North Korea (Superthread)

[GAP]

Who knew a whole new lexicon could be created out of something so .......satisfying......

 

[a_majoor]

The amount of information is so limited that any predictions can only be speculation for now:

http://pjmedia.com/blog/will-north-korea-collapse-part-two/?singlepage=true

Will North Korea Collapse? (Part Two)
The situation in North Korea remains cloudy but some information has become available. (Also read Dan Miller's PJ Media article from November titled "Will North Korea Collapse?")

by
Dan Miller

North Korea’s Dear Leader Kim Jong-il is dead at the age of sixty-nine. The spin by the North Korean media is that he died of a heart attack caused by overwork: “He worked day and night for socialist construction and happiness of people, for the union of country and modernisations. He left us so suddenly.”

Here is a video from the North Korean media of assembled denizens of Pyongyang, some in tight military-like formations, lamenting his death. Residence in that city, the capital, is carefully limited to those deemed faithful to the regime. Luxuries unavailable elsewhere are provided there.

An e-mail alert sent by STRATFOR on December 19 states that Kim died on

    the morning of Dec. 17, according to an official North Korean News broadcast at noon Dec. 19. Initial reports say Kim died of a heart attack brought on by fatigue while on board a train. Kim is believed to have suffered a stroke in 2008, and his health has been in question since.

He may have died shortly before the 17; official reports from the North are not usually very candid.  In any event, the apparent two-day delay in the official death announcement — from the morning of December 17 until noon on December 19 — may be significant. If for nothing else, time was needed to ensure stability. Now, the country has essentially shut down:

    Following the official announcement of Kim Jong Il’s death today, North Korea has imposed rigid social controls, including the complete closure of markets.

    An inside source told Daily NK this lunchtime, “The jangmadang is closed and people are not allowed to go outside. Local Party secretaries are issuing special commands through local Union of Democratic Women unit chairwomen, and the chairwomen have been gathered at district offices for emergency meetings.”

    According to the source, National Security Agency and People’s Safety Ministry agents have been deployed in streets and alleyways to control civilian movements. There have not been any signs of public unrest to date.

    Kim Jong Il’s sudden death has apparently caught people off-guard, the source revealed, commenting, “Nobody had the slightest idea about the General’s death even right before they saw the broadcast. You can hear the sound of wailing outside.”

North Korea has also “urged an increase in its ‘military capability’ as the death of North Korea’s enigmatic leader Kim Jong Il spurred fresh security concerns in the tense region.” On the same days as Kim’s death was announced, North Korea test-fired two short-range missiles off its eastern coast. There has been little additional information from the provinces as to what else may be happening there in response to Kim’s death.

In South Korea,

    President Lee Myung-bak canceled the rest of his Monday schedule and put all members of South Korea’s military on “emergency alert,” his office said. The two nations never signed a peace treaty following the Korean War of the early 1950s, leaving the two nations technically at war.

    After an emergency Cabinet meeting Monday, Lee asked South Koreans “to go about their lives.”

    “For the sake of the future of the Republic of Korea, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is more important than anything else. It should not be threatened by what has happened,” he said.

The death of Kim Jong-il will significantly disrupt the recent United States-North Korean negotiations over food aid and the termination of its nuclear activities. It was reported on December 17 that between December 15 and 17 (Kim’s death on the morning of December 17th was probably not then known by the negotiators to have occurred), the U.S. and North Korea had resumed talks about food aid and there appeared to be an agreement to send 240,000 tons of food supplies in twelve monthly shipments of 20,000 tons each. The sides, the sources said, “reached the agreement based on North Korea’s pledge to implement initial measures of denuclearization that include a suspension of its uranium enrichment program.”

On December 18 – the day after Kim’s death but the day before the official announcement — it was reported that “an agreement by North Korea to suspend its controversial uranium enrichment program will likely follow within days.” However, upon learning of Kim’s death,

    the Obama administration says it remains committed to stability on the Korean peninsula and is closely monitoring developments there following the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il and the apparent transfer of power to his son.

    The administration had been expected to decide, possibly as early as Monday, whether to try to re-engage the reclusive country in nuclear negotiations and provide it with food aid, U.S. officials said Sunday. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the situation, said Kim’s death would likely delay the effort.

    The officials said the U.S. was concerned about any changes Kim’s death might spark in the military postures of North and South Korea, but were hopeful calm would prevail.

As a minimum, it will be necessary for the United States to gather and analyze information from credible sources on who is in charge in the North and to see what may happen there next.

Kim’s death had long been anticipated, with glee but also with trepidation. His quite young son, Kim Jong-un (variously reported as between twenty-eight and thirty), is his apparent successor and the path had been well laid for his succession; the “Brilliant Young General,” who has no military experience,  is now referred to in the North Korean media as the “Great Successor.” However, it cannot yet be divined whether he will be accepted by the military or shunted aside so that a regent can assume control. In view of substantial propaganda efforts made during the past year or so to elevate his stature and popularity in the North, his continued but perhaps temporary presence in an at least a ceremonial role seems likely.

The leadership of China, said to be the only country with good access, is likely to be better able than any other to find adequate clues for predicting and perhaps for affecting the future. China may, or may not, share some of its information with the United States and others. If it does, there is no clear reason to anticipate that it will be completely forthcoming; to do so probably would not be in China’s own best interests.

In November, I wrote an article at PJ Media titled “Will North Korea Collapse?“ It was based largely on a study done by an official Russian think tank that concluded that the collapse of the North would be triggered by the death of Kim Jong-il and that the entire peninsula would eventually come under the dominion of the South. The think tank viewed that as a positive development for Russia. The Dong A-Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper, saw substantial significance in the think tank’s analysis and commented back in November:

    Russia has shunned using the term “collapse” for the North, so it is unusual for the think tank, which helps devise Moscow’s foreign policy, to consider the collapse of the North as a fait accompli. This signals that either the North is showing abnormal signs that cannot be taken lightly or Russia is making a major change in its assessment of the North’s status. Moscow has apparently judged that the North is on a downward path toward collapse and that the path is rapidly narrowing.

