Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[Colin Parkinson]

I guess that the US being culturally based on Christianity, democracy, individual freedoms plays no part either? So it ok to mention that supplying the worlds largest economy is a factor in all of their decisions, but not any other factors? If he crafted his arguments around Iraq and US involvement there. I could live with the article. But he has tried to imply by innuendo that we are there at our master bidding who is there because of oil. He is a weasel who is squirming to get out of the bind his words have put him in.

 

[McG]

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=4ebc3a98-2384-4b11-b2f9-4aec4681780f&k=14840

Building government key to securing Afghanistan, UN official says
Richard Foot, CanWest News Service
Published: Friday, March 23, 2007

Canada and its allies in Afghanistan have "completely underestimated" the importance of building strong and effective local government institutions, and will not defeat the Taliban until they do so, said Tom Koenigs, the United Nations' most senior official in Afghanistan.

"We have made mistakes, and we shouldn't repeat them," Koenigs said this week in Washington. "We have completely underestimated the challenge of governance in the southern provinces. The resurgence of the Taliban there was only possible because there was a power vacuum."

Koenigs, a longtime UN official and former deputy mayor of Frankfurt, was speaking Wednesday during a symposium on Afghanistan at the United States Institute of Peace, an independent think-tank founded by the U.S. Congress.

He has completed his first year in Afghanistan, where after more than 14 months of hard military action by Canada, the U.S., Britain and other allies, he said "the Taliban have not been defeated."

More importantly, he adds: "The victory over Afghans' hearts and minds, which at the moment is everybody's language, hasn't been seen."

Koenigs said at least "50 per cent" of the problems in Afghanistan are a result of inadequate, corrupt or non-existent government services, particularly in the rural parts of southern provinces such as Kandahar, where the Taliban draws much of its power.

When the central government in Kabul and its coalition allies fail to provide local courts, or a system of civilian justice, for example, "the Taliban comes along and said, 'We will provide justice. We will adjudicate disputes between farmers,'" Koenigs said.

Where some form of government order does exist, it is often so corrupt that the Taliban appear a better option to many Afghans.

Koenigs said one of the great failures of the NATO coalition in southern Afghanistan has been to focus on a military, rather than a "governance" solution, to the insurgency.

Even more recent attempts to defeat the insurgency by winning the hearts and minds of civilian Afghans - by building roads, holding health clinics in local villages, and focusing on economic aid - won't solve the problem, he said.

"A focus on governance is even more necessary than on other kinds of development. Hearts and minds will not be won in Afghanistan by development aid, but by governance.

"The brand-mark of the Taliban is not economic development and Afghan farmers don't ask for development. They ask for security, for decent government services, they ask to be taken seriously by district governors. They ask for law and order and justice. We have to be better at these things than the Taliban.

"It's wrong to say that if we build a road and invest in schools then the people will be on our side. It's not true ... if we don't get the governance right in the south, we will not defeat the insurgency."

Thirty-seven Canadian soldiers have died, and dozens more have been injured in Afghanistan since Canada took responsibility for security and development in Kandahar province in 2006. Koenigs said no matter how hard NATO forces work to help Afghan civilians, they will always be seen as an occupation force.

The Taliban feeds off that mindset to foster among the population a sense of legitimacy for the insurgency.

Koenigs said NATO must refocus its military campaign from one of fighting battles and manning distant garrisons to one of training and supporting Afghan government forces to do the fighting and patrolling instead.

He said a study of the 139 suicide bombings carried out in Afghanistan last year showed an interesting pattern: the only areas of the country where no attacks took place were those where the local population felt it wasn't under occupation by foreign soldiers, or soldiers of a different religion.

"I am not suggesting we should withdraw our forces," Koenigs said. "We will still have to stay for a very long time because the Afghan police and army will need backing up for a very long time.

"But these day-to-day battles in the field, these have to be taken over by Afghan forces as soon as possible. We have to show the Afghans that we will allow them to fight the insurgency."

