Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[Underway]

Third - DM and DND ADM Pol (currently Peter Hammerschmidt) will be required to come up with a new White Paper that puts the emphasis on -

• Defending Canada, proper,
• Defending North America in partnership with the USA,
• Assisting in the defence of democratic allies in Asia and Europe in cooperation with Asia-Pacific allies and as a member of NATO, and
• Supporting veterans in a fair but cost effective manner.

So basically the exact same white paper/defence policy we have had since forever:

Harpers policy
Canada First Defense Strategy - Defend Canada, Defend North America, Defend our allies

Trudeau's policy
Strong Secure Engaged - Strong in Canada, Secure in North America, Engaged with NATO and allies

Canada's strategic needs don't change. The only thing that changes is the shopping list.

A new white paper is basically a waste of time and a way to dither on important decisions/expendatures. They have multi-party support on the same friggin defence policy, they just refuse to acknowledge that.

Also a white paper on defence that mentions veterans I would call an omnibus paper. Veterans are not the CAF nor a defence problem. They are a social program problem run by Veterans Affairs.

 

[Navy_Pete]

@Edward Campbell I suspect you are right, and there will also be further real cuts to the in service side, along with some kind of DRAP 2.0 to whittle down the public service side (which fundamentally undercuts CAF ability to support itself when the various SMEs retire)

The LOE required to push projects now is insane, and even what should be straight forward buys of replacement widgets has a number of extra reviews. All that needs people and expertise, which we already don't have enough of. It's increased significantly during my career, and only getting worse.

It's really frustrating as both a CAF member trying to put parts on shelves and support units, as well as a Canadian taxpayer for how much time/work it takes to do anything and the cost of that, where a huge amount of 'oversight' and 'approval' seems to serve no useful purpose other than to add delays to spending approval.

 

[ytz]

Here is the CAF List of GOFOs:

General Officers and Flag Officers - Canada.ca

General and Flag Officers of the Canadian Armed Forces work closely with senior Defence Team executives to ensure Canada is strong at home, secure in North America, and engaged in the world.

www.canada.ca

Look at the job titles and then decide who should be lower ranked. Not as easy as you would think without substantially rethinking the institution.

I will say that maybe places like CJOC don't need to have generals leading staff functions. And maybe some DGs don't need to be MGens.

But a lot of these appointments are driven by the reality that their civilian and/or NATO equivalents have similar ranks.

 

[Edward Campbell]

OK, if I'm MND for a day, the following stay at the ranks they currently hold; you will note a certain commonality in most of the appointments:

• Vice Chief of the Defence Staff - LGen/VAdm
• Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples - LGen
• Deputy Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) - LGen
• Deputy Commander of United Nations Command in Korea - LGen
• Military Representative of Canada to NATO - LGen
• Deputy Commander Continental United States NORAD Region - MGen/RAdm
• Defence Attaché, Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (Washington) - MGen
• J3 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) - MGen
• Vice Commander United States 2nd Fleet - MGen
• National Military Representative to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - BGen/Cmdre
• Deputy Director of Strategy, Policy and Plans NORAD and United States Northern Command - BGen
• Assistant Chief of Staff J4, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers - BGen
• Assistant Chief of Staff J5, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - BGen
• Alaskan NORAD Region Deputy Commander - BGen
• Director Training (J7), Strategic Advisory Group - Ukraine - BGen
• Chief of the Defence Staff Liaison Officer to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff - BGen
• Vice J5 United States Cyber Command - BGen
• Deputy Commanding General – Operations, (United States) XVIII Airborne Corps - BGen
• Multinational Division North, Deputy Commander Maneuvre - BGen
• Deputy Commanding General-Transformation, United States Space Force - BGen
• Chief of Staff I Corps (United States) - BGen
• Deputy Commanding General, Operations, 11th Airborne Division (United States) - BGen
• Defence Attaché, Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London) - BGen
• United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Deputy J3 - BGen
• Deputy J3 US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) - BGen
• Commander Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 - BGen
• Maritime Component Command, Deputy Chief of Staff - Plans - BGen