As also noted in my November article, Russia and North Korea’s principal ally, China, have different interests. China does not desire reunification of the peninsula under South Korean control. Rather, according to Chinese President Hu about a year ago,

    “independent and peaceful reunification” of the two Koreas is “in the fundamental interest” of both sides.

    Asked whether China believes “that reunification of the Korean peninsula will bring more stability than maintaining the status quo?” Hu said, “As a close neighbor and friend of [both Koreas], China hopes that the North and the South will improve relations and achieve reconciliation and cooperation through dialogue and consultation and eventually realize independent and peaceful reunification, and we support their efforts in this regard. This is in the fundamental interests of both the North and the South and conducive to peace and stability on the peninsula.”

    The Chinese leadership has expressed support for reunification independent of the military and political influence of the U.S. and led by the two Koreas themselves several times. But it has been widely believed to prefer the status quo for strategic reasons. (Emphasis added)

The transition from Kim Jong-il, critical to the future of the two Koreas, had already begun by last November.

    Kim Jong-un, thought to be in his late 20s, emerged from obscurity a year ago this past week as a four-star general and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party. . . .

He has also been seen on state-run television with

    “octogenarian party secretaries bowing to a man their grandchildren’s age before accepting the smiling man’s handshake or kowtowing to his instructions.”

    A year after Kim Jong-un made his public debut as North Korea’s leader-in-waiting, scenes like that — the old party elite groveling — have become a staple of North Korea’s propagandist media, a crucial tool for the country’s leader, Kim Jong-il, to elevate his son as his successor.

Now that the transition, probably to Kim Jong-un but possibly temporarily and/or only as a figurehead, is substantially further underway than back in November, it may in the long term generate tensions between Russia and China. Further speculation about the short and long term consequences without additional information from the North seems pointless.  If the very recent news develops over the next few days updates will be provided.

 

[a_majoor]

More on what may happen:

http://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/2011/12/20/what-happens-next-in-north-korea/?print=1

What happens next in North Korea?

Posted By Richard Fernandez On December 20, 2011 @ 2:12 pm In Uncategorized | 80 Comments

Bruce Cumings, the University of Chicago academic who is the “left’s leading scholar of Korean history [1],” believes that “North Korea is a misunderstood land.” He thinks the terrible state of the northern half of the peninsula is at least partly America’s fault [2] and no one can escape the “significant responsibility that all Americans share for the garrison state that emerged on the ashes of our truly terrible destruction of the North half a century ago.”

The problem with that assertion is summarized in a graph of per capita GDP in the Washington Post [3] which shows that the divergence of the two Koreas actually occurred in the early 1970s. Prior to that time “the two countries were roughly comparable — in fact, AEI’s Nicholas Eberstadt argues that, at the time of Mao Zedong’s death, North Korea’s workers were more productive and better educated than China.”
[4]

Self-inflicted

So you can forget the effects of the Korean War. The disaster in the North was entirely self inflicted; it was a catastrophe written and directed in Pyongyang by the Kim family.

Somehow they managed to take things from bad to worse. Ezra Klein at the Washington Post notes the second inflection point, in 1994, took place after Kim Jong Il succeeded from his brutal father. The Dear Leader managed to fix nothing and add more wreckage of his own. The North Korean economy, already in a flat dive, nosed over like a dive bomber without speed brakes and has been descending at full tilt ever since. The Spearhead [5] argues that North Korea’s dynastic mode of Communism may be partly to blame as the Kims found some way to combine the worst aspects of Communism with all the shortcomings of  hereditary decadence into a form of governance from hell. To bolster the point, it presents a series of portraits which appear to show a process of reverse evolution, like ape emerging from man.

    The following pictures demonstrate a clear progression from manly alpha conqueror to effete omega descendant. One can see something of the family resemblance down the line, but Kim Jong-un, the latest scion of the Kim dynasty, is a sorry specimen compared to grandfather Kim Il-sung.

Given this unfortunate regression, the suggestion is that the North Koreans might see yet another inflection point with the accession of Kim Jung Un, the latest in the royal line.

MSNBC’s chart of the Kim dynasty [6] shows a Shakespearean palace intrigue: the banishment of the more enterprising and competent members of the Kim family into its outer reaches. They drown in the bath, die abroad, or make themselves scarce, when their fingers fail to clutch the iron ladder at the top of the heap. It’s not exactly the Partridge Family. A rundown of palace intrigue and politics is provided by the Daily Telegraph [7], which depicts an inner circle at daggers drawn:

    Kim Kyong Hui: The late leader’s younger sister. She kept a low profile for decades until 2009, when she began appearing with her brother during “on-the-spot guidance” trips nationwide. Now considered a top political official who has shot up in the ranks in two years, she is expected to play a caretaker role with her nephew. Kim is said to have a fiery temperament but suffers from ill health.

    Jang Song Thaek: Kim Kyong Hui’s husband and a Soviet-trained technocrat who was a rising star until he was demoted in early 2004, seen as a warning from his brother-in-law against cultivating too much influence. Jang was brought back into the fold in 2006, and he has been gaining influence since then. He heads the party’s administrative department, and oversees the intelligence agency.

    Kim Yong Nam: President of the Presidium of North Korea’s parliament, often represents the country and is considered a nominal head of state. He is a member of the party’s Central Committee.

    Ri Yong Ho: Vice marshal and chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, promoted to vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission last year and a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau. Ri was close to Kim Jong Il and is said to have strong ties with Jang.