Asside from Mr Koenigs' suggestion that we don't see the importance of developing local government, I don't disagree with any of the observations.  On roto 1, we understood the importance of developing the local governments.  We also knew we had to do our part to get the Afghans taking-up more & more of the work for themselves.  I could be wrong, but I doubt that we've forgotten the importance of the local governance factor.  Really, this UN official is only telling us what we already know.

 

[MarkOttawa]

It will take quite some time for truly effective national government to come into being, and foreigners can only push so hard. Meanwhile, there must be security provided for that government's efforts to expand its sway--security that in the end will have to be provided by Afghan forces. But that too will take quite some time.

This is not encouraging in that context:
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/15135

A majority of people in Britain would like their country’s soldiers currently deployed in Afghanistan to be brought home soon, according to a poll by YouGov released by the Sunday Times. 53 per cent of respondents believe the troops are serving no useful purpose and should be withdrawn.

Conversely, 30 per cent of respondents consider British soldiers should stay in Afghanistan until the job is done, and 16 per cent are undecided...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Port Hope]

In regards to our current effort in Afghanistan (and our American friends in Iraq), I recommend Alistair Hornes' book "A Savage War of Peace".  It has to do with the French war in Algeria.  It points out the danger of adopting the tactics of your enemy (torture, execution of prisoners, theft, rape and indiscrimnate killings).  If we adopt the tactics of our enemies, we could alienate those in Afghanistan who are in the middle.  They may or may not support our cause depending on our interaction with them.  Also, we risk losing our own souls if adopt the brutal tactics of the Taliban. 

If a man perceives that the regular rules of combat and humanity have been suspended, there is no way for him to make a separate compartment in his own psyche.  If it is okay to steal from people that we are searching, then it is certainly okay to steal from other folks too, depending on the situation.  The French soldiers who tortured and killed became the ones who wanted to assassinate DeGaulle.  Everything was in play. 

The book can be boring at times with details of French politicians, of whom we don't know or care but the overall message is this:  occupying a country is a sloppy business.

 

[3rd Herd]

In regards to our current effort in Afghanistan (and our American friends in Iraq), I recommend Alistair Hornes' book "A Savage War of Peace".  It has to do with the French war in Algeria.  It points out the danger of adopting the tactics of your enemy (torture, execution of prisoners, theft, rape and indiscrimnate killings).  If we adopt the tactics of our enemies, we could alienate those in Afghanistan who are in the middle.  They may or may not support our cause depending on our interaction with them.  Also, we risk losing our own souls if adopt the brutal tactics of the Taliban. 

If a man perceives that the regular rules of combat and humanity have been suspended, there is no way for him to make a separate compartment in his own psyche.  If it is okay to steal from people that we are searching, then it is certainly okay to steal from other folks too, depending on the situation.  The French soldiers who tortured and killed became the ones who wanted to assassinate DeGaulle.  Everything was in play. 

The book can be boring at times with details of French politicians, of whom we don't know or care but the overall message is this:  occupying a country is a sloppy business.

Me thinks you posted in the wrong forum. Military Literature would have been a better choice. Here is part of the review of the book by the Washington Post:

"To be sure, there are huge differences between the two wars. Most notably, the United States isn't a colonial power in Iraq, seeking to maintain a presence of troops and settlers as long as possible. Rather, in Iraq, victory would consist of getting U.S. personnel out while leaving behind a relatively friendly, open, stable and independent government. And while elements of the French military tried to assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle for pulling out from what he termed 'a bottomless quagmire,' there is little fear that U.S. officers will go down that rebellious road."

"But there are numerous suggestive parallels — mainly relating to conventional Western militaries fighting primarily urban insurgencies in Arab cultures while support for their wars dwindles back home and while the insurgents hope to outlast their better-armed opponents. As such, anyone interested in Iraq should read this book immediately."


