Light Support Weapons & Infantry Automatic Rifles

[GAP]

The biggest problem with markmanship of troops is the automatic firing capacity.

If you have to pull the trigger each time, you take a sight picture. Not so with the automatic feature. We used the M14 in the initial part of my tours....auto was avoided as you couldn't stay on target after about 2-3 rounds.

With the introduction of the M16, this was no longer a large issue, but that didn't mean the troops were taking sight pictures, just blazing away.

 

[Infanteer]

Sharp stick it is...


Bullpups are ergonomic nightmares -- they seems like a good idea until issued...

*Uk Mod says the SA80 replacement WILL NOT BE A BULLPUP.

I've already stated above that the C8A2 is fine.  The ballistics out to 300m are what a rifleman needs - I was arguing against looking for a rifle with real performance beyond 300 meters for the rifleman.

Frankly engagments will small arms and the hit probability is a training issue.

That is generally the argument, but from my understanding, it is not completely true.  Operational research suggests that, regardless of training, moving from a static range to a field firing environment where a soldier shoots, moves and communicates reduces the reduces the soldiers ability to hit a target by a factor of ten.  Having an enemy fire back reduces by another factor of ten, while being engaged by an enemy MG mean another factor of ten.

This suggests that all the training in the world doesn't really doesn't really help a soldier hit stuff due to the physiological and psychological factors involved in 'shoot, move and communicate'.  It also suggests why crew served weapons are so important - it's their ability to create suppression and the psychological factors involved in defeat (the bad guy is generally beaten before you have to kill him) and the fact that crews don't generally have to run around the battlefield and get engaged - they use their standoff range to avoid this degrading factors.

The so what?  We probably don't need a rifle with performance past 300 meters.  We probably don't need training to focus on trying to hit s**t while on the move across a 300 meter field that is probably being swept by machine gun fire.  We probably need something that is light, and we need to train soldiers not to piss away 7 mags (210 rounds) in a firefight to hit nothing, so that they can carry more mortar bombs, 40mm grenades or 7.62 belts.  The infantry needs a rifle that:

1.  From 0-25m can be used to clear trenches, buildings and other positions that an enemy would hide in; and

2.  From 25-300m, something that can be used from a static position to protect crew-served weapons from advancing enemy.

 

[Infanteer]

Partially true as well, PLUS Dr Grossman found out that some indidvidual soldiers will aim off during engagements.

I wouldn't bother with Dr Grossman - while there is some value in his first book, his theories are generally out there and have been run through in various articles and journals.

One aspect he does speak to, and that LCol Ian Hope also mentioned in an article, is that of the 'fighters'.  Generally, in a section of 8-10 men, 1-2 will actually do all the fighting while the rest will kind of hang around and pitch in once in a while with a half-hearted attempt.  1-2 won't do anything at all.  It's those 1-2 fighters in a section that really keep the fight going.  Here is the article where Hope mentions his observations of 'natural fighters'.  I've also attached a word doc of a report by Lionel Wigram, who studied battalions in Sicily and noticed the same thing with what he termed 'gutful men'.

 

[KevinB]

I'm going to respectfully disagree with this.

I agree in most non SOF units that Ian Hope (while I hate his guts) is correct in this comment -- however its been documented that realistic training (and repetitive realistic training) can increase both hit probability - and the actual fighting ability of individuals (and thus units).

There is a reason a lot of SOF elements are giving 7.62mm options to their shooters -- and why scopes like the Leupold 1.1-8x where developed -- and guys are killing tons of bad guys at long ranges - without machine guns etc.

This gets even more important when you spread out dismounted entities - they need to ability (and the confidence to employ the weapon at those ranges) to outmatch their enemies.

The British, Germans and Canadians (mostly SOF) are looking for a new Individual round - not quite 7.62mm NATO, but more than 5.56mm - so their troops can reach out further.

I can shoot 300m with a C8CQB and a CCO (11.5" barrel)

The problem is marksmanship in the CF, US Army etc is downright disgusting.

 

[GAP]

The problem is marksmanship in the CF, US Army etc is downright disgusting.

I agree wholeheartedly....

we had to range qualify every year, irrespective of your MOS. You must shoot 190 out of possible 250  to qualify at ranges of 100 yd, 300 yd, and 500 yd. Even in Viet Nam we had to qualify....which was ironic having just come in off a 3 week operation...

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm going to respectfully disagree with this.

