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Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

The need for "drones"


And EW driving the movement towards more autonomy. Loss of comms? Follow the last order issued and CM.

 
We debate the merits and ethics of autonomy. I have always suspected that the debate will be resolved by the "losing" side - the side that will be most strongly motivated to "do something" to tilt the balance back in their favour.


Russia is giving its armed drones more autonomy as Ukraine’s defenses tighten, a dynamic that has the U.S. Army working harder to bulk up its own anti-drone and -missile systems, service and industry officials said.

Defense One caught up with Sgt. Maj. Kellen Rowley, the top enlisted leader of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, at the AUSA conference in Washington, D.C. We asked him whether Russia is increasingly relying on autonomy software for drone attacks in order to thwart defensive measures that target the connection between the weapons and their operators.

“They are,” Rowley said. “They are becoming more adaptive. We saw them struggle quite a bit with dynamic targeting. As time has gone on, they’ve adapted.”

He declined to comment further.

An official from Epirus, which makes advanced counter-drone defenses, said greater autonomy was a growing trend in Russian drone attacks on Ukraine.

“There is clear evidence that full drone autonomy and swarming technology will become more pervasive in this new era of asymmetric warfare. One significant advancement in drone tech we’ve been closely tracking is the use of fiber-optic-guided and AI-enabled UAS that are immune to jamming and other EW countermeasures. Without a connection to jam or spoof, AI-enabled drones have seen success in Ukraine,” the official told Defense One.


It's complicated....

But counter-drone defenses are more complicated than roboticized attack drones for reasons beyond autonomy and technology, such as the increasing bureaucratic burdens of trying to work with more partners.

Said Rowley of the 10th AMDC, “I think probably our single biggest challenge is operating inside of NATO. There are 32 member nations in NATO, and our adversaries are exporting gaps to NATO policy. Group one, group one, UAS are able to operate below the threshold, and it's a challenging bit for us, under peacetime conditions and authorities for soldiers to recognize when they should or can engage..
 

24 companies came back with options that ranged from flying prototypes to more developmental ideas. Based on that feedback, the Army has now picked two drones to participate in its Project Convergence Capstone 5 event next year, though Upton remained mum on which companies will be flying since they still haven’t been notified.

He did, however, disclose that those heavy-lift drones can ferry roughly 1000 pounds up to 300-400 nautical miles.

The plan now, in part, is to use those two different drones along with autonomous boats, to look at logistics options inside the Pacific theater and other parts of the world.

The Army plans to use Project Convergence takeaways on the state of aerial cargo drone tech and weigh that against options like integrating an autonomy stack on CH-47 Chinooks, an option Upton said is “easier said than done.” Price points for both avenues will also be a focal point.

“Some of these autonomous aircraft we’re talking about are a lot cheaper per capita than a Chinook,” Upton said. “If we’re going to do logistics over the shore, you have got to be able to scale it.”

“The money they do give us is a lot of money, but you [have] got to be able to buy things and still scale to the requirement you need. We need smaller, movable boats. We need these drones to be able to move that cargo, and you’re not going to be able to spend $50 million, $60 million or $70 million per drone to do this,” he added.
 

“Group 3 remains one of the most challenging threats we have in terms of the capabilities and then the payload that you’re talking about, as well as the reach,”

Especially if they get cheaper and faster and reach farther.

Swapping out Wankel and Rotax motors for single use jets and rockets puts you on the trajectory that created the Ukrainian Paliantsiya drone


Making the problem worse is that defensive interceptors are typically more expensive than the threats they’re destroying. For example, Stewart’s chart displayed key interceptors that can take out Group 3 drones like RTX’s Coyote and Anduril’s Roadrunner. But on a separate panel on Monday, Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, the Army’s program executive officer for missiles and space, argued that while it was good the Army ramped up orders of systems like Coyote, relying on them for the long term isn’t sustainable.

Highlighting a rough price tag of about $120,000 per Coyote, Lozano said, “We’re not going to win that cost curve battle if all we do is deal with the threat kinetically.”
 
Is it a drone? Is it a satellite?

In that case, I’d say neither. It’s a balloon.

Not enough in the article to say for sure, but the MicroHAB doesn’t seem to have any means of propulsion, and “satellite” in this case means actually being in orbit, not in the stratosphere.
 
In that case, I’d say neither. It’s a balloon.

Not enough in the article to say for sure, but the MicroHAB doesn’t seem to have any means of propulsion, and “satellite” in this case means actually being in orbit, not in the stratosphere.

In the world of pseudo-craft perhaps the MicroHab could act as a RRB or ISR node after the fashion of a low earth satellite or high altitude drone?
 

The lone Pacific brigade chosen for the Army’s new equipment strategy is finding that the new tech has unique advantages for its terrain — as well as challenges, the unit’s commanding general said Friday.

The unit, the 2nd Brigade of the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division, is one of just three brigades selected for the Army’s “transforming-in-contact” strategy. The two others are the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade and the 10th Mountain Division’s 3rd Brigade.

Under the strategy, units are given a range of new tech and told to figure out how to best use it at their home bases and in challenging field exercises. Most of the new gear focuses on drone, counter-drone, and electronic warfare, drawing in part on lessons from Ukraine.

In an exercise running Oct. 7 to 16 at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, the unit brought as many as 150 small drones, said 25th Infantry Division commander Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans.

Based on advice from the 101st’s 2nd Brigade and their own experience, the 25th’s 2nd Brigade has also increased the number of Starlink satellite terminals it uses, Evans said. The 19-by-12-inch dishes provide far faster transmission speeds than traditional Army satellite systems, while being much more portable and easier to hide.

The brigade is experimenting with three to four terminals that the commander can re-distribute as necessary, as well as two terminals per battalion. Sustainment assets also get Starlink terminals, Evans said.

The terminals are particularly useful for allowing sustainment efforts to disperse, thereby becoming harder to hit.

“They can't all stay together, because they will be targetable,” he said.

Starlink devices are particularly important in the vast distances of the Pacific. One battalion, for example, is deployed 200 miles away from its brigade command, on a different island, Evans said.

The Starlinks allow the brigade to “overcome the tyranny of distance,” he said
 
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