    Choe Yong Rim: Promoted to premier last year. His family is said to have long-standing ties with the Kim family. His daughter, Choe Son Hui, is a department director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The relative prominence of the North Korean inner circle has been inferred from the now-famous “escalator photo” showing the late Kim Jong Il descending in splendid preeminence as the rest of the clan bring up the rear.

Given the situation, the basic scenario for North Korea is that if it goes on as before much longer the country must disintegrate. Sooner or later it will simply shake itself to pieces, leaving loose nuclear componentry everywhere.

Hence, many diplomats are pinning their hopes on being able to convince whomever is in charge that now is the time to come to Jesus, in a manner of speaking. Victor Cha, writing in the New York Times [8], emphasizes that Pyongyang is in the Last Chance Saloon.

    North Korea as we know it is over. Whether it comes apart in the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together after the untimely death of its leader, Kim Jong-il. How America responds — and, perhaps even more important, how America responds to how China responds — will determine whether the region moves toward greater stability or falls into conflict. …

    While some observers hope that Kim Jong-il’s death will unleash democratic regime change, China will work strongly against that possibility, especially if such efforts receive support from South Korea or the United States. Given that Beijing has the only eyes inside the North, Washington and Seoul could do little in response.

    Yet even China’s best-laid plans may come apart. The assistance may be too little, too late, especially given the problems the new leadership will face. A clear channel of dialogue involving the United States, China and South Korea is needed now more than ever.

People are now taking bets on whether North Korea manages to pull itself together or whether it will down that last drink and stumble off into the wilderness of destruction. Which it is going to be, argues Eli Lake [9], will soon be indicated by whether North Korea goes ahead with its scheduled nuclear test:

    A key test of this proposition will be whether Kim, believed to be 27 or 28, will move forward with a third nuclear test that was widely expected for 2012. The regime of the recently departed Kim Jong-il promised that 2012 would be the year North Korea would become a “full nuclear weapons state,” language that most analysts interpreted to mean Kim intended to authorize the country’s third nuclear test….

    Whether North Korea will move forward on this will depend on the younger Kim’s relationship with the country’s military, which the U.S. has tried to make inroads with in recent years despite worsening overall relations between the two countries. Experts expect significant jockeying for power inside the military even if it embraces the cult of the Kim family and its latest, youthful successor.

The leading indicator will be whether or not there will be a big boom — the nuclear kind — in North Korea and who sets it off. Not exactly a hopeful start for a new year, but for those who are interested, click here for a virtual tour [10] of North Korea. It’s not as bad as advertised. It is possibly worse.

What will the North Korean leadership do after the Dear Leader is buried?

    Fight among themselves for power and complete the ruin (55%, 409 Votes)
    Stay the course and continue the Kim family business of extortion (45%, 337 Votes)
    Pull together and turn a new leaf (0%, 2 Votes)

Total Voters: 744

(Thumbnail on PJM homepage based on a modified Shutterstock.com [14] image.)

Article printed from Belmont Club: http://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez

URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/2011/12/20/what-happens-next-in-north-korea/

URLs in this post:

[1] left’s leading scholar of Korean history: http://hnn.us/articles/2742.html

[2] America’s fault: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Cumings#cite_note-11

[3] Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/the-economic-legacy-of-kim-jong-il/2011/12/19/gIQA4osP4O_blog.html

[4] Image: http://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/files/2011/12/North-Korea-vs.-South-Korea-FIXED.jpg

[5] Spearhead: http://www.the-spearhead.com/2011/12/20/north-korea-and-dynastic-decline/

[6] MSNBC’s chart of the Kim dynasty: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39382760/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/north-koreas-first-family/

[7] Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8964926/Kim-Jong-il-North-Korean-leader-dies-aged-69-live.html

[8] Victor Cha, writing in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/opinion/will-north-korea-become-chinas-newest-province.html?_r=1

[9] Eli Lake: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/19/north-korea-s-youthful-new-leader-kim-jong-un-faces-nuclear-test.html

[10] virtual tour: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6ixGYzbLz0&feature=related

[11] Storming the Castle at Amazon Kindle for $3.99: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B005MH19XI/wwwfallbackbe-20

[12] No Way In at Amazon Kindle $3.99, print $9.99: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1453892818/wwwfallbackbe-20

[13] Tip Jar or Subscribe for $5: http://wretchard.com/tipjar.html

[14] Shutterstock.com: http://www.shutterstock.com/

 

[jollyjacktar]

Shared with the usual caveats.  Full story and photos at link below.

Oh well, looks like I'm out of a job: South Korean 'Dear Leader' double facing grim future after demise of North Korean dictator 
By Lee Moran

He has been the spitting image of Kim Jong Il for more than decade - with his bouffant hairdo, large glasses and olive green suit.  And while he got plenty of abuse in the street from the misguided few who really thought he was the North Korean dictator, South Korean Kim Young Sik was never short of work as his double.  But now it looks like the good times are over and southern Kim will have to hang up his wide-waisted trousers for good following the death of northern Kim.  'People try to comfort me, saying some figures are more famous when they're dead, but I don't think it will be the case with Kim,' said the engraver.  But he added wistfully: 'I feel very empty, as if a part of me died.'

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2080206/Kim-Jong-Il-double-facing-grim-future-demise-North-Korean-dictator.html#ixzz1i7VsutAG

 

[a_majoor]

Some interesting facts and figures. Perhaps the best case scenario is the ruling elites flee if/when the DPRK collapses so we don't have to focus on show trials and truth and reconciliation committees, but rather focus on the integration of the two economies. Having large numbers of northerners coming south to work and sending part of their pay north as remittances might also be a good thing, and spark the rebuilding of the north (especially the rural infrastructure) at a much faster pace than otherwise possible:

http://news.yahoo.com/sudden-reunification-could-trouble-seoul-060911043.html

Sudden reunification could be trouble for Seoul
Associated PressBy FOSTER KLUG | AP – 4 hrs ago

    In this Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011 photo, a North Korean woman rides a bicycle at a collective farm near the town of Sariwon, North Korea. Kim Jong Il's death has raised hopes in South Korea that a single, reunified Korea could be coming soon. His son's quick rise to power, however, makes a sudden reunification unlikely, and that may be a good thing for Seoul. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)

    In this Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2011 photo, a North Korean woman rides a bicycle at a collective …

    In this Oct. 6, 2011 photo, a North Korean man walks near farm fields on the outskirts …

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A single, reunified Korea has long been a cherished dream of people on both sides of the world's most heavily fortified border. South Korea even has a Cabinet-level ministry preparing for the day.

