Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

[Kirkhill]

This may be a second/third order effect of Posse Commitatus, where the active duty US military cannot be used in domestic situations except for certain things like NORAD.

Isn't the National Guard the usual workaround for that problem?

Air Defense Artillery Brigades​

11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas
31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Cavazos, Texas

35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Osan Air Base, South Korea
38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Sagami General Depot, Japan

108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Liberty, North Carolina

100th Missile Defense Brigade (ARNG) at Colorado Springs, Colorado
164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Orlando, Florida
174th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Columbus, Ohio
678th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Eastover, South Carolina

The unit (164th) has supported the homeland defense mission through seven deployments commanding a multi-component task force responsible for securing the airspace in and around the National Capital Region.

The 174th Air Defense Artillery Brigade is an Air Defense Artillery brigade of the United States Army. It is one of six brigade-sized major subordinate commands of the Ohio Army National Guard, activated on 1 September 2008, in Columbus, Ohio. Before, during, and following its activation, the brigade and its subordinate battalions have been very active, deploying individuals and units to support the Iraq War's Operation Iraqi Freedom, airspace defense of the National Capital Region,

100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based Midcourse Defense), known as 100th MDB (GMD), is a multi-component (meaning both Title 10 and Title 32) United States Army National Guard brigade headquartered at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado. It has component formations located in Fort Greely, Alaska, Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, and Fort Drum, New York manned by national guardsmen of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion,100th MDB, Detachment 1,and 100th MDB, Detachment 2 in Alaska, California, and New York, respectively, on a round-the-clock 24/7/365 basis.100th MDB (GMD) is part of the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

As National Guardsmen, the tempo of personnel replacements are not subject to the three-year cycle of ARFORGEN, allowing the development of long-term expertise over the past decade of training

I believe that the NCR Air Defence System is based on permanently emplaced NASAMs (Norwegian/National) launchers.



Or is it that the cost to military would be too high to engage that threat? It would eat up a massive budget?

 

[dimsum]

Isn't the National Guard the usual workaround for that problem?

It is.

Air Defense Artillery Brigades​

11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Bliss, Texas
31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Cavazos, Texas

35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Osan Air Base, South Korea
38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Sagami General Depot, Japan

108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Liberty, North Carolina

100th Missile Defense Brigade (ARNG) at Colorado Springs, Colorado
164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Orlando, Florida
174th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Columbus, Ohio
678th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ARNG) at Eastover, South Carolina







I believe that the NCR Air Defence System is based on permanently emplaced NASAMs (Norwegian/National) launchers.

View attachment 88803

Or is it that the cost to military would be too high to engage that threat? It would eat up a massive budget?

 

[Kirkhill]

I am going back to beating a well-worn drum - the notion of the reserves taking up local air defence as a task.

It occurs to me that if the air threat is evolving to the extent that every fielded entity operating independently, whether a division or a patrol, is going to require its own air defence umbrella, and if they sub-unit is going to be the basic element chopped for independent tasking then every company, every squadron, every battery is going to need its own C-RAM/C-UAS capability. That may be a dedicated platoon or troop or perhaps it could be an embedded capability in a heavy weapons platoon or troop (eg with dual function weapons like 30mm LF guns and 70mm missiles).

If every Reserve unit were required to man a sub-unit, with priority going to the manning of the C-RAM/C-UAS capability, then that would result in 150 or so troops of kinetic effectors that could be locally deployed. Or could go on expedition to Canada's north or overseas.

...

PS and the neighbours could see the Reserves preparing to manage a threat they can envisage.

 

[FJAG]

Isn't the National Guard the usual workaround for that problem?

Not really.

The Posse Commitatus Act relates to Federal troops and the prohibition against using them for civilian law enforcement purposes (like forming a posse under a sherif fto pursue outlaws)

National Guard troops acting under the authority of the state governor or state agencies are not subject to the Act. However, once called out on federal service, the act does apply to them.

