Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

[Edward Campbell]

http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/512931

China furious with U.S., cancels military meetings
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON–China has abruptly canceled a series of military and diplomatic contacts with the United States to protest a planned $6.5 billion package of U.S. arms to Taiwan, ... a Defense Department spokesperson, [lamented] that "China's continued politicization of our military relationship results in missed opportunities."

The Chinese action will not stop the country's participation with the United States in international efforts over Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs, U.S. officials said.

But it does include the cancellation of an upcoming U.S. visit by a senior Chinese general, other similar visits, port calls by naval vessels and the indefinite postponement of meetings on stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction ...

In fact the ‘opportunity’ is too good for China to miss. The US is staggered by a series of economic body blows, that is the perfect time for a jab to the head. This is, as Chinese actions so often are, a multi-pronged attack, aimed at:

• The Chinese people, themselves, for internal consumption – a fine distraction from China’s own, serious economic troubles;

• The West – reminding them us that Taiwan matters to China and that they (China) will not tolerate anything that changes Taiwan’s status as a province awaiting reunification; and

• The ‘rest’ – reminding everyone else that China is a big player quite willing and able to threaten the USA.

Maybe it's time this was merged with the China superthread? Too many overlaps in topics.

I agree! Can we merge this with the existing Chinese superthread, please? It really isn't a uniquely Canadian political issue - at least the most recent item isn't.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

I agree! Can we merge this with the existing Chinese superthread, please? It really isn't a uniquely Canadian political issue - at least the most recent item isn't.

..and done. I guess this makes it a "super duperthread" now.

 

[Edward Campbell]

..and done. I guess this makes it a "super duperthread" now.

No, I think the correct expression would be The Chinese Super-Duper Thread (about almost everything) - which is waaaaaay neater (more neat?) than mega-thread, dontcha think? 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Great Firewall of China disgorges some more secrets:

http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=21468&channel=communications&section=

The weakness of key word search engines is that they can be attacked and overwhelmed with basically spam messaging software, or in this case VOIP software rigged to work as spam.

 

[CougarKing]

As the world looks to China for a bailout, it looks like the PRC won't be willing to loan anymore money.

http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/10/09/1522548.aspx

Can’t loan anymore money
As for whether Beijing will step up by loaning the U.S. more money, the notion is "nonsensical," said Pettis. "It’s not really meaningful."

China already owns an estimated $1 trillion of U.S. debt – most of which is U.S. Treasury bonds and the rest in U.S. agency debt. "The U.S. credit crisis has led to losses in China’s own wealth," noted Zhang. So where are they going to get more money for new loans to the U.S. – to buy more debt?

"The argument was that China already has almost $2 trillion. Yes, but those are already lent to the U.S. and European governments," argued Pettis. "So they can’t re-lend them. They would have to take the money back and then lend it, which is not a new loan."

Rumors of a China-led bailout have been so rife, in fact, that the central bank here, the People’s Bank of China, had to deny reports carried in Hong Kong newspapers that the government would buy up to $200 billion worth of U.S. Treasuries to ease the financial crisis in America."...

Foreign owners of US Treasury Securities (July 2008)
Nation billions of dollars percentage
Japan 593.4 22.17%
Mainland China 518.7 19.38%
United Kingdom 290.8 10.87%
Oil exporters 173.9 6.50%
Brazil 148.4 5.54%
Caribbean banking centers 133.5 4.99%
Luxembourg 75.8 2.83%
Russia 74.1 2.77%
Hong Kong 60.6 2.26% (still technically an SAR so they have to be counted seperately)
Switzerland 45.1 1.69%
Republic of China (Taiwan) 42.3 1.58%
Norway 41.8 1.56%
Germany 41.1 1.54%
Mexico 36.0 1.35%
South Korea 35.3 1.32%
Turkey 32.4 1.21%
Thailand 31.8 1.19%
Singapore 31.4 1.17%
Canada 26.6 0.99%
Netherlands 14.9 0.56%
Poland 13.9 0.52%
Egypt 13.4 0.50%
Chile 13.1 0.49%
India 13.0 0.49%
Sweden 12.4 0.46%
Belgium 12.0 0.45%
Ireland 11.2 0.42%
All other 139.5 5.21%
Grand Total 2676.4

 

[Edward Campbell]

See this article: Big red machine hits speed bump over here in the 'US/World Economic Impact on Canada' thread.

 

[CougarKing]

This is old news, but definitely something to pay attention to in the future.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20081012.aspx

Chinese Victory At Sea

October 12, 2008: In 1974, China fought a naval battle with the Vietnamese near the Paracel islands, and took control. China has recently been expanding military facilities on these tiny islands. Among the more notable additions has been an expanded electronic monitoring facility, and a lengthened runway, now long enough to support Su-30 fighters. Several large fuel tanks have also been built, indicating an intention to base Su-30 fighters there. About a thousand military personnel are stationed there.

