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Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

Also, remember what happened to the 200 Vandoos on ATH that got a ferry ride over to Haiti years ago; not many were mobile after some heavy seas and their faces matched their uniforms.
Sounds like we could use something more suited for troop transport.
1205px-BPC_Dixmude.jpg
 
Every string on this site ends up with the same caveat: staffing. While people may not want to commit to a full career they may be quite happy to sign on in the reserves. Particularly if they can stay in their home region for much of their time. I can see growing the reserve, particularly here in Ontario where you have the Great Lakes to provide the sea room. Simple enough to position one or two of the Kingston Class replacements in Hamilton or even Midland, Orillia or Owen Sound and train from there. Do the same in Quebec. Granted that the crew won't be fully certified but they can be trained in basic watch-keeping and ready for more when needed or when they wish. Each ship would probably require a nucleus of full time people but perhaps having such a posting might prompt some to stay in. Just a thought.

Increasing the pay for all by a significant amount might also induce people to want to join up as well
Building more base housing and not charging local market rates would also help.
 
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Damen Naval offers pre-designed, customised options for payload areas, Command & Control, weapon, and platform systems. Working through the requirements with the customer, Damen Naval is able to select the most suitable - tailored - platform configuration. In addition, the modular building system is ideally suited to fulfil any economic development requirement and to involve local yards in the construction process.


The Damen Crossover XO 131 L is developed with the main focus is on payloads with higher weight. The XO 131L is fitted for self-defence and has for her logistic role, It displays a larger flightdeck and moderate speeds. Commercial rules are applied.

131
Length (m)
5500
Displacement (t)
18-22
Speed max (kn)
56-83
Crew
200
Additional personnel




Low crew. High capacity. Adequate for patrols.
 
The NSPS makes a major distinction between ships under and over 1000 tonnes displacement. Kingstons fall under the line.
1703784620286.png
General characteristics
Class and typeKingston-class coastal defence vessel
Displacement970 long tons (990 t)
Length55.3 m (181 ft 5 in)
Beam11.3 m (37 ft 1 in)
Draught3.4 m (11 ft 2 in)

The smallest "large" vessels currently built under the NSPS are the OFSVs built by Sea Span at 3212 tonnes

1703784317658.png
General characteristics
TypeFisheries research vessel
Displacement3,212 t (3,161 long tons)
Length63.4 m (208 ft 0 in)
Speed13 knots (24 km/h; 15 mph)

What happens if the tonnage of the small vessels were raised to 2000 tonnes from 1000 tonnes?

Vard's Vigilance is apparently a 75m vessel which puts it broadly into the same class as the CCGS Leonard J Cowley (72 m and 2080 tonnes) and the Irish OPV Roisin (79 m and 1500 tonnes). The RNZN's Protectors are 85m and 1900 tonnes. Denmark's Knud Rasmussen OPV's (which are not Vard designs) are 72m and 1720 tonnes.

1703784525843.png

Can some of Admiral Topshee's concerns be addressed by advancing a Kingston replacement and utilizing some of the smaller yards? The displacement of hulls seems to be rising in any event. 4000 tonne frigates are becoming 8000 tonne destroyers. Multi-Role and Arctic hulls are moving up beyond 6000 tonnes. Maybe the smaller yards could be given a bit more leeway on displacement.

Could the larger hulls take some of the mission, and training, burden off the Halifaxes? Perhaps allowing some of the CPFs to be tied up, or even laid up? Maybe some or all of the MCDVs could be retained as RCNR vessels?

I note that the rendering of the Vigilance could be construed as having this armament -

1703785949867.png


It is a 30mm RWS in RN service with a light, coaxial Multi-Purpose Missile - in this case the Thales Martlet currently in use against Russian UAVs but originally designed for air to surface roles against fast attack craft.

 
The NSPS makes a major distinction between ships under and over 1000 tonnes displacement. Kingstons fall under the line.
View attachment 82060
General characteristics
Class and typeKingston-class coastal defence vessel
Displacement970 long tons (990 t)
Length55.3 m (181 ft 5 in)
Beam11.3 m (37 ft 1 in)
Draught3.4 m (11 ft 2 in)

The smallest "large" vessels currently built under the NSPS are the OFSVs built by Sea Span at 3212 tonnes

View attachment 82058
General characteristics
TypeFisheries research vessel
Displacement3,212 t (3,161 long tons)
Length63.4 m (208 ft 0 in)
Speed13 knots (24 km/h; 15 mph)

What happens if the tonnage of the small vessels were raised to 2000 tonnes from 1000 tonnes?