The following will be deleted and any tasks that are useful (and there are most certainly some for each and every position) will be reassigned to 'survivors:'

• Chief Professional Conduct and Culture - LGen/VAdm
• Chief of Fighter Capability - MGen/RAdm
• Chief of Staff Chief Professional Conduct and Culture - MGen
• Director General Miltary Personnel - Strategic - MGen
• Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command - MGen
• Chief of Staff, Digital Transformation Office - MGen
• Director General Culture - MGen
• Director General Future Ship Capability - MGen
• Director General Issues - BGen/Cmdre
• Commander Military Personnel Generation Group - BGen
• Commander 1st Canadian Division Headquarters - BGen
• Chief of Staff Canadian Forces Intelligence Command - BGen
• Commander National Cadets and Junior Canadian Rangers Support Group - BGen
• Director General Intelligence Enterprise - BGen
• Deputy Director General Military Personnel Strategic and Director Strategic Development - BGen
• Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Professional Conduct and Culture - BGen
• Director General Reserve Force Strategic Initiatives - BGen
• Commander Canadian Armed Forces Transition Group - BGen
• Director General Professional Conduct and Development - BGen
• Reserve Special Advisor to the Royal Canadian Navy - BGen

Every other position, including the Chief of the Defence Staff will be reduced by one rank. A few, like the Provost Marshal will be reduced by two ranks from MGen/RAdm to Col/Capt(N). Almost all directors generals will be Cols/Capts(N) and almost all directors will be LCols/Cdrs. (When the forces were 'unified' (1960s) it was decided that military ranks should be tied to the civil service. In the civil service a director is the frst level 'executive' level. Anyone who thinks that a ship's captain, regiment or battalion commander or RCAF squadron commander is not the first level of military executive doesn't understand either the military or executive, most likely neither.)

 

[Navy_Pete]

Honestly think downgrading the rank of GOFOs is somewhat of a dog and pony show effort; what is more relevant is whether or not we need the various commands or organisations anyway. And you are right, some of the ranks (espcially for the deputies at places like ADM(Mat) is driven by the equivalent rank of the civilian they work for as well as the rank of DGs etc below them. From what I can tell, GOFOs are slightly underpaid compared to equivalent EXs already.

Busting down the rank of a MGen position won't magically fill any Sgt or MCpl positions or stop empire building, and does nothing for the bloat. Where it seems to be more prevalent is on all these reporting tools, dashboards etc that are all over the place, and largely pulled from DRMIS data which is full of holes, errors, and in some cases outright lies. DRMIS has turned into a digital circle jerk that everyone has a hardon to 'operationalize', but it's so user unfriendly and laborious to use (with MI project breaking the supply managmenet functions) that it's a lot of garbage data. We would have been better off in a lot of cases with manually filling in the same data (which happens anyway because the pulls are BS)., but would kill a huge swath of DRMIS policy wonks and CoEs.

 

[Quirky]

Busting down the rank of a MGen position won't magically fill any Sgt or MCpl positions or stop empire building

Too bad none of those General Positions are called Director General of Strategic Middle Management, or something to that effect. Our unit is under 30% manning in the MCpl - WO rank after this APS. No time to get ahead of things, the entire operation is a day to day struggle to keep the lights on. I'd imagine most of the RCAF/CAF is like that now.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Too bad none of those General Positions are called Director General of Strategic Middle Management, or something to that effect. Our unit is under 30% manning in the MCpl - WO rank after this APS. No time to get ahead of things, the entire operation is a day to day struggle to keep the lights on. I'd imagine most of the RCAF/CAF is like that now.

Yeah, same at our end. Personnally wish they would screw off with the dashboard reports, policy wonks, 'process improvments' etc until we can get our head above water generally. Adding extra steps onto a complicated process doesn't help, and I've yet to see anything 'streamlined' that has actually reduced the workload or made it easier in a long time.

