How did Militia training evolve?

[Haggis]

OK.... so all the green army reserve / militia has a big "delta" hanging from it's neck.

Which reduces the Army Reserves ability to deploy on short notice.   It costs a lot of money to close that delta, money that simply isn't available now.   The larger that delta widens, the more expensive it is to close when the time comes.

the reserve soldier is headed for pretty much the same thing as the labour market - contract workers; turn it on and turn it off

Then the delta must be narrowed.    Notice I didn't say "closed".   In that case the Reservist has become Reg F.   To do this the training system has to reduce less essential (what the soldier doesn't need to know right now) content in Reg F training or insert this same content into Res F training.

The reserves waited 30+ years for a Pension plan....

And the wait will go on a bit longer.

 

[geo]

Haggis,
You are correct... that darn ''delta'' is one hell of a gap to close.
trouble has been that they have been making so many changes to Reg force training that it'll take a while longer to filter down to the reservists.

Note that while the Reg does have skills that the reservist needs.... the reservist has abilities and skills that are not normaly perceived as being part of the basic infanteer's usual load. Some of it isn't of too much use but some of it is ''gold''. One thing about the typical reservist undergoing pre deployment training is that he brings a lot of enthusiasm and focus - given adequate time, he will be assimilated.

 

[Bill Smy]

I believe one of the major changes in Militia training took place in 1957 when the Ontario units took part in the Fanshaw program which evolved into the Summer Militia Training Program (amongst other names). That year, the summer concentrations were shifted from June/July to August to allow these recruits to attend camp with their parent units.

 

[Haggis]

In 1990 Ontario's summer concentration was moved back to early July.  Dubbed "On Guard 90", it was the first exercise to focus on Aid to Civil Power ops (co-incidentally wedged between Op Feather at Akwesasne and Op Salon at Oka) and was generally well received.  The problem was that the first two weeks of July are prime holiday time in business and industry.  Many Reservists who otherwise would've been at the late summer concentration found themselves unable to book holiday time for OG 90 due to a lack of seniority.  Mid level leadership(MCpl/Sgt and Capt/Maj) was very sparse.

In 1991, Ontario's concentration was moved back to August.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Guys back in the Regt still shudder when On Guard 90 is mentioned.  They remember digging trenches in Meaford for a couple of weeks to prepare for the Relief in Place by the Militia units.

I think that as a result CAC 91 was a deliberately smaller-scale affair.  As a Reserve 2Lt fresh off RESO III, I enjoyed CAC 91 (Aug 91 in Meaford) very much.  We had the RCD echelons along to support us at the Sqn and Regimental level as well as the SHQs.  The support we got was awesome and I learned tons.  Each "Regt" put in a half-Sqn and there was a reasonable officer to soldier ratio.  We also spent almost two weeks working at Fire Team and Troop level, with only one "trace" at half-Sqn level.  As a result we got pretty slick as a Troop.  It was the best time I ever got as a Tp Leader on exercise.  The smoker at the end was pretty good as well.

The big down-side was that we had no NCOs in our Troop.  We eventually had one Sgt arrive from course for the last couple of days.

Exercises now tend to be somewhat rushed, with a focus on getting to the higher levels and simply having lots of troops on the ground.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

OK, I have a couple of questions, one of which was sort of skirted around earlier.

The first one isn't a question, it is more of a statement.  The term "Militia" is in fact, still correct, and can be found in thousands of official government statements and publications.

The second question concerns promotions.  It is my impression that personnel are promoted from within the unit, by the unit, with no other screening.  I'm wondering if this is fair, and if it can possibly be changed.  For example, a strong soldier from a healthy unit may remain a Corporal for many years, but if he was in a weaker Unit, he would be promoted much sooner.  In fact, I think it could be argued that an RSM of one unit may have never made it beyond Cpl in another Unit.

I'm not trying to drag the forum down into the dirt, I am honestly curious, and I wonder if anyone else has any input?

