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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
The first one, a modified MQ-9B, supplements maritime patrol airplanes and therefore is not for setting on a corvette.

The second one is an extra asset to extend the surveillance range of the ASW helicopter, has no attack capability, and still needs a ASW helicopter for coordination of the search and the kill. Says so actually in the fourth sentence of the second article you quote, which reads:

"While UAS are not intended to replace conventional ASW helicopters or Maritime Patrol Aircraft, they can play an important role in extending coverage in vast operational theatres or in smaller areas inaccessible to crewed assets." [my underlining]

So, for a "cheap" ASW escort, you go with the basic need, and today, for ASW, it is still an ASW helicopter.

Happy Sunday to you too! :giggle: (p.s.: Here, we are watching a nice little 40 cm snowfall with 45 Km winds. I'll go out snow blowing soon)
 
If only there were crew in the CCG that knew how to do this. (Cough! Cough! ex-DFO's, if any are left in the service)
Training the crews to use and care for a .50cal is the easy part. Installing the mounts, protection and comms is slightly harder. The biggest part is training the Captains and Deck Officers in the ROE's and getting them to make those shoot/no shoot decisions. I see the .50cals as a stepping stone to make the CCG add constabulary work to their agenda.
 
The first one, a modified MQ-9B, supplements maritime patrol airplanes and therefore is not for setting on a corvette.

The second one is an extra asset to extend the surveillance range of the ASW helicopter, has no attack capability, and still needs a ASW helicopter for coordination of the search and the kill. Says so actually in the fourth sentence of the second article you quote, which reads:

"While UAS are not intended to replace conventional ASW helicopters or Maritime Patrol Aircraft, they can play an important role in extending coverage in vast operational theatres or in smaller areas inaccessible to crewed assets." [my underlining]

So, for a "cheap" ASW escort, you go with the basic need, and today, for ASW, it is still an ASW helicopter.

Happy Sunday to you too! :giggle: (p.s.: Here, we are watching a nice little 40 cm snowfall with 45 Km winds. I'll go out snow blowing soon)
CCG should also be looking at shipboard UAS for ice recce and SAR
 
Training the crews to use and care for a .50cal is the easy part. Installing the mounts, protection and comms is slightly harder. The biggest part is training the Captains and Deck Officers in the ROE's and getting them to make those shoot/no shoot decisions. I see the .50cals as a stepping stone to make the CCG add constabulary work to their agenda.
Otherwise the CCG should be the CCS - replace ‘G’uard with ‘S’ervice.
 
But it meets the requirements for a modern corvette: A small-ish vessel capable of close escort work in a group, capable of handling single threat environments, either ASW or AAW, at a time, or capable of acting alone in a lower threat environment such as constabulary work or anti-piracy / embargo scenarios.

P.S.: I forgot to specify that the vessel I envisaged would have a simpler power plant: Twin diesels providing for two shafts with variable pitch propellers, for a max speed of 24-26 Kts range.
Can we build it though?
Cut the numbers to 6 and port as much of the equipment over from the Halifax's as possible?
 
Training the crews to use and care for a .50cal is the easy part. Installing the mounts, protection and comms is slightly harder. The biggest part is training the Captains and Deck Officers in the ROE's and getting them to make those shoot/no shoot decisions. I see the .50cals as a stepping stone to make the CCG add constabulary work to their agenda.
I can’t see that going over well with many of them.

I’m sure more than a few would say “If I wanted to do navy stuff, I would have joined the navy!”
 
Some thought should be given to designing and installing hardpoints and necessary cabling and space to provide self defense armament/sensors on the new CCG icebreakers and multi-purpose ships. They don't need to be armed yet, but it would be good if capable to do so. I would push to have all major CCG vessels armed with a couple of .50cals to provide protective cover for hosted boarding parties. It would also slowly change the mindset of the crews, Captains and management as to the role of sovereignty enforcement.
There was a podcast on the CGAI network recently that talked about this exactly. If the Captain and possibly other officers were “commissioned” with the authority to apply and enforce the law at sea, any CCG vessel becomes a vessel of opportunity in a security setting, negating the need for RCMP, CBSA, DFO officers to be embarked
CCG should also be looking at shipboard UAS for ice recce and SAR
Had they not trialled and potentially purchased Camcopters a few years back? Those S-100 units?
 