The real question you need to ask is whether any particular military service performed by a soldier/unit on federal service is an act in support of local law enforcement or a national defence activity. Not every activity conducted within the continental United States is a civilian law enforcement activity. IMHO, guarding air space (especially the national capital or international airports) against hostile actors (regardless if foreign national ones or non national terrorists) would fall into the category of a national defence activity within the scope and authority of the federal government. Note also the Insurrection Act exception to Posse Commitatus.

I am going back to beating a well-worn drum - the notion of the reserves taking up local air defence as a task.

I'm of the view as well that reserves could take up much of the air defence mission. However, I do my thinking from the "continuing full-time service" v "other than continuing full-time service" provisions of the National Defence Act.

Assuming we use air defence as a resource which only deploys occasionally and through mobilization, like to Europe in the case of active hostilities then it becomes a reserve role with appropriate division of labour between those high tech or high skill jobs that require full-time service (such as maintainers and some specialists).

OTOH, if you are looking at having units deployed on a continuing full-time basis to local airports than the unit should be a RegF one albeit voluntary reserve force augmentation is a possibility.

We need to stop thinking of long term Class B reserve service as a norm. It isn't. It's become an abomination that is effectively a work-around to exceed the RegF manning levels in many cases. IMHO, in many cases we should consider a new form of RegF service that allows the recruiting of people for continuing, full-time positions under restricted terms of service that allow them to serve an entire career in a single location, such as a an air defence unit in a city with a major airport. It's essentially a form of what we consider Class B now but one that would be in accord with the NDA.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not really.

The Posse Commitatus Act relates to Federal troops and the prohibition against using them for civilian law enforcement purposes (like forming a posse under a sherif fto pursue outlaws)

National Guard troops acting under the authority of the state governor or state agencies are not subject to the Act. However, once called out on federal service, the act does apply to them.

The real question you need to ask is whether any particular military service performed by a soldier/unit on federal service is an act in support of local law enforcement or a national defence activity. Not every activity conducted within the continental United States is a civilian law enforcement activity. IMHO, guarding air space (especially the national capital or international airports) against hostile actors (regardless if foreign national ones or non national terrorists) would fall into the category of a national defence activity within the scope and authority of the federal government. Note also the Insurrection Act exception to Posse Commitatus.

Which brings up the interesting point about states appealing to other states for National Guard assistance to protect their international borders when they feel that the Federal Government isn't doing its job.

And the issue of the Alaska Air National Guard being federalized to protect the national airspace rather than being Alaskans protecting Alaskan air space...

Lots of work for lawyers ...

I'm of the view as well that reserves could take up much of the air defence mission. However, I do my thinking from the "continuing full-time service" v "other than continuing full-time service" provisions of the National Defence Act.

Assuming we use air defence as a resource which only deploys occasionally and through mobilization, like to Europe in the case of active hostilities then it becomes a reserve role with appropriate division of labour between those high tech or high skill jobs that require full-time service (such as maintainers and some specialists).

OTOH, if you are looking at having units deployed on a continuing full-time basis to local airports than the unit should be a RegF one albeit voluntary reserve force augmentation is a possibility.

We need to stop thinking of long term Class B reserve service as a norm. It isn't. It's become an abomination that is effectively a work-around to exceed the RegF manning levels in many cases. IMHO, in many cases we should consider a new form of RegF service that allows the recruiting of people for continuing, full-time positions under restricted terms of service that allow them to serve an entire career in a single location, such as a an air defence unit in a city with a major airport. It's essentially a form of what we consider Class B now but one that would be in accord with the NDA.

The issue is one of threat management, isn't it? Is the threat clear and present, current? Or is it a prospective threat?

Currently the zeitgeist is that domestically there is no threat. However, some of us think there is a potential threat. That potential threat shares much in common with the potential threat that soldiers on active service might face. The active service soldiers, whether currently serving in Estonia or in the future drawn from the Reserves will need the capabilities to counter that threat effectively. If those soldiers have those capabilities available to them in garrison in Canada for training purposes then in the event that the potential threat becomes an active threat, then those soldiers can be mobilized to meet the threat for the duration of the threat. If so then they would go from Class A service to Class B for the duration of the emergency. If the emergency persists then the temporary will become permanent and they will move from B to C and possibly Regular.

