• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

Yep. Don't know how many "scout and return" I've done on the east coast while on sovpats before the days of the recognized maritime picture (and pre internet/satcom days), but it was a lot of them. Anything we caught even at the edge of radar detection got "visited".
Yea it really frustrated me when RJOC would say "what the heck are you doing?" when we would hail vessels in the MARLOAs who were either not shining on AIS, or their IMO didn't match their AIS data... like... it's literally in the standing OPTASK RMP.
 
Yea it really frustrated me when RJOC would say "what the heck are you doing?" when we would hail vessels in the MARLOAs who were either not shining on AIS, or their IMO didn't match their AIS data... like... it's literally in the standing OPTASK RMP.
Our Wing ISSO got schooled on declassification of stale data by a SAC I was fortunate to have on loan based largely on the rules pointed out in the standing OPTASK RMP.
 
But if the Coast Guard is doing lets say a northern survey patrol and happen upon a unfriendly ship, it would be nice if they had more then a shiny red boat and a flare gun to dissuade any unfriendly intentions.
One aspect of enforcement or exercise of authority is the authority, training, equipment, etc. to respond to, in this example, an unfriendly ship who remains adamantly unfriendly to your persuasions (i.e. 'piss off little boat'). The CCG could take on such role if they:

were given the legal authority to even make the demand let alone the unfriendly response (does the authority to counter aggression, resistance, violence flow from the individual employee? The master?)
were given the equipment
were given the training.

I suspect the employee's union might have something to say about this revised exposure.
I suspect federal labour laws might have something to say about this revised workplace risk.
 
OK. I am not a navy type, but I will try here.

AOPS is for presence and surveillance, but I don't think it is meant as the recce function for strike assets. The armament it has allows it to perform the OPS function on missions like Op CARIBBE. In our Arctic it performs presence and surveillance, demonstrating that we are there. It is not a recce asset looking for enemy amphibious task groups that will then get struck by other assets. There are other assets for detecting such groups (MPA among them), should we actually be worried about amphibious strike groups approaching the shores of North America.

The AOPS is not a recce asset but it conducts reconnaissance when patrolling and providing presence and surveillance. My argument is that throughout its career it is going to spend a whole lot of time not fighting when a tonne of fuel is going to be a lot more useful than a tonne of missiles. On those rare occasions it encounters a threat then it becomes a question of what backup can it rely on.

I would think that being able to call in a F18 with a Harpoon, or an F35 with an NSM would supply a degree of comfort to a lightly armed vessel encountering the unexpected in a presumably low threat environment.

Edit - responded before reading the rest of the thread...
 
Last edited:
The AOP's are important to our Sovereignty needs in the Arctic, they certainly give the RCN the abilty to go further north, go earlier and stay later than ever before. Their primary taskings as I see it our, Presence patrols, SAR and joint exercises with other departments and other Northern governments.

Our main threat to our sovereignty are the US, China and Russia. We have already dealt with pesky Danes and their demands for Danewhiskey. so that front should be quiet for a long time. The US vs Canada will be a political/diplomatic solution (Agreeing to disagree politely).

I don't see the Chinese or Russians acting singularly, but in concert. As I mentioned the Russians have the capability to place and sustain a civilian (in matching Arctic camo) presence on the edge of our archipelago almost at anytime of the year. This will be accompanied by heavy diplomatic assaults on Canada's Arctic claims. If we have a similar government as we have now, it's likley they will be paralyzed and unsure of what to do. giving our opponents time to build their presence and round up support at the UN to challenge our claims.

Western Air Forces have been targeting civilian airliners for at least 20 years because they may present as a threat. Any takers on container ships presenting as threats in the near future?
 
One aspect of enforcement or exercise of authority is the authority, training, equipment, etc. to respond to, in this example, an unfriendly ship who remains adamantly unfriendly to your persuasions (i.e. 'piss off little boat'). The CCG could take on such role if they:

were given the legal authority to even make the demand let alone the unfriendly response (does the authority to counter aggression, resistance, violence flow from the individual employee? The master?)
were given the equipment
were given the training.

I suspect the employee's union might have something to say about this revised exposure.
I suspect federal labour laws might have something to say about this revised workplace risk.
The point is as things heat up in the northern hemisphere, It is about time our Coast Guard get a few more tools in their box to at least defend themselves. They can have a Military Det aboard if needed.
I know their Union had issues with Armed Fisheries and RCMP many years ago. They realized it was an asset not a determent. It will be interesting to see how things evolve as things get more heated up north.
 