 

[Edward Campbell]

My post above is probably not really helpful, BUT, I believe, very firmly, that having too many HQs with too many too highly ranked officers sends a message to the officers and men and women in our ships and units that the military (and bureaucratic/civilian) 'leadership' is more interested in feathering their own nests than in making the Canadian Armed Forces into the tough, superbly disciplined, well trained and adequately equipped force in which almost every man and woman in uniform really wants to serve.

I am convinced that we can have a better force if we have considerable fewer admirals and generals in a better organization.

I, personally, think that Minister Paul Hellyer was right about 60 years ago when he proposed a joint (unified) force with joint, functional commands. I believe either joint geographic commands or joint functional commands are superior, for Canada, than is the current mish-mash. I think I understand the force generation <> force employment concept well enough but I'm not sure that our current C2 structure achieves the right mix. However, I've been wrong before and I may still be wrong about this.

I believe the simplest organization is probably four joint geographic commands; Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic: Pacific and Atlantic Commands would be mainly joint Navy/Air commands, while most of the Army and the largest share of the RCAF would be found in Western and Eastern commands. Western Command could have a subordinate Northern Region and Eastern Command could have a subordinate Special Operations Group.

But, Mr Hellyer's joint functional commands could have worked well if he had gotten them right in the first place. His decision to make Air Defence and Air Transport into two lower ranked (than Maritime and Mobile) Commands led to the organizational vandalism of 1975 that created Air Command. But he was also aided by admirals and generals who didn't want to be joint and, when push came to shove, always made ships or army regiments a higher priority than their air units. The joint Materiel and Communications Commands worked very well in the 1960s and beyond. Proper joint functional commands: Maritime (joint Navy/Air), Mobile (joint Army/Air), Air and Materiel Commands could work today. Communications doesn't need its own command but there's no harm in it if it is not over-ranked.

 

[PrairieFella]

My post above is probably not really helpful, BUT, I believe, very firmly, that having too many HQs with too many too highly ranked officers sends a message to the officers and men and women in our ships and units that the military (and bureaucratic/civilian) 'leadership' is more interested in feathering their own nests than in making the Canadian Armed Forces into the tough, superbly disciplined, well trained and adequately equipped force in which almost every man and woman in uniform really wants to serve.

I am convinced that we can have a better force if we have considerable fewer admirals and generals in a better organization.

I, personally, think that Minister Paul Hellyer was right about 60 years ago when he proposed a joint (unified) force with joint, functional commands. I believe either joint geographic commands or joint functional commands are superior, for Canada, than is the current mish-mash. I think I understand the force generation <> force employment concept well enough but I'm not sure that our current C2 structure achieves the right mix. However, I've been wrong before and I may still be wrong about this.

I believe the simplest organization is probably four joint geographic commands; Pacific, Western, Eastern and Atlantic: Pacific and Atlantic Commands would be mainly joint Navy/Air commands, while most of the Army and the largest share of the RCAF would be found in Western and Eastern commands. Western Command could have a subordinate Northern Region and Eastern Command could have a subordinate Special Operations Group.

But, Mr Hellyer's joint functional commands could have worked well if he had gotten them right in the first place. His decision to make Air Defence and Air Transport into two lower ranked (than Maritime and Mobile) Commands led to the organizational vandalism of 1975 that created Air Command. But he was also aided by admirals and generals who didn't want to be joint and, when push came to shove, always made ships or army regiments a higher priority than their air units. The joint Materiel and Communications Commands worked very well in the 1960s and beyond. Proper joint functional commands: Maritime (joint Navy/Air), Mobile (joint Army/Air), Air and Materiel Commands could work today. Communications doesn't need its own command but there's no harm in it if it is not over-ranked.

Hellyer's unification was a disaster for the CAF. Never again.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Hellyer's unification was a disaster for the CAF. Never again.