Taiwan recently built a 1,150 meter long, and 30 meter wide air strip on Itu Aba, one of the Spratly Islands, 500 kilometers to the south. The Spratlys are a group of some 100 islets, atolls, and reefs that total only about 5 square kilometers of land, but sprawl across some 410,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea. Set amid some of the world's most productive fishing grounds, the islands are believed to have enormous oil and gas reserves. Several nations have overlapping claims on the group. About 45 of the islands are currently occupied by small numbers of military personnel from China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

Called Taiping Island by the Taiwanese, Ita Aba is one of the largest of Spratly Islands, at about 120 acres (489,600 square meters). It has been in Taiwanese hands since the mid-1950s, and has largely been used as a way station for fishermen. The island is also claimed by the Vietnamese, who call it Thai Binh. Taiwan has long maintained a small military presence on the island, and the new air strip is meant to cement that control. Protests were made by Vietnam, which controls the largest group of islands, and the Philippines, which also claims Itu Aba island. The Vietnamese earlier refurbished an old South Vietnamese airstrip on Big Spratly Island.

In 1988, China and Vietnam fought a naval battle, off the Spratly islands. The Chinese victory was followed by Chinese troops establishing garrisons on some of the islands. In 1992, Chinese marines landed on Da Lac reef, in the Spratly Islands. In 1995, Chinese marines occupied Mischief Reef, which was claimed by the Philippines.

The next war in this part of the world may break out because of a dispute over an uninhabited island in Southeast Asia. Border disputes have long been a cause for wars. All it takes is a country that feels it is losing out because a border is not where everyone agrees is should be. Same thing with islands. There are dozens of these island disputes worldwide. Most are not active issues, except for the fact that an international treaty (the 1982 Law of the Sea) gives whoever owns these uninhabited rocks rights to fishing, and oil drilling, for over three hundred kilometers from each of these tiny bits of land.

Thus, aside from prestige and possible historical ties, the primary reasons folks are claiming ownership of these uninhabited bits of land has to do with the ability to control sea lanes, defining maritime economic zones, possible tourist dollars in some instance, and oil, rumored to underlie much of the area. The principal islands involved (and the nations claiming ownership) are;

-- Padra Branca Islands, claimed by Malaysia & Singapore.

-- Sipadam & Ligatan Islands, claimed by Malaysia & Indonesia -- this is one that seems most likely to cause trouble in the near term.

-- Louisa Reef, claimed by Malaysia & Brunei.

-- Spratly Islands, claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, & Brunei: China claims them all, but occupies only 8, Vietnam has occupied or marked 25, the Philippines 8, Malaysia 6, and Taiwan one.

-- Paracel Islands, claimed by China, which occupies them, Taiwan, & Vietnam contest Chinese claims.

-- Sabah, claimed by Philippines & Malaysia. This is a province of Malaysia, which the Filipinos claim was ceded to the Sultan of Sulu (now part of the Philippines) back in the 1870s.

In some of these there have also been periodic clashes over who maintains aids to navigation. All of the nations making claims in this area understand that it is the U.S. Navy that still has the final say over who controls what. Someday China may contest that, and the new facilities in the Paracels are part of that.

 

[CougarKing]

Is the situation analogous at all with China's backing of successive governments in Pakistan?

Speaking of China's relationship with Pakistan...

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1851332,00.html

Friday, Oct. 17, 2008
Why Pakistan's Zardari Is Cozying Up to China
By Ishaan Tharoor

Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari completed his first state trip to Beijing on Oct. 17, signing a raft of new agreements with a nation he had hailed in Islamabad four days earlier as "the future of the world." China and Pakistan tied up at least 11 deals on trade and economic cooperation, infrastructure projects, agriculture, mining rights and telecommunications; they now aim to double bilateral trade, which currently stands at around $7 billion, by 2011.

The two countries have a long-standing, all-weather relationship, forged over decades of mutual animosity toward neighboring India, with whom they separately have fought wars. But Zardari's visit comes at a pivotal moment. His fledgling democracy is not only threatened by terrorism, but is also teetering toward bankruptcy. Spiraling inflation, now at 25%, has eaten into Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves at a rate of $1 billion a month and the country risks defaulting on debt repayment loans. These fiscal headaches have been compounded by a flare-up in tensions with its most vital ally, the U.S., which recently launched raids against terrorist targets in Pakistan's remote tribal areas without notifying Islamabad — actions that have triggered a firestorm of protest and clouded relations with Washington.

Enter China. With nearly $2 trillion amassed in foreign currency holdings, China's government had the largesse this week to grant Zardari an immediate soft loan of upwards of $1 billion, according to a report in the Financial Times. "As a long friend of Pakistan, China understands it is facing some financial difficulties," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang at a briefing with journalists on Oct. 16. Other new measures include the increase of access Pakistani goods will have in China's markets as well as agreements to launch special economic zones within Pakistan with tax incentives for Chinese companies.