There was a policy reason why, back in the late 1940s, the Gov't of Canada decided that it would have a spectrum of fleets:
  • Research - oceanographic and fisheries;
  • Navigation and shipping safety;
  • Constabulary duties, including anti-smuggling - armed (the RCMP marine division sailed armed vessels)
  • Military.
it wasn't all or even mostly union/work related, it was in fact to have a true spectrum of responses - the Coast Guard was meant to be a "friendly" service to all maritime users in a country with the world's longest coast line; the Coast Gourd and Fisheries fleets were meant to be doing good, public science for the benefit of all; the RCMP and the RCN were the "hard" and "very hard" faces of Canada's government.
 
Not quite exact, Edward.

The first two maritime services of Canada were the Harbours and Lighthouses Service and the Canadian Fisheries Service, both under the Minister of Marine. The former became the Coast Guard and the later was a heavily armed service at first (CGS Canada and two other such large armed vessels were, for all practical purposes modern light cruisers) whose specific purpose was to stop American fishing poachers from fishing in our waters because the RN wasn't willing to do it.

The Fisheries service remained a para-military armed service until it was first merged with ocean research in the 1970's then with the Coast Guard in the 1980's or 90's (can't remember the exact year). Nowadays, only the Fisheries Officers are armed and act as peace officers at sea with regards to fisheries. Nevertheless, the Fisheries Services was, and has always been part of the "hard" face of the Government of Canada . It was even the ancestor of the RCN.
 
The Fisheries service remained a para-military armed service until it was first merged with ocean research in the 1970's then with the Coast Guard in the 1980's or 90's (can't remember the exact year). Nowadays, only the Fisheries Officers are armed and act as peace officers at sea with regards to fisheries. Nevertheless, the Fisheries Services was, and has always been part of the "hard" face of the Government of Canada . It was even the ancestor of the RCN.
Also they have a great nickname - “Fish Cops”

😏
 
Would love to a see a few episodes of 'Fish Cops'.......what ya goin do when they come for you!

The Turbot War (known in Spain as Guerra del Fletán; French: Guerre du flétan) was an international fishing dispute and bloodless conflict between Canada and Spain (with the European Union) and their respective supporters.

On 9 March 1995, Canadian officials from the Canadian Fisheries Patrol vessel Cape Roger boarded the Spanish fishing trawler Estai[3] from Galicia in international waters 220 nautical miles (410 km; 250 mi) off Canada's East Coast after they had fired three 50-calibre machine-gun bursts over its bow.[4] They arrested the trawler's crew, then forced the Estai to a Canadian harbour.

History
56px-Coastguard_Flag_of_Canada.svg.png
Canada
General characteristics
NameCape Roger
NamesakeCape Roger
OwnerGovernment of Canada
OperatorCanadian Coast Guard
Port of registryOttawa, Ontario
BuilderFerguson Industries Ltd., Pictou
Yard number201
Launched12 June 1976
CommissionedAugust 1977
In service1977–present
Refit1996
HomeportCCG Base St. John's
Identification
Statusin active service
Class and typeCape Roger-class fisheries patrol vessel
Tonnage
Displacement1,465 long tons (1,489 t) full load
Length62.5 m (205 ft 1 in)
Beam12.1 m (39 ft 8 in)
Draught5.3 m (17 ft 5 in)
Installed power3,278 kW (4,396 bhp)
Propulsion2 × Polar Nohab 12-cylinder diesel engines
Speed18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)
Range10,000 nmi (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph)
Endurance31 days
Complement19
Armament2 × 12.7 mm (0.5 in) machine guns



1718198691519.png

Lightly armed but not unarmed.
 

History
56px-Coastguard_Flag_of_Canada.svg.png
Canada
General characteristics
NameCape Roger
NamesakeCape Roger
OwnerGovernment of Canada
OperatorCanadian Coast Guard
Port of registryOttawa, Ontario
BuilderFerguson Industries Ltd., Pictou
Yard number201
Launched12 June 1976
CommissionedAugust 1977
In service1977–present
Refit1996
HomeportCCG Base St. John's
Identification
Statusin active service
Class and typeCape Roger-class fisheries patrol vessel
Tonnage
Displacement1,465 long tons (1,489 t) full load
Length62.5 m (205 ft 1 in)
Beam12.1 m (39 ft 8 in)
Draught5.3 m (17 ft 5 in)
Installed power3,278 kW (4,396 bhp)
Propulsion2 × Polar Nohab 12-cylinder diesel engines
Speed18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph)
Range10,000 nmi (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) at 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph)
Endurance31 days
Complement19
Armament2 × 12.7 mm (0.5 in) machine guns



View attachment 85921

Lightly armed but not unarmed.
I remember this well! Good old Brian standing in front of his net inside of a net at the UN denouncing the fishing practices of Spain.
 