Edit to add source: Thomas E. Ricks, a Washington Post military correspondent who has reported frequently from Iraq, is the author of 'Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.'" Reviewed by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Book World (Copyright 2006 Washington Post Book World Service/Washington Post Writers Group)

 

[TCBF]

"Also, we risk losing our own souls if adopt the brutal tactics of the Taliban. "

- I read that all the time, but Western civilization amazingly bounces back once a conflict ends.  Just look at Europe today, as compared to 65 years ago.

 

[GAP]

No easy solutions in Afghanistan
Desperately poor nation lacks money and time to rebuild capability to defend itself from Taliban
Graham Thomson, The Edmonton Journal Published: Wednesday, March 28, 2007
Article Link

KABUL, Afghanistan - To get a better idea of the challenges facing Canada in Afghanistan, you need look no further than the Kabul Military Training Centre. Here, instructors from various coalition countries, including Canada, help prepare Afghan soldiers to protect their homeland.

The latest training battalion, called Kandak 61, has almost 900 new troops ready to graduate and fight the Taliban. The problem is, 15 weeks ago Kandak 61 started out with 1,242 recruits.

More than 300 have simply walked away and not come back. Coalition military officials downplay the issue, saying many of the troops are only a few days overdue or they have left to help their families temporarily. Some were trapped in their home provinces by a landslide, said one official, but they will be back.

"The main problem for me is that for three months I haven't received pay," said recruit Ali Gawhar, 27, through an interpreter. "I'm married and I've got two sons and it's very difficult."

Gawhar hasn't gone AWOL but others in his position have. Gawhar blames his pay problem on careless senior Afghan officers who didn't bother to find out that he was on duty elsewhere in the training centre the day they did a head count. He expects to get paid on graduation day next week or else he says the officers risk angering impatient troops and making even more go AWOL.

However, even if they were paid on time and had brand new weapons, they'd still leave here ill-prepared compared to Canadian troops who get at least 12 months of training before finding themselves at the sharp end of a military operation. Afghan troops get 16 weeks.
More on link

 

[GAP]

Canada's Role in Afghanistan Will be Reviewed Next Year: O'Connor
Josh Pringle  Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Article Link

Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor is promising Canada will stay in Afghanistan until permanent progress is made.

In a speech in Montreal, O'Connor said Canadian troops will remain part of the International mission in Afghanistan because of the continued threat posed by the Taliban.

O'Connor says he noticed that life is returning to normal in villages and towns on his recent visit to Afghanistan, adding "villages appeared more active."

But O'Connor warned that the "hardcore of the Taliban are determined to undermine the progress being made."

The Defence Minister says Canada is committed to helping rebuild and re-establish a stable society for the Afghan people.

Canadian troops are committed to Afghanistan until 2009.

O'Connor says Canada's participation will be reviewed next year.
More on link

 

[freedom-now]

Hi,

I tried to read that editorial, but I went to the URL and I could not see it. Can someone please email it to me?


Thanks

 

[Donut]

worked fine for me  ???

 

[a_majoor]

Although it would be nice to have unlimited time and training budgets for the Afghan troops, there are real issues of time and resources that need to be taken into account. I also look at the situation through a historical lens: Canadian troops were flung into battle with as little as 30 days training during the Great War, and troops fared little better at the beginning of WW II or the Korean War (including limited equipment, poor administration and untrained leadership.)

Fortunately, there is such a thing as a learning curve, and given the sort of raw material the ANA has to work with we may soon be wondering how we ever did without them.

 

[McG]

Afghanistan: A job half done
By Lyse Doucet
BBC Afghanistan analyst

In December 2001, a new future for Afghanistan was mapped out at an international conference in Bonn, beginning with an interim government to replace the Taleban. This week we look at how much has changed since then.

Five years ago, on a cold winter's day in Kabul, news broke that a new Afghan leader had been chosen thousands of miles away in the German city of Bonn.

I reached for a satellite telephone to call Hamid Karzai, still battling against Taleban forces in their last redoubt in the south.

"Am I the new chairman?" he shouted on a crackling line. On a morning when he had come under fire from misguided American aircraft, Hamid Karzai still had not been told officially.

"That's nice," was his unassuming reply.