Beyond this, Zardari's strengthening of ties with Beijing sends a clear signal to the U.S. On Oct. 8, Washington concluded a landmark nuclear energy deal with India — a pact that upset both Beijing and Islamabad, in part because it enabled India to skirt international regulations regarding the purchase of nuclear fuel, something the U.S. has ruled out offering Pakistan. Su Hao, professor of Asia-Pacific studies at China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, says China's foreign policy establishment is "highly concerned about the U.S.-India contract, because it was a unilateral decision by the U.S."

A burgeoning Sino-Pakistani alliance may check what many in Islamabad and Beijing fear to be a solidifying Indo-U.S. consensus in the region. Though no official statement from either government was made, Pakistan's ambassador to Beijing, Masood Khan, told The Nation, a Pakistani daily, that obtaining nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian nuclear technology would be the "main item" in talks with Beijing this week. Apart from being Pakistan's main conventional arms supplier, China has played an integral part in building Pakistan's nuclear weapons industry. In turn, Islamabad allowed the Chinese to build a deep-sea facility in Gwadar, a $250 million project that, once completed, will give Beijing an immensely strategic listening post on the Persian Gulf.

Still, a geopolitical Cold War is not at hand. The fate of Pakistan's government remains tightly bound to the White House, and China's booming trade with India is exponentially more lucrative than its transactions with Pakistan. Zardari's trip this week, though, is a sign of the many poles springing up in the multi-polar 21st century. Su of China Foreign Affairs University insists shoring up Pakistan's economic and industrial prospects can only be good for its historic foe. "Pakistan is such an important anti-terrorism frontier," he says. "Instability there will jeopardize the safety of all other countries in the region, including India."

— With reporting by Jessie Jiang/Beijing

 

[GAP]

Interesting Article

Getting China just right
PAUL EVANS From Monday's Globe and Mail October 20, 2008 at 6:30 AM EDT
Article Link

Though rarely seen during the election campaign, Canadians have China on their minds. China is no longer “over there,” but a daily part of our economic lives. Surveys conducted by the Asia Pacific Foundation and others reveal that Canadians sense the power shift under way across the Pacific and have mixed feelings about the opportunities and threats that come with it.

The current financial crisis underscores the significance of China's new global role in unmistakable ways. And it underlines the policy problem that the new Harper government will have to handle more adeptly than it did in its first term.

Part of the financial story is how closely China's economy is linked to the American. It is the number two trading partner of the United States (and of Canada). Far from being decoupled from America's economic fortunes, the consequences of the American financial meltdown are significant for China. Stock prices have fallen further in Shanghai than on Wall Street. Property prices are also falling faster. Its financial institutions have suffered enormous losses if only because about 60% of its $1.8-trillion in foreign reserves are in U.S. dollar assets. And about half of China's fund management companies are joint ventures with foreign institutions that are hemorrhaging at home. Exports to the U.S. are slowing and China's growth rate is expected to fall to single digits this year and next.

The other part of the story is that China is not just affected by the meltdown; it has a major role in how it plays out. When America sneezes, China, like Canada, catches a cold. The difference is that China is now in a position to prescribe the medicine and help build the hospital where the patients will be treated.

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China continues to prop up the U.S. dollar by maintaining its stock of U.S. treasuries. Chinese companies will eventually find a role in recapitalizing financial companies in the U.S. when the price is right and security of investment value guaranteed.

China's biggest role is keeping its economic engine running and increasing domestic and regional consumption to dampen the recession. It has dropped domestic interest rates. And, more significantly, it is increasing consumption of goods and services from its East Asian neighbours. China already has eclipsed the U.S. as the biggest customer of exports from Japan and Korea.

All of this does not signal the end of American economic dominance or the ascendance of capitalism Chinese-style. But we can expect that the arrangements and institutions that come into play will reflect the new realities of global economic power and Chinese interests and perspectives. It may be premature to predict the emergence of a G2 as the architecture of the future, yet the G8 already seems a relic of an earlier era.

This is a financial drama playing out on a geopolitical stage. If the Bretton Woods system is to be reinvented as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposes, is it farfetched to hold the meetings in a quiet Chinese location?

For Canadians, the stakes are much bigger than slumping commodity prices, bilateral trade numbers, and reduced container flows. “Cool politics, warm economics” as our approach to China has hit a dead end. Canada needs China far more than the reverse. In perilous times, both countries have a common interest in keeping markets open, beating back protectionism and dampening the global recession.

What can Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his government do? A prime ministerial visit, already announced, can do more to re-establish a constructive tone than a dozen ministerial missions. To be successful the visit will need to be accompanied by some creative thinking and bold gestures.

First, make the ambassadorship in Beijing, like Washington, a political appointment of a very senior person affiliated with the current government.

Second, phase out the official development assistance program in China and replace it with a new institution for Canada-China policy partnerships in areas including human rights and environment, but also including human security, financial systems, and product safety.

Third, deepen the approach to promoting human rights and good governance by working with Chinese partners on a range of social justice issues that include political rights, but also social and economic ones.

