- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 210
I am looking for suggestions as to low level/low cost training I can conduct for my Infantry platoon. We seem to be condemned to continuous TOET and Map and Compass training. Any suggestions would be most appreciated.
Low Level/Low Cost Training
- Thread starter PPCLI MCpl
- Start date
George Wallace
Army.ca Dinosaur
- Reaction score
- 175
- Points
- 710
A patrolling exercise mixed with "capture the Flag". Two teams and a Control staff (CP). Break them up into two or three man patrols, with radios and maps. Set boundaries in which the two teams are allowed to move and set up their flag. Let them go at it, using stealth to steal the other teams flag. Have the CP set up with two nets and constantly get CONTACTS, SITREPs and LOCSTATs from all patrols. This will get them using patrolling, navigation, comms and stalking skills. Do it at night for more experience using Night Vision devices.
Make it a game and a challenge.
GW
Make it a game and a challenge.
GW
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 410
George's suggestion is excellent. Another good one is to take any type of simple tactical training (let's say section and platoon attacks) and go through it on a sand table first, but relying on the Pte/Cpls as much as possible, to explain what is going on. Then have them take turns to "lead" the sand table section through an attack under a time limit, causing "casualties" if there is too much delay or obvious mistakes. Have the others critique about it. Once everybody in the section can demonstrate the basic of leading a section(and has offered AAR points), take them out on the ground, and put them through a series of attacks, "killing" the Section Commander, then the 2IC, and so on.
This training helps to make sure that soldiers are actually thinking through section drills and tactics instead of just mindlessly stumbling along in utter boredom, helps to ensure the ability of the organization to function if leaders are lost, and also serves to identify potential leaders for further development.
Good luck.
Cheers.
This training helps to make sure that soldiers are actually thinking through section drills and tactics instead of just mindlessly stumbling along in utter boredom, helps to ensure the ability of the organization to function if leaders are lost, and also serves to identify potential leaders for further development.
Good luck.
Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 4,267
- Points
- 1,260
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 210
Thank you Garett, I'm going to implement your idea this week.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 210
- Reaction score
- 10,344
- Points
- 1,260
Here's an interesting article on TDG's by Major Donald Vandergriff (author of The Path to Victory)
http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,14790,Vandergriff_010605-P2,00.html
Donald E. Vandergriff: Military Education - Tools exist now, just use them
January 6, 2005
[Have an opinion about the views expressed in this commentary? Sound off in the Discussion Forum.]
In today's arena of military Transformation, the newest "band wagon" everyone is jumping on is "reform military education." This comes about in light of the complex problems being faced by our leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 Leaders went there largely unprepared by current education and training systems. Our education and training doctrine was developed to deal with 2nd Generation or Industrial war. The existing system did not prepare our leaders, especially our junior officers, to adapt to the unexpected demands of the on going wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, think-tanks and military task forces are proposing all kind of changes to military education, at the levels of joint education, mid-level officer career courses, and senior level war colleges.2
My response to all this "wow you guys just don't get it!" "Why focus our efforts to change education on people who already have their character set by years of process by our antiquated personnel system?" The solution to our problem is adapting our military education system alongside the evolving generations of war, which calls for a different military mindset. I say "why not begin the reform where it all begins?" If leaders in Department of Defense, in Congress and smart people in the think-tanks really want to "Transform" the force, then they should start with the next generation of potential leaders. Earlier is better.3
Of course one of their first responses will be "how much will it cost?" And, "what are the political costs?" My answer, spelled out in my forthcoming book Raising the Bar: Evolving Army ROTC with the Changing Face of War, is it will not cost much, if anything to prepare the next generation for the leadership challenges our nation faces today and in the future.4
I will explain the reasons for change and my recommendations in a series of forthcoming articles. My proposals are holistic dealing with the way Army ROTC recruits (markets), develop, educates and trains our future officers. I conducted a thorough study of history, a detailed analysis of present and future environments so I could predict what the Army would call for officers to do in the future. Defining the endstate made it possible to put to practice (by trial and error) concepts that will build adaptability and intuition in cadets before they go on as commissioned officers to lead Soldiers.
