Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers.

Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets).


I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.

The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though)
1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover).

The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.

But part of the reason, I believe, we don't have "enablers" is that they are all considered Div or Corps assets and we have no mechanism for co-ordinating the tasks of the Brigades or of deciding how scarce resources are allocated for a mission.

Take the tanks for example - we have 4 squadrons of 3 different models. We try to divide that among 3 Brigades and end up with gaggles of pennypackets. On the other hand if they were in the hands of the Div Commander she could allocate them to a brigade according to task or keep them as in independent tactical manoeuver unit. Keeping them as a tactical unit would have encouraged the Div Commander to agitate for more AT systems for her Brigades.

Similarly on the artillery and the air defence. With a Divisional Model then there is a structure to justify the purchase of a single AD Bty rather than three independent Troops.

Aren't you lot always harping on about mission command and unity of command?

 

[CBH99]

I see what you’re saying Kirkhill, and I agree that scarce resources should all be put together & deployed under one command, if for no other reason than both the command and the assets are both better off.

(For anybody with recent experience with our tanks - are the 3 models really that different from a maintenance perspective? The engines, tracks, mechanical stuff is mostly the same, no?)



Was it Exercise Trident Juncture we practiced deploying to Europe in the case of an Article 5, (a few years back now…I couldn’t wait to leave once CJOC showed up!)

I was surprised (in a good way) at how quickly we were able to deploy, and at how many Canadian vehicles and troops I came across. Something like 16 CF-18’s too?

I was surprised (in a bad way) of how institutional stupidity quickly turned things into a bit of a mess. (CJOC that is 100% on you!)

 

[KevinB]

But part of the reason, I believe, we don't have "enablers" is that they are all considered Div or Corps assets and we have no mechanism for co-ordinating the tasks of the Brigades or of deciding how scarce resources are allocated for a mission.

Take the tanks for example - we have 4 squadrons of 3 different models. We try to divide that among 3 Brigades and end up with gaggles of pennypackets. On the other hand if they were in the hands of the Div Commander she could allocate them to a brigade according to task or keep them as in independent tactical manoeuver unit. Keeping them as a tactical unit would have encouraged the Div Commander to agitate for more AT systems for her Brigades.

Similarly on the artillery and the air defence. With a Divisional Model then there is a structure to justify the purchase of a single AD Bty rather than three independent Troops.

Aren't you lot always harping on about mission command and unity of command?

If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.
I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway. You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars. GS Regiments belong at higher.

Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.

I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.

WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here. That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed.

The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong.

A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere.


The same goes for other assets.

 

[Kirkhill]

If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.
I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway. You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars. GS Regiments belong at higher.

Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.

I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.

WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here. That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed.

The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong.

A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere.


The same goes for other assets.

You are talking about an army that can afford specialized formations.

I am thinking about an army that has to work with the kit they have while taking on an assortment of tasks.

We should be keeping the cutlery in the drawer and practice taking it out as needed. We shouldn't be hung up on particular structures.

And I agree we will never deploy a division. However our one active division may end up deploying a Brigade Gp here, a Battle Gp there and an couple of Coy Cbt Tms with each of them having particular enablers assigned from Division.

 

[Kirkhill]

We've been nattering away on the Ukraine thread about COTS and IT stuff that are going to impact the future structure of all forces.

Accordingly I am posting this article here to drag the conversation into a more appropriate thread.

Open systems architecture can unlock 'limitless potential:' Army Undersecretary - Breaking Defense

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities

breakingdefense.com

Open systems architecture can unlock ‘limitless potential:’ Army Undersecretary​

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities​

This goes hand in glove with rapid incorporation of COTS solutions and with rapid coding. Do we need more uniformed riflemen or do we need more tubby coders in shorts?

 

[KevinB]

You are talking about an army that can afford specialized formations.

I am thinking about an army that has to work with the kit they have while taking on an assortment of tasks.

We should be keeping the cutlery in the drawer and practice taking it out as needed. We shouldn't be hung up on particular structures.

And I agree we will never deploy a division. However our one active division may end up deploying a Brigade Gp here, a Battle Gp there and an couple of Coy Cbt Tms with each of them having particular enablers assigned from Division.