Afghans have, in some ways, made an impressive journey since a hastily assembled group of Afghans and foreign envoys forged what became known as the Bonn process.

With some difficulty and delay all the ambitious targets were met: a traditional assembly, or loya jirga, approved a new government in 2002; a second loya jirga came up with a constitution; and presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first time in decades.

But for many Afghans it is a job half done.

"We reached the quantity of targets, but the quality is still missing," says Nader Nadery, an observer at the Bonn conference who is now a Commissioner at Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission.

Afghanistan is still a place awash with guns, where commanders and local officials can impose their will with impunity, where many Afghans say their lives have changed little.

Most startling of all, the Taleban have made a comeback in the south, fighting with unexpected ferocity and firepower.

There is no doubting some progress, but why did billions of dollars in aid and thousands of foreign troops not make more of a difference?

I have put this question in recent weeks to many of the players who helped shape Afghanistan over the past five years.

Former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani insists the world's aid agencies simply were not equipped for state building in an impoverished country emerging from a quarter century of war.

Even Lakhdar Brahimi, who presided over much of this process as the UN's senior envoy, offers a scathing verdict on the performance of the UN and donors.

"The way we are doing it is really lousy. We are too late, too bureaucratic, and frankly we spend too much money on ourselves rather than developing the skills of Afghans," he says.

Most critically for Mr Brahimi and many others, countries who vowed to "stand by Afghanistan for the long run" didn't send enough troops in 2002 to start rebuilding, including disarmament, across the country.

Only 5,000 soldiers were sent to Kabul while 8,000 US troops concentrated on rooting out remnants of the Taleban and al-Qaeda.

Mr Brahimi speaks of a "great deal of bitterness" that resources were then suddenly found for a war in Iraq.

"In 2002, the warlords and commanders were shaking in their boots fearing they were going to be disarmed or cast aside," recalls Francesc Vendrell, the former UN envoy who is the now the EU's man in Kabul. "Now it's much more difficult."

Five years on, Afghanistan's powerful regional leaders no longer command private armies but in province after province, men with guns now have access to state resources and positions of power.

Huge cracks have been exposed in this state building exercise. including the failure to focus enough attention on rebuilding institutions like the judiciary and police.

"Ten good police are better than 100 corrupt police and 10 corrupt police can do more damage to our success than one Taleban extremist," explains Lt General Karl Eikenberry, the senior US commander.

He has now put police reform at the top of the US military's agenda after years of a German-led effort which concentrated mainly on training.

Government failings also fuel the rise of Taleban and other opposition forces.

President Karzai is often blamed for making poor choices when it comes to appointing provincial governors and police chiefs.

'Big tent'

In an interview at his heavily guarded presidential palace, he admits "there are things I would have done differently".

But he rejects criticism that he still relies too heavily on advice from former mujahideen factional leaders blamed for the destruction of Kabul during the civil war of the 1990s.

His political signature has been "the big tent" approach. But what Mr Karzai views as a wise strategy to bring everyone on board, others see as a sign of weakness.

Many express regret over other missed opportunities.

Lakhdar Brahimi worries that he and others were wrong not to bring the Taleban into the political process as early as 2002.

Former US envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad told me he wished more attention had been paid to Taleban "sanctuaries" across the border in Pakistan.

Five years on, there is consensus on an urgent need to get a grip on the situation.

It is more difficult now with the emergence of a new "mafia": a nexus of drug smugglers, criminals, and in some provinces Taleban, filling a vacuum left by the government.

Nato forces are now acutely aware their fight is also about jobs and reconstruction. As General Eikenberry puts it: "Where the road ends, the Taleban begins".

As another harsh winter closes in, long cold nights without electricity, even in Kabul, concentrate Afghan minds.

Spring must bring not just a reprieve from winter's icy blast, but clear signs that their government, backed by Nato forces and major donors, is heading in the right direction.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6205220.stm

 

[GAP]

This belongs in this thread.

