Why Not Canadian Amphib/Marine Capability? (merged)

[George Wallace]

Nope not at all, we're a bunch of noobs.

George can you tell me about what kind of training and courses LAV drivers get in the battalion?

Not being at a Bn I can't tell you.  I can tell you that they will not spend their whole career as a LAV driver.

What a LAV driver does at a Sqn or Reg't, I can.  (S)He will be doing D&M on not only the LAV, but probably on the whole range of B Vehs in the unit.  (S)He will also be doing Comms training, First Aid Trg, and the full range of training on wpns from C7/C8, C6, C9, M72, Carl G, M203 Grenade Launcher, Grenades, etc.  They will be taught Tactics.  Within a few years (s)he will likely get on a 25 mm Turret Operators Course, or a Surveillance Course.  One does not remain a LAV driver for very long, before progressing on to another job.  Not only that, all members of the crew must have a basic understanding of what each member's job is.

But your friend should have told you all this.

 

[Old Sweat]

If you are only looking at the European Theatre during WW II then I would agree with you.  The South Pacific, however, was not so.

There was an article in the old Canadian Army Journal in the early sixties by then LCol (later LGen and then Senator) SC Waters who was the CFLO at Quantico re the Marine Corps. He noted that despite the fact that the US Army conducted more amphibious operations than the USMC in the Second World War, the latter was firmly fixed in the public's mind as the force that did all the landings in the Pacific. The army had conducted two landings in the Aleutians (one of which included 13 CIB), several in New Guinea and the Philipines and of course Okinawa. There were also some landings which included both army and marine formations.

 

[Jarnhamar]

He'd also get a real kick out of how specific U.S. Military jobs are. What's that? You want to do laundry and fix clothes?

WELL, guess what! The U.S. Military has that too! The Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist!

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/administrative-support/shower-laundry-and-clothing-repair-specialist.html

Is this your attempt to try and make fun of the US Military?  Someone who does a support task like laundry and tailoring clothing isn't important in an army of hundreds of thousands of soldiers.  That it's somehow less honourable? The US war machine is gigantic, I'd actually rate laundry and tailoring as pretty damn important.  What's the longest you've went in the same set of combats SevenSixTwo?  Hygene probably isn't a big deal though. You figure grunts should cross train to be laundry dudes?

What's that young chap? You don't want to load the artillery gun you just want to do the data control which, would normally be a course in the Canadian Forces? Well guess what! That's too hard for everyone to learn so we made three separate occupations just to manage one gun.

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/field-artillery-automated-tactical-data-system-specialist.html

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/field-artillery-firefinder-radar-operator.html

http://www.goarmy.com/content/goarmy/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/combat/fire-support-specialist.html


Do I need to illustrate myself more? In the Canadian Army one could be trained to eventually do all of these jobs.


You MAY NOT think your training is vast but when the U.S. Military trains a gunner in 15 weeks and the Canadian Military trains a gunner in 24 weeks (I don't know how long DP1 Artillery is). You don't think something is up?

More LOLz
Instructor-student ratio is one of the biggest issues in the CF.  Considering the size difference between us and the US, plus the soldiers they loose to civilian jobs, private security, injury and death do you think the US faces the same kind of issues we do?
Because of their size Americans will send a soldier or 2 from a company on NBCD training and that soldier turns around and brings that know how back to their respective companies, sound familiar?

I know what point you're trying to make. A US mechanic might be trained to fix humvees and that's what he does, a Canadian mechanic might be trained on LAV3s, T lavs, RGs or whatever (Might, that's not always the case).  But to say our soldiers get a vast amount of training and make us soundd light years ahead of the US? We still have guys in the battalions who sit around as a lav driver for 2 or 3 years who don't get much in the line of courses. Their a lav driver so that's what they'll do until told otherwise.

 

[George Wallace]

True.  Kiska in the Aleutians was the first test of the FSSF.  I am not saying that the Marines were the sole units used in the South Pacific, but they did contribute more than what was implied prior to the end of WW II.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Not being at a Bn I can't tell you.  I can tell you that they will not spend their whole career as a LAV driver.

I agree they won't spend their whole 20 year career as a LAV driver, usually. In Pet there was a tanker corporal who spent his whole career driving tanks. He loved it and was happy there.