You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.

Right now the Army, Navy and RCAF are in dire straights - they can't legitimately go anywhere or do anything. without a bucket brigade bailing the leaks.

Militaries need structures to train on, one needs to make hard decisions with the Tax Payer Monies on how one will create a Force -- right now that can has been kicked so far down the road, I am not even sure it is visible.

Canada has been locked with Europe since it was founded -- that fact isn't going to change.
Armored Forces are generally better for most of Europe in both an offensive and defensive capability -- BUT they are slow to deploy.
Light Forces are generally easier to move anywhere - and for places like the Asian Rim - have more flexibility for deployment.

Canada's Army needs a mix of Forces - including a plethora of capabilities it doesn't currently have.
But that mix is much like oil and water, as Heavy and Light while they can be complimentary, aren't interchangeable, and need their own specific enablers.

At least the Army has a general concept that War Fighting (and deterrence of the same) is it's mission.
The RCN, and RCAF seem to often wonder what their actual purpose it - as the RCN for such a small Navy doesn't seem to understand that in a small Navy that every ship needs to be a potential warship. The RCAF seems to constantly be focused on Fighters - the MRTT seems more to be an effort to keep Fighters in the air, than actual concern about movements - and the RCAF tends to ignore TacHel are Maritime Helicopters as best as they can.

My Napkin Army split a few things off, each under a MGen, with a 3* as CDS (life sucks GO/FO's wear a helmet)

CSOC - Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM, with more but with a shorter name )

RCN - 17 CSC, 5 AOR, 10 AOPS (which better weapons platforms), and 10 SSN

Canadian Army - 1 "Div" of 5 Brigade Groups (1 Armor, 1 Para, 1 Light/Airmobile, and 2 Medium LAV/CAV) - including the Reserves.

RCAF - 156 F-35, 45 C-130J, 34 P-8, 18 MRTT, 12 C17 (yes I know the line is stale)

TSAG (Tactical Support Aviation Group) - I moved TacHel and MH out of the RCAF, as well as all the UAS, I loaded up on CH-47's (144) HH-60's (also doing MH) for 306, and AH-1Z's (for Bell to a tune of 306 ) and a 306 UAS split of 50/50 MQ-1D's and RQ-4D Phoenix (which can also do the S of SAR), but TacHel, MH, and UAS are OPCOM to the CA and RCN.

Yes I knocked down the Army - mainly as I think to make a robust force, the logistics and service support aspects are more important, I grew the other services - as I think Bde tasks are about all Canada will consider for the Army beyond a Global War...

 

[daftandbarmy]

You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.

There's a great problem statement.

 

[Kirkhill]

You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.

And?

So what?

 

[TacticalTea]

And?

So what?

So it's absolutely embarrassing to be in the G7 and yet yield so little influence, in matters military but others also.

 

[Kirkhill]

So it's absolutely embarrassing to be in the G7 and yet yield so little influence, in matters military but others also.

I would suggest that our current governors aren't of a like mind. Hand over last year's parka and throw a fiver in the kettle and they're good.

 

[CBH99]

If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.
I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway. You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars. GS Regiments belong at higher.

Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.

I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.

WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here. That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed.

The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong.

A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere.


The same goes for other assets.

Agreed on all points.

I wouldn’t try to jam M109’s and M777’s together - I was referring more to our tanks, and how many could actually be deployed in such a scenario.

(Gifting Ukraine our Leopard 2’s, and arranging a 2:1 replacement with Abrams makes a ton of sense. From a training, maintenance, spare parts perspective - and from a deployment perspective. All in all sounds like good sense.)

 

[GR66]

You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.

And as a result sub G20 influence in the World

Right now the Army, Navy and RCAF are in dire straights - they can't legitimately go anywhere or do anything. without a bucket brigade bailing the leaks.

Agreed. And much more than some duct tape, baling wire and a couple of band-aids will be required to fix them. It will be a LONG process.

Militaries need structures to train on, one needs to make hard decisions with the Tax Payer Monies on how one will create a Force -- right now that can has been kicked so far down the road, I am not even sure it is visible.

Agreed. Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army. I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities.

For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time. I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment. Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.