Voices: Afghanistan casualties
TheStar.com - opinion - Voices: Afghanistan casualties
April 10, 2007
Article Link

We asked you whether you think our commitment in Afghanistan worth the price. Here's what you had to say.
We have a choice as a civilized nation; do we let terrorists take over a country or do we try to stop them? Whatever consequences ultimately come from this decision must be accepted as the cost of our choice.
Sean Doolittle, Mississauga

Stephen Harper owes it to the country to explain plainly what we intend to accomplish in Afghanistan and under what conditions our troops will be brought home.
William Bedford, Toronto

We cannot get an explanation of our goals so that we may evaluate our progress. We cannot get the truth of what is happening on the ground.
Allan Eizinas, Simcoe, Ont.

My answer is a question: Would you sooner that we fight them on our soil?
Don Lowther, Halifax

No, It is not worth the price. What are we doing sending our young men to die for something that is not our business?
Badet Ellen, Windsor

Why are our troops in Afghanistan to begin with? This was never our war and our troops should never have been sent there.
Mary Matheson, Toronto

If I say I'm going to do something, then I usually do it. So yes, I believe Canada should remain committed to this cause (without judging the merits of our presence there).
Virginia Furlong, Pickering

Absolutely it is worth the price. While I agonize over every report about another member of our forces being killed or maimed, I think too of the children who may now have an opportunity for a normal life, Afghan girls who may now receive an education, Afghan women who may now engage in a career if they wish.
David Carr, Whitby

No. We rushed to help the U.S. in the context of stopping bin Laden and Al Qaeda and we inherited an unwinnable tribal war when the U.S. imperiously moved into Iraq.
John Ansara, Toronto

The question should be: "Do we Canadians think that the Afghanis deserve the same freedoms that we enjoy?" That's what you're really asking. If we believe that our freedoms are worth fighting for, then how can we deny them to others?
Andrew Mannie, Barrie

Since "our commitment in Afghanistan" is all about protecting central Asian petroleum for transnational corporations, it may well be worth the "price" (of the oil), but it is definitely not worth the cost (in lost Afghani and Canadian lives).
Al Eslami, Toronto

We as a free-thinking nation cannot turtle in the face of adversity, run away and hope for the best through "group hugs."
Brent Williams, New Brunswick

It's estimated 20 million soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice to stop the scourge of Nazi Germany. Was that a too high a price to pay?
Helena Desouza, Toronto

The families of those serving who have been killed would probably be the ones to ask the question of. For the rest of us, the question is academic.
Renata Schneider, Toronto

We were warned, we distorted facts to gain public and government approval, we even made some facts up. Now soldiers from every nation are paying the price for hasty decisions made by arrogant, politically self-serving officials. It is certainly not worth the price, but it is a price we are now morally obliged to pay for our ignorance and our arrogance.
Erica Holloway, Thornhill

Prior to recent PC cash infusions to our armed forces, we had effectively abandoned our defence to the U.S. How then could we refuse a request by the U.S. to at least support the Afghanistan war action?
Bill Soles, Oro-Medonte, Ont.
More on link

 

[MarkOttawa]

Peaceable Canadians. Who, nous?
http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/vp_kinsman/20070409.html

Even though our principal international engagement at the moment is a risky military operation in Afghanistan, this contribution and our sacrifices there are less noticed around the world because of the propensity these days for each country's media to cover only its national contingents and ignore the activity of others.

Meanwhile, our self-image shares the view others have of us, especially concerning our core role as international "peacekeepers."..

When it comes to Afghanistan, the discussion I hear, especially in the university arena, suggests that many Canadians are very uneasy with the deployment of force, even to the point of having difficulty seeing force as a legitimate part of our repertoire of international tools.

The notion of Canada as peacekeeper or even peacemaker has become deeply ingrained in our psyche. But it has not caught up with the darker reality of today.

Classic peacemaking in the original sense of the UN emergency force in the Sinai in 1956 always relied on the parties to a conflict wanting peace, which the peacekeepers could then supervise. The moment one of them ceased to want peace, the lightly armed peacekeepers are out of there, as happened to UNEF in 1967.

