Infantry Vehicles

[markppcli]

Falklands vet: Vehicles what the hell do you need an isv for? In my day we yomped 56 miles and still kicked ass when we got there. You youngsters are just spoiled

The Flaklands AARs were also pretty clear on AFVs, and more of them.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Flaklands AARs were also pretty clear on AFVs, and more of them.

Does an 8 tonne alumin(i)um box on tracks with a 76 mm gun qualifiy as an AFV?

And I'm not being facetious here. I regularly argue here the benefits of "light" vehicles which can be universally deployed. And equally regularly I am told they are a waste of money and we should concentrate on heavy vehicles which can fight the battles we choose but which we can't get to the battlefields we want.

That Scorpion turret is the same one that was mounted on the Cougar if I remember correctly. At 76mm, low pressure and 45 degrees of elevation (-10 to +35) and 6 RPM it could sub in for the 81mm mortar for infantry support. The Aussies also used the Scorpion, and the Saladdin turret - also with the 76mm gun - on their M113s as a Fire Support Vehicle. They ensured that their FSVs remained amphibious and light.

Specifications
Manufacturer	Alvis Vehicles, Coventry, England
No. built	ca. 3,000 (1,500 for UK, ca. 1,500 exported)[2]
Variants	Scorpion 90
Mass	17,800 lb (8.074 tonnes)
Length	5.288 m (17 ft 4.2 in)[3]
Width	2.134 m (7 ft 0 in)[3]
Height	2.102 m (6 ft 10.8 in)[3]
Crew	3[3]
Armour	Aluminium armour, Cast and 1318b plate
Main armament	ROF 76mm L23A1 gun 90mm Cockerill Mk3 M-A1 gun (in Scorpion 90)[3]
Secondary armament	Coaxial 7.62 mm L43A1 machine gun[3]
Engine	Cummins BTA 5.9-litre (diesel)[3] 190 hp (140 kW)
Power/weight	22.92 hp (17.3 kW) / tonne[3]
Transmission	Self Change Gears TN15X[3]
Suspension	Torsion-bar
Operational range	756 km (470 mi)[3]
Maximum speed	72.5 km/h (45.0 mph)[3]

Specifications
Production history
Service history
L23A1 gun
Place of origin	United Kingdom
In service	1973–present
Manufacturer	Royal Ordnance
Length	2.157 m (7 ft 0.9 in)
Calibre	76 mm (3.0 in)
Elevation	+35 degrees/-10 degrees
Rate of fire	6 rounds per minute
Effective firing range	2,200 m (2,400 yd)

 

[KevinB]

Does an 8 tonne alumin(i)um box on tracks with a 76 mm gun qualifiy as an AFV?

And I'm not being facetious here. I regularly argue here the benefits of "light" vehicles which can be universally deployed. And equally regularly I am told they are a waste of money and we should concentrate on heavy vehicles which can fight the battles we choose but which we can't get to the battlefields we want.

That Scorpion turret is the same one that was mounted on the Cougar if I remember correctly. At 76mm, low pressure and 45 degrees of elevation (-10 to +35) and 6 RPM it could sub in for the 81mm mortar for infantry support. The Aussies also used the Scorpion, and the Saladdin turret - also with the 76mm gun - on their M113s as a Fire Support Vehicle. They ensured that their FSVs remained amphibious and light.

Specifications
Manufacturer	Alvis Vehicles, Coventry, England
No. built	ca. 3,000 (1,500 for UK, ca. 1,500 exported)[2]
Variants	Scorpion 90
Mass	17,800 lb (8.074 tonnes)
Length	5.288 m (17 ft 4.2 in)[3]
Width	2.134 m (7 ft 0 in)[3]
Height	2.102 m (6 ft 10.8 in)[3]
Crew	3[3]
Armour	Aluminium armour, Cast and 1318b plate
Main armament	ROF 76mm L23A1 gun 90mm Cockerill Mk3 M-A1 gun (in Scorpion 90)[3]
Secondary armament	Coaxial 7.62 mm L43A1 machine gun[3]
Engine	Cummins BTA 5.9-litre (diesel)[3] 190 hp (140 kW)
Power/weight	22.92 hp (17.3 kW) / tonne[3]
Transmission	Self Change Gears TN15X[3]
Suspension	Torsion-bar
Operational range	756 km (470 mi)[3]
Maximum speed	72.5 km/h (45.0 mph)[3]