There was a podcast on the CGAI network recently that talked about this exactly. If the Captain and possibly other officers were “commissioned” with the authority to apply and enforce the law at sea, any CCG vessel becomes a vessel of opportunity in a security setting, negating the need for RCMP, CBSA, DFO officers to be embarked.
That's still just constabulary, not armed conflict. Even in terms of constabulary work, enforcing Canadian laws in Canadian waters, there's a lot of steps in front of law enforcement before a trigger gets pulled. Things like knowledge of the particular statute, powers and authorities, reasonable grounds, etc. I wouldn't have the first clue what observations of a fishing vessel would give me reasonable grounds to take investigative or enforcement action.

Limiting authority under a particular statute to a ship's officer(s) doesn't necessarily give them the authority to 'deputize' their crew to do their bidding. It's all fun and games until use-of-force gets involved. Unless there is some new concept of unlimited civilian liability that I haven't heard of, no one else can direct someone who has the authority to use lawful force - particularly lethal - to, in fact, use it. Liability belongs to the person exercising it.

I suspect trying to change the Coast Guard into something that it is currently not might run up against a unionized workforce who would argue they didn't sign up for their new role and aren't paid for it. Introducing the element of shooting weapons, especially heavy ones, implies an environment where somebody might shoot back (or first).
 
The first one, a modified MQ-9B, supplements maritime patrol airplanes and therefore is not for setting on a corvette.

The second one is an extra asset to extend the surveillance range of the ASW helicopter, has no attack capability, and still needs a ASW helicopter for coordination of the search and the kill. Says so actually in the fourth sentence of the second article you quote, which reads:

"While UAS are not intended to replace conventional ASW helicopters or Maritime Patrol Aircraft, they can play an important role in extending coverage in vast operational theatres or in smaller areas inaccessible to crewed assets." [my underlining]

So, for a "cheap" ASW escort, you go with the basic need, and today, for ASW, it is still an ASW helicopter.

Happy Sunday to you too! :giggle: (p.s.: Here, we are watching a nice little 40 cm snowfall with 45 Km winds. I'll go out snow blowing soon)


In....

Uncrewed rotorcraft​

The submarine-hunting robot helicopter is designed to help the Royal Navy. The three-tonne autonomous Proteus drone, developed by defence company Leonardo, is meant to be a low-cost jack of all trades.

Submarine drones​

Britain is planning to patrol the Atlantic using the Type 93, a drone submarine which is expected to free up crews on warships for other missions. The drones form part of a Royal Navy initiative focused on anti-submarine warfare.

Cheap loitering munitions​

The Army is set to acquire 200 loitering munitions as part of a Medium Range Precision Strike system. The unmanned drones are fitted with built-in warheads and designed to hover around a target area and crash into it.

Decoy missiles​

Decoy cruise missile-like weapons such as the ADM-160 MALD are designed to confuse and distract enemy air defences at low cost. Boasting a range of up to 500 miles, the decoys have been used by Ukraine against Russia.

Out ...

Watchkeeper drone programme​

The £1.35bn programme was meant to provide cutting-edge surveillance capabilities and deliver real-time battlefield intelligence using its fleet of 54 drones but faced numerous setbacks since its launch.

CH-47 Chinook fleet​

A quarter of the UK's CH-47 Chinook fleet was decommissioned as part of MoD cuts in Nov 2024. Fourteen helicopters costing £1.4m each will be replaced by the newer H-47(ER) variant this year.

HMS Albion, HMS Bulwark, HMS Northumberland​

Defence Secretary John Healey said HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark were retired by previous ministers but 'superficially kept on the books at a cost of £9m a year'. HMS Northumberland has been deemed uneconomical to repair.

RFA Wave Knight and RFA Wave Ruler

The Royal Navy wave class tankers will be retired by March 2025. The two oilers have not been operational since 2017 and 2022 respectively. The UK is said to have previously approached Brazil about a potential sale.

...

Proteus RWUAS


The final design of Proteus was revealed in January 2025. Its airframe is derived from the Kopter AW09 single-engine light helicopter and shares its shrouded anti-torque system and five-bladed rotor. It is designed to carry modular payloads which can be interchanged to meet different mission requirements, such as at-sea replenishment and anti-submarine warfare.