And while Kim Jong Il's death last month has raised those hopes higher among some in Seoul, few are eager to talk about the cold reality: Sudden reunification could be traumatic for both countries.

Any North Korean collapse and hurried reunification, analysts say, could spell the end of Pyongyang's ruling class while flooding Seoul with refugees and causing huge financial burdens — perhaps trillions of dollars — for South Koreans who have only recently gotten used to their country's emergence as a rising Asian power.

Korea observers aren't predicting such a collapse or the kind of "big bang" reunification that happened in Germany, which saw the overnight fall of the communist side and its swift absorption into its Western neighbor. The new North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il's son Kim Jong Un, is fast consolidating power, winning key backing from the government and military.

Still, the extraordinary changes in North Korea following the Dec. 17 death of the man whose iron rule lasted 17 years have stirred up dreams of a single Korea among some in the South. And not just in those with memories of life before the country was divided into U.S.- and Soviet-occupied zones in 1945.

The Swiss-educated Kim Jong Un "is less allergic than his father was to introducing new ideas from the world. That will help ease isolation and open room for reunification," said Bae Sang-il, a 36-year-old office worker. "A generational change is meaningful in North Korea."

Many South Koreans support the idea of eventual reunification, but they seem more wary of the huge costs that will come with it.

A poll in South Korea late last year, before Kim's death, showed just over half of those interviewed believed they would eventually be better off after reunification, although more than two-thirds said the costs are bigger than the benefits.

Both countries talk about reunification, but they have very different notions of what it would be.

North Korea sees it as a two-state federation, with each state abiding by its own rules and regulations but as one Korea.

South Korea and its U.S. ally would likely balk at anything other than a Korea that's a liberal democracy, or at least moving in that direction.

From Seoul's point of view, slow and steady are crucial for any successful reunification. A sudden reunification would be a serious blow for South Korea's vibrant economy and well-ordered society.

South Korea, whose constitution enshrines the goal of reunification, will be much better off, analysts say, if it can gradually build up a North Korean economy that Seoul estimates is about one-fortieth its own size.

Officials in Seoul will be faced with a monumental set of problems, whatever happens. They will likely have to open up the North's economy to trade and investment, quickly raise the living standards of millions, control the flow of North Koreans into the South, and retrain North Korean bureaucrats so they can help run the country under new policies.

This will be very expensive.

A South Korean government-affiliated institute said recently that the cost could be up to $240 billion after a year and up to $2.4 trillion after a decade.

South Korea's president has urged his country to prepare for reunification by studying the possibility of adopting a tax aimed at raising money for the costs of integration. The idea has largely stalled for the time being.

The German model is often raised for Korea, but there are important differences.

Germans in the west largely footed the bill for reunification after the collapse of communism, bringing the overall infrastructure of the former East Germany up to a standard similar to that in the West.

North Korea's population, however, is about half the size of the South's, while East Germany's population was only a quarter of the West's, according to Erik Lueth, an economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland. East Germany, he points out, was one of the wealthiest of the Soviet affiliated states; North Korea is much poorer than the South, and there are estimates of widespread malnutrition.

Also, East Germany's ruling elite, chafing under the Soviet yoke, was not averse to the idea of uniting with West Germany and even accepting its capitalist system. North Korean leaders, analysts say, won't quickly accept a system that would take away their power and seek accountability for a rule that the United States and others say often trampled on rights.

"Reunification would be terrible for North Korea's elite and wonderful for the North Korean people, although there would be a traumatic period of adjustment," said Ralph Cossa, president of Pacific Forum CSIS, a Hawaii-based think tank. "For the top handful of North Korean leaders, reunification under Seoul would mean jail or worse."

For South Korea, reunification "will no doubt be messy and costly, even if it comes with a whimper, not a bang," Cossa said. Still, "living with a hostile, unpredictable, nuclear-armed North Korea is not much fun either."

Reunification could also provide eventual benefits for the South's economy.

Economist Marcus Noland at the Peterson Institute for International Economics describes a "peace dividend" that would come with a reduction in military tensions and the associated drop in military spending this would allow. The North also has abundant natural resources and a relatively well-educated and cheap labor force.

Predicting the future is, of course, a gamble, especially in a place as unpredictable as North Korea. That hasn't stopped people from trying: Paddy Power, an Irish betting agency, is offering odds of 12 to 1 that Korean reunification occurs before 2020.

History, however, provides some potential clues about North Korea's future. Despite famine, international isolation and outside skepticism, North Korea survived the 1994 death of Kim Il Sung, the North's founder and father of Kim Jong Il.

"Now, despite a food shortage and economic hardships, the regime will probably be able to avoid a worst-case scenario due to unity among its top officials and assistance from China," former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo wrote recently in the Chosun Ilbo.

So reunification, at least for the time being, seems a distant dream. And that may be a good thing for Seoul.
___
Associated Press writers Hyung-jin Kim and Sam Kim contributed to this story from Seoul. Follow AP's Korea coverage at twitter.com/APklug and twitter.com/samkim_ap

 

[Edward Campbell]

Notwithstanding the potential problems of reunification - and Germany had them, too (still has some after 20 years) - the advantages, for everyone, HUGELY outweigh the disadvantages of the status quo.