One program is already putting to practice many ideas on how to better educate and train cadets. We have done it without raising our budget, or adding to our personnel with outside contractors. We have done it entirely with the cadre the Army gave us through its personnel assignment system. These NCOs and Officers accomplished this goal by adhering to a few principles:
1. Continue to evolve our program based on the lessons from war
2. Be open to well-thought out ideas
3. Always set the example
4. Place as much ownership for the program in the hands of the cadets
5. Don't let your ego get in the way of encouraging cadets how to think
The bottom line is that this climate drives all members of the organization to do the best they can in preparing their cadets for the future by using the most effective methods in education and training.5 The end state we are seeking is creating leaders of character who are ready, willing and able to make the right decisions in the face of adversity, be it the enemy, subordinates, peers or superiors, on and off the battlefield. We also use several education techniques to assist us in achieving our endstate. One of them is the Tactical Decision Game or TDG.
The TDGs is a cheap tool, but an intellectually expensive centerpiece of our program of instruction (POI). By using the term "intellectually expensive" I mean that TDGs put demands on the instructor that goes beyond most "ease on instructor," or "turn key" program of instruction (POIs) used today. There is also an art to teaching. It requires an instructor who understands war, is proficient in the technical aspects of the profession of arms, and finally who is a good leader. Oh, one last important asset, the instructor must have an imagination. With these ingredients, the instructor will find many ways to use the TDG in teaching decision-making and in building character.
How to use the TDG as a Decision Making Teaching Tool
Today and in the future, the TDG will assume more importance in developing and sharpening cadet's tactical skills without an extensive and expensive commitment of resources. To be sure, experience is one of the most valuable aspects of teaching and training, but it is also often costly in terms of what an ROTC department's limited resources. The proposed Program of Instruction (POI) encompasses military history, , essays and varied education techniques (which carry over easily to the field). A new curriculum combined with a new operating environment and training philosophy will provide an opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of earlier warriors.6
When thinking how to use the TDG, cadre can also consider it a Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT). Cadre is only limited by the imagination. There is a lot they can do with the TDG. They can use it in a written exam-like writing an OPORD to plan for the scenario for a test-conditions changed, like adding time limits to provide a solution, and/or to do an exam. Along with the written portion there will often be a sketch or plan on which a student is required to sketch out his/her plan. The scenario should also define who you are, why you are there, what your assets are, your mission or objective and the threats against you, but the instructor can change or adjust all of these based on what he wants to achieve and the level of proficiency pf the class. While we want the cadets to "experience the thing before you try to give it a name," we want to give them problems they can manage. By exposing the cadets to too complex a problem, you may discourage them early on from taking risks, and thinking boldly about their solutions.7
As cadre get comfortable with TDGs, and get a feel of how their cadets are evolving into them, the cadre can adjust all aspects of the TDG to teach critical thinking skills. For example, they can be vague in certain areas of the OPORD. This forces cadets to make assumptions or educated guesses. We also teach the cadets how to ask questions and not to ask dumb questions. Asking dumb questions generally means that they need to learn how to listen the first time and how to take concise notes quickly. I believe that telling cadets that "there are no dumb questions" is counterproductive to teaching them "how to think." Allowing them to ask dumb questions gives them bad habits like not listening attentively the first time the order is briefed or guidance is given. Not much time for questions over the tactical radio. Everything we do falls back to teaching the cadet how to deal with the stress of combat.
We encourage cadets to seek more knowledge when they ask pertinent questions. The instructor will now do this through the cadet brief back of their solution. Cadets give their solutions to their peers who will in turn evaluate the cadet's decision. The instructor is there to "guide" the discussion. He is also there to encourage the theme of classical education. As a result of this session cadets will seek, on their own, to gain more knowledge.