L23A1 gun
Service history
Production history
Specifications
Place of origin	United Kingdom
In service	1973–present
Manufacturer	Royal Ordnance
Length	2.157 m (7 ft 0.9 in)
Calibre	76 mm (3.0 in)
Elevation	+35 degrees/-10 degrees
Rate of fire	6 rounds per minute
Effective firing range	2,200 m (2,400 yd)

IMHO they belong to the Medium Force.
Which can be deployed with either Light Forces for additional firepower and protected mobility, or heavy forces for a great degree of road mobility and some protection.

They should not be integral to either Heavy or Light Forces, but are simply components that can be added as requirements dictate.


Let’s look at a NEO Forcible entry.
Drop a Bn (or more) of Para Light forces to secure an airport.
The light forces can quickly secure the air head site - but don’t have armor to do much in terms of escorting or moving the personnel being recovered.

• SOF can locate and secure the personnel, but again don’t have the ground mobility necessary to ensure the Non-combatants can move safely to the exfil area.
• the Medium Force however can do that in most situations.

The “tankettes’s” can somewhat function as a tank in some areas, but that is threat dependent, as Red Tanks or ATGM’s will ruin their day.

 

[GR66]

And I'm not being facetious here. I regularly argue here the benefits of "light" vehicles which can be universally deployed. And equally regularly I am told they are a waste of money and we should concentrate on heavy vehicles which can fight the battles we choose but which we can't get to the battlefields we want.

Without getting into a discussion on specific platforms, I think you are somewhat mis-characterizing some of the comments on here about light vehicles. I don't think many/any on here are saying that there is no role for the kind of light force that you are describing, but that light forces BY THEMSELVES are no panacea for an army. Light forces have their place but heavy forces have their own place. One cannot replace the other.

I believe (correct me if I am wrong) that you are leaning strongly into the idea that since Canada doesn't have the capability to deploy heavier forces rapidly enough to be an effective response to enemy actions then we should concentrate our efforts on light forces which are much easier to deploy quickly and where required.

I'll admit to seeing a certain logic in such a position. Heavy/Medium forces sitting in Canada that take months to deploy to a conflict zone don't do much for either deterrent effect or for rapidly needed combat power. Heavy/Medium forces realistically don't really do anything for the territorial defence of Canada itself.

There are other factors to consider however. We are part of the NATO alliance and we have a commitment to participate in the defence of Europe. And while today we may feel that Russia is in no real position to pose a direct conventional military threat to Europe, I don't doubt that once the Ukraine conflict is over (whatever the outcome) that the Russia that remains will continue to have its own defence objectives and will work hard to rebuild and restructure its forces in such a way as to avoid the mistakes that it made in this conflict. That will require a continued military deterrent by NATO against potential Russian aggression.

Light forces, while rapidly deployable I don't believe provide the same type of deterrent effect (or the same sense of shared commitment by our Allies) as heavy forces do. Deployed or pre-positioned heavy forces provide much greater deterrent effect and can be just as rapidly put into action as Light forces based in Canada.

You might argue that forward deploying our heavy forces in Europe against one specific military threat limits our flexibility to deploy against other various military threats. I'd suggest that Russia is really the only major military power that has (or will seek to gain) the ability to directly threaten the Western alliance "homelands" with heavy mechanized forces. China's threats to Taiwan, Japan, Australia, etc. are best responded to with strong Naval and Air forces. North Korea does pose a mechanized threat to South Korea, but I'd argue that the mountainous terrain of the Korean peninsula would be just as suitable for a Light force response as a Heavy force response from Canada if required. Iran is not close enough to directly threaten the major Western powers directly so if a conflict against them (or other regional powers) is required we would likely have time to deploy our forces like the West did with Desert Storm, etc.

I'd argue that politically and militarily Canada would be best served by a pre-deployed Heavy force element in Europe in support of NATO and a Light element in Canada. Medium forces, while possibly good for peacekeeping type operations seem to be sucking resources away from our war fighting capabilities on both ends of the spectrum. We could retain the LAVs so that our non-deployed Heavy and Light units have a Medium vehicle available for non-combat deployments/operations when they are the more suitable vehicle option, but for combat deployments we should be equipped with the appropriate Heavy and Light vehicles in my opinion.

