Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

[Stoker]

I can happily discuss the weaknesses (and strengths) of the Cyclone, and fully acknowledge the current supportability and generation issues. However, the implication that the Cyclone is "killing crews" is not helpful.

I was talking just today with somebody at the museum about the "bad old years" of the Sea King. I mentioned that I actually looked up and phoned an ex-submariner who was acting like an expert and telling the press the Sea Kings were dangerous. I told him I wasn't impressed, because every time he told the press that, I had to re-convince my wife that they weren't.

As an aside, I think that ditching the Cyclone wouldn't result in new, proven airframes, it would result in Cretien finally achieiving his vision of "zero helicopters."

Is the software for the helo fixed? When can we expect it to be fixed?

 

[Baz]

Is the software for the helo fixed? When can we expect it to be fixed?

Have you read even the executive summary of the report?

Flight Safety Investigation Report for Stalker 22 Accident - Canada.ca

This accident was not the result of one single causal factor, but a combination of several and could have happened to any other crew on any other day. We concluded the Command Model Attitude Bias Phenomenon was an active causal factor, which was unknown to the manufacturer, airworthiness authorities, and aircrew prior to the accident. Over the course of 13 months, we analyzed an extensive quantity of data and worked closely with partners to identify other contributing factors. The Flight Safety Investigation Report delivers a number of recommendations to prevent a similar accident from happening in the future.

The investigation concluded that during a complex turning manoeuver at low altitude, when the helicopter was returning to the ship, the aircraft did not respond as the crew would have expected due to a Command Model Attitude Bias Phenomenon. This phenomenon develops under a very specific and narrow set of circumstances where manual inputs to the primarily flight controls override the aircraft’s automation system, referred to as the Flight Director, while it is engaged and set to fly at a fixed airspeed or pitch attitude. The bias that developed in this instance resulted in insufficient aft cyclic controller authority, resulting in a high-energy descent and impact with the water.

A series of other causal factors were highlighted in the report, to include:

• Control inputs when flying with the Flight Director engaged were not verbalized in the cockpit,
• Flying publications contained information that may have been confusing or misleading,
• The Statement of Operating Intent for the CH-148 did not specify the operational requirement to fly the manoeuver involved in the accident,
• Standard operating procedures for this manoeuver were undocumented,
• It was common practice to manually override primary flight controls while the Flight Director was engaged, and
• The mode annunciation may not have sufficiently drawn the pilot’s attention to the fact the Flight Director was engaged during the manoeuver.

The software isn't being "fixed," it was doing exactly what it was supposed to do. The crew was asking for it to do something it wasn't expecting. The maneuver in question was never told to Sikorsky, and even when we did it in the Sea King (which was also not a published maneuver) the aircraft was out of roll limits.

As well, the software isn't being "fixed." It is being improved in order to better fit a more thorough understanding of how the aircraft is intended to be flown by Canada.

And here's the kicker: if we bought a "new, proven" helicopter and flew it in a "Canadian" way it wasn't originally intended to be flown, and similar thing might happen, and has happened to other's before.

 

[Baz]

Sorry for the thread hijack (again):

The first Sea King lost was of HMCS Bonaventure 30 Hov 1967, in which both back end crew were unfortunately killed. 5 years after first aircraft arrival.

I've been reading a lot about the period, and there are some good lessons learned from the Sea King for what is happening now.

Paraphrasing, the cause of the crash seems pretty simple. They were in a starboard delta (an oval pattern flown within five miles on the starboard side of the carrier, usually to allow fix wing ops on the port side), at night, at what would later be considered a very low altitude (well below 200 ft), with no RadAlt warning (which alerts the crew visually and aurally when flown below a certain altitude, and was installed later). The lost SA and impacted the surface; seems simple enough.

However, as I was doing research, I stumbled across the "carrier operational procedures" (sic, I don't have it in fron of me), which are what we would now call FLOPS (Fleet Operational Procedures). The fixed wing approaches were well defined, with plates and missed approaches, etc, but the helicopter ones literally said that because helicopters fly low and slow they should just stay out of the way of the fixed wing, and literally encouraged them to fly at the altitude they were at.

The point is, sometimes the hard lessons are only learned when you find out the "unknown unknowns..."

 

[Stoker]

Have you read even the executive summary of the report?

Flight Safety Investigation Report for Stalker 22 Accident - Canada.ca




The software isn't being "fixed," it was doing exactly what it was supposed to do. The crew was asking for it to do something it wasn't expecting. The maneuver in question was never told to Sikorsky, and even when we did it in the Sea King (which was also not a published maneuver) the aircraft was out of roll limits.