I disagree!

Unification, the creation of joint forces was the right idea; all our allies were doing it.​

​

Integration, the attempt to create a single service wearing the "jolly green jumper" was silly and destructive.​

But it's important to keep the two very different things separate in your minds.

 

[dimsum]

I disagree!

Unification, the creation of joint forces was the right idea; all our allies were doing it.​

​

Integration, the attempt to create a single service wearing the "jolly green jumper" was silly and destructive.​

But it's important to keep the two very different things separate in your minds.

Something in between may have benefits.

If you’re training trades that are common (say clerks), a combined school like we have now is preferable to 3 separate schools like most of our allies.

 

[Furniture]

Something in between may have benefits.

If you’re training trades that are common (say clerks), a combined school like we have now is preferable to 3 separate schools like most of our allies.

Agreed, speaking to American Met folks showed me that pretty quickly. The USAF, USMC, and USN all have their own Met training... They learn the same things, just in slightly different ways. It's a waste of resources, when it could easily be combined into a single school teaching all three branches.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Something in between may have benefits.

If you’re training trades that are common (say clerks), a combined school like we have now is preferable to 3 separate schools like most of our allies.

Agreed: Training Command was a joint command; it was highly imperfect because the command staff overlapped the NDHQ individual training bureaucracy which was, in turn, a mish-mash of single service, 'stove-pipe' vested (but often powerful/high ranked) interests and a small, and ineffective, as I recall, joint individual training staff buried somewhere in the personnel staff.

I remember ranting about training to my boss in the '80s and he quipped that promotion boards made mistakes (not he and I, of course ) and Training Command (and RMC and the Staff College) was good place to bury some of them.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Something in between may have benefits.

If you’re training trades that are common (say clerks), a combined school like we have now is preferable to 3 separate schools like most of our allies.

Schools, yes. Because the same policies and systems can exist across the services. (Force Generation)

The employment, no. Uniforms matter and employment environment matters. (Force Employment)

I also strongly believe the purplness is dying.

 

[FJAG]

I am convinced that we can have a better force if we have considerable fewer admirals and generals in a better organization.

As an aside, I disagree with jointness in force generation entities. It merely leads to another layer of bureaucracy. I do believe firmly in jointness in operational forces including planning headquarters.

I'm fully on board with the idea of eliminating many GOFOs and reducing in rank the position of many more. I'm going to unashamedly quote myself from the first edition of "Unsustainable at Any Price" (I've since deleted this segment for Ed 2)

"When Sir Arthur Harris was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for the UK in 1940 he found the Air Staff “fantastically bloated” and inefficient. He instituted an across the board 40% reduction in staff which resulted in the “essential work not only still being done, but being done with much more efficiency and speed.”[1]

More recently, Ford Motor Company cut 7,000 white collar jobs, 20% of it’s upper-level managers reducing its organizational layers from 14 to nine because “[t]o succeed in our competitive industry, and position Ford to win in a fast-changing future, we must reduce bureaucracy, empower managers, speed decision making, focus on the most valuable work and cut costs,”[2]

Similarly, the US Department of the Army was recently forced to review its overall active Army strength including the size of its headquarters:

From July 2014 through March 2015, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) completed an organizational redesign aimed at reducing overall personnel authorizations 25 percent and reducing operating costs by fiscal year (FY) 2019.
...
HQDA had too many echelons in place for clear and effective communication, leaders had low spans of supervisory control, and numerous deputies or senior employees were too deep within the organizations to operate effectively and often reported to each other. The USA and VCSA stated their intent to reduce the number of echelons and redundant management processes, or “de-layer” the headquarters, to reverse these trends. In the long run, de-layering the HQDA could offset some of the impact of the 25 percent personnel authorization reductions, making organizations easier to manage and more efficient in terms of work and information flow, as proven in other large civilian business headquarters.[3]"