 

[dutchie]

The second question concerns promotions.   It is my impression that personnel are promoted from within the unit, by the unit, with no other screening.   I'm wondering if this is fair, and if it can possibly be changed.   For example, a strong soldier from a healthy unit may remain a Corporal for many years, but if he was in a weaker Unit, he would be promoted much sooner.   In fact, I think it could be argued that an RSM of one unit may have never made it beyond Cpl in another Unit.

I'm not trying to drag the forum down into the dirt, I am honestly curious, and I wonder if anyone else has any input?

It doesn't really work that way. If you are a strong Cpl, and wish to pursue leadership training, you will be loaded and off you go. There is no stopping a unit from sending 5 troops on PLQ, provided there was spots available, and troops worthy of the training. Same goes, AFAIK, for Sgt and WO. How it works above that, well, it's above my rank.

That RSM not making it beyond Cpl is right out of 'er, BTW. Wouldn't happen.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Some problems come to mind here Lance.

1) How would you post the deserving Reserve RSM across Canada to his new Unit?
2) How would you provide for a fair chance at training for all, considering the existing inequities Units now face in trying to course load candidates from their Units on National courses.
3) The Corps career manager has a hard enough time trying to keep the Reg side of the house sorted, now your going to add us to his mix?

The first step to making things equitable would be to equip all Reserve units equally. Get rid of Unit histories and traditions. Make the Regiments west of Thunder Bay outlying Sqns of the Strats, Central and Eastern Regiments RCD and Quebec Regiments RBC. Mandate the manning level and orbats, backfill immediate inadequecies with Reg Force parent Units NCOs and Officers. Provide equal training opportunities and merit list the whole works. Once this is done, you still have the problem of neopotism within the Regiments themselves, albiet only three now.

The above can be shot full of holes, but you can't force a Reg force solution on the Reserves without revamping the whole system, and with the way the fiasco of reroling is being accomplished, I don't think we should try for anything above kindergarden level at the moment.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

That's what I was wondering, if there is a solution. 

I have seen some very weak senior NCO's from some units, and I have seen Corporals in other Units that shine in comparison.  Ergo, my remark on a strong Cpl remaining a Cpl in a strong Unit for a long period of time, where the same person in another Unit would be promoted quickly through the ranks.  And that, we have seen happen.

The Unit, will, of course, merit its people.  But if the top two or three are not available for training, is the next down sent, so he can be promoted?  After all, the Units do have to fill the remar, right?  Is there a solution?

Standards for leadership courses are not high, certainly not as high as the regs.  For good reason, I might add.  It is impossible for the militia to train at the same standard, with substandard kit and substandard support.  It is also impossible for a part time soldier to acquire the skills of the full time soldier, although there are exceptions, to be sure.  And, of course, there is another, almost intangible factor.  Iit is hard to fail a person that gives up his evenings, weekends and vacation time to pursue a second career in the militia.

Dave suggested one solution, that of course will have many naysayers.  Another possible solution is for a centralized standards cell, that would enforce standards at all levels of training, at all locations.  This would ensure that only those that really deserve the qualification actually gets it.  This may mean that some in some Units, promotions would drastically slow down.

Heck, I don't know.  I guess I just don't like the idea of promotions being handed out by a select one or two, to people only they select, with nobody to answer too.

 

[geo]

Lance,
to qualify for those promotions you were alluding to, you have to attend and pass some national trade and leadership courses that will take care of some screening.
Personnel from weaker units may have an unfair advantage in that they come up to the top of their rank "heap" a little faster than personnel from another unit but, that weak unit won't get as many vacancies (chances to fill course positions) and once you're on course.... it's not the unit that decides if you pass or fail... thereafter, there are merit boards and the requirement to have individuals "approved" at a higher level once you get to the WO levels (and beyond).... If a unit does not have a competent person to fill a position..... it creates oportunities for strong NCOs from other units who have no succession problems..... it all comes out in the wash.

