada doesn't even focus ..."

 

[FJAG]

I don’t see us ever deploying heavy armour fast enough and in big enough numbers to be relevant. I’ll also argue that if we need rapid deployment of assets, so do our allies and it won’t be available when we need it most.

We seemed to manage well enough to get them into Afghanistan in sufficient numbers to be effective and relevant. The question with respect to having tanks in your inventory is will you need them at some point for a mission that needs doing. Latvia is that mission.

Almost by definition heavy armour is not a rapid reaction force. Everyone knows this. The strategic and logistics plan has to take it into account.

We know that pre-positioning them is probably a pipe dream.

Why is it a pipe dream? It's easily done. Even Canada used prepositioned equipment in 4 CMBG in part while the US used REFORGER in large part.

You need a permanent presence in that location and while Latvia is it now, it probably won’t be in the long term.

Canada had a permanent presence in Germany for close to 4 decades. We spent almost a decade in Afghanistan. All of our potential foes are folks who play the long game.

When we went into Germany in the 1950s it was with the idea that we would need a full-time force on the ground because of the rapidity of a Soviet attack. Since then the ability to preposition equipment and reinforce has gone up exponentially and our early threat warnings have also. Canada needs to wean itself off the roto system. That will destroy the army in the long run. That, however, doesn't mean we can't put better solutions in place.

Canada's commitment to the Latvian MNBde really requires a permanent presence of around 1,000 Canadians to form the MN BG core, the bde HQ and the requisite logistics and HQ staffs. The MN BG is one of the bde's BGs, the Dane/Sedes form the second and all we need to add is one additional BG plus additional combat support and combat service support elements. That's probably 1,200-1,500 people which the RCAF could fly in on one lift even if we up the second BG to a mech or combined arms one.

This is neither rocket science math nor a difficult logistics issue to solve.

I just find the lack of agility to deploy heavy armour from theater to theater.

No one wants to or needs to move it theatre to theatre.

Made sense in the 80s when we were in Germany.

We didn't move it around then either other than by European rail networks. Both the Canadians and the German railroad companies were highly efficient at it because they practiced it often. The RCAF played only a minor role in flying in augmentees

Doesn’t make much sense now, other than keeping a semblance of capability.

I guess that's one opinion. Is it your proposal then that we should simply tell NATO to pound salt and get out of Europe?

 

[Halifax Tar]

Unpopular question: Given you deficiency in lift capability, why do we need a heavy armoured capability in Canada? If we can’t deploy it in sufficient numbers in a timely fashion, why do we need to maintain that capability?

That is the question. But you're on Army.ca so chances are the hive decision has already been made. Everyone wants to get them into theatre, but no one has a plan to sustain/replace them once they get knocked out or break down. They are basically one and done toys.

Put them all, except what is required for training, in Latvia.

It's not an unpopular question but its one used to deflect the real issue. The solution to rapid deployment is quite simple. Our NATO commitment is Latvia. Latvia is a heavy armour (and all kinds of other things) commitment. Preposition the equipment and the ammo stocks in Latvia in secured bunkers and deploying equipment becomes a minor matter. The RCAF can easily airlift the additional personnel needed to round out the brigade.

Its not a deflection at all. And this attitude speaks to the general apathy that the CAF has towards sustainment. Its a very fair question. If we don't have a plan for after the first time we get punched in the nose then the whole thing is for not and we've just wasted lives and equipment for peacetime politics.

We seemed to manage well enough to get them into Afghanistan in sufficient numbers to be effective and relevant. The question with respect to having tanks in your inventory is will you need them at some point for a mission that needs doing. Latvia is that mission.

The low intensity of that conflict and complete inability of the enemy to deny our over seas supply lines is skewing your view on this. Russia will have surface, sub surface and air defence which will be hunting for our sustaining forces.

Why is it a pipe dream? It's easily done. Even Canada used prepositioned equipment in 4 CMBG in part while the US used REFORGER in large part.

This is the only way it works, just put them all there now, with the exception of what is required at the armor school; and hope they last long enough if the environment heats up. Because it will be years before Canada sees replacement tanks should we need them in a conventional WW3 scenario.

This is neither rocket science math nor a difficult logistics issue to solve.

It is when you have neither the ability to support that strategic lift in the air or at sea assets to move your equipment and people that make this a difficult logistics issue to solve. Throw into the mix that enemy gets a say in how many of our toys actually make it to theatre and its now a more complicated and difficult issue to solve.

 

[KevinB]

That is the question. But you're on Army.ca so chances are the hive decision has already been made.

Predeployment of heavy forces is the only option to ensure you have those tools.