 

[Kirkhill]

IMHO they belong to the Medium Force.
Which can be deployed with either Light Forces for additional firepower and protected mobility, or heavy forces for a great degree of road mobility and some protection.

They should not be integral to either Heavy or Light Forces, but are simply components that can be added as requirements dictate.


Let’s look at a NEO Forcible entry.
Drop a Bn (or more) of Para Light forces to secure an airport.
The light forces can quickly secure the air head site - but don’t have armor to do much in terms of escorting or moving the personnel being recovered.

• SOF can locate and secure the personnel, but again don’t have the ground mobility necessary to ensure the Non-combatants can move safely to the exfil area.
• the Medium Force however can do that in most situations.

The “tankettes’s” can somewhat function as a tank in some areas, but that is threat dependent, as Red Tanks or ATGM’s will ruin their day.

Without getting into a discussion on specific platforms, I think you are somewhat mis-characterizing some of the comments on here about light vehicles. I don't think many/any on here are saying that there is no role for the kind of light force that you are describing, but that light forces BY THEMSELVES are no panacea for an army. Light forces have their place but heavy forces have their own place. One cannot replace the other.

I believe (correct me if I am wrong) that you are leaning strongly into the idea that since Canada doesn't have the capability to deploy heavier forces rapidly enough to be an effective response to enemy actions then we should concentrate our efforts on light forces which are much easier to deploy quickly and where required.

I'll admit to seeing a certain logic in such a position. Heavy/Medium forces sitting in Canada that take months to deploy to a conflict zone don't do much for either deterrent effect or for rapidly needed combat power. Heavy/Medium forces realistically don't really do anything for the territorial defence of Canada itself.

There are other factors to consider however. We are part of the NATO alliance and we have a commitment to participate in the defence of Europe. And while today we may feel that Russia is in no real position to pose a direct conventional military threat to Europe, I don't doubt that once the Ukraine conflict is over (whatever the outcome) that the Russia that remains will continue to have its own defence objectives and will work hard to rebuild and restructure its forces in such a way as to avoid the mistakes that it made in this conflict. That will require a continued military deterrent by NATO against potential Russian aggression.

Light forces, while rapidly deployable I don't believe provide the same type of deterrent effect (or the same sense of shared commitment by our Allies) as heavy forces do. Deployed or pre-positioned heavy forces provide much greater deterrent effect and can be just as rapidly put into action as Light forces based in Canada.

You might argue that forward deploying our heavy forces in Europe against one specific military threat limits our flexibility to deploy against other various military threats. I'd suggest that Russia is really the only major military power that has (or will seek to gain) the ability to directly threaten the Western alliance "homelands" with heavy mechanized forces. China's threats to Taiwan, Japan, Australia, etc. are best responded to with strong Naval and Air forces. North Korea does pose a mechanized threat to South Korea, but I'd argue that the mountainous terrain of the Korean peninsula would be just as suitable for a Light force response as a Heavy force response from Canada if required. Iran is not close enough to directly threaten the major Western powers directly so if a conflict against them (or other regional powers) is required we would likely have time to deploy our forces like the West did with Desert Storm, etc.

I'd argue that politically and militarily Canada would be best served by a pre-deployed Heavy force element in Europe in support of NATO and a Light element in Canada. Medium forces, while possibly good for peacekeeping type operations seem to be sucking resources away from our war fighting capabilities on both ends of the spectrum. We could retain the LAVs so that our non-deployed Heavy and Light units have a Medium vehicle available for non-combat deployments/operations when they are the more suitable vehicle option, but for combat deployments we should be equipped with the appropriate Heavy and Light vehicles in my opinion.

I guess I'll try again.

My problem with the current Canadian structure is with the Medium Force. I like the Medium Force concept. But I believe it has lost its way in Canada. With the LAV 6.0 it is now based on a platform that is too light to be Heavy and too heavy to be Medium.

When the LAVs were plussed up for Afghanistan they lost their strategic and much of their tactical mobility. In particular they lost their amphibiousity.