I agree in most non SOF units that Ian Hope (while I hate his guts) is correct in this comment -- however its been documented that realistic training (and repetitive realistic training) can increase both hit probability - and the actual fighting ability of individuals (and thus units).

There is a reason a lot of SOF elements are giving 7.62mm options to their shooters -- and why scopes like the Leupold 1.1-8x where developed -- and guys are killing tons of bad guys at long ranges - without machine guns etc.

This gets even more important when you spread out dismounted entities - they need to ability (and the confidence to employ the weapon at those ranges) to outmatch their enemies.

The British, Germans and Canadians (mostly SOF) are looking for a new Individual round - not quite 7.62mm NATO, but more than 5.56mm - so their troops can reach out further.

I can shoot 300m with a C8CQB and a CCO (11.5" barrel)

The problem is marksmanship in the CF, US Army etc is downright disgusting.

If war is the auditor of nations, the Boer War was the auditor of marksmanship... poor mostly in the case of the victors:

THE civilian rifle club movement in England grew out of the disasters of the first months of the Anglo-Boer War late in 1899. The British Army suffered a series of reverses at the hands of outnumbered civilians unlike anything the nation had witnessed in the prior years. One of the shocking revelations of the war was the poor standard of marksmanship in the army compared to that of the Boers. The Boers grew up hunting and riding; each burgher provided his own horse and rifle when he joined his commando. These expert game shots, partial to the bolt-action Mauser repeater, took a heavy toll on British troops often ordered to advance in long lines as if fighting lightly armed tribesmen.

http://nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2001/champions-of-civilian-marksmanship.aspx?s=

 

[Old Sweat]

If war is the auditor of nations, the Boer War was the auditor of marksmanship... poor mostly in the case of the victors:

THE civilian rifle club movement in England grew out of the disasters of the first months of the Anglo-Boer War late in 1899. The British Army suffered a series of reverses at the hands of outnumbered civilians unlike anything the nation had witnessed in the prior years. One of the shocking revelations of the war was the poor standard of marksmanship in the army compared to that of the Boers. The Boers grew up hunting and riding; each burgher provided his own horse and rifle when he joined his commando. These expert game shots, partial to the bolt-action Mauser repeater, took a heavy toll on British troops often ordered to advance in long lines as if fighting lightly armed tribesmen.

http://nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2001/champions-of-civilian-marksmanship.aspx?s=

Without quibbling too much, that was true of rural burghers, but not so much for the some of the less affluent urban males. Agreed that it didn't help that the British army seemed to want to play Figure 11 Targets. I also believe that the governments of the two Boer republics supplied rifles - usually Mauser 98s but Portuguese Guedes and other types were issued. Later in the war when ammunition supply became critical, many Boers used captured Lee-Metfords and Lee-Enfields.

As for the number of real warriors per section, I recall reading something by either Horrocks, Montgomery or Slim to the effect that many Brit generals disliked "special units" because they attracted the warriors as volunteers.

 

[KevinB]

The USMC is probably the ONLY entity that still does medium range individual rifle qualification.
  They stacked up insurgents in Anbar province at range - to the degree of the number of headshots, they got accused of doing executions.

However most Armies on do 300m quals.

So if you do the Infanteer math -- they are probably only going to hit 30m targets.  If folks still shot out to 600m (like we did with the iron sighted FN C1A1) - they'd at least hit to 60m 

Keep in mind the R22eR CSM who shot a serb in FYR at 870ish meter with his C7A1  - took a few round but he did it.

Also there have been numerous kills at range by personnel armed with 7.62mm and 5.56mm precision systems in a DM role - all under fire.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm not talking SOF.  I'm talking Infantry.

SOF has self-selection/unit selection processes that generally ensure it gets all "natural fighters".  SOF has specific missions, specific kit and specific TTPs.

I'm talking about bog standard infantry in an engagement.  I'd be interested in seeing the documented studies showing that realistic and repetive training can increase both hit and probability because the OR I have seen points to the opposite.  All I have seen to date is that realistic targetry and stress training helps increase the rate of firers, but nothing speaks to this fire as being particularly effective.

 

[vonGarvin]

I'd be interested in seeing the documented studies showing that realistic and repetive training can increase both hit and probability because the OR I have seen points to the opposite. 

I have no such studies, but the conclusion from the premise that realistic and repetive training decreases probability of hit implies that the less training you have, the greater chance of scoring hits.

(If that's what you meant).