Fourth, develop a strategy that connects Canada to the new East Asian regionalism in the same way Canada supported similar processes in Europe a half century earlier.

Fifth, help small- and medium-sized Canadian companies succeed in Asia through better preparation and new instruments including trading companies.

Sixth, clarify the foreign investment rules as quickly as possible to create a favourable environment for major new plays, including in energy.

Seventh, expand the Gateway concept beyond transportation infrastructure and into building Gateway economies in Canada that link North America to global Asia.

In responding to the economic crisis, we need an Asia policy with China at its centre as much as we need immediate remedial action at home.
More on link

 

[CougarKing]

More reason to worry?

And now the Manchurian microchip
Robert Eringer

October 18, 2008 7:13 AM

The geniuses at Homeland Security who brought you hare-brained procedures at airports (which inconvenience travelers without snagging terrorists) have decreed that October is National Cyber Security Awareness Month. This means The Investigator -- at the risk of compromising national insecurities -- would be remiss not to make you aware of the hottest topic in U.S. counterintelligence circles: rogue microchips. This threat emanates from China (PRC) -- and it is hugely significant.

The myth: Chinese intelligence services have concealed a microchip in every computer everywhere, programmed to "call home" if and when activated.

The reality: It may actually be true.

All computers on the market today -- be they Dell, Toshiba, Sony, Apple or especially IBM -- are assembled with components manufactured inside the PRC. Each component produced by the Chinese, according to a reliable source within the intelligence community, is secretly equipped with a hidden microchip that can be activated any time by China's military intelligence services, the PLA.

"It is there, deep inside your computer, if they decide to call it up," the security chief of a multinational corporation told The Investigator. "It is capable of providing Chinese intelligence with everything stored on your system -- on everyone's system -- from e-mail to documents. I call it Call Home Technology. It doesn't mean to say they're sucking data from everyone's computer today, it means the Chinese think ahead -- and they now have the potential to do it when it suits their purposes."

Discussed theoretically in high-tech security circles as "Trojan Horse on a Chip" or "The Manchurian Chip," Call Home Technology came to light after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched a security program in December 2007 called Trust in Integrated Circuits. DARPA awarded almost $25 million in contracts to six companies and university research labs to test foreign-made microchips for hardware Trojans, back doors and kill switches -- techie-speak for bugs and gremlins -- with a view toward microchip verification.

Raytheon, a defense contractor, was granted almost half of these funds for hardware and software testing.

Its findings, which are classified, have apparently sent shockwaves through the counterintelligence community.

"It is the hottest topic concerning the FBI and the Pentagon," a retired intelligence official told The Investigator. "They don't know quite what to do about it. The Chinese have even been able to hack into the computer system that handles our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system."

Another senior intelligence source told The Investigator, "Our military is aware of this and has had to take some protective measures. The problem includes defective chips that don't reach military specs -- as well as probable Trojans."

A little context: In 2005 the Lenovo Group in China paid $1.75 billion for IBM's PC unit, even though that unit had lost $965 million the previous four years. Three congressmen, including the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, tried to block this sale because of national security concerns, to no avail. (The PRC embassy in Washington, D.C., maintains a large lobbying presence to influence congressmen and their staffs through direct contact.)

In June 2007, a Pentagon computer network utilized by the U.S. defense secretary's office was hacked into -- and traced directly back to the Chinese PLA.

A report presented to Congress late last year characterized PRC espionage as "the single greatest risk to the security of American technologies." Almost simultaneously, Jonathan Evans, director-general of MI5, Britain's domestic security and counterintelligence service, sent a confidential letter to CEOs and security chiefs at 300 UK companies to warn that they were under attack by "Chinese state organizations" whose purpose, said Mr. Evans, was to defeat their computer security systems and steal confidential commercial information.

The Chinese had specifically targeted Rolls-Royce and Shell Oil.

The key to unlocking computer secrets through rogue microchips is uncovering (or stealing) source codes, without which such microchips would be useless. This is why Chinese espionage is so heavily focused upon the U.S. computer industry.

Four main computer operating systems exist. Two of them, Unix and Linux, utilize open-source codes. Apple's operating system is Unix-based.

Which leaves only Microsoft as the source code worth cracking. But in early 2004, Microsoft announced that its security had been breached and that its source code was "lost or stolen."

"As technology evolves, each new program has a new source code," a computer forensics expert told The Investigator. "So the Chinese would need ongoing access to new Microsoft source codes for maintaining their ability to activate any microchips they may have installed, along with the expertise to utilize new hardware technology."

No surprise then that the FBI expends much of its counterintelligence resources these days on Chinese high-tech espionage within the United States. Timothy Bereznay, while still serving as assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, told USA Today, "Foreign collectors don't wait until something is classified -- they're targeting it at the research and development stage." Mr. Bereznay now heads Raytheon's Intelligence and Information Systems division.

The PRC's intelligence services use tourists, exchange students and trade show attendees to gather strategic data, mostly from open sources. They have also created over 3,500 front companies in the United States -- including several based in Palo Alto to focus on computer technology.