Vard's Vigilance is apparently a 75m vessel which puts it broadly into the same class as the CCGS Leonard J Cowley (72 m and 2080 tonnes) and the Irish OPV Roisin (79 m and 1500 tonnes). The RNZN's Protectors are 85m and 1900 tonnes. Denmark's Knud Rasmussen OPV's (which are not Vard designs) are 72m and 1720 tonnes.

View attachment 82059

Can some of Admiral Topshee's concerns be addressed by advancing a Kingston replacement and utilizing some of the smaller yards? The displacement of hulls seems to be rising in any event. 4000 tonne frigates are becoming 8000 tonne destroyers. Multi-Role and Arctic hulls are moving up beyond 6000 tonnes. Maybe the smaller yards could be given a bit more leeway on displacement.

Could the larger hulls take some of the mission, and training, burden off the Halifaxes? Perhaps allowing some of the CPFs to be tied up, or even laid up? Maybe some or all of the MCDVs could be retained as RCNR vessels?

I note that the rendering of the Vigilance could be construed as having this armament -

View attachment 82061


It is a 30mm RWS in RN service with a light, coaxial Multi-Purpose Missile - in this case the Thales Martlet currently in use against Russian UAVs but originally designed for air to surface roles against fast attack craft.

The Kingston Class been taking the pressure off the Halifax for many years now and soon enough AOPS will be helping as well. We are many years away from a Kingston Class replacement. I can see it a matter of money now vice need.
 
The problem is capability. MCDVs and AOPs don't have the same war fighting capabilities as the CPFs.

They are at best constabulary/presence vessels but truly lack any self defense or AWW, AAA or ASW capabilities.

The AOPs have an increased ability to stay on station over an MCDV. With bigger ingrained logistics, so that's a plus. But if that station goes hot they are simply in the wrong place and need leave most riki tik.

The AOPs and MCDVs (MCDVs mostly) are taking a good chunk of the tasks but you can't plug them into say an SNMG or Battle group. So I'm not sure it's pressure as a lot of the tasks the MCDVs and AOPs are or will do is in their wheel house and not really in CPFs.
 
I would say yes if it weren't for the incredibility high maintenance costs for 100 year old ship, the amount of money and upkeep that this ships sucks down in incredible.
Point. Ding Heritage Canada for a maintenance grant?
The NSPS makes a major distinction between ships under and over 1000 tonnes displacement. Kingstons fall under the line.
View attachment 82060
General characteristics
Class and typeKingston-class coastal defence vessel
Displacement970 long tons (990 t)
Length55.3 m (181 ft 5 in)
Beam11.3 m (37 ft 1 in)
Draught3.4 m (11 ft 2 in)

The smallest "large" vessels currently built under the NSPS are the OFSVs built by Sea Span at 3212 tonnes

View attachment 82058
General characteristics
TypeFisheries research vessel
Displacement3,212 t (3,161 long tons)
Length63.4 m (208 ft 0 in)
Speed13 knots (24 km/h; 15 mph)

What happens if the tonnage of the small vessels were raised to 2000 tonnes from 1000 tonnes?

Vard's Vigilance is apparently a 75m vessel which puts it broadly into the same class as the CCGS Leonard J Cowley (72 m and 2080 tonnes) and the Irish OPV Roisin (79 m and 1500 tonnes). The RNZN's Protectors are 85m and 1900 tonnes. Denmark's Knud Rasmussen OPV's (which are not Vard designs) are 72m and 1720 tonnes.

View attachment 82059

Can some of Admiral Topshee's concerns be addressed by advancing a Kingston replacement and utilizing some of the smaller yards? The displacement of hulls seems to be rising in any event. 4000 tonne frigates are becoming 8000 tonne destroyers. Multi-Role and Arctic hulls are moving up beyond 6000 tonnes. Maybe the smaller yards could be given a bit more leeway on displacement.

Could the larger hulls take some of the mission, and training, burden off the Halifaxes? Perhaps allowing some of the CPFs to be tied up, or even laid up? Maybe some or all of the MCDVs could be retained as RCNR vessels?

I note that the rendering of the Vigilance could be construed as having this armament -

View attachment 82061


It is a 30mm RWS in RN service with a light, coaxial Multi-Purpose Missile - in this case the Thales Martlet currently in use against Russian UAVs but originally designed for air to surface roles against fast attack craft.

Idiot-level question: is that missile mount right in the "either too many or nowhere near enough" band? Feels like something you'd want more of if dealing with something too numerous, evasive, or out of arc for the gun, but just complex enough to require exponentially more maintenance and backend than say "S1 with a shoulder launcher."
 