 

[a_majoor]

Same old, same old:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/01/05/china-cringes-as-north-korea-thumps-chest/

China Cringes As North Korea Thumps Chest

With friends like North Korea, who needs enemies? That’s probably what China was thinking after yet another round of needless chest-thumping by its “ally” North Korea reminded all Asia why it might not be such a bad idea to keep the U.S. active and engaged in the region. The Wall Street Journal reports (subscription required) that

    North Korea rebuked Japan for what it saw as a lack of respect over the death of Kim Jong Il and called Tokyo “the laughingstock of the world” because of its frequent changes of government—the latest indication Pyongyang’s new regime has no interest in improving relations with countries it considers foes.

    Pyongyang’s state news agency used virtually identical language to its admonishment last week of South Korea. The comments show the regime now led by Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong Eun appears to be returning to its traditional pattern of lashing out at the countries it has long portrayed to its citizens as enemies: South Korea, Japan and the U.S.

As the head of state changes in “the world’s most stable” dictatorship, the regime wants everyone to be clear that nothing other than the first name of the ruling Kim will change. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies in the region are planning to step-up their security operations:

    [T]he South Korean Ministry of National Defense said it would sign a new joint operational plan with the U.S., its chief ally, this month and increase the number of annual joint exercises.

China’s alliance with North Korea has always been a marriage of convenience, but the bride isn’t any better looking or sweeter tempered as the years go by. Unfortunately, China doesn’t have many options. If the Kim dynasty were to collapse, it would likely send millions of refuges across the Yalu River, creating widespread chaos in Manchuria. Nevertheless China now sees North Korea not so much as an asset but as a liability that must be tolerated.  China and North Korea may still be “closer than lips and teeth” in Chairman Mao’s old phrase, but the teeth are gritted and the jaw is clenched.

 

[Kalatzi]

"OFFICIAL STATEMENT FROM HIS EXCELLENCY ADMIRAL GENERAL ALADEEN
SUPREME LEADER
ALL TRIUMPHANT GENERAL AND CHIEF OPTHAMOLOGIST OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF WADIYA

I am saddened to learn of the passing of my dear friend Kim Jong-Il.
Our thoughts go out to his wife and 813 children.
“K-Jo” was a great leader, good friend and average double’s badminton partner.
He died as he lived, in 3-inch lifts.
An extraordinary man, he did so much to spread compassion, wisdom and uranium throughout the world.

On behalf of myself, Ahmadinejad, Chavez and Newt Gingrinch, we would like to welcome his son, Kin Jong Un into the "Axis of Evil.”

Link Here http://splitsider.com/2011/12/sacha-baron-cohens-general-aladeen-has-released-a-statement-on-kim-jong-ils-death?ref=obsplitsider

 

[BadgerTrapper]

I felt the need to stir the pot here, 2 weeks and no activity. Not sure if you've seen this yet, but this analyses our southern neighbour one on one with North Korea.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

link?

 

[BadgerTrapper]

http://www.rense.com/general37/nkorr.htm

I apologize, kind of an "off" day.

 

[DBA]

http://www.rense.com/general37/nkorr.htm

No reasoning or analysis in it at all, just a endless barrage of factoids, anecdotes, comments and opinions followed by conclusions that take the opinions as fact.  Often they are barely related to each other. While some of the opinions and conclusions may be true there is nothing in the article to support them. It also seems to be 10+ years old with some updates made around 2003.

 

[a_majoor]

What happened with the North Koren nuclear program and the implications for other nuclearizing regimes:

http://pjmedia.com/blog/lessons-from-north-korea-for-israel-and-iran/?print=1

Lessons from North Korea for Israel and Iran
Posted By Rick Richman On February 8, 2012 @ 12:00 am In Asia,History,Homeland Security,Iran,Israel,Koreas,Middle East,US News,World News | 8 Comments

On January 20, President Obama told [1] a New York reception that “we’re not going to tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of this Iranian regime.” Four days later, in his State of the Union address [2], he issued this declaration:

Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.

The words were as direct as presidential language gets: we will not “tolerate” an Iranian nuclear weapon and will take “no options off the table” — complete with Obama’s trademark preface, “Let there be no doubt.” In his Super Bowl interview on Sunday, Obama reiterated [3] that “no option is off the table.”

But this is not the first time an American president declared he would not “tolerate” a nuclear weapon, insisted on dismantlement of a nuclear weapons program, applied crippling sanctions — and then declined to act after the regime violated an explicit presidential warning.

George W. Bush said it in 2003 with respect to North Korea; issued the warning in 2006; failed to act in 2007; and left office with an expanded North Korea nuclear weapons program in place, which expanded dramatically under Barack Obama.

The North Korea story is important not only in itself, but because of its obvious implications for the current face-off with Iran. As Iran evaluates President Obama’s seemingly clear words, it knows what happened — or didn’t happen — with respect to similar rhetoric in the case of North Korea. From the memoirs recently published by George Bush [4], Dick Cheney [5], and Condoleezza Rice [6], we can now piece together what occurred. The story places Obama’s recent words in a context that leads to an important conclusion.

In 2001, the Bush administration inherited a failed North Korea policy. The Clinton administration had negotiated an “Agreed Framework [7]” in 1994 after North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agreed Framework provided $4.5 billion in aid and assistance in exchange for North Korea’s promise to suspend work on its covert nuclear weapons program, but the promise was not kept. The incoming Bush administration was told that the most pressing national security question was North Korea, which was threatening again to expel all inspectors and restart its facilities.

Bush decided the Clinton approach had been backwards: U.S. concessions had been made for North Korean promises of future performance. Bush told his national security team that henceforth North Korean performance would precede any additional U.S. aid or diplomatic concessions. The new administration considered the North Korean nuclear program and its possible proliferation a global, not just a regional, issue — a concern magnified by the events of September 11 and the inclusion of North Korea in an “axis of evil” with Iraq and Iran.