The Turbot War (known in Spain as Guerra del Fletán; French: Guerre du flétan) was an international fishing dispute and bloodless conflict between Canada and Spain (with the European Union) and their respective supporters.

On 9 March 1995, Canadian officials from the Canadian Fisheries Patrol vessel Cape Roger boarded the Spanish fishing trawler Estai[3] from Galicia in international waters 220 nautical miles (410 km; 250 mi) off Canada's East Coast after they had fired three 50-calibre machine-gun bursts over its bow.[4] They arrested the trawler's crew, then forced the Estai to a Canadian harbour.
Nipigon was ready duty ship and we sailed one Fri night, then came back, then sailed the next Fri night (I'd have to check my log for the exact dates). My now ex-wife was visiting from Wales at the time and was left here alone. Oops.

We were talking to the Spanish Navy on NATO crypto to help avoid anything stupid happening. I don't remember any exciting things happening while flying. There was a lot of confusion; some of the important crew was a little too gung ho. I also don't remember if we embarked DFO for either sailing.
 
There was an outcry in the CCG when we were forcibly merged with DFO, as CCG felt their goodwill with the Coastal communities and fleets would be eroded by the Fish Cops. I remember helping Fish Cops inspect Vietnamese owned fishing boats as they were apparently heavily armed and not happy to see us. Thankfully no shooting happened.

The 40mm Bofors in my Regimental Museum came from Pat Bay, it had been destined for a DFO patrol boat, but never installed. It was brand new and still boxed.

The RCMP had quite the fleet at one time including ex-Fairmiles and Minesweepers.

Frankly I always felt that all the major CCG ships should be equipped with two .50cals. Mainly to support any boarding party they are hosting. Equipping the ships and training the crews to operate and maintain them is the easy part. Getting the Captains to accept them and use the ROE effectively will be the hard part.

When it comes to a departments mandate, that can be changed by the stroke of a pen and has happened many times.

While the RCN was established with Constabulary duties in mind, it wasn't to long before they were being tasked with evacuating British and Canadians from revolutionary hot spots.
 
Very solid post.

Perhaps a better suite of sub surface sensors and sonar type stuff would be beneficial.

But then again sure you can find them, and then what ?
Pretty sure the normal sub surface sensor fits are incompatible with the ice breaking capability, and there is really limited space for secure equipment. Plus then you start getting into red power runs, 'power cleanliness', and all sorts of other issues that aren't part of the design so snowballs very quickly. They also don't have a bunch of empty bunks and capacity for extra riders to bolt on extra things, so unsexy considerations like fresh water, toilets and food very quickly come into play when you look at QoL and effective time on station. So they may be able to have a drone det, or an air det, or a constabulary det, but likely not concurrently.

I think we'll probably shoehorn it into doing all kinds of things its not intended to do because it's all we have, but expectations should be pretty limited as it's a non-combatant that just meets SOLAS, and didn't have any additional requirements beyond that for recoverability, survivability or susceptability you may add onto a non-combatant doing military things (like they did to a small extent with JSS).

If you look at it as primarily showing the flag and a way to get people to sea for training makes a lot more sense than expecting it to replace the CPFs or even the MCDV functions.

If we get the helo bit sorted though, probably also useful for HADR. There are so many workarounds and RAs for the MAX RIMPAC though that guessing it's years and multiple ECs away from being a real capability (even if we have the HCRFF people, which is also a big shortage).
 
Not quite exact, Edward.

The first two maritime services of Canada were the Harbours and Lighthouses Service and the Canadian Fisheries Service, both under the Minister of Marine. The former became the Coast Guard and the later was a heavily armed service at first (CGS Canada and two other such large armed vessels were, for all practical purposes modern light cruisers) whose specific purpose was to stop American fishing poachers from fishing in our waters because the RN wasn't willing to do it.

The Fisheries service remained a para-military armed service until it was first merged with ocean research in the 1970's then with the Coast Guard in the 1980's or 90's (can't remember the exact year). Nowadays, only the Fisheries Officers are armed and act as peace officers at sea with regards to fisheries. Nevertheless, the Fisheries Services was, and has always been part of the "hard" face of the Government of Canada . It was even the ancestor of the RCN.
Fair enough, but still a spectrum of capabilities <-- soft ----- hard -->, by policy design.
 
Back
Top