Back in 2005, when the Chinese espionage problem was thought to be focused on military technology, then-FBI counterintelligence operations chief Dave Szady said, "I think the problem is huge, and it's something we're just getting our arms around." Little did he know just how huge, as it currently applies to computer network security.

The FBI is reported to have arrested more than 25 Chinese nationals and Chinese-Americans on suspicion of conspiracy to commit espionage between 2004 and 2006. The Investigator endeavored to update this figure, but was told by FBI spokesman William Carter, "We do not track cases by ethnicity."

Excuse us for asking. We may be losing secrets, but at least the dignity of our political correctness remains intact.

Oh, and Homeland Security snagged comic icon Jerry Lewis, 82, trying to board a plane in Las Vegas with a gun -- no joke.

If you have a story idea for The Investigator, contact him at reringer@newspress.com. State if your query is confidential.

http://cryptome.org/manchu-chip.htm

 

[CougarKing]

Very disturbing.

Rand Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China

Published: 16 Oct 11:45 EDT (15:45 GMT)

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3774348&c=ASI&s=TOP

TAIPEI - A new RAND study suggests U.S. air power in the Pacific would be inadequate to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2020. The study, entitled "Air Combat Past, Present and Future," by John Stillion and Scott Perdue, says China's anti-access arms and strategy could deny the U.S. the "ability to operate efficiently from nearby bases or seas."

According to the study, U.S. aircraft carriers and air bases would be threatened by Chinese development of anti-ship ballistic missiles, the fielding of diesel and nuclear submarines equipped with torpedoes and SS-N-22 and SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fighters and bombers carrying ASCMs and HARMs, and new ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

The report states that 34 missiles with submunition warheads could cover all parking ramps at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa.

An "attack like this could damage, destroy or strand 75 percent of aircraft based at Kadena," it says.

In contrast, many Chinese air bases are harder than Kadena, with some "super-hard underground hangers."

To make matters worse, Kadena is the only U.S. air base within 500 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, whereas China has 27.

U.S. air bases in South Korea are more than 750 miles distant, and those in Japan are more than 885 miles away. Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, is 1,500 miles away. The result is that sortie rates will be low, with a "huge tanker demand."

The authors suggest China's CETC Y-27 radar, which is similar to Russia's Nebo SVU VHF Digital AESA, could counter U.S. stealth fighter technology. China is likely to outfit its fighters with improved radars and by "2020 even very stealthy targets likely [would be] detectable by Flanker radars at 25+ nm." China is also likely to procure the new Su-35BM fighter by 2020, which will challenge the F-35 and possibly the F-22.

The authors also question the reliability of U.S. beyond-visual-range weapons, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. U.S. fighters have recorded only 10 AIM-120 kills, none against targets equipped with the kinds of countermeasures carried by Chinese Su-27s and Su-30s. Of the 10, six were beyond-visual-range kills, and it required 13 missiles to get them.

If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the authors say it is difficult to "predict who will have had the last move in the measure-countermeasure game."

Overall, the authors say, "China could enjoy a 3:1 edge in fighters if we can fly from Kadena - about 10:1 if forced to operate from Andersen. Overcoming these odds requires qualitative superiority of 9:1 or 100:1" - a differential that is "extremely difficult to achieve" against a like power.

If beyond-visual-range missiles work, stealth technology is not countered and air bases are not destroyed, U.S. forces have a chance, but "history suggests there is a limit of about 3:1 where quality can no longer compensate for superior enemy numbers."

A 24-aircraft Su-27/30 regiment can carry around 300 air-to-air missiles (AAMs), whereas 24 F-22s can carry only 192 AAMs and 24 F-35s only 96 AAMs.

Though current numbers assume the F-22 could shoot down 48 Chinese Flankers when "outnumbered 12:1 without loss," these numbers do not take into account a less-than-perfect U.S. beyond-visual-range performance, partial or complete destruction of U.S. air bases and aircraft carriers, possible deployment of a new Chinese stealth fighter around 2020 or 2025, and the possible use of Chinese "robo-fighters" to deplete U.S. "fighters' missile loadout prior to mass attack."

The authors write that Chinese counter stealth, anti-access, countermissile technologies are proliferating and the U.S. military needs "a plan that accounts for this."

 

[Edward Campbell]

I do not see this as ”disturbing”; I do not even find it surprising.

First: It is not surprising. The US has been drawing down its combat forces for a generation; what remains is quantitatively better – more flexible, longer range, etc - but there is, of necessity, less and less of it. The Chinese have also drawn down, perhaps even at a greater rate – but from a much larger starting ‘base,’ it has also modernized more. The end result is that the US has, relatively, few first rate combat formations available in SE Asia while China has many, many almost first rate formations available. This is, in part, the result of the US being a global superpower on the Roman model – with a strong, balanced force in each region while China looks like it is following something closer to a version of the 19th century British strategy – the (army) ‘main force’ is deployed at the ‘jewel of the crown’ which, in China’s case, is at home, not half way around the world. Thus, China has a large, capable, military force in its home region; the Chinese have spent HUGE amounts on their national defence; we ought not to be surprised that force structure reform and spending pay off.