1739759777742.png1739759821172.png

Parent helicopter Kopter AW09

  • Length: 13.13 m (43 ft 1 in)
  • Height: 3.74 m (12 ft 3 in)
  • Volume: 6.5 m3 (230 cu ft)
  • Empty weight: 1,300 kg (2,866 lb)
  • Max takeoff weight: 2,850 kg (6,283 lb) with internal load, 3,000 kg (6,614 lb) with external load
  • Fuel capacity: 750 liters (198 US gallons), 600 kg (1,323 lb)
  • Rotor systems: 5 blades on bearingless main rotor, shrouded 120 cm tail rotor <a href="Kopter AW09 - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>35<span>]</span></a>
  • Powerplant: 1 × Safran Arriel 2K dual FADEC turbine engine , 750 kW (1,006 hp) <a href="Kopter AW09 - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>55<span>]</span></a><a href="Kopter AW09 - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>56<span>]</span></a>
  • Main rotor diameter: 10.96 m (35 ft 11 in)
 
I suspect trying to change the Coast Guard into something that it is currently not might run up against a unionized workforce who would argue they didn't sign up for their new role and aren't paid for it. Introducing the element of shooting weapons, especially heavy ones, implies an environment where somebody might shoot back (or first).
It's a uphill battle, but can be done, not exactly the first armed unionized force in Canada. The role of the MG is to provide support and protection to the boarding parties provided by other agencies.
 
I can’t see that going over well with many of them.

I’m sure more than a few would say “If I wanted to do navy stuff, I would have joined the navy!”
We also had Captains saying ; "I won't let Deck apes care for a pregnant woman" when we started the Rescue Specialist program which was a bottom up initiative. I was also part of the diveteam at Sea Island Hovercraft base which management tried to shut down several times. Eventually change is accepted and becomes day to day ops.
 
That's still just constabulary, not armed conflict. Even in terms of constabulary work, enforcing Canadian laws in Canadian waters, there's a lot of steps in front of law enforcement before a trigger gets pulled. Things like knowledge of the particular statute, powers and authorities, reasonable grounds, etc. I wouldn't have the first clue what observations of a fishing vessel would give me reasonable grounds to take investigative or enforcement action.

Limiting authority under a particular statute to a ship's officer(s) doesn't necessarily give them the authority to 'deputize' their crew to do their bidding. It's all fun and games until use-of-force gets involved. Unless there is some new concept of unlimited civilian liability that I haven't heard of, no one else can direct someone who has the authority to use lawful force - particularly lethal - to, in fact, use it. Liability belongs to the person exercising it.

I suspect trying to change the Coast Guard into something that it is currently not might run up against a unionized workforce who would argue they didn't sign up for their new role and aren't paid for it. Introducing the element of shooting weapons, especially heavy ones, implies an environment where somebody might shoot back (or first).
I don’t think the proposal was meant to turn the CCG into an armed service in the same way as the Navy. It was largely intended to be a step towards making use of the much larger fleet availability as a constabulary tool, as you rightly noted.

The proposal took into account the starting point of where the department is now, what sort of difficulties there are to overcome and took the approach that this would be an incrementally applied transformation. The parallel drawn was the state of Customs being an unarmed, civil service to now being invested with an enforcement, protection and investigation mandate. Of course it took quite a long time, but a journey of a thousand miles and all…

Maybe what it looks like in the interim is having armed (not M2HB, but sidearm/long gun) DFO officers on more than just two patrol ships. Were there to be an increase in their numbers and availability, it would go some distance towards having the right people in the right places at critical times, or so the idea went.

The other pitch made was for the new vessels that are being constructed (POLAR, MEMTV, etc) to have at least the ability designed into them for more advanced sensors and communication links, to aid in intelligence gathering and relay. It may be too late for the heavy breakers, but the smaller ones from David and VSY are still in design stage, so the time to include any of that is now.

If I had any technical expertise at all, I’d post the link for the CGAI podcast that I’ve referenced above. I found it very interesting and well worth the listen.
 
