Canada's tanks

[MJP]

Interesting. I appreciate the look into your world. What we do is probably closer to what you call robbing.

Incidentally, in the RCN the TRANREQ process is initialized by FER (Formation Engineering) but the CO of the losing ship needs to approve the removal of the material.

We have NAVORDs around this, if you really want to get nerdy lol.

No worries, it is just a high level over view. As much as it pains me to admit our DGLEPM/RCEME folks are great at their jobs even if they at daily/ individual level they can be frustrating.

For the RCN, it makes sense that it's more tightly controlled considering it's reducing a system on very low density platform (ship) therefore reducing the ability to move that platform and the capability of the RCN overall. Interesting insight thanks.

 

[dapaterson]

Interesting. I appreciate the look into your world. What we do is probably closer to what you call robbing.

Incidentally, in the RCN the TRANREQ process is initialized by FER (Formation Engineering) but the CO of the losing ship needs to approve the removal of the material.

We have NAVORDs around this, if you really want to get nerdy lol.

There are differences between an army with 1500+ vehicles and a navy with 12 ships...

 

[PrairieFella]

I've been involved with the tank fleet for years, primarily in a tertiary support role. Parts have always been a challenge, but I haven't seen the issue quantified in some time. Since my RCEME colleagues often attribute problems to missing parts—when the real bottleneck might be a lack of facilities or personnel—I decided to take a deeper dive. Without getting into specifics, I reviewed work orders for the domestic fleet and analyzed some up-to-date briefs. Broadly speaking, the primary issue isn’t parts availability, but rather personnel shortages and limited time.


That’s not to say we aren’t missing parts, that sourcing them isn’t difficult, or that we always have enough on hand. However, the fleet’s current serviceability appears to be more closely tied to a lack of personnel and facilities. With the Leo facility in Nisku coming online to handle resource-intensive inspections, this could relieve pressure on overstretched 2nd (and 1st) line maintainers. In turn, this may free up time to address the minor corrective and preventative maintenance issues that are currently dragging down tank serviceability.

Interesting perspective, thank you for giving us a view at the real problem. In your opinion as a guy on the inside, what might be done to help get VOR down?

 

[MJP]

Interesting perspective, thank you for giving us a view at the real problem. In your opinion as a guy on the inside, what might be done to help get VOR down?

Just so I make it clear, I am on a very far rung on the tank support file currently. I recently assisted the LEO EMT with some orders for the NISKU Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) facility but I don't work in/around the tanks day to day. When I was in Edmonton myself and a number of key players had our hands in making parts flow and vehs not be VOR and I still interact with many of those folks to this day.

Honestly IMHO one of the biggest things is getting the intensive inspections schedule out of being done by the CAF resources and set up a proper reconditioning line. They take up a large ammount of resources especially trained pers who could have been working on corrective maint or less intensive preventative maint. Hopefully with RMC coming online we will see the fleet in a healthier place in the coming years