Second: It is not disturbing. Taiwan IS part of China; everyone, including the Americans, British, Canadians and Taiwanese recognize that political fact. The question is: when and how will reunification take place? The worst case scenario is soon and violently. As far as I can guess from my readings, and a few very occasional discussions with some Chinese academics etc, no one is looking for the worst case ‘solution.’ But, it could happen and the Chinese are preparing for that eventuality. Being prepared for the nightmare scenario does not equal taking an aggressive stance. I continue to believe  that we will see, probably in what’s left of my lifetime, another version of “one country/two systems” – this one designed to accommodate a highly independent Taiwan, with similar status granted to Hong Kong and, eventually and on a lesser scale, even to Tibet and Xinjiang.

 

[CougarKing]

I do not see this as ”disturbing”; I do not even find it surprising.

First: It is not surprising. The US has been drawing down its combat forces for a generation; what remains is quantitatively better – more flexible, longer range, etc - but there is, of necessity, less and less of it. The Chinese have also drawn down, perhaps even at a greater rate – but from a much larger starting ‘base,’ it has also modernized more. The end result is that the US has, relatively, few first rate combat formations available in SE Asia while China has many, many almost first rate formations available. This is, in part, the result of the US being a global superpower on the Roman model – with a strong, balanced force in each region while China looks like it is following something closer to a version of the 19th century British strategy – the (army) ‘main force’ is deployed at the ‘jewel of the crown’ which, in China’s case, is at home, not half way around the world. Thus, China has a large, capable, military force in its home region; the Chinese have spent HUGE amounts on their national defence; we ought not to be surprised that force structure reform and spending pay off.

Second: It is not disturbing. Taiwan IS part of China; everyone, including the Americans, British, Canadians and Taiwanese recognize that political fact. The question is: when and how will reunification take place? The worst case scenario is soon and violently. As far as I can guess from my readings, and a few very occasional discussions with some Chinese academics etc, no one is looking for the worst case ‘solution.’ But, it could happen and the Chinese are preparing for that eventuality. Being prepared for the nightmare scenario does not equal taking an aggressive stance. I continue to believe  that we will see, probably in what’s left of my lifetime, another version of “one country/two systems” – this one designed to accommodate a highly independent Taiwan, with similar status granted to Hong Kong and, eventually and on a lesser scale, even to Tibet and Xinjiang.

I only found it surprising because I assumed that the US technological advantage would still win out in the end and still nullify the supposed numerical advantage China has, no matter what China bought from Russia; the RAND analysts seem certain that China may be able to narrow the technological gap on the air front within just a decade. And I already was aware that China has been drawing down its forces, though this was more on the land front, where many of its troops have been transferred to the People's Armed Police to help cut down on redundancy, IIRC.

 

[Kirkhill]

CougarDaddy,

Remember what Rand's mission is when producing these reports.  Generally it is not to determine who would win.  It is usually to determine how the other guy could win with their known available assets.  That allows the US, and it is usually the USAF in particular, to plan how to shore up their perceived weak spots.

Cynics have also charged that the primary role is actually to allow the US, and the USAF in particular, to shore up their budget.

These types of reports were standard fare all through the Cold War. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

I only found it surprising because I assumed that the US technological advantage would still win out in the end and still nullify the supposed numerical advantage China has, no matter what China bought from Russia; the RAND analysts seem certain that China may be able to narrow the technological gap on the air front within just a decade. And I already was aware that China has been drawing down its forces, though this was more on the land front, where many of its troops have been transferred to the People's Armed Police to help cut down on redundancy, IIRC.

Those, most people here, who keep much closer tabs on the PLA and Chinese military technology will correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that China is doing more than just buying Russian technology.

I think the biggest and 'best' Chinese military decision was to scrap the huge, conscripted PLA and replace it with much smaller but much, much more professional forces. My experience says that well trained regulars can always make good use of whatever kit is available - even when it is not the very latest technology.

But I also think China is developing new, very modern weapon systems of its own. I believe it is loss of military secrets that prompted the most recent US crackdowns on Chinese expatriates in America. Which is to say that I believe the American suspicions are well founded and that there is - has been for 30 years - a large, active Chinese military-industrial espionage network in the USA.

 

[a_majoor]

The other thing this report neglects is potential counters not based on USAF numbers and technology, as well as unorthodox methods the USAF "could" employ; anything from using ICBMs with conventional warheads as the strike force or SOF teams taking out Chinese air bases (or even more outlandish schemes like space war or releasing a 48 hr flu virus in the Chinese industrial heartland). As well, the USAF and Navy have other long levers; mining Chinese ports or cutting the flow of oil and resources by attacking pipelines in Kazakhstan or shipping in the Strait of Malacca .