It's a uphill battle, but can be done, not exactly the first armed unionized force in Canada. The role of the MG is to provide support and protection to the boarding parties provided by other agencies.
Indeed, and perhaps @Haggis can share how long it took/is taking within the CBSA. One of the first things to do would be change any applicable laws. I assume CBSA enforcement personnel were already classed as peace officers, or that status was changed prior to them being armed. Whatever Coast Guard member - certain ones or all of them - who would potentially have to use lethal force (and possess the otherwise prohibited weapons to do so) would have to be similarly or somehow designated, even if their role is just in support of other enforcement personnel.
 
Indeed, and perhaps @Haggis can share how long it took/is taking within the CBSA. One of the first things to do would be change any applicable laws. I assume CBSA enforcement personnel were already classed as peace officers, or that status was changed prior to them being armed. Whatever Coast Guard member - certain ones or all of them - who would potentially have to use lethal force (and possess the otherwise prohibited weapons to do so) would have to be similarly or somehow designated, even if their role is just in support of other enforcement personnel.
Border Services Officers (BSOs) were already peace officers prior to the beginning of the Arming Program in 2016. The program ran for ten years to equip, train and arm approximately 8500 BSOs. Keep in mind that this included requalifying those who were trained annually while also continuing to qualify existing officers while also training new recruits, a huge undertaking.
 
You notice that I arm the ships, but shy away from giving CCG it's own boarding parties. I personally think arming the ships with MG's will be easier than standing up armed CCG boarding parties.
I can see the crews using the MG's to protect the boarding party or to be a threat to ships they want to inspect. However the type of people that want to be on a armed boarding party are not the same type that want to build beacons and scrape/paint buoys and other dirty work.
CCG could stand up a few boarding party teams and then fly them to the ship as required. They be Peace Officers with specialized training related to boarding and inspecting ships.
As for changing the laws, I seen that done several times. As my friend said, "Just by the stroke of a pen"
 
Here's my dream:

Made in Canada Corvete (or light frigate - your choice of denomination) 2,000 to 2,400 tons displacement, 120 meters approx. length with: 32 CAMM-MR, 76 mm Leonardo main gun, 2x 35 mm remote controlled gun, SMART-S Mk 2, CANTASS, 2x French SLAT anti-torpedo system, CANTASS, hangar for one Merlin ASW helicopter, CCS330. Size of purchase: 12 but not, repeat not, at the expense of any of the RCD's.

However, bought as an emergency program, with the Halifax's being brought home from oversea deployment as training ships to get these ready for front line employment.
My understanding is that one of the hard requirements for the CMMC was max 105m length due to berthing requirements. As far as the other stated requirements of approx. 1,000 tons displacement and a crew of 40 frankly I think someone's been smoking some pretty serious stuff to think all of the stated requirements can fit in a ship that size and be operated by a crew so small. The stated timelines are also out to lunch for a new design to be delivered in a 10-year timeframe (and as far as I can see there are no existing designs that meet the stated requirements).

I also question the serious role creep that seems to be in the requirements. Strike-length VLS for BMD and Space Ops? If we're going to get into the BMD game do we need our launchers to be on our small combatants? Wouldn't land-based interceptors be cheaper? Land strike capabilities? Do we really envision putting our corvettes close enough to launch land strike missiles? Isn't that ideally the role for our future submarines and stealth fighters?

Realistically since I think the primary maritime threat to Canada is enemy submarines then the CMMC should be primarily an ASW platform. A vessel of 105m or less is totally doable but the displacement is almost certainly going to be closer to 2,000 tons. Complement of 40 is in dreamland I think but could be in the 100 or less range with automation and some survivability risk. An embarked helicopter is ideal for ASW operations but the Cyclone takes up a lot or real estate unless we either jump on the uncrewed bandwagon (Firescout, etc.) or procure a smaller MH (AW-159?).

What off the shelf designs are out there that we could get the first several made off shore while we possibly get a Canadian shipyard tooled up to take over production for the balance of the order? And what plan do we have to keep that shipyard busy after the CMMC run is complete? Unmanned "arsenal" ships? With the CMMC's trending more to the "frigate" end of the spectrum is there then a requirement for something cheaper to replace the lower-end roles of the Kingston-class? Maybe something like the Vard-7-072? Has a flight deck for UAV operations and can deploy with an ISO container in the aft for a containerized VDS so still has some ASW detection capabilities to supplement the Rivers and CMMC's in wartime if required.
 
