Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

"I will keep Stalingrad supplied!" Herman Goering, 1942

 

[GR66]

As someone who has made a career working with industry marketing materials I am well aware of their limitations.

Having said that I am happy to work in the universe of the possible even if I am only getting a 70% solution. We'll work on it once it is delivered.

You mean like relying on 7.62 and 25mm as your lethal solutions? Absent SAMs, ATGMs, Mines, Shells, AGM/ASMs, Attack Helicopters....

We have nothing but suboptimal solutions.

We can't afford American solutions.

The above quotes were from the Ukraine - Superthread but I think my response is better suited here.

I wonder if he highlighted comments indicate a flaw in our basic thinking with regard to our defence strategy (such as it is).

I think most people will agree that due to our physical location that our Army is really for expeditionary purposes rather than homeland defence and therefore in many ways fulfills political purposes as much as strictly military purposes.

The question is, who are we needing to impress politically? In reality does impressing the Germans, Danes, Norwegians, Poles or Latvians give us any significant political benefit? If we deployed a full Armoured Division to Latvia would these countries suddenly become less Eurocentric and seek out greater economic, cultural and political ties with Canada? Would they open up their defence industries to Canadian companies and begin producing here? Would they start seeking out out input on political matters affecting them and invite us into new decision-making organizations? I seriously doubt it. I'd argue that the people we really get political benefit from impressing are the Americans. So the question is, how do we best impress the Americans?

I've always argued that the #1 way we can impress the Americans is to take continental defence seriously which to me means a primary focus on NORAD modernization (including participation in BMD), fighters, Air-to-Air Refueling, MPAs and ASW (both ships and subs) which are all primarily RCAF and RCN responsibilities. What does that mean then for Army priorities?

We could continue on the path we have been on for the past 50 years or so and have an American Army "Light" so to speak. Just get "good enough" (the above mentioned "70% solution") kit to keep us in the game. Enough capability to be able to show up when required. Give the political benefit of being another coalition flag to demonstrate united Western resolve. It's enough to give us a seat at the table, but not enough for us to actually have any say. It's basically the minimum that is expected of us. It's also the same that's expected of every other NATO ally of the US, so it in no way distinguishes our contribution from anyone else's contribution. We're all just the kid brothers tagging along.

The US knows that it will bear the primary burden in any conflict. It will make the key decisions and it will use its own forces to fulfill the key tasks and use the less capable partner forces to support its efforts.

In my opinion the only way to stand out to the Americans is to field a force that is equally capable as their own forces. A force that they can trust to perform as well as their own units. The goal should not to be to have forces that are interoperable with US forces, but rather forces that are in effect interchangeable with US forces. That's when the US political leadership will start taking Canada seriously as a partner.

Kirkhill suggested "We can't afford American solutions". I'd suggest that isn't technically true. We CAN afford American solutions...we just can't afford them at American scale. I'd suggest however that matching American capability at a smaller scale gives us more political clout with the US than providing lesser capability at a larger scale.

In my opinion this is the approach we should take when deciding what the future Canadian Army should look like. Create the largest force we can afford that matches the top level US capabilities rather than a larger "70% Solution" force.

$0.02

 

[Kirkhill]

The above quotes were from the Ukraine - Superthread but I think my response is better suited here.

I wonder if he highlighted comments indicate a flaw in our basic thinking with regard to our defence strategy (such as it is).

I think most people will agree that due to our physical location that our Army is really for expeditionary purposes rather than homeland defence and therefore in many ways fulfills political purposes as much as strictly military purposes.

The question is, who are we needing to impress politically? In reality does impressing the Germans, Danes, Norwegians, Poles or Latvians give us any significant political benefit? If we deployed a full Armoured Division to Latvia would these countries suddenly become less Eurocentric and seek out greater economic, cultural and political ties with Canada? Would they open up their defence industries to Canadian companies and begin producing here? Would they start seeking out out input on political matters affecting them and invite us into new decision-making organizations? I seriously doubt it. I'd argue that the people we really get political benefit from impressing are the Americans. So the question is, how do we best impress the Americans?