As well, the software isn't being "fixed." It is being improved in order to better fit a more thorough understanding of how the aircraft is intended to be flown by Canada.

And here's the kicker: if we bought a "new, proven" helicopter and flew it in a "Canadian" way it wasn't originally intended to be flown, and similar thing might happen, and has happened to other's before.

My bad when will the software be "improved" Any timeline? We're on the hook for this right? How times have these helos been grounded? I would say get rid of them and get something else.

 

[Baz]

My bad when will the software be "improved" Any timeline? We're on the hook for this right? How times have these helos been grounded? I would say get rid of them and get something else.

I don't have that answer, because I've retired... as well, it isn't as important as you seem to believe. The operational work arounds, including doing a better job of teaching the crew how the aircraft actually works, are in place.

How many times were the Sea Kings grounded, especially in the early years? That question is rhetorical, but if you want a shot at the answer I can try, given I have a copy of the servicing set for 12401 sitting on the shelf next to me (becuase of the research I'm doing).

I can easily get on board with replacing the Cyclone, as long as we first:

• revisit the ConOps (because it can be very dangerous to fly an aircraft in ways other then it was intended). In other words, change the ConOps to fit a different aircraft
• revisit the crewing
• revisit the TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures)
• train the crews somewhere else, at least to start with (like the P-8 and F-35)
• accept that we'll loss one of the benefits of the Cyclone, that being an excellent "cross over" aircraft (ie designed for the primary ConOps roles of ASW and ASuW, but very good at utility and SAR due to the large size and tail ramp)

But I'll reiterate, I don't think getting rid of the Cyclone will result in a new a batter maritime helicopter, I think it will result in no helicopter at all. As we've seen some other RCAF types allude to on this board, the RCAF would gladly take those trained bodies (the positions will disappear) and use them on other fleets if that happened.

 

[Stoker]

I don't have that answer, because I've retired... as well, it isn't as important as you seem to believe. The operational work arounds, including doing a better job of teaching the crew how the aircraft actually works, are in place.

How many times were the Sea Kings grounded, especially in the early years? That question is rhetorical, but if you want a shot at the answer I can try, given I have a copy of the servicing set for 12401 sitting on the shelf next to me (becuase of the research I'm doing).

I can easily get on board with replacing the Cyclone, as long as we first:

• revisit the ConOps (because it can be very dangerous to fly an aircraft in ways other then it was intended). In other words, change the ConOps to fit a different aircraft
• revisit the crewing
• revisit the TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures)
• train the crews somewhere else, at least to start with (like the P-8 and F-35)
• accept that we'll loss one of the benefits of the Cyclone, that being an excellent "cross over" aircraft (ie designed for the primary ConOps roles of ASW and ASuW, but very good at utility and SAR due to the large size and tail ramp)

But I'll reiterate, I don't think getting rid of the Cyclone will result in a new a batter maritime helicopter, I think it will result in no helicopter at all. As we've seen some other RCAF types allude to on this board, the RCAF would gladly take those trained bodies (the positions will disappear) and use them on other fleets if that happened.

So the Sea Kings are not operational now but the Cyclones are. I think based on the continuing issues were have had with them including deaths we get new helos and enough of them. I think its hogwash that we'll lose that ability, perhaps bring back naval air where it belongs.

 

[Furniture]

To bring this back to the AOPVs, I'm not sure the AOPVs will require Air Dets all that regularly. To embark an Air Det on an AOPV means giving up other capabilities, unlike with a CPF, RCD, or JSS. The ships just aren't made to take the numbers we need to do all of the things, all of the time, like we do on a "heavy".

I think being able to embark a helo is definitely where the AOPVs need to get to, but I don't think we will be using them as often as some people are thinking.

 

[Baz]

So the Sea Kings are not operational now but the Cyclones are. I think based on the continuing issues were have had with them including deaths we get new helos and enough of them. I think its hogwash that we'll lose that ability, perhaps bring back naval air where it belongs.

To a profession, the introduction of the Sea King, Sea Hawk, Merlin, in various services, informs how the introduction of other fleets, be it the Cyclone or some nebulous replacement, will go. It explains what is happening with Cyclone, and says any replacement might not be as simple as some may think.

As for naval air, that ship has sailed. Even a cursory study of the RCN years between 1945 and 1970 shows how hard it was. Although I too am a supporter of that I am not under any delusions it is a silver bullet. Right off the bat I’m not sure the RcN is in any mood to dedicate the resources that would be required.

I’m fully aware nothing I say will influence you; the only reason I’m engaging is to hopefully pass on my niche set of experiences to others. Beyond that, it’s beyond my pay grade, which is now interested outsider.