The instructor is also the referee adding reality to cadet solutions with "not possible," or "in reality this is what this so and so can do for you in this type of terrain." Or, the instructor asks probing, Socratic questions like "is your course of action in keeping with the spirit of the commander's intent?" or "what caused you to change the mission you were given by higher?" These repeated sessions build character-adaptability and intuition-over time.
The major benefit of this type of education is that cadets can be put into situations that are either impractical or too expensive to enact in the field or in an electronic simulation. Your cadets can go over literally hundreds of scenarios without ever leaving the classroom. This establishes a solid foundation in understanding decision making prior to moving to the field and more costly training. Obviously this is not a substitute for free play force on force exercises, but a useful adjunct. If you find a particularly relevant scenario, you can enact it live.
Some Other Guidelines
The following are a set of general guidelines we follow when using TDG's. They are not designed to be restrictive but ensure that cadets get the most out of the situation. Cadets should be informed that most TDGs are written to appeal to a wide international audience. Cadre will have to take the time to translate the TDG into Army language (most TDGs we download are from the Marine Corps Gazette). Your particular ROTC battalions may develop different operating procedures, but don't get caught up in arguing about specific procedural points, there will be plenty of time for that during debrief.8
The main thing to remember is to encourage the cadet to treat the situation as if they were there living it. In many of the scenarios cadets have literally fractions of a second to react, and allowing them to ponder the situation for hours reduces the benefits of the exercise. Spontaneity is the key. Tell the cadet's that their first reaction is probably the best one. Again, it is a good tool to build character, especially when your course of action is being attacked by the rest of the class. No matter what the course of action, if the cadet thinks they are right, they should defend it. The instructor must divorce their selves from their ego in order to support a cadet's decision that contradicts their solution, but is still sound.9
Also instruct the cadets to give as much detail as possible in their answer. We have the cadets imagine that they are giving orders to their unit, or explaining their actions to their battalion commander. In several cases, I will read scenarios to them with their eyes closed and without the benefit of taking notes. In single person scenarios, have the cadet describe the techniques they would use and why, what considerations are they taking into account and what follow-ups they would perform. In team scenarios, have them describe what each cadet is doing and why, what are their actions and reactions. When placed under a time constraint, this approach teaches you how to time manage, how to prioritize tasks, an effective tool to lead subordinates with limited time to plan and execute a mission.
We also employ other factors that add stress on top of most cadets' own self induced stress in the scenario. We play TV - with a war movie - or loud music, opened the windows during the winter, have a radio speaker in the class room continually updating the enemy and friendly situation, and whatever else we can think of to approximate the distractions felt in the heat of battle.
But, finally have fun with TDGs. There is no 'right' answer, only better ones. All responses have some benefit, and highlight your perception of the problem. There is nothing to stop you from coming up with more than one response. Recognizing, however, that there are many ways to approach a problem, we do not limit the student to one pass-or-fail school solution. This is hard when using the TDG to evaluate decision-making ability during an examination, but it can be done. Cadre uses four evolving questions when grading the TDG exams and quizzes. First and foremost was a decision made? If so, we jump to two was it communicated to their subordinates effectively? Then, we ask was the decision made in support of the commander's intent (long-term contract), and mission (short-term contract). From there, if it was not, then the instructor asks himself was the cadet solution based on changing conditions that made it a viable decision even if it violated the original mission, but supported the intent?
Failure on the TDG comes from not making any decision. Or, in the course of briefing their course of action, or while the instructor is grading the TDG, the cadet changes their decision because the instructor challenged the cadet's choice. The cadet demonstrates the need to go along with the instructor ("higher"). Even if the instructor feels that the cadet's decision is a sound one, they may challenge or test the cadet's character in the face of adversity, to see how much the cadet believe in themselves.
In the end we believe that TDGs provide the best educational approach for building a cadet's strength of character. The current POI uses process and task training to train potential officer on "what to think." In most of our wars, with the U.S. coming in late, and after the Germans were bled down and almost already beaten, it made it appear in the "glow of victory," that our system of officer production was the right one.