Having said all this, I do believe it's intuitive that realistic training is a necessity.  I'm not saying that being able to drop a Fig 11 at 300 m on a sunny day in Wainwright means that you will drop an enemy soldier at 300m on a rainy day in (insert name of shitty country here).  But I do know that, all things being equal, if you have two soldiers at similar ranges in similar conditions firing at similar ranges in combat, the one with the realistic training will have a greater chance of scoring a hit.

Having said all of that, however, I do acknowledge that it is the support weapons that are the battle-winners.  It was stated earlier the model of the ~1982 rifle section of ten soldiers: LAR group with the 2IC, Rifle Group with the Section Commander, giving the section 2 x FN C2, 2 x SMG C1 and 6 x FN C1.  In 2012, the rifle section still numbers 10.  Could it go to a model of LMG group with 2IC and Rifle Group with the Section Commander?  Of course it could, and it would require no shift in doctrine to do so.  It's up to the commanders on the ground.  Hell, if they want to go to three groups, they can do it.  The only limit is imagination.

 

[a_majoor]

Perhaps I am misunderstanding something here.

The reason for DM's. pushing GPMG's to section level and developing exotic weaponry like the M-25 is because the enemy has developed TTPs to engage outside of the range band of the individual rifleman, and *we* need a way for everyone to rapidly respond to engagements opened outside of the 300m range band. I am thinking from the thrust of most of these arguments that the old "most engagements happen at under 300m" conventional wisdom is being eclipsed, and a new generation of general issue service weapons capable of providing fire beyond the 300m mark are what is being advocated for (hence my support of a weapon using 6.5mm LSAT type rounds).

Hitting and killing an enemy fighter/soldier/insurgent at 500m+ with a well aimed rifle shot isn't outside the bounds of possibility (assuming the round still has enough energy to deliver a lethal blow), but I am realistic enough to say that having a round snap past your ear at any range will certainly throw you off, and if our riflemen can do that, it gives the crew served weapons time to set up and come into action. Obviously, excellent training and a decent set of optics are also a must have, and if we were to combine a more rigerous training standard with a better sight than the C-79, and issue "hot" ammunition with more muzzle energy, then we have a 75-80% solution.

 

[McG]

That is generally the argument, but from my understanding, it is not completely true.  Operational research suggests that, regardless of training, moving from a static range to a field firing environment where a soldier shoots, moves and communicates reduces the reduces the soldiers ability to hit a target by a factor of ten.  Having an enemy fire back reduces by another factor of ten, while being engaged by an enemy MG mean another factor of ten.

If we trained our soldiers to engage enemy at greater ranges, does the resulting stand-off protection (ie. now shooting from beyond enemy fire) result in a gain by a factor of 10?

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps I am misunderstanding something here.

The reason for DM's. pushing GPMG's to section level and developing exotic weaponry like the M-25 is because the enemy has developed TTPs to engage outside of the range band of the individual rifleman, and *we* need a way for everyone to rapidly respond to engagements opened outside of the 300m range band. I am thinking from the thrust of most of these arguments that the old "most engagements happen at under 300m" conventional wisdom is being eclipsed, and a new generation of general issue service weapons capable of providing fire beyond the 300m mark are what is being advocated for (hence my support of a weapon using 6.5mm LSAT type rounds).

Hitting and killing an enemy fighter/soldier/insurgent at 500m+ with a well aimed rifle shot isn't outside the bounds of possibility (assuming the round still has enough energy to deliver a lethal blow), but I am realistic enough to say that having a round snap past your ear at any range will certainly throw you off, and if our riflemen can do that, it gives the crew served weapons time to set up and come into action. Obviously, excellent training and a decent set of optics are also a must have, and if we were to combine a more rigerous training standard with a better sight than the C-79, and issue "hot" ammunition with more muzzle energy, then we have a 75-80% solution.

Isn't the range thing really a function of environment?  In Vietnam cover and concealment allowed approaches to knife fighting distances.  Gagetown brings you up to pistol shot.  In downtown Toronto I think you would be hard pressed to find 100 m lines of sight.  On the wide-open prairies, the arctic, South Africa's veldt and in Afghanistan's open country - well on a clear day and a high ledge out here in Alberta I can easily observe out to 30 km - just need good optics and a very big rifle - one of Old Sweat's would do.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps I am misunderstanding something here.