Canada has been locked with Europe since it was founded -- that fact isn't going to change.
Armored Forces are generally better for most of Europe in both an offensive and defensive capability -- BUT they are slow to deploy.

Agreed. We were wrong to ever abandon our heavy capabilities as an Army. A heavy force can always fight lighter but a light force can't fight heavier.

Light Forces are generally easier to move anywhere - and for places like the Asian Rim - have more flexibility for deployment.

Agreed.

Canada's Army needs a mix of Forces - including a plethora of capabilities it doesn't currently have.
But that mix is much like oil and water, as Heavy and Light while they can be complimentary, aren't interchangeable, and need their own specific enablers.

Again in total agreement.

At least the Army has a general concept that War Fighting (and deterrence of the same) is it's mission.

Based on some of our divestment decisions in the past I'd argue that many in the Army leadership have lost that concept.

The RCN, and RCAF seem to often wonder what their actual purpose it - as the RCN for such a small Navy doesn't seem to understand that in a small Navy that every ship needs to be a potential warship.

There are lots of very important non-combat roles that are typically undertaken by a nation's navy. However, as I stated previously there are times when the storm clouds are gathering when the Navy has to prepare for war and let other national agencies bear much of those non-combat tasks.

The RCAF seems to constantly be focused on Fighters - the MRTT seems more to be an effort to keep Fighters in the air, than actual concern about movements - and the RCAF tends to ignore TacHel are Maritime Helicopters as best as they can.

For a country as large as ours and with virtually any military deployment (even within Canada) essentially being "expeditionary" we have a pathetically limited airlift capacity.

My Napkin Army split a few things off, each under a MGen, with a 3* as CDS (life sucks GO/FO's wear a helmet)

CSOC - Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM, with more but with a shorter name )

RCN - 17 CSC, 5 AOR, 10 AOPS (which better weapons platforms), and 10 SSN

I can't see the CSC build exceeding the planned 15 ships due to the cost and the manning requirements. To be honest I wouldn't be shocked if the final count was reduced to 12.

Taking an option for a 3rd JSS would be smart in my mind and you could supplement with a pair of contracted (or Reserve) oilers.

The AOPS (even with better weapons) are simply not warships. I'd use the AOPS that are already planned now to train and expand our Navy manning but as the CSCs come online I'd transfer them to other government agencies (CCG, DFO, RCMP) for constabulary work. Instead of expanding the AOPS buy I'd instead look at a small combatant replacement for the MCDVs to supplement the CSC fleet.

10 x SSNs I can't see happening. Both politically and logistically. Between US, British and Australian build schedules I just don't see the capacity to get ten SSNs anytime in the near future. I think we'd be better to aim for 8 x AIP SSKs. Much easier to sell politically and much more likely to actually be available in the timelines we'd need to replace the Victorias.

Canadian Army - 1 "Div" of 5 Brigade Groups (1 Armor, 1 Para, 1 Light/Airmobile, and 2 Medium LAV/CAV) - including the Reserves.

As noted above I'd opt for 1 x Heavy and 1 x Light Division even if we're missing key elements and work toward filling in those gaps over time.

RCAF - 156 F-35, 45 C-130J, 34 P-8, 18 MRTT, 12 C17 (yes I know the line is stale)

TSAG (Tactical Support Aviation Group) - I moved TacHel and MH out of the RCAF, as well as all the UAS, I loaded up on CH-47's (144) HH-60's (also doing MH) for 306, and AH-1Z's (for Bell to a tune of 306 ) and a 306 UAS split of 50/50 MQ-1D's and RQ-4D Phoenix (which can also do the S of SAR), but TacHel, MH, and UAS are OPCOM to the CA and RCN.

This is where I think you're taking a bit of a leap from wishful thinking to fantasy. Training and keeping pilots is already a major problem for the RCAF (as well as the USAF and other Air Forces around the World) but you're massively increasing the number of aircraft.

I doubt you'll see an increase in the F-35 buy due to cost. Perhaps in time a Loyal Wingman option will be available to supplement the fighter fleet.