Today in Iraq junior leaders are being forced to improvise on their own to overcome what they were not taught in peacetime. We must realize that the foundation of an effective officer corps in the future must begin early. Military education must change radically to establish "how to think" and create leaders that are adaptable and have intuition. If we are going to really "Transform" the future force, we need to start now with the next generation.
Contributing Editor Maj. Donald Vandergriff is the author of Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press). He is retiring next summer following a 23-year career in the Marines and the Army, including "out of the box" service as a personnel reform expert who has consulted with congressional, Army and DoD leaders, as well Army Task forces and think-tanks that dealt with Transformation issues on personnel reform. He is currently writing his next book, Raising the Bar: Evolving ROTC with the changing Face of War. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Endnotes:
1 Dr. Lenny Wong, "Developing Adaptive Leaders," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 04)
2 Major General Robert Scales, Jr. (U.S. Army retired), "Culture-Centric Warfare," Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, September 2004)
3 Dr. Charles, White, The Enlightened Soldier: Gerhard Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft, (New York: Praeger, 1988), This volume explores the essence of German military professionalism as exemplified by the 19th-century Prussian German Staff. The study focuses on the most important Prussian military reformer--Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, who in 1801 founded the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society) in Berlin. The Gesellschaft became the focal point for the transformation of the Prussian army from a robotic war machine into a modern fighting force that was instrumental in defeating Napolean in 1813 and in 1815.
4 The Honorable Ike Skelton, "Remarks for the Association of the United States Army Space & Missile Defense Symposium and Exhibition Dinner," (December 8, 2004), ""Warfare is becoming more complex at lower and lower levels, and our professional military education system must continue to evolve to develop the thinking warriors the future will require. I understand that the way your career timelines are managed now, we can not just add more educational requirements without relieving some of the other demands on your time. I think eventually reconciling this tension between professional education and other assignments required for career development is going to require a fundamental reassessment of what an Army career means and how success is measured."
5 Lieutenant Colonel Allen Gill, "The Hoya Battalion," unpublished brief, (Georgetown University Army ROTC, November 8, 2004), given to the Academic Counsel of Deans. The brief gives a good summary of the academic rigor we applied in evolving the program at Georgetown.
6 Surveys of cadre-NCOs and officers-taken by the author, 2000,-2004 garner similar responses regarding the use of TDGs: "There is no task-condition and standard," "How can I grade this?", "The cadets need to be taught more before given this [TDG]," This is something they should learn later [after they are commissioned and later in their careers]."
7 Major Donald E. Vandergriff, "Lessons Learned with Decision Making," unpublished AAR, (Georgetown University Army ROTC, October 2003), this came after overseeing the playing of over a 100 TDGs with cadets.
8 The Marine Corps Gazette TDG website is at http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/tdg.htm, it also archives years of past TDGs with solutions.
9 William H. Kilpatrick, "introduction to Heinrich Pestalozzi" The Education of Man - Aphorisms, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951)
http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,14790,Vandergriff_010605-P2,00.html
Donald E. Vandergriff: Military Education - Tools exist now, just use them
January 6, 2005
[Have an opinion about the views expressed in this commentary? Sound off in the Discussion Forum.]