 

[DG-41]

Standards for leadership courses are not high, certainly not as high as the regs.

I haven't been on course in a little while, but ~ 8 years ago, this certainly wasn't true.

I've done both the Reg Force BOTC in Chilliwack, and the Reserve BOT/BOAT in Meaford, and aside from it raining a lot more in Chilliwack, and doing a lot more walking in Chilliwack, the courses were equally difficult. Certainly the Reserve course was no cakewalk.

And as far as phase training goes, courses were often mixed Reg and Reserve.

Mine wasn't - mine was all Reserve. But there were 5 of us on a course intended to train 30, and being outnumbered by instructors 3 to 1 meant we got extra special attention. I have never been on any course as difficult and demanding as that one, Reg Force or Reserve. It made CMR Recruit Camp seem like a picnic.

Now maybe things have changed since... but during my training,  the Reserve courses were every bit as difficult and the standards were every bit as high as any Reg force course I ever did.

In fact, that was one of the big surprises I got when I transferred Reg->Reserve. I always assumed life was easier for the Reserves, and I found completely the opposite. With less training time and less resources, you had to work twice as hard to accomplish the same job - and do it with less.

DG

 

[geo]

DG concurr with you - most of the time...
- Officer Phases 1, 2 & 3 were all`''comon''.... regs & reserve side by side...it was planned that way.
Later staff courses would not necessarily be the same though - reservists don`t have the same problems as the regs do..... (Reserves are required to do a lot more budget managing.... dollars and cents.... because they have to consider salaries & pay...

NCO training is, for the most part, identical or similar.
Did a visit to Valcatraz battle school this summer - school is led by Regs but staffed by Reg & Res
- Reserve PLQ (Block 6) was instructed by Regs. The material is more condensed but covers all of the basics. Instructors found that reservists did not have as much experience (as regs) coming into the course - so some of the basics had to be reviewed. They found the dedication, enthusiasm and ability to capture concepts went a lot faster with reservists who were, for the most part, college & university students.
- Reserve ILQ & ALQ are being managed by the school of leadership - same as, same as.....

There are limits on how much time availability a reservist can offer to his country every summer.... so there are some hard choices to be made - do you ''trim'' the contents of the course to fit the time (accept the ''delta'') or do you stretch the course over a couple of years... if you do that - ya have to make sure that you do not change the course package every year - as has been happening of late.... otherwise - the work you did last year won`t have any more value this year & you have to start again (or face another ''delta'').... and we aren`t the DELTA force.

Cheers!

 

[DG-41]

What I have seen is that - within certain limits - the time it takes to carry out training expands to fit the time availible. A long course and a short course, both with the same teaching points and the same lesson plan, will impart the same training, but the short course will be very much more intense and focussed, where the long course will be more leisurely and have more downtime.

My Reg Force QL3 Vehicle Tech course spent almost as much time on Euker as twisting wrenches. We couldn't work on the floor if there wasn't an instructor present, so anytime one of them took a smoke break or went to the can or whatever, we were punted outside to the picnic tables, and the cards would come out.

That course was 6 months long (and covered a lot of ground), but we could probably have done it in half the time if the intensity level had been cranked up.

Now, trying to maintain that sort of intensity level over three months probably would have killed us, so there are practical limits on just how hard you can train for how long. But the Reserve version of that course could probably be broken into three or fouror more courses (off the top of my head, it could be broken up into Basic Mechanical Theory, Powertrain, Suspension/Steering/Brakes, Electrical, Operate an MRT, Recovery Procedures, Assemble/Disassemble/Drive Iltis, Assemble/Disassemble/Drive AVGP, Assemble/Disassemble/Drive M113) and then run the courses in blocks with the intensity level turned way up.