Increasing airlift capacity would be a definite plus. It would be nice to see a new heavy lift aircraft become available by the time our C-177s need to be replaced. As you suggested we could increase our C-130J and MRTT fleets but I just can't see the numbers your suggesting being possible. For P-8's I'm guessing the Government will likely try to just replace the 14 x CP-140M's being modernized but if I were king I'd push to get at least 18 to 24 due to their literally daily utility in protecting our sovereignty.

As far a rotary wing it would definitely be nice to have more Chinooks and a common medium-lift airframe to replace the Griffins, Cyclones and Cormorants would be ideal (with more of each) but again I just can't see anything close to the numbers you're proposing being a possibility.

Yes I knocked down the Army - mainly as I think to make a robust force, the logistics and service support aspects are more important, I grew the other services - as I think Bde tasks are about all Canada will consider for the Army beyond a Global War...

Totally agree with the logistics and support services. I'd rather be able to deploy a single Brigade that is well equipped and supported than a Division that's trying to operate on a shoestring.

 

[FJAG]

I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway. You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars. GS Regiments belong at higher.

Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.

I'm still mulling this over but more and more I'm thinking artillery regiments could use bifurcation.

On the one hand there are the sense functions. BCs/FOOs or FSOs/FISTs - whatever - but other than training and personnel management, they really have no need to be affiliated with any particular regiment. We have most of them in one battery now within each CS regiment and the Brits go even further with having them in what they call Tactical Group Batteries. Each one has a BC, and FSCC, a number of observer/JTAC parties and a Joint Fires cell with roughly 40 pers. They're enough for basically one battalion. A regiment can therefore have none or one or more tactical group batteries. There can also be independent tactical group batteries not attached to any gun batteries.

Similarly, STA batteries do not need to be affiliated with any particular regiment.

The other elements are the act elements: guns, rockets, armed UAVs, you name it.

I'm thinking that the more that you get away from the concept of a CS regiment within the brigade, to one of a divisional artillery brigade which holds the resources, the more flexibility you have in assigning a right mix of sense and act elements to a particular battle group or brigade as required.

In addition bifurcation makes organizing reserve regiments/batteries simpler. A designated battery in a given location can be a tactical group battery, an STA battery, a gun, rocket or UAV battery depending on size, need, proximity to ranges etc etc.

That wouldn't stop peacetime affiliations where a given Regt Hq and 9, 10, 26, 42, 81, and 99 batteries all being affiliated for training to 1 CMBG.

Just a thought.

I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.

I also think that deployable divisional headquarters needs a NATO role on a flyover basis. If for no other reason to show a Canadian Flag on NATO map boards. We are entirely too humble (and currently we have a lot to be humble about) We need to take on more and very definitely need to be seen to take on more in dramatic fashion.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on.

Why do you need a second Division to do that? I assume an Army HQ could manage the FG requirements just fine...

 

[FJAG]

Why do you need a second Division to do that? I assume an Army HQ could manage the FG requirements just fine...

IMHO, Army HQ should be looking at the bigger more strategic picture and stop micromanaging day-to-day admin and training.

There's also the idea that one division focuses on Europe and the other on everything else.

 

[KevinB]

I'm still mulling this over but more and more I'm thinking artillery regiments could use bifurcation.

On the one hand there are the sense functions. BCs/FOOs or FSOs/FISTs - whatever - but other than training and personnel management, they really have no need to be affiliated with any particular regiment. We have most of them in one battery now within each CS regiment and the Brits go even further with having them in what they call Tactical Group Batteries. Each one has a BC, and FSCC, a number of observer/JTAC parties and a Joint Fires cell with roughly 40 pers. They're enough for basically one battalion. A regiment can therefore have none or one or more tactical group batteries. There can also be independent tactical group batteries not attached to any gun batteries.

Similarly, STA batteries do not need to be affiliated with any particular regiment.

The other elements are the act elements: guns, rockets, armed UAVs, you name it.

I'm thinking that the more that you get away from the concept of a CS regiment within the brigade, to one of a divisional artillery brigade which holds the resources, the more flexibility you have in assigning a right mix of sense and act elements to a particular battle group or brigade as required.

In addition bifurcation makes organizing reserve regiments/batteries simpler. A designated battery in a given location can be a tactical group battery, an STA battery, a gun, rocket or UAV battery depending on size, need, proximity to ranges etc etc.