The wrong decision was made on the CCV programme, and even on the TAPV programme.

The Leos should be escorted by CV-90s or a similar 30 to 40 tonne vehicle. A small, Heavy force, even a couple of Troops would add sufficient heft to a Medium, or even a Light Force, that it would be worth the commitment of our C17s for a focused delivery. 5 C17s. 1 Leo one aircraft or 2 CV90s at 35 tonnes. 5 aircraft could deliver 3 Leos and 4 CV90s in one lift. A definite "Nice to have" for any force.

My Light Force lift parameter is whatever can be lifted by the helicopters that Canada has, and in that I include the Navy's CH-148s and the Yellow Fleet's CH-149s. In fact I would make the upper limit of the light force vehicles 4 or 5 tonnes precisely because of that. What can you buy that fits in that bracket? VBLs, Ferrets, Dingos. Bv206s.

My Medium Force limit is the same as Shinsecki's. The C-130. But I would have load limited the vehicle to 75 or 80% of the carrying capacity of the C130 or about 15 tonnes. And that puts you squarely into the 15 tonne range. M113s. Grizzlies. Cougars. Bisons. Coyotes at a stretch.

C17s could lift four at a time, or a platoon/troop.

C130s could lift three or four of the Light Force's 4-5 tonners.

My argument is that we CAN supply a useful Force at the "light" end of the spectrum. We can't supply a useful Force at the "heavy" end of the spectrum.

We should properly equip our forces with equipment that, like matyushka dolls, nest within each other. Also, when dealing with light(er) forces we should adopt those principles which have kept light forces safe and effective on battlefields for centuries:

Speed -
Mobility -
Precision -
Range -

Fire and Retire quickly -
Move quickly on variety of terrain - "through the bushes and the briers where the rabbits couldn't go"
Picked shots
Stand off

We may end up like the French in Kuwait, "relegated" to the Flank Guard, but I don't recall us being in Kuwait at all. The French were there. With their AMX-10s and Panhard 90s and VBLs.

PS - I prize amphibiousity highly in a country filled with rivers, marshes and lakes and which floods regularly every year.

 

[markppcli]

The LAV 3 was never amphibious, so it wasn’t “lost” in the update to

I guess I'll try again.

My problem with the current Canadian structure is with the Medium Force. I like the Medium Force concept. But I believe it has lost its way in Canada. With the LAV 6.0 it is now based on a platform that is too light to be Heavy and too heavy to be Medium.

When the LAVs were plussed up for Afghanistan they lost their strategic and much of their tactical mobility. In particular they lost their amphibiousity.

LAV 3 was never amphibious, nor was the Coyote. Maybe Bison was but it certainly wasn’t lost in upgrade for Afghanistan. Amphibious capabilities in APCs and IFVs have generally fallen by the way side because of the substantial prep work required to float them.

The wrong decision was made on the CCV programme, and even on the TAPV programme.

Generally agree.

The Leos should be escorted by CV-90s or a similar 30 to 40 tonne vehicle. A small, Heavy force, even a couple of Troops would add sufficient heft to a Medium, or even a Light Force, that it would be worth the commitment of our C17s for a focused delivery. 5 C17s. 1 Leo one aircraft or 2 CV90s at 35 tonnes. 5 aircraft could deliver 3 Leos and 4 CV90s in one lift. A definite "Nice to have" for any force.

what we need is more transport not less armour.

My Light Force lift parameter is whatever can be lifted by the helicopters that Canada has, and in that I include the Navy's CH-148s and the Yellow Fleet's CH-149s. In fact I would make the upper limit of the light force vehicles 4 or 5 tonnes precisely because of that. What can you buy that fits in that bracket? VBLs, Ferrets, Dingos. Bv206s.

My Medium Force limit is the same as Shinsecki's. The C-130. But I would have load limited the vehicle to 75 or 80% of the carrying capacity of the C130 or about 15 tonnes. And that puts you squarely into the 15 tonne range. M113s. Grizzlies. Cougars. Bisons. Coyotes at a stretch.

Why the artificial limit ? We flew LAVs to Kandahar.

C17s could lift four at a time, or a platoon/troop.