I've always argued that the #1 way we can impress the Americans is to take continental defence seriously which to me means a primary focus on NORAD modernization (including participation in BMD), fighters, Air-to-Air Refueling, MPAs and ASW (both ships and subs) which are all primarily RCAF and RCN responsibilities. What does that mean then for Army priorities?

Up to here I am in 100% agreement.

We could continue on the path we have been on for the past 50 years or so and have an American Army "Light" so to speak. Just get "good enough" (the above mentioned "70% solution") kit to keep us in the game. Enough capability to be able to show up when required. Give the political benefit of being another coalition flag to demonstrate united Western resolve. It's enough to give us a seat at the table, but not enough for us to actually have any say. It's basically the minimum that is expected of us. It's also the same that's expected of every other NATO ally of the US, so it in no way distinguishes our contribution from anyone else's contribution. We're all just the kid brothers tagging along.

Agreed

The US knows that it will bear the primary burden in any conflict. It will make the key decisions and it will use its own forces to fulfill the key tasks and use the less capable partner forces to support its efforts.

Agreed

In my opinion the only way to stand out to the Americans is to field a force that is equally capable as their own forces. A force that they can trust to perform as well as their own units. The goal should not to be to have forces that are interoperable with US forces, but rather forces that are in effect interchangeable with US forces. That's when the US political leadership will start taking Canada seriously as a partner.

Here is where things get tougher -

Kirkhill suggested "We can't afford American solutions". I'd suggest that isn't technically true. We CAN afford American solutions...we just can't afford them at American scale. I'd suggest however that matching American capability at a smaller scale gives us more political clout with the US than providing lesser capability at a larger scale.

Which capabilities do we want to field? All of the American capabilities but at 1/10th scale?

They have 10 divisions. We have 1 division.
They field a specialist division. We field a specialist battalion.
They field a battalion. We field a platoon.
Etc.

That becomes a very expensive force to train, equip and maintain - not to mention the costs of transporting any heavy elements.

It becomes more challenging when we look at this

11th Abn Div - 2x IBCT with 5 Battalions
82nd Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
101st Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
10th Mtn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
25th Inf Div - 2x IBCT with 6 Battalions
173rd Sep Bde - 1x IBCT with 2 Battalions

1st Armd Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Cav Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units
3rd Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units

2nd/7th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions
4th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions and 1x ABCT with 3 Combined Arms Units

Looking at those choices we can build 2 battalion and 3 battalion brigades, separate brigades, 2 and 3 brigade divisions, airborne, heliborne, leg, Lt Armd, and Armd units, brigades and divisions.

The US also has a bunch of National Guard elements of various types.

From that it seems to me that the US is quite comfortable with integrating a large variety of elements in its force structure.

My sense is that whatever we decide to do, as long as we do it well, all assistance will be gratefully received. If we look at the various organizations of the US Allies (NATO, SEATO, Japan, ABCANZUS... USMC) there seems to be very little call to make our army look like their army.

The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours. I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now. Something that will bend and flex with the times.

$0.02

In my opinion this is the approach we should take when deciding what the future Canadian Army should look like. Create the largest force we can afford that matches the top level US capabilities rather than a larger "70% Solution" force.

$0.02

 

[FJAG]

The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours. I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now. Something that will bend and flex with the times.

I'm not so sure about this part.

A division being eaten up in a peer battle has nothing to do with having one but how we utilize it and where and how we commit it.

I appreciate that the need to deploy a Canadian division is not likely but it's not a non-zero possibility. More importantly, the size of Canada's current army is well within the range of the size of a division, maybe even two, but certainly not five divisional and fourteen brigade headquarters.

More importantly a division is required as a framework of training and career progression of both the brigade staffs as well as divisional staff. This allows Canadian staff capable of integrating seamlessly into allied formations. We do some of that already using exchange postings but we have the numbers to do more domestically.