That wouldn't stop peacetime affiliations where a given Regt Hq and 9, 10, 26, 42, 81, and 99 batteries all being affiliated for training to 1 CMBG.

I like structure
To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.

The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.

Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets

Just a thought.

I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.

I also think that deployable divisional headquarters needs a NATO role on a flyover basis. If for no other reason to show a Canadian Flag on NATO map boards. We are entirely too humble (and currently we have a lot to be humble about) We need to take on more and very definitely need to be seen to take on more in dramatic fashion.

Agreed. Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army. I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities.

I think Canada should be able to field two Div - but I didn't prioritize it in my Napkin Army as I think there are higher priorities.

For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time. I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment. Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.

One might argue you don't have all the necessary items to make a real Bde at this point...
I have argued Bde's to play into US Div systems before, other than you, it didn't get a lot of traction.

I can't see the CSC build exceeding the planned 15 ships due to the cost and the manning requirements. To be honest I wouldn't be shocked if the final count was reduced to 12.

2 is 1, 1 is none, IMHO 12 CSC isn't enough to do the missions.

Taking an option for a 3rd JSS would be smart in my mind and you could supplement with a pair of contracted (or Reserve) oilers.

The AOPS (even with better weapons) are simply not warships. I'd use the AOPS that are already planned now to train and expand our Navy manning but as the CSCs come online I'd transfer them to other government agencies (CCG, DFO, RCMP) for constabulary work. Instead of expanding the AOPS buy I'd instead look at a small combatant replacement for the MCDVs to supplement the CSC fleet.

Not true warships - but they can mount a lot of pod based systems - and work up North, which from a. strictly Canadian sovereignty issue is a win.

10 x SSNs I can't see happening. Both politically and logistically. Between US, British and Australian build schedules I just don't see the capacity to get ten SSNs anytime in the near future. I think we'd be better to aim for 8 x AIP SSKs. Much easier to sell politically and much more likely to actually be available in the timelines we'd need to replace the Victorias.

I don't see it happening either, but AIP SSK's won't fill the role that Canada needs both from a Patrol Range/Speed for the Pacific, and the Under Ice operations up north.

As noted above I'd opt for 1 x Heavy and 1 x Light Division even if we're missing key elements and work toward filling in those gaps over time.

This is where I think you're taking a bit of a leap from wishful thinking to fantasy. Training and keeping pilots is already a major problem for the RCAF (as well as the USAF and other Air Forces around the World) but you're massively increasing the number of aircraft.

I doubt you'll see an increase in the F-35 buy due to cost. Perhaps in time a Loyal Wingman option will be available to supplement the fighter fleet.

Again, I looked at a what does Canada need to conduct both Domestic Patrol, and Expeditionary work - and arrived at the number that way.
I would probably look at the F-15 to supplement the F-35's and conduct strike roles to leave the F-35 for AS.

Increasing airlift capacity would be a definite plus. It would be nice to see a new heavy lift aircraft become available by the time our C-177s need to be replaced. As you suggested we could increase our C-130J and MRTT fleets but I just can't see the numbers you're suggesting being possible. For P-8's I'm guessing the Government will likely try to just replace the 14 x CP-140M's being modernized but if I were king I'd push to get at least 18 to 24 due to their literally daily utility in protecting our sovereignty.

You're getting P-8's, we've told your dear Leader very clearly

Everything is possible, and those numbers are not even crazy when you look at the cube and mass required to move a Bde and support it in an expeditionary setting.

As far a rotary wing it would definitely be nice to have more Chinooks and a common medium-lift airframe to replace the Griffins, Cyclones and Cormorants would be ideal (with more of each) but again I just can't see anything close to the numbers you're proposing being a possibility.

To run MH, and support TacHel for each Bde, as well as a fully Airmobile Bde, that is the numbers you are looking at, when you look at the actual platform costing - it would be doable over a period of 10 years with a 2% Defense Budget commitment.

Totally agree with the logistics and support services. I'd rather be able to deploy a single Brigade that is well equipped and supported than a Division that's trying to operate on a shoestring.

That's where I went with the Brigade Group concepts. I viewed my Napkin Army as a restructuring base - with the goal of striving for more.

 

[GR66]

I like structure
To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.

The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.

Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets

I'll leave discussions on artillery organization to the Gunners...just so long as we get a lot more of them.

I think Canada should be able to field two Div - but I didn't prioritize it in my Napkin Army as I think there are higher priorities.


One might argue you don't have all the necessary items to make a real Bde at this point...
I have argued Bde's to play into US Div systems before, other than you, it didn't get a lot of traction.

We as a nation need to get over our reflexive anti-Americanism when it comes to practical military issues. The fact is we need to be as interoperable as possible to be effective and frankly being interoperable will in the long run be cheaper than trying to re-invent the wheel every time in order to be uniquely Canadian.

2 is 1, 1 is none, IMHO 12 CSC isn't enough to do the missions.

Not true warships - but they can mount a lot of pod based systems - and work up North, which from a. strictly Canadian sovereignty issue is a win.

I don't see it happening either, but AIP SSK's won't fill the role that Canada needs both from a Patrol Range/Speed for the Pacific, and the Under Ice operations up north.

Again, I looked at a what does Canada need to conduct both Domestic Patrol, and Expeditionary work - and arrived at the number that way.
I would probably look at the F-15 to supplement the F-35's and conduct strike roles to leave the F-35 for AS.

You're getting P-8's, we've told your dear Leader very clearly

Everything is possible, and those numbers are not even crazy when you look at the cube and mass required to move a Bde and support it in an expeditionary setting.

To run MH, and support TacHel for each Bde, as well as a fully Airmobile Bde, that is the numbers you are looking at, when you look at the actual platform costing - it would be doable over a period of 10 years with a 2% Defense Budget commitment.

All of these issues are related and are probably the single most important thing that we need to address when talking about the Army's (and Navy/Air Force's) future structure. You're absolutely right that with some political backbone and a solid budget we can likely afford most of the equipment that you're talking about. The major elephant in the room though (and again this is not unique to Canada) is manning that equipment. Even if we magically fix our training and retention issues the fact is that people in the West are increasingly less and less interested in joining the military. We need to face that fact and find ways to work around it, otherwise we're likely to end up with a bunch of equipment that we don't have the people to maintain and deploy.

FJAG's been screaming into the wind on this forever, but we need to find ways to effectively make use of Reservists. Not only to fill out the bulk of our combat arms units in case of war, but also for those higher-skilled trades (techs of all sorts, pilots, Reserve-manned ships, etc.).

We also need to very seriously start looking to unmanned platforms to make the most use of our limited manpower - UAVs, "Loyal Wingman"-type aircraft, Satellites, USVs and UUVs, UGVs for both combat and logistics, etc.

That's where I went with the Brigade Group concepts. I viewed my Napkin Army as a restructuring base - with the goal of striving for more.

The sad thing is that at some point institutionally the CAF lost the goal of "striving for more". Military leadership for years has just tried to plod along without change in face of Government neglect rather than pushing to find ways of doing better even if with less.

 

[KevinB]

I'll leave discussions on artillery organization to the Gunners...just so long as we get a lot more of them.

Never trust a Gunner
But seriously all components need input into force structures - to ensure that a logical and usable system is created, and no one goes off empire building on their own

We as a nation need to get over our reflexive anti-Americanism when it comes to practical military issues. The fact is we need to be as interoperable as possible to be effective and frankly being interoperable will in the long run be cheaper than trying to re-invent the wheel every time in order to be uniquely Canadian.

Totally agreed.

All of these issues are related and are probably the single most important thing that we need to address when talking about the Army's (and Navy/Air Force's) future structure. You're absolutely right that with some political backbone and a solid budget we can likely afford most of the equipment that you're talking about. The major elephant in the room though (and again this is not unique to Canada) is manning that equipment. Even if we magically fix our training and retention issues the fact is that people in the West are increasingly less and less interested in joining the military. We need to face that fact and find ways to work around it, otherwise we're likely to end up with a bunch of equipment that we don't have the people to maintain and deploy.

FJAG's been screaming into the wind on this forever, but we need to find ways to effectively make use of Reservists. Not only to fill out the bulk of our combat arms units in case of war, but also for those higher-skilled trades (techs of all sorts, pilots, Reserve-manned ships, etc.).