The reason for DM's. pushing GPMG's to section level and developing exotic weaponry like the M-25 is because the enemy has developed TTPs to engage outside of the range band of the individual rifleman, and *we* need a way for everyone to rapidly respond to engagements opened outside of the 300m range band. I am thinking from the thrust of most of these arguments that the old "most engagements happen at under 300m" conventional wisdom is being eclipsed, and a new generation of general issue service weapons capable of providing fire beyond the 300m mark are what is being advocated for (hence my support of a weapon using 6.5mm LSAT type rounds).

Hitting and killing an enemy fighter/soldier/insurgent at 500m+ with a well aimed rifle shot isn't outside the bounds of possibility (assuming the round still has enough energy to deliver a lethal blow), but I am realistic enough to say that having a round snap past your ear at any range will certainly throw you off, and if our riflemen can do that, it gives the crew served weapons time to set up and come into action. Obviously, excellent training and a decent set of optics are also a must have, and if we were to combine a more rigerous training standard with a better sight than the C-79, and issue "hot" ammunition with more muzzle energy, then we have a 75-80% solution.

Anything outside of the effective range of my section/platoon direct fire weapons is going to get the attention of my 60mm MORs (oops, don't have them anymore) or my MFC with my dedicated section of 81mm mortars (oops, can't guarantee that anymore) or the arty (not at priority call, sorry).

 

[Infanteer]

(If that's what you meant).

No, its not.  What is said is that training cannot necessarily overcome the battlefield effects that substantially reduce the effectiveness of small arms.

 

[vonGarvin]

No, its not.  What is said is that training cannot necessarily overcome the battlefield effects that substantially reduce the effectiveness of small arms.

By "effectiveness", I take it you mean accuracy (eg: hitting that which you intend to hit).  In any event, my conclusion from this is is that training is not necessary because it "cannot necessarily overcome the battlefield effects that substantially reduce the effectiveness (accuracy) of small arms." 

So, then, why train at all if it cannot overcome these effects?

(This is why I raise the BS flag on that conclusion)

EDIT:  Do they mean "the current training" or "any" training? 

 

[a_majoor]

Isn't the range thing really a function of environment?  In Vietnam cover and concealment allowed approaches to knife fighting distances.  Gagetown brings you up to pistol shot.  In downtown Toronto I think you would be hard pressed to find 100 m lines of sight.  On the wide-open prairies, the arctic, South Africa's veldt and in Afghanistan's open country - well on a clear day and a high ledge out here in Alberta I can easily observe out to 30 km - just need good optics and a very big rifle - one of Old Sweat's would do.

While range is indeed a function of the environment; operational research from WWII is where the "300m range band" argument comes from. You will note this is also where the intermediate cartridge first made its appearance in the StG 44 assault rifle, which was designed with these considerations in mind.

This conventional wisdom has held firm in wars ranging from the Arab-Israeli wars to the Falkland Islands and innumerable wars in between, which have been fought in everything from open desert to tight urban environments, and with every weapon from the latest issue to home made zip guns.

Once again, I might be misreading the arguments here but the 300m range band has been breached so most squad/section weapons are rendered ineffective. A secondary argument of greater penetration vs barricades, walls and body armour is also raised as a reason to go for a more powerful weapon/round. Highly trained riflemen can put 5.56mm rounds on target at impressive ranges, but the weapon and round are optimized for the 300m fight, and not to penetrate barriers.

 

[Infanteer]

By "effectiveness", I take it you mean accuracy (eg: hitting that which you intend to hit).  In any event, my conclusion from this is is that training is not necessary because it "cannot necessarily overcome the battlefield effects that substantially reduce the effectiveness (accuracy) of small arms." 

So, then, why train at all if it cannot overcome these effects?

(This is why I raise the BS flag on that conclusion)

Effectiveness is, in my opinion, the ability to suppress or kill the enemy, and we need to train because their are still important things to train for to achieve this effect.  Having riflemen pinging off a head in a trench from 300m is not one of those (although we should still teach the basics of marksmanship).  The right training is on section/platoon manoeuvre - moving the team to gain a position of advantage against the enemy.  Gaining a position of advantage does not mean riflemen running around and banging off rounds at trenches, it means using the terrain to get the crew-served weapons in a position to suppress.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I'm not going to jump in with both feet, but we shot C7, iron sight (before Elcan), at 500 mtr on a regular basis, with consistent effect. It's not rocket science, just basic musketry skills.

Get back to basics and forget the technology.

 

[OldSolduer]

Get back to basics and forget the technology.

I am with you on this one. BUT....and there always is a BUT.....time and range space, and ammo all being constraints.