Last, but by no means least, every once in a while you need to do something on the scale of an RV exercise to point out the systemic issues of your doctrine, your structure and with operating in or running of or being part of a large formation. It does it in a way that a CAX simply won't do, particulalry in the field of logistics. IMHO a real divisional/brigade structure is critical for the Cdn Army, but not in the form of the administrative organizations that we currently have.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not so sure about this part.

A division being eaten up in a peer battle has nothing to do with having one but how we utilize it and where and how we commit it.

I appreciate that the need to deploy a Canadian division is not likely but it's not a non-zero possibility. More importantly, the size of Canada's current army is well within the range of the size of a division, maybe even two, but certainly not five divisional and fourteen brigade headquarters.

More importantly a division is required as a framework of training and career progression of both the brigade staffs as well as divisional staff. This allows Canadian staff capable of integrating seamlessly into allied formations. We do some of that already using exchange postings but we have the numbers to do more domestically.

Last, but by no means least, every once in a while you need to do something on the scale of an RV exercise to point out the systemic issues of your doctrine, your structure and with operating in or running of or being part of a large formation. It does it in a way that a CAX simply won't do, particulalry in the field of logistics. IMHO a real divisional/brigade structure is critical for the Cdn Army, but not in the form of the administrative organizations that we currently have.

Back to the perennial problem of the tactical div and the administrative div.

I am close to you and GR66 on Div structure.

But.

I would opt for two light brigades of two battalions and an ISR unit each, a 3 battalion LAV brigade with an ISR unit and a Tank unit and a separate Arty Brigade.

Reserves organized primarily as single function subunits allied to the regs but administered by a separate div hq.

So a two div army. One at notice to move. One dedicated to training and sustainment.

The Reg div has to be able to deploy elements in cooperation with friends and allies.

And we need transport and warehouses.

 

[FJAG]

Back to the perennial problem of the tactical div and the administrative div.

I am close to you and GR66 on Div structure.

But.

I would opt for two light brigades of two battalions and an ISR unit each, a 3 battalion LAV brigade with an ISR unit and a Tank unit and a separate Arty Brigade.

I'm not wedded to any particular brigade structure as I tend to have bought into the building block system. That was the 2000s transformation paradigm, forces built on combinations of companies and headquarters which were routinely used to build task forces. This is why I feel 30/70 structures are viable. That said, there needs to be a doctrinal battalion, brigade and even division structure to build up to and all the appropriate building blocks need to be there. That structure also serves as a peacetime administrative and training organization.

I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.

Reserves organized primarily as single function subunits allied to the regs but administered by a separate div hq.

Single function sub-units is where my head is at. Organized separate from the RegF has been the ResF problem over the years.

So a two div army. One at notice to move. One dedicated to training and sustainment.

Two div army yes. One day-to-day quick reaction, the other expansion and sustainment.

The Reg div has to be able to deploy elements in cooperation with friends and allies.

Both need to.

And we need transport and warehouses.

And manufacturing arsenals.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not wedded to any particular brigade structure as I tend to have bought into the building block system. That was the 2000s transformation paradigm, forces built on combinations of companies and headquarters which were routinely used to build task forces. This is why I feel 30/70 structures are viable. That said, there needs to be a doctrinal battalion, brigade and even division structure to build up to and all the appropriate building blocks need to be there. That structure also serves as a peacetime administrative and training organization.

I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.


Single function sub-units is where my head is at. Organized separate from the RegF has been the ResF problem over the years.

Two div army yes. One day-to-day quick reaction, the other expansion and sustainment.


Both need to.


And manufacturing arsenals.

I sense a mutual approach in the offing.

 

[GR66]

Which capabilities do we want to field? All of the American capabilities but at 1/10th scale?

They have 10 divisions. We have 1 division.
They field a specialist division. We field a specialist battalion.
They field a battalion. We field a platoon.
Etc.