My understanding is that one of the hard requirements for the CMMC was max 105m length due to berthing requirements. As far as the other stated requirements of approx. 1,000 tons displacement and a crew of 40 frankly I think someone's been smoking some pretty serious stuff to think all of the stated requirements can fit in a ship that size and be operated by a crew so small. The stated timelines are also out to lunch for a new design to be delivered in a 10-year timeframe (and as far as I can see there are no existing designs that meet the stated requirements).

I also question the serious role creep that seems to be in the requirements. Strike-length VLS for BMD and Space Ops? If we're going to get into the BMD game do we need our launchers to be on our small combatants? Wouldn't land-based interceptors be cheaper? Land strike capabilities? Do we really envision putting our corvettes close enough to launch land strike missiles? Isn't that ideally the role for our future submarines and stealth fighters?

Realistically since I think the primary maritime threat to Canada is enemy submarines then the CMMC should be primarily an ASW platform. A vessel of 105m or less is totally doable but the displacement is almost certainly going to be closer to 2,000 tons. Complement of 40 is in dreamland I think but could be in the 100 or less range with automation and some survivability risk. An embarked helicopter is ideal for ASW operations but the Cyclone takes up a lot or real estate unless we either jump on the uncrewed bandwagon (Firescout, etc.) or procure a smaller MH (AW-159?).

What off the shelf designs are out there that we could get the first several made off shore while we possibly get a Canadian shipyard tooled up to take over production for the balance of the order? And what plan do we have to keep that shipyard busy after the CMMC run is complete? Unmanned "arsenal" ships? With the CMMC's trending more to the "frigate" end of the spectrum is there then a requirement for something cheaper to replace the lower-end roles of the Kingston-class? Maybe something like the Vard-7-072? Has a flight deck for UAV operations and can deploy with an ISO container in the aft for a containerized VDS so still has some ASW detection capabilities to supplement the Rivers and CMMC's in wartime if required.
i took @Oldgateboatdriver plan as more of a solution to Halifax class rust out vs the Kingston Class Replacement
 
You notice that I arm the ships, but shy away from giving CCG it's own boarding parties. I personally think arming the ships with MG's will be easier than standing up armed CCG boarding parties.
I can see the crews using the MG's to protect the boarding party or to be a threat to ships they want to inspect. However the type of people that want to be on a armed boarding party are not the same type that want to build beacons and scrape/paint buoys and other dirty work.
CCG could stand up a few boarding party teams and then fly them to the ship as required. They be Peace Officers with specialized training related to boarding and inspecting ships.
As for changing the laws, I seen that done several times. As my friend said, "Just by the stroke of a pen"
I see the point you’re making, Colin, but even RCN boarding parties are made up from a very wide variety of trades. I’m sure there are people better informed than me that can vouch for how diverse boarding party backgrounds can be. Might be the very thing that provides a nice change of pace for someone who wants a break from buoy husbandry.
 
I see the point you’re making, Colin, but even RCN boarding parties are made up from a very wide variety of trades. I’m sure there are people better informed than me that can vouch for how diverse boarding party backgrounds can be. Might be the very thing that provides a nice change of pace for someone who wants a break from buoy husbandry.
Shooting a MG during practice will be a thrill for them. But the majority of deck crew have a "construction worker" mindset, they are generally really good at seamanship, working hard and getting dirty types. They even see SAR as "necessary evil" which they will do as required, but most don't see it as a primary task. In my day the Buoytending fleet and the SAR fleet barely spoke and looked down on each other. It's better now, but the boarding party would be like the dive team, requires 80% of the training time/budget for 5% of the job. Which is why we only have a CCG diveteam at Sea Island and they travel on the westcoast to assist where required.
 
Land strike capabilities? Do we really envision putting our corvettes close enough to launch land strike missiles? Isn't that ideally the role for our future submarines and stealth fighters?
Wouldn't a corvette be the platform of choice for pirates and other coastal pests? The eternal brig/schooner/gunboat+boats and boarding/landing parties role, for which subs and fighters aren't well-suited. Being able to reach inland seems useful for that sort of thing.
 
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