The problem is capability. MCDVs and AOPs don't have the same war fighting capabilities as the CPFs.

They are at best constabulary/presence vessels but truly lack any self defense or AWW, AAA or ASW capabilities.

The AOPs have an increased ability to stay on station over an MCDV. With bigger ingrained logistics, so that's a plus. But if that station goes hot they are simply in the wrong place and need leave most riki tik.

The AOPs and MCDVs (MCDVs mostly) are taking a good chunk of the tasks but you can't plug them into say an SNMG or Battle group. So I'm not sure it's pressure as a lot of the tasks the MCDVs and AOPs are or will do is in their wheel house and not really in CPFs.
True they don't and never claimed to be but still do deployments that frankly using a CPF is a waste. ie OP Caribbe, Great Lakes, Op Nanook, Op Projection and also OP Reassurance for MCM and whatever else the RCN wants them to do. Even a MCDV replacement won't be put into a battlegroup unless they significantly up the requirements I saw. The Kingston Class operating costs including maintenance is a pittance compared to AOPS. We should be trying to replicate that in the Kingston Class replacement.
 
Point. Ding Heritage Canada for a maintenance grant?

Idiot-level question: is that missile mount right in the "either too many or nowhere near enough" band? Feels like something you'd want more of if dealing with something too numerous, evasive, or out of arc for the gun, but just complex enough to require exponentially more maintenance and backend than say "S1 with a shoulder launcher."

No idea on the answer to that.

Is an OPV likely to be swarmed or is it likely to have to fend off a wide range of threats occasionally?

The 30x173 apparently gets you a range of 5 km on a good day. The Martlet Lightweight Multirole Missile apparently has an advertised range of 8 km with a 16 sec time of flight to max range.

OTOH

In 2019, a trial was carried out on board HMS Sutherland to test the fitting and operation of Martlet light surface-to-surface missiles on a modified DS30M Mark 2 mount. While initial reports suggested that the tests were deemed successful, subsequent reports indicated otherwise.[4] As a result, Martlet has not been integrated into Royal Navy DS30M Mk 2 mounts in the surface-to-surface mode.[
 
So - The RCN has sufficient vessels for constabulary duties - MCDVs and AOPSs but according to Admiral Topshee's video he only has enough qualified crew for one of his 4 AOPS (4 delivered with 2 commissioned) and most (all) of his MCDVs are tied up to make up the crew numbers for the CPFs.

Meanwhile the CPFs (1988 to 1996) are struggling along with the lack of qualified crew.

COA 1 - tie up the CPFs and fully man the MCDVs and AOPSs.

Pros - sailors in sound hulls at sea doing useful, necessary tasks.
Cons - dissatisfied sailors at sea not getting blue water time in multi-national, high end roles.

COA 1a - tie up half the CPFs and man the MCDVs and AOPSs
COA 1b -tie up half the CPFs, man the AOPSs and the JSS and send the MCDVs back to the Reserves.


COA 2 - Procure interim solution for the CSCs and tie up half or all of the CPFs.

Interim solutions?

Used USN/RN Hulls - but their frigate fleets are not in much better shape than the RCNs.
Third Party Hulls - Japanese, South Korean, European (RN/Danish/Polish/Indonesian Type 31s) - The Type 31s won't be available until the late 20s - Perhaps the Japanese or South Koreans could perform a miracle or two and supply a couple of ships in short order.

An Interim CSC - pay Irving more money to deliver less faster (go the Absalon route - modified power plant and fitted for not with).

COA 3 - Offer the sailors we have to those navies that have ships in better condition - a surface version of AUKUS?

COA 4 - Fold until 2040 and start all over again.
 
So - The RCN has sufficient vessels for constabulary duties - MCDVs and AOPSs but according to Admiral Topshee's video he only has enough qualified crew for one of his 4 AOPS (4 delivered with 2 commissioned) and most (all) of his MCDVs are tied up to make up the crew numbers for the CPFs.

Meanwhile the CPFs (1988 to 1996) are struggling along with the lack of qualified crew.

COA 1 - tie up the CPFs and fully man the MCDVs and AOPSs.

Pros - sailors in sound hulls at sea doing useful, necessary tasks.
Cons - dissatisfied sailors at sea not getting blue water time in multi-national, high end roles.

COA 1a - tie up half the CPFs and man the MCDVs and AOPSs
COA 1b -tie up half the CPFs, man the AOPSs and the JSS and send the MCDVs back to the Reserves.


COA 2 - Procure interim solution for the CSCs and tie up half or all of the CPFs.

Interim solutions?