There were raucous debates within the Bush administration about how to respond to North Korea. Everyone agreed North Korea was engaged in serious violations, but they differed on how to respond. Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, together with John Bolton in the State Department, favored regime change, believing the existing regime would never make a deal (or at least not one worth making). Regime change had occurred in Iraq, and late in 2003 Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program out of concern for its own regime.

On May 23, 2003, at a joint press conference with the Japanese prime minister, Bush declared [8] the U.S. would not “tolerate” nuclear weapons in North Korea, and he defined what that meant:

We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. … We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Rice favored a policy of “tailored containment” — combining pressure with sending a U.S. envoy and expanding the group of nations to negotiate. She personally prevailed on Bush to support that approach, recounting in her memoir that she had a “heart to heart” talk with him, telling him it “was surely a long shot, but maybe Kim Jong-il could be induced, step by step, to give up his nuclear ambitions in exchange for benefits, which would also be doled out step by step.” Her approach was to unite other countries on a strategy of insisting not on regime change but simply a change in regime policy, while developing defensive measures.

The “Six Party Talks” began in 2003 and from the beginning made almost no progress. But in September 2005, Rice’s envoy, Christopher Hill, reported he was close to getting agreement on a “Joint Statement” that would set a “framework” for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In her memoir, Rice calls the Joint Statement [9] a “breakthrough” document. But here is how she describes what happened after that:

Unfortunately, the North Korean issue would soon settle into a kind of predictable pattern; cooperation from Pyongyang and progress in negotiations followed by misdeeds and stalemate. In November, the talks stalled once again, and they would lie fallow for more than a year as North Korea probed for division among the parties and an opportunity to walk back past agreements.

The talks not only stalled but broke down. On July 4, 2006, North Korea test-fired seven missiles, including an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), ignoring multiple warnings not to do so. The United States and Japan sponsored stronger sanctions at the UN.

A few months later, North Korea exploded an underground nuclear device. The next day, Bush went before cameras at the White House and declared [10] that North Korea was “one of the world’s leading proliferators of missile technology, including transfers to Iran and Syria.” Then he issued this warning:

The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action.

Rice thought the North Korean missile tests and underground explosion gave the U.S. the “upper hand” in public relations, and that it was therefore time to . . . engage. She argued for a strategy of offering North Korea a “grand bargain” (her words) — a peace treaty recognizing the regime if it would give up its nuclear weapons.

In early 2007 she pushed ahead, sending Hill back to North Korea in hopes of moving the process forward, and the U.S. agreed to ease sanctions and provide fuel oil in exchange for North Korea agreeing once again to a process for dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

In the Spring of 2007, however, the U.S. also learned that North Korea was secretly assisting Syria in building an undeclared nuclear reactor — one capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The head of Israeli intelligence met at the White House with Vice President Cheney and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, going over photos and other intelligence material. The pictures showed the reactor had a “striking resemblance” (the same phrase is used by Bush, Cheney, and Rice in each of their books) to the North Korean one.

Israel asked the U.S. to destroy the reactor — something Bush in his memoir says would have been “no sweat,” and which Cheney writes could have been accomplished “with ease.” Cheney supported the Israeli request — for reasons going far beyond the reactor itself:

I believed an American military strike on the reactor would send an important message not only to the Syrians and North Koreans, but also to the Iranians, with whom we were attempting to reach a diplomatic agreement to end their nuclear program. An American strike to destroy the Syrian reactor would demonstrate that we were serious when we warned as we had for years against the proliferation of nuclear technology to terrorist states. … [O]ur diplomacy would have a far greater chance of being effective if the North Koreans and Iranians understood that they faced the possibility of military action if the diplomacy failed.

Cheney held a private lunch with Bush and urged him to act, and Rice recounts that the national security team met on the issue “for the better part of two months.” Cheney made a formal presentation to the National Security Council, but both Rice and Defense Secretary Gates were opposed, and no one else supported Cheney. The CIA had a high degree of confidence that the Syrian site was a nuclear reactor, but only a low degree of confidence that it was part of a nuclear weapons program, and Bush felt this was insufficient to justify a military strike.

They recommended a diplomatic course to Israel — multilateral action to expose Syria, with the possibility of military action later if Syria did not dismantle its plant. Rice told Bush she thought Israel would accept this advice; Cheney predicted that Israel would act if the U.S. did not. A few months later Israel struck the Syrian reactor, without seeking or receiving a green light from Bush. Israel removed the threat to itself, but the U.S. failure to act sacrificed the broader impact an American strike would have had on North Korea and Iran.

Rice writes that by 2008, opponents of continued diplomacy with North Korea were asking how the U.S. could negotiate with a country that had lied about its nuclear facilities, was still pursuing nuclear weapons, and had engaged in proliferation with Syria. She acknowledges this was “a very good and penetrating question,” but she “felt strongly that we had to go the last mile.” She decided to try one more time to get a “breakthrough.” She persuaded Bush to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for a “verbal commitment” from North Korea to address its uranium enrichment program. Bush removed it from the list; the commitment went unfulfilled; talks collapsed again; and the Bush administration ended.

Cheney catalogs in his memoir what happened during the first two years of the Obama administration: (a) in April 2009, North Korea tested an ICBM; (b) in May 2009, it tested a second nuclear weapon; (c) in September 2009, it announced it was in the final stages of enriching uranium and weaponizing plutonium; (d) in November 2010, it publicly unveiled 2,000 new centrifuges at its facility.

In February 2011, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told [11] the Senate North Korea had continued to develop nuclear weapons; that “we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, but we assess it has the capability to do so”; that it had successfully tested ICBM technologies; and had quite possibly “has built other uranium enrichment facilities.”