After the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, many in the international community called for something more — a UN-sanctioned force that can actually use force, especially to protect civilians in grave
danger...

We need to remember that we went to Afghanistan because al-Qaeda had launched a murderous global jihad from that failed state. What's more, we went there as part of a thorough international consensus to enable non-Taliban Afghans to rebuild their country and its governance.

Now that the Taliban is back fighting NATO forces and the international aid effort, seeing that as interfering in the sovereign affairs of a Muslim state, there are misgivings at home about our military engagement...

...to function effectively, we need more candid and thorough debate, particularly, I would argue, of the role the so-called peaceful Canadian in a troubled and violent world.

This includes how we handle the serious international responsibilities that engage us in Afghanistan...

Jeremy Kinsman [the author] was Canada's ambassador to the European Union from 2002 until his retirement earlier this year...

We must help the Afghans -- but how?
With the deaths of more Canadians, we need to set realistic goals
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=967658f8-1405-48ca-b2e0-aa3b5b43f223

Rory Stewart does not look like the kind of guy who spent almost six months walking across Afghanistan. His twin sidelocks, his tight, quizzical expression and his long, angular fingers suggest a seminarian more than an adventurer.

In January 2002, a few weeks after the Taliban was driven from power in Afghanistan, Stewart began a walk from Herat to Kabul. He was told he was crazy; as a foreigner, with money, in winter, he would surely perish.

Over the next six months he moved from village to village, across flat plains and windswept mountains, some with three metres of snow.

He was often alone in a medieval world, dependent on the kindness of strangers...

After leaving the British Foreign Office, he spent 16 months walking 30 to 40 kilometres a day across Iran, Pakistan, India and Nepal. After a hiatus, he went on to Afghanistan. Why he made this epic journey, he doesn't really know.

What we do know is that Stewart knows something about Afghanistan, where he is now lives and works (he runs a charitable foundation helping restore historic Kabul) and where Canadians are fighting and dying. So when he warns us that we are going about what we're doing there the wrong way, we should listen.

Fundamentally, Stewart doesn't think we can defeat the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. We can fight them and kill them, sure, but others will follow.

Moreover, democracy, human rights, the advancement of women and other western ideas have no resonance among most Afghans and it is naive to think these can take root there. Creating a functioning state may be impossible, at least in the near term. The world has spent billions on reconstruction in Afghanistan, but the roads are terrible and the garbage in Kabul is "a total disgrace."

The conflict, he says, is now "at a tipping point."

But Stewart isn't telling Canada to withdraw its 3,000 soldiers tomorrow. He is urging us and our NATO allies to re-examine how we are doing this (our tactics won't work), where we can be of most use (he suggests protecting the large cities) [emphasis added], lowering expectations (abandon "utopian fantasies" of a democratic, united state without a narcotics trade)...

The question is whether Canadians are ready for higher casualties. Do we have the stomach for losing six or 10 soldiers at a time?

For a people who haven't been in a shooting war since Korea, will casualties be the test of commitment?

The choice is not whether Canada should be in Afghanistan. A nation of our stature, with our history, diversity and idealism, has a duty to do its share. It is a principle of internationalism we have always embraced.

The question is how. Is spending $110 million on deploying Leopard tanks the best way? Is chasing the Taliban in isolated villages the best way? Is a military commitment that expires in 2009 -- rather than an obligation for the next 10 or 20 years -- the best way?..

But surely if ISAF retreats to the big cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jallalabad) that is conceding defeat with the countryside (at least in the south and east) lost.  Will foreigners be willing to stay, in effect forever, in besieged cities dependent on, perhaps increasingly risky, air supply?

On the other hand it is dreaming madly to think that Afstan can in any conceivable period of time be changed into a democracy along western lines with, for just one thing, full rights for women.  Just look east, west, and north.