In today's arena of military Transformation, the newest "band wagon" everyone is jumping on is "reform military education." This comes about in light of the complex problems being faced by our leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 Leaders went there largely unprepared by current education and training systems. Our education and training doctrine was developed to deal with 2nd Generation or Industrial war. The existing system did not prepare our leaders, especially our junior officers, to adapt to the unexpected demands of the on going wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, think-tanks and military task forces are proposing all kind of changes to military education, at the levels of joint education, mid-level officer career courses, and senior level war colleges.2
My response to all this "wow you guys just don't get it!" "Why focus our efforts to change education on people who already have their character set by years of process by our antiquated personnel system?" The solution to our problem is adapting our military education system alongside the evolving generations of war, which calls for a different military mindset. I say "why not begin the reform where it all begins?" If leaders in Department of Defense, in Congress and smart people in the think-tanks really want to "Transform" the force, then they should start with the next generation of potential leaders. Earlier is better.3
Of course one of their first responses will be "how much will it cost?" And, "what are the political costs?" My answer, spelled out in my forthcoming book Raising the Bar: Evolving Army ROTC with the Changing Face of War, is it will not cost much, if anything to prepare the next generation for the leadership challenges our nation faces today and in the future.4
I will explain the reasons for change and my recommendations in a series of forthcoming articles. My proposals are holistic dealing with the way Army ROTC recruits (markets), develop, educates and trains our future officers. I conducted a thorough study of history, a detailed analysis of present and future environments so I could predict what the Army would call for officers to do in the future. Defining the endstate made it possible to put to practice (by trial and error) concepts that will build adaptability and intuition in cadets before they go on as commissioned officers to lead Soldiers.
One program is already putting to practice many ideas on how to better educate and train cadets. We have done it without raising our budget, or adding to our personnel with outside contractors. We have done it entirely with the cadre the Army gave us through its personnel assignment system. These NCOs and Officers accomplished this goal by adhering to a few principles:
1. Continue to evolve our program based on the lessons from war
2. Be open to well-thought out ideas
3. Always set the example
4. Place as much ownership for the program in the hands of the cadets
5. Don't let your ego get in the way of encouraging cadets how to think
The bottom line is that this climate drives all members of the organization to do the best they can in preparing their cadets for the future by using the most effective methods in education and training.5 The end state we are seeking is creating leaders of character who are ready, willing and able to make the right decisions in the face of adversity, be it the enemy, subordinates, peers or superiors, on and off the battlefield. We also use several education techniques to assist us in achieving our endstate. One of them is the Tactical Decision Game or TDG.
The TDGs is a cheap tool, but an intellectually expensive centerpiece of our program of instruction (POI). By using the term "intellectually expensive" I mean that TDGs put demands on the instructor that goes beyond most "ease on instructor," or "turn key" program of instruction (POIs) used today. There is also an art to teaching. It requires an instructor who understands war, is proficient in the technical aspects of the profession of arms, and finally who is a good leader. Oh, one last important asset, the instructor must have an imagination. With these ingredients, the instructor will find many ways to use the TDG in teaching decision-making and in building character.
How to use the TDG as a Decision Making Teaching Tool
Today and in the future, the TDG will assume more importance in developing and sharpening cadet's tactical skills without an extensive and expensive commitment of resources. To be sure, experience is one of the most valuable aspects of teaching and training, but it is also often costly in terms of what an ROTC department's limited resources. The proposed Program of Instruction (POI) encompasses military history, , essays and varied education techniques (which carry over easily to the field). A new curriculum combined with a new operating environment and training philosophy will provide an opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of earlier warriors.6
When thinking how to use the TDG, cadre can also consider it a Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT). Cadre is only limited by the imagination. There is a lot they can do with the TDG. They can use it in a written exam-like writing an OPORD to plan for the scenario for a test-conditions changed, like adding time limits to provide a solution, and/or to do an exam. Along with the written portion there will often be a sketch or plan on which a student is required to sketch out his/her plan. The scenario should also define who you are, why you are there, what your assets are, your mission or objective and the threats against you, but the instructor can change or adjust all of these based on what he wants to achieve and the level of proficiency pf the class. While we want the cadets to "experience the thing before you try to give it a name," we want to give them problems they can manage. By exposing the cadets to too complex a problem, you may discourage them early on from taking risks, and thinking boldly about their solutions.7
As cadre get comfortable with TDGs, and get a feel of how their cadets are evolving into them, the cadre can adjust all aspects of the TDG to teach critical thinking skills. For example, they can be vague in certain areas of the OPORD. This forces cadets to make assumptions or educated guesses. We also teach the cadets how to ask questions and not to ask dumb questions. Asking dumb questions generally means that they need to learn how to listen the first time and how to take concise notes quickly. I believe that telling cadets that "there are no dumb questions" is counterproductive to teaching them "how to think." Allowing them to ask dumb questions gives them bad habits like not listening attentively the first time the order is briefed or guidance is given. Not much time for questions over the tactical radio. Everything we do falls back to teaching the cadet how to deal with the stress of combat.