Of course, this also works both ways, and the more outlandish the scheme, the less likely it is to succeed or at least not divert critical resources from elsewhere.

 

[CougarKing]

Speaking of Chinese airpower, here' s a link to the recent PLAAF air show at Zhuhai/珠海 airport.

http://mil.huanqiu.com/Focus_photo/2008-10/259859.html

The imprint of the IAI Lavi on those J10 aircraft is just amazing!

 

[armyca08]

I can only hope this doesn't get interpreted as a flame, so under the 1 china policy which all countries who have diplomatic contacts and even Taiwan agrees to.. China is the #1 holder if counting all provinces and administrative regions of china. Outranking Japan - of course de facto control of those securities may be another matter completely.

As the world looks to China for a bailout, it looks like the PRC won't be willing to loan anymore money.

Foreign owners of US Treasury Securities (July 2008)
Nation billions of dollars percentage
Japan 593.4 22.17%
Mainland China 518.7 19.38%
United Kingdom 290.8 10.87%
Oil exporters 173.9 6.50%
Brazil 148.4 5.54%
Caribbean banking centers 133.5 4.99%
Luxembourg 75.8 2.83%
Russia 74.1 2.77%
Hong Kong 60.6 2.26% (still technically an SAR so they have to be counted seperately)
Switzerland 45.1 1.69%
Republic of China (Taiwan) 42.3 1.58%
Norway 41.8 1.56%
Germany 41.1 1.54%
Mexico 36.0 1.35%
South Korea 35.3 1.32%
Turkey 32.4 1.21%
Thailand 31.8 1.19%
Singapore 31.4 1.17%
Canada 26.6 0.99%
Netherlands 14.9 0.56%
Poland 13.9 0.52%
Egypt 13.4 0.50%
Chile 13.1 0.49%
India 13.0 0.49%
Sweden 12.4 0.46%
Belgium 12.0 0.45%
Ireland 11.2 0.42%
All other 139.5 5.21%
Grand Total 2676.4

 

[CougarKing]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/29/china.comment


Complex legacy of Chairman Mao
He may have been a despot, but the leader of the largest country in the world unintentionally did his people good

  Will Hutton
  The Observer,
  Sunday May 29 2005
  Article history

It is less than 30 years ago that the 20th-century's bloodiest dictator was approaching death, his country still dirt poor, his vision in ruins, with tens of millions of his fellow citizens dead at his hands. Today, that same country has enjoyed three decades of the most unparalleled economic growth. Mao's death has proved the trigger for an extraordinary economic renaissance.

Nobody can disagree that he was a cruel and authoritarian despot who murdered millions; even his successor, Deng Xiaoping, pronounced that he was at least 30 per cent wrong and guilty of 'excesses'.

The open question is how much more wrong he was than the official assessment, how much of his legacy still informs the communist leadership and whether his long shadow and his thinking is any guide to what China might do in the future. If you think he was 100 per cent wrong, you must worry; China's Communist party has an evil DNA in its genes that will one day provoke war and mayhem with global implications. Agree with Deng and you might be more hopeful.

A new book, Mao: The Unknown Story (Jonathan Cape), places Mao unambiguously in the 100 per cent wrong category. Jung Chang, author of the compelling Wild Swans, the story of today's China through the pained eyes of three generations of women, and her husband, Jon Halliday, have used 10 years of research to indict comprehensively Mao's cynical lust for power and careless disregard for humanity. Whether it's the news that Mao never actually marched in long stretches of the Long March but was, instead, carried in a bamboo litter he designed himself, or of the scale of his purges and executions, this is a catalogue of disclosures that overturns almost all our received wisdom. The impact will be substantial.

It's an impressive achievement, but the book's unyielding view that there is not one even unintended benefit from his legacy leaves me uneasy. Mao is presented as an evil genius visited upon an innocent China courtesy of communist ideology which he cynically manipulated, who delivered nothing but murder and economic disaster.

It is blood lust and quest for world domination, for example, that drove Mao to consecrate the overwhelming share of China's scarce resources to the military in the first five-year plan; the drive to build dams and irrigation systems was carried out irrespective of the lives either of the builders or those later drowned by their collapse. When he saw violence at close quarters, he acknowledged it induced a kind of ecstasy.

And any idea that Mao was a great military strategist is dashed; even his victories are revealed as either disguised fiascos or the results of political fixes. Essentially, he led the communists to power by betraying efforts to find a common front against the invading Japanese, which he openly acknowledged, while carefully courting Moscow.

We are spared no detail of Mao's weaknesses - his failure to take a bath for 25 years, his 50-odd personal estates and his habit of having fresh fish delicacies from Wuhan carried 1,000 kilometres for his epicurean delight. I agree; guilty on all charges.

But Mao didn't come from nowhere. If you don't know about the century of China's humiliation, the complete bankruptcy of the Qing dynasty as it imploded in 1911 and the subsequent ungovernability of China and the apparent hopelessness of any project that might even half successfully modernise it, then it's hard to understand how it could be that Mao and Chinese communism would have any appeal. You will learn little of such context in this biography.