That becomes a very expensive force to train, equip and maintain - not to mention the costs of transporting any heavy elements.

It becomes more challenging when we look at this

11th Abn Div - 2x IBCT with 5 Battalions
82nd Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
101st Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
10th Mtn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
25th Inf Div - 2x IBCT with 6 Battalions
173rd Sep Bde - 1x IBCT with 2 Battalions

1st Armd Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Cav Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units
3rd Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units

2nd/7th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions
4th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions and 1x ABCT with 3 Combined Arms Units

Looking at those choices we can build 2 battalion and 3 battalion brigades, separate brigades, 2 and 3 brigade divisions, airborne, heliborne, leg, Lt Armd, and Armd units, brigades and divisions.

The US also has a bunch of National Guard elements of various types.

From that it seems to me that the US is quite comfortable with integrating a large variety of elements in its force structure.

My sense is that whatever we decide to do, as long as we do it well, all assistance will be gratefully received. If we look at the various organizations of the US Allies (NATO, SEATO, Japan, ABCANZUS... USMC) there seems to be very little call to make our army look like their army.

The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours. I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now. Something that will bend and flex with the times.

$0.02

To me the goal isn't to recreate the span of the US military in miniature. It is to select what elements make sense for us but to make sure that those elements are able to operate together with and at the same level as the US military. Not a peer at everything, but in effect a peer in those areas that we choose to field.

I'm open minded as to what those capabilities and structures might be.

 

[KevinB]

Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed.

Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate.

III Armored Corps :: U.S. Army Fort Cavazos

Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Cavazos, Texas.

home.army.mil

XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Liberty

The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...

home.army.mil

If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)

 

[Kirkhill]

I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.

The structure I am looking at gives you 3 Brigade HQs, two of which can deploy a Battle Gp each at short notice and one of which can deploy a two up - one back Brigade Gp. All three Brigades can shuffle battalions and all three can be reinforced from the other brigades or the arty brigade.

 

[IKnowNothing]

To me the goal isn't to recreate the span of the US military in miniature. It is to select what elements make sense for us but to make sure that those elements are able to operate together with and at the same level as the US military. Not a peer at everything, but in effect a peer in those areas that we choose to field.

I'm open minded as to what those capabilities and structures might be.

When you combine the divisions defined in Waypoint 2028 with our current state, political will, and senior leadership ability I'd argue that a meaningful heavy force comes off the board and our option set to accomplish "peer" contributions is limited to

2x SBCT, 1x IBCT, 1x Arty Bde, reserves as augments, all but one SBCT promised to round out US Divisions
or
1x SBCT (organic CS, CSS, 4th battalion from reserves) (Quebec) PLUS
1x Light Division (everything else)

In both cases CSOR chopped backed to the Army as a Bn+ Forcible Entry Regiment

 

[Good2Golf]

On the other hand our UAVs have been problematic starting with the Sperwer and the Skylark which were more often used in what I would call a recce role rather than an air observation post role although both were used for that as well. I think the real reason the artillery got into the UAV business was because the RCAF Army had canned the light observation helicopters, wasn't even interested in tactical UAVs (much less mini UAVs) and because the artillery was in the right place and time to champion their use.

Not to be too much of a ’y pedant…but…St-Hubert…

 

[FJAG]

Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed.

Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate.

III Armored Corps :: U.S. Army Fort Cavazos

Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Cavazos, Texas.

home.army.mil

XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Liberty

The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...

home.army.mil

If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)

I think III Corps was part of our NATO heritage concept. V Corps was only recently re-established and would be a more logical choice.

XVIII Airborne Corps is a waste of time for us. We'd be much better off with I Corps with its 7th Division (three Stryker Brigades) or 11th Airborne Division in Alaska. I was thinking the Marine Expeditionary force for Norway but I think "Marine" is a bit out of our wheelhouse while Norway would be useful.