What a LAV driver does at a Sqn or Reg't, I can.  (S)He will be doing D&M on not only the LAV, but probably on the whole range of B Vehs in the unit.  (S)He will also be doing Comms training, First Aid Trg, and the full range of training on wpns from C7/C8, C6, C9, M72, Carl G, M203 Grenade Launcher, Grenades, etc.  They will be taught Tactics.  Within a few years (s)he will likely get on a 25 mm Turret Operators Course, or a Surveillance Course.  One does not remain a LAV driver for very long, before progressing on to another job.  Not only that, all members of the crew must have a basic understanding of what each member's job is.

But your friend should have told you all this.

George I can tell you that US soldiers aren't simply told how to drive a vehicle, handed an M16 and then given a pat on the back. Just like us they get trained on M16s, Pistols, C9/C6, grenades.  They get taught tactics not to mention first aid.  Sometimes (apparently) theres screw ups and some dude won't know how to do anything BUT their job but you're kidding yourself if you don't think they get crossed trained too. I remember hearing that 14 years ago in basic training.  Americans suck they don't cross train!

I had an RCR sgt ask me to program his CI for him in his LAV and and an American Sgt I worked with had what must have been dozens of courses, and was as cross trained as an Canadian.

That's getting off topic though.

 

[CombatDoc]

The idea of a CF "Marines" is not going to happen for one simple reason, and that is lack of money.  Currently, we are significantly "under-resourced" financially and the recent 15% budget decrement (aka Strategic Review) doesn't help.  The Air Force is going to purchase a new fleet of next-generation fighters, find a fixed wing SAR bird, bring the maritime helicopters online and refurb the herc fleet.  The Navy has to recapitalize their AORs, destroyers, do the mid-life frigate refit as well as bring the Arctic patrol vessels online (not to mention find the crews for these vessels).  The Army  - to start with - has to refurb its armoured vehicle fleet after Afghanistan, purchase the new CCV, etc.  Where is the money for amphibious ops/training going to come from?

Although I would like to see closer integration between land/sea/air capabilities in the CF similar to that found in the USMC, as others have said we are too small and poor to create this as a niche capability.

 

[Blackadder1916]

There was an article in the old Canadian Army Journal in the early sixties by then LCol (later LGen and then Senator) SC Waters who was the CFLO at Quantico re the Marine Corps. He noted that despite the fact that the US Army conducted more amphibious operations than the USMC in the Second World War, the latter was firmly fixed in the public's mind as the force that did all the landings in the Pacific. The army had conducted two landings in the Aleutians (one of which included 13 CIB), several in New Guinea and the Philipines and of course Okinawa. There were also some landings which included both army and marine formations.

Some excerpts from that article (in CAJ Vol 18, No. 1, 1964) by then Col Waters.

A Story of the U.S. Marine Corps - Marine Magic

by COLONEL S.C. WATERS, CD*
(* The author is Director of Administration at Army Headquarters, Ottawa, and is a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal. - Editor.)

The vice-president of a well-known Madison Avenue, New York, advertising agency was once heard to say, "In the U.S. only two things are sacred and free from criticism: motherhood and the U.S. Marines - and I'm not sure I have them in their proper order" My impressions after some two and one-half years with the United States Marine Corps as the first Canadian Army Liaison Officer to be assigned to this Corps would tend to confirm the above comment. But I'm not sure I can explain why, nor can I get any two Marines to agree on an explanation. Hence the rather dramatic title of this article which hints of sorcery but which I am going to try to explain by briefly examining their history, some of their current training programmes and a few other relevant details about this famous Corps. This all too brief survey may also assist you to reach your own conclusions as to what makes a Marine the symbol of the idealized fighting man in the United States.