And if the emergency persists further then I would anticipate new technologies being applied to reduce the number of Class C and Regs on the payroll.

We agree, I think, that the Reserves are only a temporary or stop gap measure. But no stopping of gaps is possible without plugs, mattresses and balks - or guns and missiles in this case.

 

[FJAG]

Which brings up the interesting point about states appealing to other states for National Guard assistance to protect their international borders when they feel that the Federal Government isn't doing its job.

And the issue of the Alaska Air National Guard being federalized to protect the national airspace rather than being Alaskans protecting Alaskan air space...

Lots of work for lawyers ...

Actually not so much. Both are permissible. The first is within Posse Commitatus because there is no federalization. The second is a legitimate federalization of the Alaska National Guard.

The issue is one of threat management, isn't it? Is the threat clear and present, current? Or is it a prospective threat?

Currently the zeitgeist is that domestically there is no threat. However, some of us think there is a potential threat. That potential threat shares much in common with the potential threat that soldiers on active service might face. The active service soldiers, whether currently serving in Estonia or in the future drawn from the Reserves will need the capabilities to counter that threat effectively. If those soldiers have those capabilities available to them in garrison in Canada for training purposes then in the event that the potential threat becomes an active threat, then those soldiers can be mobilized to meet the threat for the duration of the threat. If so then they would go from Class A service to Class B for the duration of the emergency. If the emergency persists then the temporary will become permanent and they will move from B to C and possibly Regular.

And if the emergency persists further then I would anticipate new technologies being applied to reduce the number of Class C and Regs on the payroll.

We agree, I think, that the Reserves are only a temporary or stop gap measure. But no stopping of gaps is possible without plugs, mattresses and balks - or guns and missiles in this case.

There's a bit of muddling of apples and oranges here, if I understand you correctly.

"Continuing, full-time service" v "other than continuing, full-time service," is the fundamental statutory definition that divides a reservist from a RegF soldier. Classes of reserve service is a regulatory provision that controls certain pay, benefits and even obligations of reservists at all times. (such as how many days a reservist may be ordered to train under s 33(2)(a) of the NDA or as a foundation as to what pay and benefits are payable depending on the type of service performed)

The CAF in large measure relies on voluntary service. The real crux of the matter, however, is the ability to call out reservists on a compulsory basis such as NDA s 31 (place on active duty) or NDA s 33(2)(a) (order to train) or NDA s 33(2)(b) (call out on service for any lawful duty other than training) or NDA s 275 (Call out in Aid of the Civil Power).

Quite frankly the powers that be in the CAF do not understand these concepts well, or at all, and as a result neither does the government. As an example, how many people know that when a reservist volunteers for NATO related tasking they are automatically placed on active service by virtue of OiC SI/89-103 once they leave Canada? How many know what the consequences of that are? My guess is @dapaterson is one of the very few. As a consequence we have defaulted into a system of reservists volunteering not only for operations but also day to day Class A service. Canada simply does not "require" a reservists to show up for anything. This, IMHO, is a headspace problem. Canada's reserves could be used very similarly to the way that the US ARNG and USAR , however, the CAF (and by extension the GoC) has consciously chosen and then defaulted into not doing so.

Also don't use the term "emergency" too loosely. "Emergency" is a defined term under the NDA which

means an insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, whether real or apprehended

We agree totally on the concept that reservists must be properly trained to meet anticipated threats that they may be mobilized to defend against. Equally they should have the equipment to meet that task albeit a concept of a given stock of equipment which is less than the total force that can be mobilized is a valid financial political risk course of action as long as the risk is fully understood and accepted by the powers that be. That's where I differ from the current CAF thinking. My belief is that, like the US ARNG and USAR, soldiers and units should have the equipment in hand that they will be mobilized on.