In my mind with equipment a lot of the retention and recruitment issues go away.

1) New equipment is sexy, people tend to care more for new and capable equipment. It also generates confidence. Capability deficiencies are corrosive to cohesion and moral.

2) Newer Items generally don’t need the same amount of maintenance to keep running and for the most part are safer. Which reduced concerns on individual safety and crew burnouts (which also enhances safety). All of which increase career satisfaction.

3) With modern equipment more missions can be conducted. People who join the Military generally like doing the job, so deployments tend to attract more recruits, and retain experienced personnel as with growth and experience there is mobility upwards.

4) I totally agree a future force needs to be a Total Force - which means Reg/Res integration.

We also need to very seriously start looking to unmanned platforms to make the most use of our limited manpower - UAVs, "Loyal Wingman"-type aircraft, Satellites, USVs and UUVs, UGVs for both combat and logistics, etc.

The sad thing is that at some point institutionally the CAF lost the goal of "striving for more". Military leadership for years has just tried to plod along without change in face of Government neglect rather than pushing to find ways of doing better even if with less.

Agreed.

 

[FJAG]

I like structure
To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.

The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.

Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets

Hey! It's your napkin army. You can do whatever looks good.

I must admit, bifurcation is already partially there because of the current gun bty/OP structure except we still have a BC and his FSCC crew in the gun battery in garrison because - majors and PYs - and we can't trust captains to run company-sized sub-units. Which never made sense to me. In days of yore when deployed to the field the gun-line portion of the battery belonged to the Battery Captain who was - ta da - a captain. Now we have captains as troop commanders when their equivalents in the past were lieutenants.

There's a real problem in properly setting up a career stream to ensure that officers and NCOs go through postings that they need to get the right type of experience for their next level of leadership. The artillery is getting too small and is spread across too many career fields what with guns and STA and soon AD. Fire support coordination, JTACing etc is also becoming complex to the point that it could almost be a separate career field but that then really starts screwing people up at the WO and Maj and above levels as they will only have seen one facet of the much wider field. What happens when a guy who has gone through a dozen years as a FOO/FSCC tech and JTAC then gets promoted to be the BSM of a gun or missile or STA battery?

It's a conundrum. If you go in silos then you have senior leaders without the right breadth of experience and if you pop people around through all the different lanes then you get folks who are jacks of all trades and masters of none.

There's a lot more to think about than what symbol should go inside the rectangle of a line diagram.

 

[KevinB]

Hey! It's your napkin army. You can do whatever looks good.

I must admit, bifurcation is already partially there because of the current gun bty/OP structure except we still have a BC and his FSCC crew in the gun battery in garrison because - majors and PYs - and we can't trust captains to run company-sized sub-units. Which never made sense to me. In days of yore when deployed to the field the gun-line portion of the battery belonged to the Battery Captain who was - ta da - a captain. Now we have captains as troop commanders when their equivalents in the past were lieutenants.

There's a real problem in properly setting up a career stream to ensure that officers and NCOs go through postings that they need to get the right type of experience for their next level of leadership. The artillery is getting too small and is spread across too many career fields what with guns and STA and soon AD. Fire support coordination, JTACing etc is also becoming complex to the point that it could almost be a separate career field but that then really starts screwing people up at the WO and Maj and above levels as they will only have seen one facet of the much wider field. What happens when a guy who has gone through a dozen years as a FOO/FSCC tech and JTAC then gets promoted to be the BSM of a gun or missile or STA battery?

It's a conundrum. If you go in silos then you have senior leaders without the right breadth of experience and if you pop people around through all the different lanes then you get folks who are jacks of all trades and masters of none.

There's a lot more to think about than what symbol should go inside the rectangle of a line diagram.

Admittedly I don’t have all the answers.
Some aspect though I think need to split the trade, which admittedly is an issue when you end up with a small trade in a small Army.

WRT to the FOO/JTAC at the NCO and O levels, having post Reg’t positions at Bde, Div and Schools can help, but it won’t be the be all and end all.

ADA needs to be a different trade, perhaps the Officer stream could be linked with STA/UAS.

But it also goes beyond the Artillery, as I think the Amoured Corps is going to have issues with transitioning from Tanks into LAV and TLAV and back and forth