This week — one year later — Clapper testified again before the same Senate committee. This time, he told [12] the Senate flatly that North Korea “has produced nuclear weapons.” He did not specify how many.

The same day President Obama was assuring his New York audience that he would not “tolerate” an Iranian nuclear weapon, Secretary of State Clinton was asked [13] about Iran’s recently expressed willingness to return to talks: did she believe Iran was willing to engage fully, and what steps did she want the Iranians to take? She responded as follows:

SECRETARY CLINTON: … [W]e all are seeking clarity about the meaning behind Iran’s public statements that they are willing to engage, but we have to see a seriousness and sincerity of purpose coming from them. They know we want to see them coming to the table to seriously engage about the future of a program that is prohibited under their obligations pursuant to the NPT and in light of Security Council resolutions. So we will await their response. …

QUESTION: … You didn’t say what those specific steps you wanted to see were from Iran. Can you tell us what those are?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, we won’t know until we know whether they’re serious about engaging with us.

QUESTION: You don’t have anything in mind already?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, yeah. We do. They have to give up their nuclear weapons program. (Laughter.) They have to be – they have to be willing to come to the table with a plan to do that.

QUESTION: The confidence-building measures were specifically referenced in the [P5+1 October] letter [to Iran] –

SECRETARY CLINTON: … I think what’s important is that confidence will start with their conveying a seriousness of purpose to engage. … That would build confidence, and then the additional steps will await the actual resumption of negotiations.

After three years of outstretched hands, whirring centrifuges, and sanctions that “bite” but have not stopped the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the Obama administration wants to negotiate, but is a little uncertain about exactly what step it wants Iran to take first, other than build our confidence so negotiations can begin.

On the same day Obama and Clinton made their respective statements, the distinguished nuclear scientist Jeremy Bernstein published “Iran: The Scientists and the Bomb [14]” on the New York Review of Books blog. He expressed pessimism that sanctions or negotiations will work, and he concluded that:

Thus, if the Iranians … have a goodly stock of 20 percent enriched uranium—as they now claim they do—they should be able to reach weapons-grade pretty quickly. … So far the IAEA inspectors have been able to monitor these enrichment activities to a degree. But the Iranians have a penchant for building secret enrichment sites, and for all one knows they may have one or more of these operating. Of one thing I am quite certain. They have plans that can be used to make a nuclear weapon. …

We have announced that we will not permit the Iranians to make a nuclear weapon. But where is the red line? … What if we only know after Iran has tested a device?

In the comments section to his post, Bernstein added one more observation:

[The Iranians] also see the examples of Libya and North Korea. Libya gave up its nuclear program and look what happened. The North Koreans did not and look what happened.

What happened with North Korea was a U.S. president declared he would not tolerate a nuclear weapons program, but allowed a naive secretary of state to pursue “breakthroughs” for four years. No options were taken off the table, but none were used — not even when there was blatant North Korean proliferation in violation of an express presidential warning. Under the successor — and current — U.S. president, the North Korean program continued unabated.

As Iran’s nuclear program heads toward a possible point of no return, the U.S. inaction in 2007, and three years of continued North Korean nuclear activity under the Obama administration, with U.S. intelligence now conceding publicly that North Korea has an unspecified number of nuclear weapons, may complicate the effort to persuade either Iran or Israel of the credibility of Obama’s words.

A commitment not to “tolerate” an Iranian nuclear weapon will not likely suffice, absent significant public steps to demonstrate it is not simply rhetoric that has been heard before. Last week, the Bipartisan Policy Center issued an impressive report [15] on how to demonstrate a credible military option. It will take more than words, no matter how clearly expressed.

Article printed from PJ Media: http://pjmedia.com

URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/blog/lessons-from-north-korea-for-israel-and-iran/

URLs in this post:

[1] told: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/19/remarks-president-campaign-event
[2] address: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address
[3] reiterated: http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-obama-in-super-bowl-interview-i-deserve-a-second-term-20120205,0,3127673.story
[4] George Bush: http://www.amazon.com/Decision-Points-George-W-Bush/dp/0307590631/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1327884964&sr=8-1
[5] Dick Cheney: http://www.amazon.com/My-Time-Personal-Political-Memoir/dp/1439176191/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327885390&sr=1-1
[6] Condoleezza Rice: http://www.amazon.com/No-Higher-Honor-Memoir-Washington/dp/030758786X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1327643558&sr=8-1
[7] Agreed Framework: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
[8] declared: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030523-4.html
[9] Joint Statement: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm
[10] declared: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061009.html
[11] told: http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf
[12] told: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/james-clapper-senate-testimony.html
[13] asked: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/01/182322.htm
[14] Iran: The Scientists and the Bomb: http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jan/20/iran-scientists-bomb/
[15] impressive report: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/meeting-challenge-stopping-clock

 

[cupper]

Seems like they want to stir the pot up a little more.

http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/envoy/north-korea-issues-unusually-specific-threat-152720861.html

North Korea issues unusually specific threat

By Dylan Stableford

North Korea's military vowed a new and unusually specific threat to its neighbors, saying it would reduce South Korea "to ashes" in less than four minutes.

The statement, released Monday when programming was interrupted on North Korea's state TV by a special report, comes amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Earlier this month, North Korea was unsuccessful in a long-range missile launch, prompting worries that North Korea may conduct another nuclear test. South Korean officials say new satellite images show that North Korea has been digging a tunnel in what appears to be preparation for a third atomic test.

According to the Associated Press, the statement from North Korea was unusual in promising something soon and in describing a specific period of time.

The North Korean military threatened to "reduce all the rat-like groups and the bases for provocations to ashes in three or four minutes, (or) in much shorter time, by unprecedented peculiar means and methods of our own style."

For months the North has castigated South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the conservative administration for insulting their leadership and criticizing a new cruise missile capable of striking anywhere in the south.