The structure I am looking at gives you 3 Brigade HQs, two of which can deploy a Battle Gp each at short notice and one of which can deploy a two up - one back Brigade Gp. All three Brigades can shuffle battalions and all three can be reinforced from the other brigades or the arty brigade.

And that's where I'd like to push the capability. By eliminating three division headquarters and five ResF brigade headquarters you can form 5 manoeuvre brigade headquarters (with a total of 26 battle group headquarters) two artillery brigades, a CS brigade and a CSS brigade headquarters.

The manoeuvre brigades can still generate up to 14 RegF battle groups but also up to 26 mixed RegF and ResF battlegroups with each commanded by RegF leadership.

Effectively you create a force structure capable of generating more brigade and battlegroup headquarters for peacetime rotations (basically giving headquarters a longer time within which to reconstitute) and also have a mobilization structure to build on in the event a larger force is needed.

When you combine the divisions defined in Waypoint 2028 with our current state, political will, and senior leadership ability I'd argue that a meaningful heavy force comes off the board and our option set to accomplish "peer" contributions is limited to

2x SBCT, 1x IBCT, 1x Arty Bde, reserves as augments, all but one SBCT promised to round out US Divisions
or
1x SBCT (organic CS, CSS, 4th battalion from reserves) (Quebec) PLUS
1x Light Division (everything else)

In both cases CSOR chopped backed to the Army as a Bn+ Forcible Entry Regiment

I don't think we need to throw a heavy capability under the bus. We just need to accept using LAV 6.0s with tanks.

You can form three mechanized 30/70 brigades (1 tk regt & 2 mech bns each) and a fourth flyover prepositioned 10/0 brigade using the eqpt resources of all our tanks and five mech infantry battalions and the personnel from 1 RegF armoured regiment and three RegF mech battalions. In effect that is the Army's low readiness division for high intensity warfare and holds the equipment to form two full brigades.

You can concurrently form two light 70/30 brigades (one 70/30 light recce regt, two 100/0 light Inf bns and two 30/70 light infantry bns each) and two light infantry regiments (one 30/70 light recce regt and two 30/70 light inf battalions each) from the remaining 2 RegF armoured recce regiments and six RegF infantry battalions. That's your high readiness light force for day to day multipurpose use.

The two artillery brigades, CS brigade and CSS brigade are essentially 30/70 organizations.

I'll show the sketch again:

Not to be too much of a ’y pedant…but…St-Hubert…

I'll concede to change that to DND and CAF because there is clearly enough blame to spread around.

 

[IKnowNothing]

I don't think we need to throw a heavy capability under the bus. We just need to accept using LAV 6.0s with tanks.

We could do so with the will, and that being the objective. But I'd argue that doing so would fly in the face of @GR66 's concept of selecting capabilities and delivering them to American standards.

I'd also argue (admittedly ignorantly) that if we followed the American Light Division structure and tasked RCD and LdSH each with providing a tank bn(-) (Leo or Griffin/MPF (I prefer the latter)) + cavalry troop/squadron that from a long term institutional capability perspective we would not being throwing the heavy capability under the bus, we'd just cease pretending in the short term.

 

[FJAG]

I think much of what we're discussing here is heavily dependent on what signal Canada's government wants to show to NATO.

If we are seriously looking at a brigade for North Europe, whether a headquarters and one or more battlegroups, then eventually we will need to think heavy mechanized built around Leo 2s (or M1s) and something tracked IFV. That's pretty much what most others have and its for a reason. Northern and central Europe are generally the same or wetter than Ukraine and you can see what havoc the terrain there can play at certain times of the year.

Honestly its not that much of a cost. Hell, one ship could pay for the better part of a full brigade. I'm not saying we need to cut ships, but we need to use some perspective.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think much of what we're discussing here is heavily dependent on what signal Canada's government wants to show to NATO.

If we are seriously looking at a brigade for North Europe, whether a headquarters and one or more battlegroups, then eventually we will need to think heavy mechanized built around Leo 2s (or M1s) and something tracked IFV. That's pretty much what most others have and its for a reason. Northern and central Europe are generally the same or wetter than Ukraine and you can see what havoc the terrain there can play at certain times of the year.