---

[1] Marshall of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris, “Bomber Offensive”, 1947, Pen and Sword Military Classics, Barnsley, UK pp. 49-51
[2] Howard, Phobe Wall, “CEO Hacket: Ford Motor Company to lay off 500 US workers this week, more in June” Detroit Free Press, May 20, 2019
CEO Hackett: Ford Motor to lay off 500 US salaried workers this week, more by June
[3] Spoehr, Lt. Gen. Thomas, et al, “Reducing the Size of Headquarters of the Army, An After-Action Report”, Military Review, January-February 2015
Reducing the Size of Headquarters, Department of the Army

The point is not the mere spiteful reduction in ranks and numbers of the GOFOs, but the resultant reduction and adjustment of the bureaucracy that underlies and supports them and the reduction of silos and layers to speed communication and decision making.

It's abundantly clear from the institutional reaction to the 2011 CAF's Transformation initiative that the the bureaucratic (both military and civilian) resistance to an orderly, cooperative processes is strong and deeply entrenched. IMHO, reductions need to be imposed with almost arbitrary target quotas and layers, a la the above examples, leaving what's left of the leadership to sort out how to manage with what is left. It's not just personnel, but process that need streamlining.

 

[dimsum]

Schools, yes. Because the same policies and systems can exist across the services. (Force Generation)

The employment, no. Uniforms matter and employment environment matters. (Force Employment)

I also strongly believe the purplness is dying.

In the tactical sense (ship, field unit) sure, but in the HQs I don’t think it matters as much.

If you’re a clerk in one of the HQs, is it that different whether your beret is blue, green, or black?

Of course, it brings up the question whether those should be military positions or not.

 

[quadrapiper]

In the tactical sense (ship, field unit) sure, but in the HQs I don’t think it matters as much.

If you’re a clerk in one of the HQs, is it that different whether your beret is blue, green, or black?

Of course, it brings up the question whether those should be military positions or not.

Perhaps a layer or two back from the ships and field units? MARPAC's clerks "getting" what ships and sailors do (timelines, comms, how their shipboard peers do their business, pier jumping, whatever) seems like it might be useful.

As far as civvy versus military clerks, beyond providing enough stable not-shipboard or field billets to rotate people and having a layer of admin pers who know what's up, what other drivers actually justify uniformed clerks in (say) Ottawa? Or for that matter, uniformed loggies past a certain point?

 

[Halifax Tar]

In the tactical sense (ship, field unit) sure, but in the HQs I don’t think it matters as much.

If you’re a clerk in one of the HQs, is it that different whether your beret is blue, green, or black?

Of course, it brings up the question whether those should be military positions or not.

Do we need a uniformed clerk working in an OR at CJOC ?

I think all the clerks in the HQ/S90 in Halifax should be Navy, In Shearwater - RCAF, in Gagetown - Army ect ect.

I think all the uniforms in RCN platforms should be RCN. Same for RCAF organizations and CA organization.

 

[Edward Campbell]

From The Economist; the Brits talk about doing more wth less:

----------​

Britain’s army chief fears war may come sooner than anyone thinks​

Could the army cope without more money and troops?​

The hall of Church House, nestled next to Westminster Abbey, is full of pious exhortations to peace and love. On July 22nd-23rd it was filled with military officers debating how to kill people more efficiently. General Sir Roly Walker, who became chief of the general staff in June, was one of those addressing the army’s annual land-warfare conference, run by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-tank. In his speech he set out his aim “to double our fighting power in three years and triple it by the end of the decade”.

In the past that might have been seen as a cynical ploy to pitch for more money and troops. Unusually, General Walker said he was not asking for either. Instead his plan reflects a fear that war might come sooner than anyone thinks. General Walker sees 2027-28 as a moment in which Russian rearmament, China’s threat to Taiwan and Iran’s nuclear ambitions might come together in a “singularity”. (Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the chief of the defence staff and General Walker’s boss, is more relaxed: he argues that Russia would need five years to rebuild its army to the pre-2022 standard, and another five to fix deeper problems.)

