No argument here on the insurgency case Zipper, but I am afraid that that argues for light forces again.
As I look at Iraq, I see the evolution of an Army.
In a peaceful, ordered society where people accept their government then policemen can go unarmed.
If there are ruffians and the ruffians have knives then the policeman needs a gun
If the ruffians get a gun then the police need two guns.
If a pack of ruffians get guns then the police need machine guns and armoured vehicles - At this time they start to need paramilitary back up like the Police Commandos and the Iraqi National Guard
If the ruffians get heavy weapons then heavier weapons need to be supplied to the authorities - Now we are starting to move into light infantry and light cavalry roles
If the ruffians get armour the authorities need a functioning army with heavy armour.
I don't see the prospect of battalions of marauding anybody rampaging across Canada anytime soon, still least with Armoured vehicles and heavy weapons. Platoon sized elements with light weapons and all sorts of nasty explosive devices and WMDs are more likely. The counter is Coy/Bn sized forces with Light Armour (Maybe some Heavy APCs).
Roughly the same type of forces found in the UK Royal Marines.
Practicing them on the coasts would add to sovereignty claims, thereby minimizing the chances of having to take lethal action against anybody. At the same time they would develop skill sets that would be useful in other theatres.
Rather than trying to build up the force so that we have a little of this and a little of that and not much of anything at all - incapable of sustaining a presence when presence is needed, wouldn't it be better to determine the type of force we need to meet our domestic needs, equip and train it well to work in our environments to our purposes, then recruit more units of that type than we need.
Farm the surplus-to-requirement units out to the international community so as to make friends and influence people, generate stability so our merchants can make lots of money and pay for my health benefits, and in the meantime the troopies get lots of practical experience in distant lands and climes. All good stuff it seems to me.
Once we have got those bases covered then we can start thinking about what else we can afford, after the day-care bills are paid, and start buying additional capabilities, starting from this premise: "What value does it give to Canada?"
And by the way, an example of such thinking might be, after the requisite numbers of light troops, helicopters, aircraft, Bv206s, LSVW replacements, EEZ patrol and SAR capabilities have been met, after all that, then look at the cost of a heavy armoured battle group to be able to support, rescue lightly armed and armoured Canadians in far-flung places.
But the way that I take Sea-dog, and I agree with him in principle if not in detail, is to do our appreciation based on domestic needs first, make sure those needs are dealt with then start considering how to get involved with the rest of the world.
The biggest threats to our security come through our seaports and airports in freight containers. The biggest undefended zones are our the maritime approaches, the seaways, the railways and the highways. The greatest risk is to our cities.
The answer, as in any other defensive scheme, is to channel the traffic (enemy or friendly) through the existing ports, cover the ports with security (fire) then monitor the obstacles (ice, rock, forests, barbed wire) and bind them into a fire plan (soldiers with rifles, boats with guns, aircraft with bombs and missiles, - yes even subs with torpedoes) in case someone tries to breach the obstacles.
We are going to know if somebody tries to sneak a Division into the country by air or sea. We could probably do some significant damage to the shipping on our own just now - and no doubt we would find a friend to help us out.
The problem again is small units, covert units, and weapons without units at all, just a cell phone.
So disused fishing trawlers in remote locations, low flying civilian aircraft, bodies in cargo containers in ships docked at quayside.
The other potential risk is commercial ventures.
Like foreign scrap iron merchants at an abandoned whaling station or sealers on an island undetected coming back year after year for 2-5 years. Making claims that seeing as how we aren't using the place, didn't know about it, didn't complain about it then they have more right to it than we do.
What happens if the decide not to move when the local mountie and his trusty DFO partner show up and they decline to move, demonstrate they are armed and request assistance from the Motherland to protect their commercial rights?
On all of these grounds I say that building a light force base CF, with a modest heavy reinforcement capability, is probably the right answer for us.
Or put it another way 3 light brigades and a cavalry brigade with a heavy armour battlegroup. Lots of transport, air (fixed and rotary), sea and land. A useful (what does that mean???) amount of Combat Air Support. Naval forces capable of operating in all our waters, all the time in all seasons and also being able to escort/transport our expeditionary forces.
And a credible Militia force capable of securing Vital Points, including cities, and conducting route patrols of pipelines, highways, canals and powerlines.
Cheers.