 

[GR66]

I don't have that answer, because I've retired... as well, it isn't as important as you seem to believe. The operational work arounds, including doing a better job of teaching the crew how the aircraft actually works, are in place.

How many times were the Sea Kings grounded, especially in the early years? That question is rhetorical, but if you want a shot at the answer I can try, given I have a copy of the servicing set for 12401 sitting on the shelf next to me (becuase of the research I'm doing).

I can easily get on board with replacing the Cyclone, as long as we first:

• revisit the ConOps (because it can be very dangerous to fly an aircraft in ways other then it was intended). In other words, change the ConOps to fit a different aircraft
• revisit the crewing
• revisit the TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures)
• train the crews somewhere else, at least to start with (like the P-8 and F-35)
• accept that we'll loss one of the benefits of the Cyclone, that being an excellent "cross over" aircraft (ie designed for the primary ConOps roles of ASW and ASuW, but very good at utility and SAR due to the large size and tail ramp)

But I'll reiterate, I don't think getting rid of the Cyclone will result in a new a batter maritime helicopter, I think it will result in no helicopter at all. As we've seen some other RCAF types allude to on this board, the RCAF would gladly take those trained bodies (the positions will disappear) and use them on other fleets if that happened.

Curious....IF we were to divest the Cyclones what other nation(s) conduct ASW helicopter operations most similar to the way that Canada does?

Would adopting the CH-149 as a common air frame for SAR and MH ease the crewing/logistical challenges of ship borne operations or does the Cormorant/AW101 have challenges of its own that might negate the benefits of commonality?

Lastly, understanding that it would require a complete change to the current Canadian ConOps for MH operations, and obviously capability trade-offs/losses, might there be some advantage in adopting a smaller MH airframe so that you could have two on the River-Class? Also possibly making it an option for a future Corvette-type Kingston-Class replacement?

 

[suffolkowner]

Curious....IF we were to divest the Cyclones what other nation(s) conduct ASW helicopter operations most similar to the way that Canada does?

Would adopting the CH-149 as a common air frame for SAR and MH ease the crewing/logistical challenges of ship borne operations or does the Cormorant/AW101 have challenges of its own that might negate the benefits of commonality?

Lastly, understanding that it would require a complete change to the current Canadian ConOps for MH operations, and obviously capability trade-offs/losses, might there be some advantage in adopting a smaller MH airframe so that you could have two on the River-Class? Also possibly making it an option for a future Corvette-type Kingston-Class replacement?

not much out there that makes sense other than the AW101 and the SeaHawk is there?

the below graphic from Navylookout suggests some possibilities for the Hangar/Mission Bay. I dont know how realistic it is

 

[Baz]

Curious....IF we were to divest the Cyclones what other nation(s) conduct ASW helicopter operations most similar to the way that Canada does?

Would adopting the CH-149 as a common air frame for SAR and MH ease the crewing/logistical challenges of ship borne operations or does the Cormorant/AW101 have challenges of its own that might negate the benefits of commonality?

Lastly, understanding that it would require a complete change to the current Canadian ConOps for MH operations, and obviously capability trade-offs/losses, might there be some advantage in adopting a smaller MH airframe so that you could have two on the River-Class? Also possibly making it an option for a future Corvette-type Kingston-Class replacement?

The UK.

Probably. But the choice of mission system would matter. Looping back to the first question would seem to indicate using the Merlin Mk-2 Avionics, with the CH-149 airframe to get the ramp, and include the capability to use the ASaC fit.

I don’t think two 60R/S would fit, so you would be down to Wildcat size, and I don’t think that would be flexible enough, but maybe?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Interesting to think the UK runs two different helicopter ASW airframes.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

The River class destroyers are 18 feet wider than the old IRO's were, so there is no reason why you couldn't have a double wide hangar (two helos side by side ) like you had in the IRO's. But it would have to be something you work in the design from the start - which is not currently the design in use.

Don't shoot the messenger, I am just saying the size makes it possible. But there are, I am sure, other reasons why it hasn't been selected as a way to go.

 

[Baz]

Interesting to think the UK runs two different helicopter ASW airframes.

Yeah, although the Wildcat is really more anti-surface.

Also interesting the number of Merlin Mk-2s they were willing to sacrifice for the Merlin ASaC.

Hmm, thinking out loud (ie not suggesting, just musing)… what would it look like if we adopted the Wildcat, Merlin Mk-2 (with ramp) and ASaC kits. Say 30 each of the Merlin and Wildcat. Use the UK schools until we could set up a satellite school, with sims both east and west. All UK TTPs.

That would give us flexibility in what we put in the Rivers; either two Wildcats or one Merlin. Also give us a platform that’s a better fit for AOps (Wildcat).