We encourage cadets to seek more knowledge when they ask pertinent questions. The instructor will now do this through the cadet brief back of their solution. Cadets give their solutions to their peers who will in turn evaluate the cadet's decision. The instructor is there to "guide" the discussion. He is also there to encourage the theme of classical education. As a result of this session cadets will seek, on their own, to gain more knowledge.
The instructor is also the referee adding reality to cadet solutions with "not possible," or "in reality this is what this so and so can do for you in this type of terrain." Or, the instructor asks probing, Socratic questions like "is your course of action in keeping with the spirit of the commander's intent?" or "what caused you to change the mission you were given by higher?" These repeated sessions build character-adaptability and intuition-over time.
The major benefit of this type of education is that cadets can be put into situations that are either impractical or too expensive to enact in the field or in an electronic simulation. Your cadets can go over literally hundreds of scenarios without ever leaving the classroom. This establishes a solid foundation in understanding decision making prior to moving to the field and more costly training. Obviously this is not a substitute for free play force on force exercises, but a useful adjunct. If you find a particularly relevant scenario, you can enact it live.
Some Other Guidelines
The following are a set of general guidelines we follow when using TDG's. They are not designed to be restrictive but ensure that cadets get the most out of the situation. Cadets should be informed that most TDGs are written to appeal to a wide international audience. Cadre will have to take the time to translate the TDG into Army language (most TDGs we download are from the Marine Corps Gazette). Your particular ROTC battalions may develop different operating procedures, but don't get caught up in arguing about specific procedural points, there will be plenty of time for that during debrief.8
The main thing to remember is to encourage the cadet to treat the situation as if they were there living it. In many of the scenarios cadets have literally fractions of a second to react, and allowing them to ponder the situation for hours reduces the benefits of the exercise. Spontaneity is the key. Tell the cadet's that their first reaction is probably the best one. Again, it is a good tool to build character, especially when your course of action is being attacked by the rest of the class. No matter what the course of action, if the cadet thinks they are right, they should defend it. The instructor must divorce their selves from their ego in order to support a cadet's decision that contradicts their solution, but is still sound.9
Also instruct the cadets to give as much detail as possible in their answer. We have the cadets imagine that they are giving orders to their unit, or explaining their actions to their battalion commander. In several cases, I will read scenarios to them with their eyes closed and without the benefit of taking notes. In single person scenarios, have the cadet describe the techniques they would use and why, what considerations are they taking into account and what follow-ups they would perform. In team scenarios, have them describe what each cadet is doing and why, what are their actions and reactions. When placed under a time constraint, this approach teaches you how to time manage, how to prioritize tasks, an effective tool to lead subordinates with limited time to plan and execute a mission.
We also employ other factors that add stress on top of most cadets' own self induced stress in the scenario. We play TV - with a war movie - or loud music, opened the windows during the winter, have a radio speaker in the class room continually updating the enemy and friendly situation, and whatever else we can think of to approximate the distractions felt in the heat of battle.
But, finally have fun with TDGs. There is no 'right' answer, only better ones. All responses have some benefit, and highlight your perception of the problem. There is nothing to stop you from coming up with more than one response. Recognizing, however, that there are many ways to approach a problem, we do not limit the student to one pass-or-fail school solution. This is hard when using the TDG to evaluate decision-making ability during an examination, but it can be done. Cadre uses four evolving questions when grading the TDG exams and quizzes. First and foremost was a decision made? If so, we jump to two was it communicated to their subordinates effectively? Then, we ask was the decision made in support of the commander's intent (long-term contract), and mission (short-term contract). From there, if it was not, then the instructor asks himself was the cadet solution based on changing conditions that made it a viable decision even if it violated the original mission, but supported the intent?