Honestly its not that much of a cost. Hell, one ship could pay for the better part of a full brigade. I'm not saying we need to cut ships, but we need to use some perspective.

Absolutely - the answer to the wet terrain is a heavy force....

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/spx8xr

Come on FJAG.

The Mud stopped the Russians. It stopped the Ukrainians. It stopped the original Panzergrenadiers.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's your all terrain, all season mobility solution

 

[FJAG]

Absolutely - the answer to the wet terrain is a heavy force....

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/spx8xr

Come on FJAG.

The Mud stopped the Russians. It stopped the Ukrainians. It stopped the original Panzergrenadiers.

Come on, Kirkhill It stops them a lot less than it stops wheeled vehicles.

Simple physics based on ground pressure exerted by a tracked vehicle (low) over that of a wheeled (high). The BVs do really well because of lighter vehicle with wide tracks.

BVs do not do well in a straight up tank fight in open fields. Or for that matter in a BV v IFV fight.

We're not talking boreal forests but these kind of conditions:

 

[KevinB]

Come on, Kirkhill It stops them a lot less than it stops wheeled vehicles.

Simple physics based on ground pressure exerted by a tracked vehicle (low) over that of a wheeled (high). The BVs do really well because of lighter vehicle with wide tracks.

BVs do not do well in a straight up tank fight in open fields. Or for that matter in a BV v IFV fight.

We're not talking boreal forests but these kind of conditions:

The only think moving well in that terrain is Aviation.

Which of course depends on the air situation.

 

[Kirkhill]

Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed.

Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate.

III Armored Corps :: U.S. Army Fort Cavazos

Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Cavazos, Texas.

home.army.mil

XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Liberty

The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...

home.army.mil

If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)

I think III Corps was part of our NATO heritage concept. V Corps was only recently re-established and would be a more logical choice.

XVIII Airborne Corps is a waste of time for us. We'd be much better off with I Corps with its 7th Division (three Stryker Brigades) or 11th Airborne Division in Alaska. I was thinking the Marine Expeditionary force for Norway but I think "Marine" is a bit out of our wheelhouse while Norway would be useful.

@FJAG - Brother do we disagree.
I'd sooner XVIII over III/V. But I'd be willing to compromise on I. Particularly the 11th Airborne Div ....

BUT

Retain the Stryker Brigade with our attached Leo Regiment to supply Mobile Protected Firepower to the Div when the circumstances permit (than means penny-packeting in infantry support)

Form two of the 2 battalion Light Brigades - heliportable, air portable, Bandvagon portable.

Add a solid Div Arty Brigade with CS, LRPFs and GBAD.


I am coming to think the LAV with its 25mm/7.62mm coax is not such a bad combo for a battle taxi these days. The gun would make a great system for swatting all these mini UAVs dropping handgrenades. Could it also be tasked alongside something like the Trophy system to tackle ATGMs in flight?

Property	Value
Specifications:
Depression (degree)	-7​
Elevation (degree)	59​
Slew rates in Elevation (deg/sec)	36​
Slew rates in Azimuth (deg/sec)	45​
Traverse arc (degree)	360​
Auxiliary gun calibre (mm)	240​
Ammunition of the auxiliary gun	400​
Grenade launcher calibre (mm)	76​
Number of smoke grenade launchers	8​
Auxiliary gun calibre (mm)	7.62​
Crew	2​
Main weapon caliber (mm)	25​

Rate of fire	• Cyclic: 200rpm with 1hp or 500rpm with 8hp
Muzzle velocity	1,100 metres per second (3,600 ft/s)
Effective firing range	3,000 metres (9,800 ft)
Maximum firing range	6,800 metres (22,300 ft)

Does it need a more effective anti-aircraft round?

Given that drones/UAVs are being engaged by M2s, 14.5s, and 23s, the 25 can't be much less effective.