There is no country in modern times that has ever suffered so many defeats at so many hands as China did between 1842 and 1911; the British, the French, the Russians and the Japanese all easily disposed of Chinese armies and fleets. In 1898, the Western powers, including Germany, took great chunks of China and Chinese ports to administer for their own benefit. China was so weak that there was no point in spending money colonising it; foreign powers could get all they wanted by expending much less effort.

For the Chinese, their weakness was a complete bouleversement of their universe, and the contemptuously low status in which self-consciously racist foreigners held them (little more than animals) poured further salt in a gaping and humiliating wound. The system that had provided them with order for millenniums, granaries for famine, law, canals, agricultural prosperity and a sophisticated Confucian bureaucracy - and which presented the astounded Marco Polo as a civilisation more advanced, more peaceful and evidently superior to the never-ending conflict and barbarism of Europe - could neither rejuvenate itself from within nor begin to match the overwhelming achievements of the West.

How was this vast country, now collapsing into a myriad of local wars with peace provided by rapacious local warlords routinely deploying torture, to be governed? How was it to be industrialised? How could it defend itself against further despoilment by foreigners?

Communism, paradoxically building on the Confucianism it deplored, provided an answer, the reason it drew so many adherents. The strategy for modernisation - raising agricultural productivity by trial-and-error attempts at combining collectivisation with respect for village structures while building up industry on an equally decentralised basis - was very different from Stalin's centralised Sovietisation, despite the surface parallels.

It was more closely modelled on the imperial system than either critic or supporter ever concedes. And when Mao died, the second paradox is that the decentralisation and pragmatism he fostered, notwithstanding mad forays such as the campaign to kill sparrows, allowed Deng, the architect of today's China, quickly to put in place policies that would drive the astonishing economic turnround.

As for Mao's preoccupation with military spending, I submit that any new government in the 1950s would have placed an overwheening priority on defence, given China's history.

While the Great Leap Forward and the disaster of the Cultural Revolution are famed exercises in futility, personal delusion and inhumanity, brilliantly documented by Chang and Halliday, don't forget that between one and the other Chinese growth averaged 15 per cent per annum, never achieved before in a single year in China's long history.

China's vast rural hinterland was becoming, via the conception of village enterprise, the springboard for today's economic growth.

It would take Deng's opening up to trade and investment along the coast, and the reintroduction of capitalism, to make the most of the opportunity. But a Stalinistic communism would never have created the chance in the first place, as today's Russia bears grim witness.

Mao is now revealed as more of a monster than we ever guessed, thanks to Chang and Halliday. But even monsters can create good they may never have self-consciously aimed for or wanted.

History is the story of contradictions and unintended consequences. This book - and our understanding of China - would have been stronger still had it acknowledged them.

What I highlighted above in red gives a partial explanation for the recent displays of Han-centric/China-centric ultra-nationalism that have marked this year, from the mobs of Chinese students at Western universities ganging up on pro-Tibetan protestors in the months leading up to the Olympics to the widely televised scenes of those PRC taikonauts doing their first spacewalk. This Han nationalism, fueled by all the decades of conflicts, humiliation and suffering, which started with the unequal treaties with the West imposed since China's defeat in the 1840s Opium Wars and continued all the way to the 2nd Chinese Civil War of 1945-49, is but a tool that the CCP has learned how to harness in order to ensure its continued legitimacy.

To put it simply, no other previous government other than the CCP one (even the ROC/Guomindang at its height when Chiang-Kai Shek ruled from Nanjing in the early 1930s, could not stamp out all the warlord holdouts), for the 1st half of the 20th century, was able to unite China and keep it relatively stable for the other half of the 20th century, and keep China together in spite of such upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping would not have been able to open up China it if it had not been mostly unified and stable in the first place and the ensuing growth and prosperity would not have occurred. It is this promise of stability and a greater, stronger China, which has allowed the CCP to redefine itself and grow out of Communist ideology, and keep the "mandate of heaven", or rather of the people.

And as final sidenote in response to the comment that Mao was not a military genius, it was already commonly known that he was more of a political commissar than a military commander, since it was his generals such as Zhu De, Peng De Huai and Lin Biao who helped him conduct a successful guerrila war against the Japanese and later to victory in a more conventional campaign against the Nationalists/Guomindang during the 1945-49 Civil War.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I cannot recall any other place, and I travelled a lot in 65+ years, that celebrates humiliation quite the way China does. The ‘century of humiliation’ is taught in schools, displayed in museums and in shows and so on. There is a national humiliation day but the Chinese had to fight over  which humiliation was worst.

The points, as CougarDaddy notes are:

• Provide a low baseline against which the accomplishments of the CCP can be measured; and

• Instil a sense of anti-foreign grievance that was used to persuade Chinese that they didn’t want what the evil Westerners had and now is used to convince Chinese to work harder to make and get more of whatever the evil Westerners have.

It works.