Failure on the TDG comes from not making any decision. Or, in the course of briefing their course of action, or while the instructor is grading the TDG, the cadet changes their decision because the instructor challenged the cadet's choice. The cadet demonstrates the need to go along with the instructor ("higher"). Even if the instructor feels that the cadet's decision is a sound one, they may challenge or test the cadet's character in the face of adversity, to see how much the cadet believe in themselves.
In the end we believe that TDGs provide the best educational approach for building a cadet's strength of character. The current POI uses process and task training to train potential officer on "what to think." In most of our wars, with the U.S. coming in late, and after the Germans were bled down and almost already beaten, it made it appear in the "glow of victory," that our system of officer production was the right one.
Today in Iraq junior leaders are being forced to improvise on their own to overcome what they were not taught in peacetime. We must realize that the foundation of an effective officer corps in the future must begin early. Military education must change radically to establish "how to think" and create leaders that are adaptable and have intuition. If we are going to really "Transform" the future force, we need to start now with the next generation.
Contributing Editor Maj. Donald Vandergriff is the author of Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press). He is retiring next summer following a 23-year career in the Marines and the Army, including "out of the box" service as a personnel reform expert who has consulted with congressional, Army and DoD leaders, as well Army Task forces and think-tanks that dealt with Transformation issues on personnel reform. He is currently writing his next book, Raising the Bar: Evolving ROTC with the changing Face of War. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Endnotes:
1 Dr. Lenny Wong, "Developing Adaptive Leaders," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 04)
2 Major General Robert Scales, Jr. (U.S. Army retired), "Culture-Centric Warfare," Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, September 2004)
3 Dr. Charles, White, The Enlightened Soldier: Gerhard Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft, (New York: Praeger, 1988), This volume explores the essence of German military professionalism as exemplified by the 19th-century Prussian German Staff. The study focuses on the most important Prussian military reformer--Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, who in 1801 founded the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society) in Berlin. The Gesellschaft became the focal point for the transformation of the Prussian army from a robotic war machine into a modern fighting force that was instrumental in defeating Napolean in 1813 and in 1815.
4 The Honorable Ike Skelton, "Remarks for the Association of the United States Army Space & Missile Defense Symposium and Exhibition Dinner," (December 8, 2004), ""Warfare is becoming more complex at lower and lower levels, and our professional military education system must continue to evolve to develop the thinking warriors the future will require. I understand that the way your career timelines are managed now, we can not just add more educational requirements without relieving some of the other demands on your time. I think eventually reconciling this tension between professional education and other assignments required for career development is going to require a fundamental reassessment of what an Army career means and how success is measured."
5 Lieutenant Colonel Allen Gill, "The Hoya Battalion," unpublished brief, (Georgetown University Army ROTC, November 8, 2004), given to the Academic Counsel of Deans. The brief gives a good summary of the academic rigor we applied in evolving the program at Georgetown.
6 Surveys of cadre-NCOs and officers-taken by the author, 2000,-2004 garner similar responses regarding the use of TDGs: "There is no task-condition and standard," "How can I grade this?", "The cadets need to be taught more before given this [TDG]," This is something they should learn later [after they are commissioned and later in their careers]."
7 Major Donald E. Vandergriff, "Lessons Learned with Decision Making," unpublished AAR, (Georgetown University Army ROTC, October 2003), this came after overseeing the playing of over a 100 TDGs with cadets.
8 The Marine Corps Gazette TDG website is at http://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/tdg.htm, it also archives years of past TDGs with solutions.
9 William H. Kilpatrick, "introduction to Heinrich Pestalozzi" The Education of Man - Aphorisms, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951)