Before the war in Ukraine, the British Army’s aim was to modernise slowly in the hope of building a battle-ready force by the early 2030s. That timeline has been shredded. General Walker’s plan is to eke out more combat power from the force at his disposal now. His idea is to create an “internet of military things” in which any sensor (a satellite or drone, say) can funnel data to any weapon, the entire process fuelled by artificial intelligence. “We will sense twice as far, decide in half the time, deliver effects over double the distance with half as many munitions,” he says, pointing to Ukraine’s military ingenuity.

Sceptics retort that the army is running on fumes. On July 23rd John Healey, the new defence secretary, reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to offer NATO a corps in any war with Russia—roughly, three divisions’ worth of troops, comprising six combat brigades plus enablers such as engineering and artillery units. That is fanciful. The army currently has around 75,000 regular troops. In April General Sir Nick Carter, an ex-army chief, told Parliament that the army had calculated it would need 82,000 troops just to generate a single “warfighting” division. Manpower is not the only issue. RUSI estimates that deploying a single armoured brigade would absorb 70-80% of the army’s engineering capabilities for crossing rivers or minefields.

“The British Army has been handed a policy commitment by wider government that it is not resourced to deliver,” says Jack Watling, a RUSI expert whose writing has acquired cult status among generals. It is not the army’s place to set policy, he acknowledges. “But the rest of government needs to realise that demanding the impossible is grossly irresponsible.” The idea of a corps is a “fantasy”, says an American general who has worked closely with the British Army. “They could project maybe two understrength brigades.” He suggests that Britain look to the us Marine Corps and do away with tanks entirely in favour of a smaller and lighter force that could “plug in” to an American division.

The task of advising on military priorities will fall to three outsiders undertaking a “root-and-branch” defence review announced by Mr Healey on July 16th. Lord Robertson, a NATO secretary-general in 1999-2003, will take the lead, supported by Sir Richard Barrons, a retired general, and Fiona Hill, a British-American expert on Russia who served in Donald Trump’s national-security council. That may lead to more resources for General Walker. But he isn’t banking on it. ■

----------

I think General (ret'd) Carter is correct when he suggests that 80,000+ troops are required to "generate" 1 division of 20,000+ soldiers. A full corps - three divisions, 75,000+ soldiers - requires an Army of 250,000 to 350,000 all ranks.

As to using AI to "multiply" combat power: I love the concept but I worry that in most military operations there is a weak link: telecommunications. Most military operations are mobile to a very great or lesser degree. Mobile means radio. I'm to an expert on operations but I do know a whole helluva lot about radio-communication, more than 95% of the population I would guess, and I know how vulnerable it is is to a vast array of "threats" - natural and manmade.

The Economist also worries about the state of the US military:

----------​

America is not ready for a major war, says a bipartisan commission​

The country is unaware of the dangers ahead, and of the costs to prepare for them​

General charles “cq” brown, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, America’s top military officer, recently told the Aspen Security Forum, a gathering of the country’s foreign-policy elite, that the nation’s armed forces were the “most lethal, most respected combat force in the world”. Steely-faced, and to jubilant whoops, he declared: “I do not play for second place.” In reality, America’s military position is eroding. That is the message of a report published on July 29th by a bipartisan commission entrusted by Congress with scrutinising the Biden administration’s national defence strategy (nds), a document published two years ago.

The nds commission was chaired by Jane Harman, a former congresswoman, with Eric Edelman, an undersecretary of defence in the George W. Bush administration, deputising. In 2018 the previous such commission had warned that America “might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia”. This time the language is starker. The threats to America, including “the potential for near-term major war”, are the most serious since 1945, it says. The country is both unaware of their extent and unprepared to meet them.