But, could also plus up the UK Carrier Strike Groups; get us back in the game, so to speak. They are hurting for escorts and helos. So send a River plus a helo package of 6 ish (3 + 3), which would also give us the “2nd line” piece.

Also use it as justification for the 2 extra Protecteurs we need.

The would show more serious consideration by Canada to NATO maritime security… but it wouldn’t be cheap!

<pop>… that’s the thought bubble bursting

 

[suffolkowner]

not much out there that makes sense other than the AW101 and the SeaHawk is there?

the below graphic from Navylookout suggests some possibilities for the Hangar/Mission Bay. I dont know how realistic it is


View attachment 90297

navylookout says the Mission Bay is 20m wide by 15m long
wikipedia says the AW101 is 15.7 m long folded
hangar is ??

 

[Baz]

navylookout says the Mission Bay is 20m wide by 15m long
wikipedia says the AW101 is 15.7 m long folded
hangar is ??

Putting them in line like that does have some serious deck cycle issues though, as we’ve talked about previously. Right off the bat you’re going to need some type of mule, and tee along the helo out of the trap to use a mule is going to limit the sea state you can do that in and ship’s maneuverability while you do it. Have a 10-15 ton helicopter rolling around on a 6-8000 ton ship would be interesting.

 

[Underway]

Mission bay is 20m wide because that's the beam of the ship. The hangar is about half that width (as you can see in the images). The Cyclone is for the purposes of our discussion similar sized to a Merlin (its smaller but its still pretty big).

You would only realistically take a single Merlin on the T26 for normal ASW operations. Wildcats would not normally going to be taken as its not part of the T26 mission parameters.

As for what Canada needs I think Merlin is more in line with the doctrine, as they (like the Cyclone) can independently hunt and kill submarines without relying on the ship to much. Wildcats and 60R's are more tethered to the ships they come from to help in ASW.

As for the missions AOPS needs air support for, I suspect that Class 2 UAV's will be more than capable enough to provide the 80% solution.

 

[Furniture]

not much out there that makes sense other than the AW101 and the SeaHawk is there?

the below graphic from Navylookout suggests some possibilities for the Hangar/Mission Bay. I dont know how realistic it is


View attachment 90297

I don't see a time when we have only one rescue boat on a RCD...

Most of those loads ignore the reality that the RCN likes having more than one way to rescue a sailor that ends up in the drink.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yeah, although the Wildcat is really more anti-surface.

Also interesting the number of Merlin Mk-2s they were willing to sacrifice for the Merlin ASaC.

Hmm, thinking out loud (ie not suggesting, just musing)… what would it look like if we adopted the Wildcat, Merlin Mk-2 (with ramp) and ASaC kits. Say 30 each of the Merlin and Wildcat. Use the UK schools until we could set up a satellite school, with sims both east and west. All UK TTPs.

That would give us flexibility in what we put in the Rivers; either two Wildcats or one Merlin. Also give us a platform that’s a better fit for AOps (Wildcat).

But, could also plus up the UK Carrier Strike Groups; get us back in the game, so to speak. They are hurting for escorts and helos. So send a River plus a helo package of 6 ish (3 + 3), which would also give us the “2nd line” piece.

Also use it as justification for the 2 extra Protecteurs we need.

The would show more serious consideration by Canada to NATO maritime security… but it wouldn’t be cheap!

<pop>… that’s the thought bubble bursting

Well, it sounds like they might also have problems with their engines so why not...


The outstanding airmanship and composure of naval pilot Dan Burnett have earned him an award for saving all six people aboard his failing helicopter.

In September 2024, Lt Burnett and his crew were charged with flying three patients ashore from the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to a hospital in Newcastle during training in the North Sea.

Just 35 miles into the 115-mile journey, in what should have been a routine MEDEVAC (medical evacuation) sortie, their Wildcat helicopter from 847 Naval Air Squadron – normally assigned to supporting Royal Marines – suffered a severe fault.

Wildcat pilot commended for remarkable skill during engine failure over North Sea

Naval pilot Dan Burnett earned the award for saving all six people aboard his failing helicopter during a training sortie.

www.forcesnews.com

 

[KevinB]

JSS from day one considered flight safety, down to the external airlock and hatch night lighting to be green lighting instead of red (so it doesn't mess up NVG's). The anal retentiveness of the Civilian IC and Pilots attached to the PMO would have made any Airforce Sea Trainer or Flight Safety representative shed (safe) tears of bureaucratic joy.

AOPS as I say all the time is the George Costanza project. All their instincts were wrong and we should do the exact opposite.

Real folks get white phos tubes…