C130s could lift three or four of the Light Force's 4-5 tonners.

My argument is that we CAN supply a useful Force at the "light" end of the spectrum. We can't supply a useful Force at the "heavy" end of the spectrum.

I’d argue our Bg in Afghanistan was squarely in the heavy end and was very useful.

We should properly equip our forces with equipment that, like matyushka dolls, nest within each other. Also, when dealing with light(er) forces we should adopt those principles which have kept light forces safe and effective on battlefields for centuries:

Speed -
Mobility -
Precision -
Range -

Fire and Retire quickly -
Move quickly on variety of terrain - "through the bushes and the briers where the rabbits couldn't go"
Picked shots
Stand off

All of which is covered in our light force doctrine, but the reality is you need to be operating against the enemy, and they won’t be in the briars and thickets, they’ll be in the cities, or in defended wood lines like we see in Ukraine.

We may end up like the French in Kuwait, "relegated" to the Flank Guard, but I don't recall us being in Kuwait at all. The French were there. With their AMX-10s and Panhard 90s and VBLs.

I believe our contributions to the Gulf war were more political than capabilities based.

PS - I prize amphibiousity highly in a country filled with rivers, marshes and lakes and which floods regularly every year.

The rivers, marshes, and Lakes are by and large far from the population and our strategic assets. I don’t see a land war in the arctic being anything more than island hoping to air strips.

 

[KevinB]

I guess I'll try again.

My problem with the current Canadian structure is with the Medium Force. I like the Medium Force concept. But I believe it has lost its way in Canada. With the LAV 6.0 it is now based on a platform that is too light to be Heavy and too heavy to be Medium.

When the LAVs were plussed up for Afghanistan they lost their strategic and much of their tactical mobility. In particular they lost their amphibiousity.

The wrong decision was made on the CCV programme, and even on the TAPV programme.

The Leos should be escorted by CV-90s or a similar 30 to 40 tonne vehicle. A small, Heavy force, even a couple of Troops would add sufficient heft to a Medium, or even a Light Force, that it would be worth the commitment of our C17s for a focused delivery. 5 C17s. 1 Leo one aircraft or 2 CV90s at 35 tonnes. 5 aircraft could deliver 3 Leos and 4 CV90s in one lift. A definite "Nice to have" for any force.

My Light Force lift parameter is whatever can be lifted by the helicopters that Canada has, and in that I include the Navy's CH-148s and the Yellow Fleet's CH-149s. In fact I would make the upper limit of the light force vehicles 4 or 5 tonnes precisely because of that. What can you buy that fits in that bracket? VBLs, Ferrets, Dingos. Bv206s.

My Medium Force limit is the same as Shinsecki's. The C-130. But I would have load limited the vehicle to 75 or 80% of the carrying capacity of the C130 or about 15 tonnes. And that puts you squarely into the 15 tonne range. M113s. Grizzlies. Cougars. Bisons. Coyotes at a stretch.

C17s could lift four at a time, or a platoon/troop.

C130s could lift three or four of the Light Force's 4-5 tonners.

My argument is that we CAN supply a useful Force at the "light" end of the spectrum. We can't supply a useful Force at the "heavy" end of the spectrum.

We should properly equip our forces with equipment that, like matyushka dolls, nest within each other. Also, when dealing with light(er) forces we should adopt those principles which have kept light forces safe and effective on battlefields for centuries:

Speed -
Mobility -
Precision -
Range -

Fire and Retire quickly -
Move quickly on variety of terrain - "through the bushes and the briers where the rabbits couldn't go"
Picked shots
Stand off

We may end up like the French in Kuwait, "relegated" to the Flank Guard, but I don't recall us being in Kuwait at all. The French were there. With their AMX-10s and Panhard 90s and VBLs.

PS - I prize amphibiousity highly in a country filled with rivers, marshes and lakes and which floods regularly every year.

The AVGP isn’t amphibious in the manner you want. They bog heavily on soft ground, that sort of amphibious desire you have is more BV territory.
The LAV-25 doesn’t fit the Herc, as the turret makes it too tall.

IMHO if you need tanks for a NEO type operation you wanted way way too long, and it’s not going to go well as any forcible entry force will have a rough time against Mech/Armor without Air Support.