There are plusses and minuses associated with the high intensity too. Because there is so little time and no wasted fat, high-intensity courses don't adapt well to Unforseen Circumstances, and they can be hard on basically competant soldiers who happen to be slow learners or have trouble with a certain concept (who might get a better opportunity to learn the material if instructors can spend more time with them) But the high intensity tends to better replicate actual field conditions, and it really separates the men from the boys; you get a chance to see who can learn and adapt under stress.

Where the Reserves really get boned isn't the course training - it's the opportunity to practice afterwards. You get this sudden burst of high-power training, followed by periods of extended idleness. I went from doing between 6 to 8 assessed traces per day on course (I lost over 30lbs in the space of 1 summer) to where I might do 1 or 2 traces per month, maybe.

It's enormously frustrating as a leader, because you want to give the guys an opportunity to practice the skills they learned on course. In the Armoured Corps, where for some god-knows-why reason we don't train crew commanding skills until the 6A (but where senior Cpls and MCpls are employed as crew commanders all the time) it's essential that we be able to teach these skills and practice these skills, and we just don't get the time to do it.

But the upside is that when you DO get the time to practice - like, say, in the work-ups to a deployment - Reserve units can be brought up to the same quality level as any Reg Force unit.

One thing where I think we may be seeing some quality issues with Reserves on taskings is the augmentee system we use. We take a guy out of his unit, away from his friends and support structure, and we plunk him down in the middle of a unit of complete strangers who start off expecting him to be an untrained idiot. It can be really difficult to slot into a new unit as a Private fresh off your 3s, or as a trained NCO transferred in from another unit; you have to fit into a group who have already established a social bond and who see you as an outsider. To ask that of a Reservist, who *does* need practice to come up to speed, is just that much more difficult - not to mention the social stigma of being "a Reservist". No wonder we sometimes have problems with these guys; who wouldn't?

We'd be MUCH better off if we sent entire Reserve units (or composite Reserve units, a la Stalwart Guardian) instead of individual augmentees. Everybody would start off on the same footing, everybody would develop together and in step, and we could leverage the already-in-place command and support structure - and everybody would be happier.

Maybe even down on a section or crew level; if we MUST augment, then put all the guys from the same home unit into the same subunit.

DG

 

[geo]

Agreed DG

Those composite Sections, Troops & Coys make it an awful lot easier for the shaking out period to evolve. Cover the DELTA and move on...

 

[Haggis]

It's enormously frustrating as a leader, because you want to give the guys an opportunity to practice the skills they learned on course.

This is one of the intangibles in the Delta.  Skill fade.  It's not that Reserve courses don't equal that of the Regular Force (regardless of whether the course is high intensity/short duration or low intensity/long duration) but it's the expereince portion that causes the sharpest deliniation of the delta.

But the upside is that when you DO get the time to practice - like, say, in the work-ups to a deployment - Reserve units can be brought up to the same quality level as any Reg Force unit.

Yes, but Reservists have a "remembering curve" to overcome due to skill fade and, therefore, require more time to be brought up to speed. There is also an "unofficial" learning curve as well.  Most Reservists will arrive for pre-deployment training qualified, fit and raring to go but having never seen some basic kit (like a PAQ3, TCCCS CI or a KITE sight) and having never worked in an organization bigger than Section/det or troop/platoon for more than 7 days at a time.  These are things that a Reg F unit takes for granted.

We'd be MUCH better off if we sent entire Reserve units (or composite Reserve units, a la Stalwart Guardian) instead of individual augmentees. Everybody would start off on the same footing, everybody would develop together and in step, and we could leverage the already-in-place command and support structure - and everybody would be happier.

There are numerous pros and cons to this, beaten to death in other threads, but I'll bring out two points.

First, for the individual soldier, it removes the Reservist's ability to be assimilated, to "hide in plain sight" among his fellows.  Second, it places the entire sub-unit under the microscope.  Both are distracting and can be demoralizing.

The bright side to this is that the numbers of Reserve leaders who now have recent operational experience is growing and they can be trusted to train their own, given the time, resources and support of the force generating units/CBGs/ASUs and the deploying unit.  This, as we know, costs money.