Books by Mr Stewart:

Places In Between
http://www.amazon.ca/Places-Between-Rory-Stewart/dp/0143053302/ref=sr_1_1/701-9840826-9598762?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1176247097&sr=1-1

Prince Of The Marshes
http://www.amazon.ca/Prince-Marshes-Rory-Stewart/dp/0143052314/ref=sr_1_2/701-9840826-9598762?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1176247097&sr=1-2

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Two today from the Crvena Zvezda:

1) Jim Travesty:
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/202190

What can we achieve? 
This is rapidly becoming Stephen Harper's war and the Prime Minister must start explaining why we are still in Afghanistan

A less inspiring anniversary is advancing just as Vimy's 90th retreats. Come mid-May, it will be a year since Stephen Harper extended the Afghanistan mission by threatening an election.

With little time to prepare and after only half-a-dozen hours of shallow debate, a divided Parliament added two years to the Kandahar deployment that within the last five days has claimed eight more lives. Without that extension, Canadians bearing the heaviest of NATO losses would have been out of harm's way two months ago.

Some say that makes this Harper's war, and the most recent of 54 casualties, his. Along with unfair, that slides over deeper concerns.

Politically, Afghanistan has been Harper's war since he hustled there soon after winning the 2006 election. Using language that drew instant comparisons with President George W. Bush, the Prime Minister promised the troops that a Canada under his command would never "cut and run."

His visit was well received and wasn't just about boosting morale. It was part of a carefully crafted effort to define Harper as a leader domestically and to begin reshaping Canada's international image from peacekeeping do-gooder to Washington's aye-aye ally.

There's merit as well as obvious self-interest in being seen as strong at home and resolute abroad. But no political or diplomatic advantage comes without asterisks and one of them relates to responsibility.

Voters who see Harper as more prime ministerial than his rivals will eventually get a chance to reward or punish him for where Conservative foreign policy is leading the country.

If the national attention span stretches far enough, ballot-box justice will turn, at least in part, on how much due diligence preceded extending the mission. Before passing judgment, Canadians should consider the context.

Liberals were so slow in finally agreeing to another Afghanistan deployment that the choice was Kandahar.

Even then it was a dangerous place made only slightly less frightening by the hope that the threats were as inflated as those for the post-9/11 Kabul tour and by the brevity of the commitment.

Based on those assumptions, a Paul Martin government with deep reservations about Afghanistan and abiding interest in other parts of the world accepted Gen. Rick Hillier's argument that Kandahar was the right mission at the right time.

The assumptions were flawed. Instead of facing a sporadic insurgency, Canadians found themselves fighting pitched battles. Then their exposure doubled when Harper bowed to NATO pressure to stay until 2009 at least.

War is never predictable and always chaotic, twin realities that make pivotal decisions problematic.

Still, politicians accept that responsibility along with the perquisites of power and it's never more necessary to hold them accountable than when lives are put in jeopardy.

In making their choice, Liberals miscalculated about Taliban tactics and ferocity. Then Conservatives failed to use the leverage that comes with doing NATO's dirtiest work to extract concessions needed to make the mission successful and Canadian soldiers as safe as possible...

Harper is no more personally responsible for this week's deaths than his Liberal predecessors are for those before the extension. But the Prime Minister is answerable for the mission.

Next month's anniversary offers a better chance than most for a shoulder-to-shoulder talk about why Canada is still in Afghanistan and what it can reasonably achieve at what cost.

But experience warns that Harper will try to glide past, waving the flag ever more frenetically with each new casualty...

2) Haroon the Magnificent:
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/202191

Where is Afghan mission heading?
Canada should demilitarize the mission as much as possible, seek political reconciliation with the Taliban and stop blaming Pakistan for the insurgency

What are Canadian soldiers dying for in Afghanistan? The official answer is that (a) they are there so that terrorists don't come here, though the reverse is more likely, and (b) our troops are helping the Afghans get back on their feet.

The more realistic answer is that (a) Gen. Rick Hillier wanted to prove to the Americans that Canada belonged in the big league, and (b) his first boss, Paul Martin, wanted to please the White House, and, his second, Stephen Harper, is ideologically committed to the failed global doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush.