@markppcli posted while I was writing.

The Bison originally was Amphibious (it had the rear propellers) like the AVGP, I don’t recall when they were pulled off, but I never saw the props on the Coyote.

Either way, that amphibious capability was more for river crossings, and required hard ramp like banks to actually do anything.

 

[markppcli]

The AVGP isn’t amphibious in the manner you want. They bog heavily on soft ground, that sort of amphibious desire you have is more BV territory.
The LAV-25 doesn’t fit the Herc, as the turret makes it too tall.

IMHO if you need tanks for a NEO type operation you wanted way way too long, and it’s not going to go well as any forcible entry force will have a rough time against Mech/Armor without Air Support.


@markppcli posted while I was writing.

The Bison originally was Amphibious (it had the rear propellers) like the AVGP, I don’t recall when they were pulled off, but I never saw the props on the Coyote.

Either way, that amphibious capability was more for river crossings, and required hard ramp like banks to actually do anything.

Sorry I mean to go into more detail, the actual list of requirements to get an afv to float a river / lake is enough that it’s rarely worth doing. Never mind the vulnerability of the vehicle while that crossing is being conducted.

 

[FJAG]

Interesting photo from Facebook. The caption reads:

Members of the Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, participate in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in Petawawa, Ontario, 31 May, 2023.
Photo

: Private Jennifer Froome

 

[OldSolduer]

Interesting photo from Facebook. The caption reads:

Members of the Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, participate in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in Petawawa, Ontario, 31 May, 2023.
Photo

: Private Jennifer Froome

Cool but that .50 might shake that ATV to pieces unless its reinforced and maintained.

Reminds me of The Rat Patrol.

 

[markppcli]

Interesting photo from Facebook. The caption reads:

Members of the Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, participate in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in Petawawa, Ontario, 31 May, 2023.
Photo

: Private Jennifer Froome

Very interested in the wiring of those TOW missiles.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interesting photo from Facebook. The caption reads:

Members of the Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, participate in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in Petawawa, Ontario, 31 May, 2023.
Photo

: Private Jennifer Froome

That would be a really fun way to die (gloriously in battle)

 

[KevinB]

Interesting photo from Facebook. The caption reads:

Members of the Third Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, participate in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in Petawawa, Ontario, 31 May, 2023.
Photo

: Private Jennifer Froome

That mount for the M2 and C-16 is beyond ridiculously high. I question the engineering background (and common sense) of whoever designed it.

 

[Kirkhill]

Sorry I mean to go into more detail, the actual list of requirements to get an afv to float a river / lake is enough that it’s rarely worth doing. Never mind the vulnerability of the vehicle while that crossing is being conducted.

So, to get a recce platoon across a water obstacle it is better to wait for the Engineers to show up with the pontoons?

 

[GK .Dundas]

Remember hearing a story that in the early 70's the my reserve unit did an inhouse experiment with what was referred to as a fire support troop. 60 mm mortars , Carl G and 50 Cal's.
Turns out that the old rat patrol mount would accept either the C5 or the M2 .
Also turned out after a full day firing said 50 you find nuts and bolts lying on the ground from the jeeps and that was the end of the fire support troop.
Now I have no idea if the above story is true or just a tall tale . But I have fired the 50 and I know the 68 pattern jeep and it was a hell of lot more solid then those ATVs.

 

[markppcli]

So, to get a recce platoon across a water obstacle it is better to wait for the Engineers to show up with the pontoons?

It’s better for them to do their job and find a ford. There’s a very good reason why amphibious capability has been sidelined in the last 3p-40 years, and it’s limited use is chief amount them.

 

[Kirkhill]

Russians at the ford.

Ukrainians not at the ford.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/143lkry

 

[Kirkhill]

Trouble with buttons.... deleted.

 

[OldSolduer]

Trouble with buttons.... deleted.

One of the most difficult operations is the assault river crossing. A natural obstacle that your enemy can cover with all kinds of nasty shit like arty and direct fire and there are only so many places that are suitable for crossing.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It’s better for them to do their job and find a ford or, even better, seize an intact bridge. There’s a very good reason why amphibious capability has been sidelined in the last 3p-40 years, and it’s limited use is chief amount them.

There, made that a drier option FY