Everyone wants to get them into theatre, but no one has a plan to sustain/replace them once they get knocked out or break down. They are basically one and done toys.

This is why Canada needs a POMCUS type depot storage system. If I was Galactic Space Emperor, I had have 4 Armor Bde of Gear in Latvia, 1 in a pre deployed Bde, 1 for the flyover Bde and two Bde’s worth of spares.

Put them all, except what is required for training, in Latvia.

I’d go further and push all the armor to Latvia, and run the school in Latvia, Poland or Germany.
The same goes for the Heavy Infantry.

Its not a deflection at all. And this attitude speaks to the general apathy that the CAF has towards sustainment. Its a very fair question. If we don't have a plan for after the first time we get punched in the nose then the whole thing is for not and we've just wasted lives and equipment for peacetime politics.

Agreed.

The CA needs to reform - if you accept a 2Div structure then 1 CAD is a 30/70 entity in Europe, with a large maintenance support network there to keep everything running, and your 2nd Armor Bde and most of the 2 Inf Bde’s to that DIV are Reservists that come over for annual training.

The low intensity of that conflict and complete inability of the enemy to deny our over seas supply lines is skewing your view on this. Russia will have surface, sub surface and air defence which will be hunting for our sustaining forces.

Ack

This is the only way it works, just put them all there now, with the exception of what is required at the armor school; and hope they last long enough if the environment heats up. Because will be years before Canada sees replacement tanks should we need them in a conventional WW3 scenario.

Which is why y’all need extra kit that is there and ready.

It is when you have neither the ability to support that strategic lift in the air or at sea assets to move your equipment and people that make this a difficult logistics issue to solve. Throw into the mix that enemy gets a say in how many of our toys actually make it to theatre and its now a more complicated and difficult issue to solve.

110%

 

[Halifax Tar]

Predeployment of heavy forces is the only option to ensure you have those tools.

This is why Canada needs a POMCUS type depot storage system. If I was Galactic Space Emperor, I had have 4 Armor Bde of Gear in Latvia, 1 in a pre deployed Bde, 1 for the flyover Bde and two Bde’s worth of spares.

I’d go further and push all the armor to Latvia, and run the school in Latvia, Poland or Germany.
The same goes for the Heavy Infantry.

Agreed.

The CA needs to reform - if you accept a 2Div structure then 1 CAD is a 30/70 entity in Europe, with a large maintenance support network there to keep everything running, and your 2nd Armor Bde and most of the 2 Inf Bde’s to that DIV are Reservists that come over for annual training.

Ack

Which is why y’all need extra kit that is there and ready.

110%

We are cut from the same cloth.

IMHO If Canada wants to play the tank game it needs hundreds, not 10s. And anything less than hundreds is just wasted resources for the sake of cap badges and sacred cows that should be allocated elsewhere.

We do not have a big enough force to be all singing and all dancing, and our inability to concentrate what we resources we do have leaves us broad but weak and fragile.

 

[PrairieFella]

We are cut from the same cloth.

IMHO If Canada wants to play the tank game it needs hundreds, not 10s. And anything less than hundreds is just wasted resources for the sake of cap badges and sacred cows that should be allocated elsewhere.

We do not have a big enough force to be all singing and all dancing, and our inability to concentrate what we resources we do have leaves us broad but weak and fragile.

I don't think you'll find any disagreement here that we need hundreds. The government has forgotten since the peace dividend who will actually win a war if the flag goes up, and it looking like it might. It's time for the RCAF and RCN to be good corporate citizens and recognize the Army needs every new penny for the next 5 years to properly be prepared, Navies and Air Forces don't win wars in Europe or continental Asia.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I don't think you'll find any disagreement here that we need hundreds. The government has forgotten since the peace dividend who will actually win a war if the flag goes up, and it looking like it might. It's time for the RCAF and RCN to be good corporate citizens and recognize the Army needs every new penny for the next 5 years to properly be prepared, Navies and Air Forces don't win wars in Europe or continental Asia.

World War Two would beg to differ…

 

[Fabius]

Canada needs to wean itself off the roto system.

Very much this, unfortunately I don’t see any evidence in the Canadian Army that there is any realization of this.
The Army is effectively doubling down on peace time rotations and everything is geared to that.
The UORs coming on line very clearly demonstrate that in their fielding plans.

The rotation mindset and similarly the belief that the Army is only capable of fighting one BG with a tank SQN and an Arty Bty at a time is well established.

Trying to break that mindset will need sustained commitment to culture change by the Army.

 

[dapaterson]

If the Army's deployable force is a BG, the Army's commander can be a BGen...