While Ottawa talks about its 3-D approach (development, democracy and diplomacy), our Afghan mission has been characterized, in the words of one analyst, by 3-Gs (guns, guards and gates), as we copy America's failed military tactics.

The tableau we see in our media tells all: barefooted Afghans in rags staring stone-faced at the increasingly Americanized Canadian soldier in fatigues, bulletproof vest and helmet, and carrying a ferocious looking gun, finger on the trigger [emphasis added].

There's no escaping the imperial inequality of that equation, no matter how polite the Canadians, which they invariably are.

The vulnerability of the Afghans is reinforced by NATO air bombings, 2,000 last year, which killed about 4,000 people.

The war is against the Taliban but it is the civilians who also get killed, maimed and displaced and who do not have hospital care, drinking water and food, let alone employment...

...Afghanistan did have peace, thanks to the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, of which Canada was a proud part.

But the allies have pulled defeat out of the jaws of victory, just as in Iraq.

There are other parallels.

As in Iraq, brutal military tactics, combined with racist disregard for the lives and the religious and cultural mores of the occupied, have alienated the people Canada ostensibly wants to save.

As in Iraq, insurgent-occupied towns are won militarily, only to be lost later.

In some ways, the Afghan situation is worse. The puppet regime in Kabul is more corrupt and more loathed than the one in Baghdad.

Yet there's a Dutch contingent in south-central Afghanistan that is not waiting for peace to break out before trying the non-military approach...

Afghanistan did have peace, thanks to the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, of which Canada was a proud part.

But the allies have pulled defeat out of the jaws of victory, just as in Iraq.

There are other parallels.

As in Iraq, brutal military tactics, combined with racist disregard for the lives and the religious and cultural mores of the occupied, have alienated the people Canada ostensibly wants to save.

As in Iraq, insurgent-occupied towns are won militarily, only to be lost later.

In some ways, the Afghan situation is worse. The puppet regime in Kabul is more corrupt and more loathed than the one in Baghdad.

Yet there's a Dutch contingent in south-central Afghanistan that is not waiting for peace to break out before trying the non-military approach...

What should Canada do?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization cannot possibly kill all the Taliban. So, demilitarize the mission as much as possible. Say so, to send a signal.

Look for political reconciliation.

Even Hamid Karzai has now admitted that he has been talking to elements of the Taliban. We excoriated NDP Leader Jack Layton for suggesting just that.

Stop blaming neighbouring Pakistan. It is not the real problem, any more than Syria and Iran are in Iraq...

...Harper is emulating Bush: questioning the patriotism of his critics; claiming victory in a war that's almost lost; and having himself photographed with the troops, while having them muddle along in Afghanistan.

Rather than following the American tactics, we should be trying to find a Canadian way out of Afghanistan.

As for "Americanized", Mr Siddiqui might look at these pictures:
http://www.deutsche-welle.de/dw/article/0,2144,2431253,00.html
http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/schaedel-fotos-nazi-emblem_did_13807.html (check picture 2 and further)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,461369,00.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Port Hope]

Woher kommen Sie Denn?

 

[MarkOttawa]

Port Hope: Nicht vom links, überhaupt nicht von dem roten Stern (Crvena Zvezda) . 

In Washington, D.C. geboren, von kanadischen Eltern.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Port Hope]

Ich bin in Kanada geboren (keine deustche Eltern) aber ich habe fast zwei Jahre in Deutschland gewohnt.  Wir koennen immer etwas von unseren deutschen Freuden lernern!

 

[vonGarvin]

Ich bin in Kanada geboren (keine deustche Eltern) aber ich habe fast zwei Jahre in Deutschland gewohnt.  Wir koennen immer etwas von unseren deutschen Freuden lernern!

Yes, you ARE right, we CAN learn from our German joys ;D

 

[Port Hope]

Offensichtlich, brauche ich ein "spellcheck" auf Deutsch!