South Korean officials responded, urging North Korea to end the threats. "We urge North Korea to immediately stop this practice," Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Hyung-suk said, according to the Associated Press. "We express deep concern that the North's threats and accusations have worsened inter-Korean ties and heightened tensions."

Meanwhile, in a meeting Sunday with a North Korean delegation in Beijing, China's senior official on foreign policy praised the leadership shown by North Korea's new young leader, Kim Jong Un.

The meeting follows the April 13 launch of what the United States called a disguised ballistic missile test by North Korea. The rocket disintegrated minutes after launch.

-- With reporting by Ron Recinto

 

[Gunnera]

North Korea has launched three test flights of Taepodong-2 vehicles since 1998, with each flight resulting in failure.....North Korea launched a third test of the Taepodong-2 on April 13, 2012, which resulted in an early ...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

How to bite the hand that feeds you....or perhaps the leadership is begining to lose control of certain elements?

Armed N.Koreans 'kidnap Chinese sailors'

This file illustration photo, taken from Chinese border town of Dandong, shows sun rising over the Yalu River bridge that leads into North Korea, in 2011. Twenty-nine Chinese fishermen have been kidnapped at sea by unidentified North Koreans who have demanded 1.2 million yuan ($190,000) in ransom, fellow sailors and media said Thursday. AFP - Twenty-nine Chinese fishermen have been kidnapped at sea by unidentified North Koreans who have demanded 1.2 million yuan ($190,000) in ransom, fellow sailors and media said Thursday.

The men were fishing in three separate vessels on May 8 when a group of gunmen boarded their boats and forcibly took them over, locking up those on board, said a boat owner surnamed Sun who has been in touch with them.

"On May 9, one of the kidnapped boat owners used a phone given to him by the North Koreans to call us. He said the kidnappers asked for a ransom of 400,000 yuan per boat," Sun -- who like the hostages is from the northeastern port city of Donggang -- told AFP.

Chinese state media reports said the men were fishing off the coast of northeastern China, in the waters that run between China and North Korea, when they were snatched.

The foreign ministry said it was "keeping close contact with North Korea to safeguard our citizens' rights and interests," according to reports. The ministry did not immediately respond to AFP's request for comment.

Sun, who refused to give his full name, said another boat owner he works with managed to speak to them again earlier this week.

"He could hear in the background that sailors were being beaten and there was the sound of crying, and the boat owner said they had not eaten for two days," he said.

"If the kidnappers don't get the money by today (Thursday), they will sell off the boats, which are worth 3 million yuan."

Another Donggang-based boat owner surnamed Zhang said no threats had yet been made against the sailors themselves.

Media reports say the three boats were taken to North Korean waters, but Sun said he was "100 percent sure" there were Chinese people among the hijackers.

"They left us a Chinese number, and once, the hijacked boat owner called, I picked up the phone and asked if there were any Chinese people besides them. He whispered 'yes'," he said.

Chinese fishermen regularly run into difficulties with the authorities of other countries as they fish in areas that are claimed by both China and its neighbours.

However, there was no immediate indication that the North Korean gunmen who seized the Chinese sailors were security forces from the isolated country -- a ally of China.

Calls to the Donggang government went unanswered, and an official at the government of Dandong city -- which oversees Donggang -- said they were not in charge of the case.

http://www.france24.com/en/20120517-armed-nkoreans-kidnap-chinese-sailors

 

[MikeL]

http://news.yahoo.com/us-commandos-parachuted-n-korea-report-212356834.html

I doubt this is true,

Any other thoughts?
True/OPSEC Failure?
PsyOps campaign?
BS news story?

US commandos parachuted into N. Korea: report
AFP – 2 hrs 27 mins ago

US and South Korean special forces have been parachuting into North Korea to gather intelligence about underground military installations, a US officer has said in comments carried in US media.

Army Brigadier General Neil Tolley, commander of US special forces in South Korea, told a conference held in Florida last week that Pyongyang had built thousands of tunnels since the Korean war, The Diplomat reported.

"The entire tunnel infrastructure is hidden from our satellites," Tolley said, according to The Diplomat, a current affairs magazine. "So we send (South Korean) soldiers and US soldiers to the North to do special reconnaissance."

"After 50 years, we still don't know much about the capability and full extent" of the underground facilities," he said, in comments reported by the National Defense Industrial Association's magazine on its website.

Tolley said the commandos were sent in with minimal equipment to facilitate their movements and minimize the risk of detection by North Korean forces.

At least four of the tunnels built by Pyongyang go under the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Korea, Tolley said.

"We don't know how many we don't know about," he admitted.

Among the facilities identified are 20 air fields that are partially underground, and thousands of artillery positions.

In February, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that had built at least two new tunnels at a nuclear testing site, likely in preparation for a new test.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

http://news.yahoo.com/us-commandos-parachuted-n-korea-report-212356834.html

I doubt this is true,

Any other thoughts?
True/OPSEC Failure?
PsyOps campaign?
BS news story?

My guessimate? Yes, they did send SF into N.K. to gather info and now the operation (for whatever reason) has now been halted and the Americans decided to send a not to subtle hint to the N. Koreans that the U.S. know has the locations of their underground facilities. On the other hand, the operation never happened and the Americans/S. Koreans are just jerking the Commies around.

 

[Kirkhill]

Option 1 - True
Option 2 - Psyops
Option 3 - Steve McGarrett

Ki'ilua
While Five-0 investigates the death of a muckraking reporter, Jenna returns to ask McGarrett for help finding her fiancé in North Korea--which is actually part of Wo Fat's revenge plot--and Joe White leads the mission to bring them home.

 

[Nemo888]

Ground penetrating radar made such incursions unnecessary at least a decade ago.(commercial) Did anyone not know about all the N Korean Tunnels? One of the worst kept secrets in the world. Only slightly more poorly kept than all the cool sh@t American satellites can do.