The most serious problem is China. “We’re at least checkmating China now,” boasted Joe Biden, America’s president, on July 6th. In fact, China is “outpacing” America not only in the size but also the “capability” of its military forces, as well as in defence production, and is probably on track to meet its target of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027, argues the commission. In space and cyber, the People’s Liberation Army is “peer- or near-peer-level”.

Russia is a lesser concern but, despite its quagmire in Ukraine, still poses a serious threat. On July 19th Vipin Narang, a senior Pentagon official, confirmed reports that Russia was seeking to place a nuclear weapon in orbit, describing it as a “threat to all of humanity” and “catastrophic for the entire world”. The report says that America should boost its presence in Europe to a full armoured corps, a much larger commitment than exists today, accompanied by enablers such as air defence and aviation, with some of today’s rotational forces, which swap in and out, potentially turned into permanently deployed ones.

Compounding these threats is the increasing political and military alignment between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, including the transfer of arms, technology and battlefield lessons. That presents “a real risk, if not likelihood,” says the commission, “that conflict anywhere could become a multi-theatre or global war”. In 2018 the Trump administration did away with the previous requirement that the Pentagon be prepared to fight two major wars, including one in Europe and one in Asia, at the same time. Mr Biden’s team stuck to that reduced ambition. The result is that a war in one theatre would stretch America dangerously thin, forcing it to rely on nuclear weapons to compensate.

A conflict would also find America wanting in other respects. “Major war would affect the life of every American in ways we can only begin to imagine,” warns the commission. Cyber-attacks would pound critical infrastructure including power, water and transport. Access to critical minerals for civilian and military industry “would be completely cut off”, they say.

Casualties would far exceed any Western experience in recent memory. Recent simulations by the army show that, in battles involving corps and divisions—larger formations that the army is prioritising over brigades and battalions—casualties ran to 50,000 to 55,000, including 10,000-15,000 killed. The commission does not call for a return to the draft, abandoned in 1973, but hints at it, saying that the all-volunteer force faces “serious questions”.

In response to these problems, the commission makes several recommendations. One is to bolster alliances. On July 28th the Biden administration made a big stride in that regard by announcing the creation of a new “warfighting” headquarters in Japan to command all army, air force and navy forces in the country. Another is to reform the Pentagon, whose procurement, research and development practices are described as “Byzantine”.

A third is to sharply raise defence spending, which is projected to remain flat in real terms for the next five years, despite the previous commission’s recommendation for 3-5% annual real-terms growth. That particular figure is somewhat arbitrary. Nonetheless, the commission urges Congress to revoke existing spending caps, pass a multi-year supplemental budget to beef up the defence industrial base and open the fiscal taps to put defence “on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the US national effort seen during the Cold War”.

There is something here to irritate everyone. To pay for all this, the report proposes additional taxes and cuts to spending on health care and welfare. Both parties will balk at that. Democrats shy away from more defence spending. Republicans are allergic to more taxes. The defence-policy wonks in Donald Trump’s orbit will like the idea of beefing up the armed forces, but many will recoil at the idea of putting more troops into Europe, rather than Asia.

For the commission, there is little time to waste. “The us public are largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs…required to adequately prepare,” says the commission. “They do not appreciate the strength of China and its partnerships or the ramifications to daily life if a conflict were to erupt…They have not internalised the costs of the United States losing its position as a world superpower.”■

----------​

Like me, the NDS commission and The Economist see the CRINKs ( & ) as a major, coordinated threat that requires the US-led West to be able to fight major wars, simultaneously, on at least two fronts.

One sincerely hopes no one looks too closely at the state of Canada's military.

 

[KevinB]

In the tactical sense (ship, field unit) sure, but in the HQs I don’t think it matters as much.

If you’re a clerk in one of the HQs, is it that different whether your beret is blue, green, or black?

Probably not

Of course, it brings up the question whether those should be military positions or not.

Is it, or should it be, a deployable position. To me that is the only question to ask for those positions.