The most frustrating and time consuming part of getting a Reservist on a deployment is not pre-deployment training, it's administration.  Too many Reservists show up at the AAG without the basics signed off (such as shots, I cards, dentals, kit, etc.) because:

a. the Support Bases/ASUs will not expend their limited resources on a Class "A" Reservist unless he's got a tasking message in his hot little hand; and
b. the soldier is too reliant on "the system" to prepare him, rather than exercising some initiative and sorting himself out (for example, every Reservist has a dental plan.).

Look at Palladium Rotos 11 through 14 and Athena Rotos 0 to 4.  The "Lessons Learned" in deploying Reservists are never incorprorated. Best practises are discarded.  We (the BIG we of "The Army") make the same mistakes over and over again until they become systemic and entrenched as "the way it goes".

The dichotomy is that a Reservist is not funded or mandated (or expected) to maintain any decent level of short term deployability and that the "system" is neither funded or mandated to encourage him to do so.  Status quo is the status quo.  Anything else costs money.

 

[geo]

Doh.... the budget thing rears it's ugly head again

 

[Haggis]

Doh.... the budget thing rears it's ugly head again

Always, Geo, always!

Moreover, the "system" complains that Reservists are, for the most part, costly to deploy.  Wonder why??? Whether its Reg F or Reserve, Canada always tries to build the $6M soldier on a $60 budget.

Seems the Naval and Air Reserves have got this beat to a far better extent than the Army does.  Maybe we should look towards their way getting people through the PRV system and up to speed for deployment.

 

[geo]

too true haggis,
with new CSDS and comd LFC there are some sounds I've been hearing that appear to be headed in the right direction - only time will tell if they get cut enough slack to get the job done.

(a fella can dream can't he?)

Chimo!

 

[CanadianGuy]

Here is an anecdotal story (that goes back a few years ago!) I will tell that ties in with the discussion on "composite reserve" sections,platoons to be attached to Regular Forces units as opposed to individual augmentees. Ex Thunderbolt was a Reg Force Bge EX in May 1991 that was a month long in Meaford then Petawawa where about 50 Reservists showed up but rather then slotting them in individually wherever they were needed  it was decided to form a "Reserve Platoon" and it would be in place of the missing platoon in Charles Coy 1 RCR who were still back in the middle east cleaning up after their Gulf War deployment. It was difficult at first taking 30+ troops from all different units and then also have to learn 1 RCR's SOP's but after 2 weeks we actually began to get things together. By the end of the Ex we actually had the platoon working quite well and myself being the only Reservist Sgt I was pleasantly surprised to hear the Charles Coy NCO's from the CSM down making positive comments about the platoon. At the end of the Ex the Coy OC (privately) told our (reserve) PL Comd & myself we had become the best functioning platoon which was actually noticeable to all but it sure took alot of hard work and I'm not saying that the other two platoons in Charles Coy were slouches either! Why was this and how did it happen? Alot of hard work and motivation from the Reservists to not look like fools and fall on our faces, the majority of the troops were College/University students hence a little older Privates and Corporals with more experience and maturity, decent Reserve NCO's and Officer and finally the initial Charles Coy attitude that the "Molitia" tools would surely fail miserably but it turned out to be a kind of a "turtle and the hare" story(?) Now since 1991 things have changed namely I believe better Reserve Army training and experience of its individual troops through (ie) overseas deployments.

 

[geo]

Canadianguy...
You are right.... there are heros and zeros in all organisations.

Well motivated reservists, given adequate oportunity proper guidance will shake out and become quite capable. Reserve Sections, platoons and companies have been deployed over thae last couple of years. Mostly in mature theatres but, at other times, in earlier - hairier situations.

The Cdn army that deployed in WW1 and WW2 was raised from the ranks of the militia...
There were some bloody lessons learnt.... let's hope we don't have to pay that kind of price again.

Chimo!