Used USN/RN Hulls - but their frigate fleets are not in much better shape than the RCNs.
Third Party Hulls - Japanese, South Korean, European (RN/Danish/Polish/Indonesian Type 31s) - The Type 31s won't be available until the late 20s - Perhaps the Japanese or South Koreans could perform a miracle or two and supply a couple of ships in short order.

An Interim CSC - pay Irving more money to deliver less faster (go the Absalon route - modified power plant and fitted for not with).

COA 3 - Offer the sailors we have to those navies that have ships in better condition - a surface version of AUKUS?

COA 4 - Fold until 2040 and start all over again.
So we do have more than one crew for AOPS, the issue right now is qualified MSE tickets most of the original ones went to work with ISSC. There has been a flurry of activity to get tickets qualified so we should be in better shape this spring to get Max Bernays out west and at least one to two others operating fully out East.

What we'll probably see is several CPF's self pay off, alongside in 180 days readiness much the same as some of the 280's. The good thing is that they can be used as training platforms alongside. We already have 4 Kingston Class alongside with a caretaker crew. (3 West and 1 East in refit)

The priority will be to crew AOPS. If we can get some r reserves out for Kingston Class then that will be great. JSS will be a problem unless we go with a civilian crewing option, plenty of ex RCN would love that.

The CPFs will continue to solider on their 2 year refits and hope for the best.

What we won't see is used hulls or a corvette class or light frigate. No money.

What we need is to get all the smart people together both CAF and civilian and have a reimagining of recruiting but that will take money. Don't know if we have the will or the means to do so.
 
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So we do have more than one crew for AOPS, the issue right now is qualified MSE tickets most of the original ones went to work with ISSC. There has been a flurry of activity to get tickets qualified so we should be in better shape this spring to get Max Bernays out west and at least one to two others operating fully out East.

What we'll probably see is several CPF's self pay off, alongside in 180 days readiness much the same as some of the 280's. The good thing is that they can be used as training platforms alongside. We already have 4 Kingston Class alongside with a caretaker crew. (3 West and 1 East in refit)

The priority will be to crew AOPS. If we can get some r reserves out for Kingston Class then that will be great. JSS will be a problem unless we go with a civilian crewing option, plenty of ex RCN would love that.

The CPFs will solider on their 2 year refits and hope for the best.

What we won't see is used hulls or a corvette class or light frigate. No money.

Seen and thanks.

What we need is to get all the smart people together both CAF and civilian and have a reimagining of recruiting but that will take money. Don't know if we have the will or the means to do so.

Here's a question:

Do you want sailors who learn trades or tradesmen who sail?

The underlying thought is that I have spent a few years in the past working with the fishing industry. They take all-comers. They will take people to do cleaning jobs in factories, machine operators, stewards and cooks, any type of civilian skill that they can make use of. That group becomes a self-selecting group. Some quit as soon as they reach the first port. Others enjoy the life and bouncing around on the briny. They then start looking for new opportunities to stay at sea, making more money and doing more interesting stuff. Some will head to the factory, some to the deck, some to the machinery rooms and some to the pilothouse.

Is there a naval path that would look similar?
 
Seen and thanks.



Here's a question:

Do you want sailors who learn trades or tradesmen who sail?

The underlying thought is that I have spent a few years in the past working with the fishing industry. They take all-comers. They will take people to do cleaning jobs in factories, machine operators, stewards and cooks, any type of civilian skill that they can make use of. That group becomes a self-selecting group. Some quit as soon as they reach the first port. Others enjoy the life and bouncing around on the briny. They then start looking for new opportunities to stay at sea, making more money and doing more interesting stuff. Some will head to the factory, some to the deck, some to the machinery rooms and some to the pilothouse.

Is there a naval path that would look similar?
Aren't we already doing that with the naval experience program?
 
But, seriously, military recruiting is hard when the military isn't up to much and the perception (reality, too, I think) is that this government doesn't even want a military, much less one that actually does military stuff like fight against bad guys.

There was a story, maybe apocryphal, in the '60s or '70s, from the UK which said that the Minister of Defence stood up in the House and said something like: "I'm pleased to report that for the first time in (large double digit) years not one British serviceman has been killed by enemy action. I also note," he continued, "that recruiting is falling far short of our requirements."
 
As I recall there was no shortage of people wanting to sign up for infantry during Afghanistan? I suspect people join to do something dangerous and different.
You are correct...up to a point.

I don’t have stats with me but I’m assuming there was some point in the GWOT where US recruiting dipped. There was “stop-loss” around the 2008 timeframe so I would guess around then too.
 
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