( . . . )

MAJOR MARINE OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
DATE FORMATION LOCATION CASUALTIES*

7 Aug 42 - 8 Feb 43 1st MARDIV Guadalcanal 4400 2nd MARDIV

1 Nov 43 - 28 Dec 43 3rd MARDIV Bougainville 1100

26 Dec 43 - 21 Apr 44 1st MARDIV Cape Gloucester 1300

20 Nov 43 - 23 Nov 43 2nd MARDIV Tarawa 3400

1 Feb 44 - 2 Feb 44 4th MARDIV Kwajalein 600 (Roi-Namur)

17 Feb 44 - 22 Feb 44 22 Mar Regt Eniwetok 100

15 Jun 44 - 9 Jul 44 2nd MARDIV Saipan 9900 4th MARDIV

21 Jul 44 - 10 Aug 44 3rd MARDIV Guam 5900 1st Mar Prov Bde

24 Jul 44 - 1 Aug 44 2nd MARDIV Tinian 2800 4th MARDIV

15 Sep 44 - 15 Oct 44 1st MARDIV Peleliu 5400

19 Feb 45 - 26 Mar 45 4th MARDIV Iwo Jima 23,800 5th MARDIV 3rd MARDIV (Res)

1 Apr 45 - 30 Jun 45 1st MARDIV Okinawa 21,400 6th MARDIV 2nd MARDIV (Res) * Unofficial figures to nearest 100-Author.

It is well to record that the landings on Kwajaein, Eniwetok, Guam and Okinawa were done in conjunction with U.S. Army forces, and further it is interesting to note that two other joint Army- Marine assaults not shown in the chart (Russell Islands and New Georgia) also took place. What is frequently forgotten is that the U.S. Army deployed some three Field Armies with 17 Army Divisions in the Pacific War and conducted same 36 amphibious assaults of RCT size or larger in which no major Marine forces participated. In fact, the two largest amphibious operations of the Pacific the landings at Leyte and at Lingayen Gulf, both in the Philippines - were entirely Army/Navy operations. To the general public, I believe, the amphibious war on the Pacific was considered a Marine war despite the great disparity in the size of the forces deployed by the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army. The old magic was still at work and the Corps finished the war with an unblemished record and a greatly enhanced reputation with gallant battles like Tarawa and Iwo Jima engraved on every loyal American heart, while the Army's actions at places like Biak Island and Leyte were largely forgotten.

( . . . )

. . . the Marines naturally are proud of their performance and attribute it in large part to their outstanding leadership, discipline and training. It is also said, somewhat enviously, that the Marines have the best public relations image in the United States. "Give me a squad of Marines and a photographer and I'll make military history" is not an uncommon jest. Another tongue-in-cheek tale widely circulated is that the reason Lieut.-Colonel John Glenn, USMC, was not selected for the first space shot was because there wasn't room for all three in the space capsule - Colonel Glenn, the Marine reporter and the Marine photographer! The late Knute Rockne, coach of the great Notre Dame teams that dominated U.S. college football for so many years, once was asked the secret of his teams' successes and he answered he didn't know, but he went on to say, "Ask the New York Yankees or the Marines - they have it too." This same kind of "magic" sets the Royal Canadian Mounted Police apart from most other police organizations and contributes strongly to its great esprit and efficiency. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that the U.S. Marines hold a unique place in the hearts of their countrymen, and continue to set, in the eyes of the American public, the standard for a fighting man. Perhaps the simplest and best explanation of all is in leadership. It is only with great leadership that great organizations emerge and it is only with great leadership that great things are done. To paraphrase Napoleon, "The art of leadership is a simple art; everything is in the performance." It is in performance that the U.S. Marines have made their mark. Maybe this is the Magic.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It must be the quality of scotch I'm drinking these days but I am starting to like the idea of ArmyRick for CDS.....Is there a write-in somewhere?

And Field Marshall Slim would agree with him.

If the Navy can't find the bodies to run small boats then the Engineers seem like a good option.  Don't the Engineers run those bumper boats use by the logging companies on the west coast when the army wants to hold a pontoon bridge in place?

LCUs and LCVPs (and perhaps, maybe, pretty please....some of those Swedish Combat Boats) operated by the naval reserve would still be a good option I think.

As far as big boats are concerned, as D&B points out we could always by Marine Atlantic a couple of spare Maersk ferries .... NATO has regularly used Maersk ferries in the Baltic and points beyond.

Daft.... Is there a shuffle board serial somewhere that one needs to sign up for?  Or is the training just what is expected of the well rounded bootie?

A colleague of mine used to command this outfit: 1 Assault Group. I think, with some modification for Canadian 'littoral needs', that this would be the only specilazed amphibious unit we would require.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1_Assault_Group_Royal_Marines

Ideally, we should have an LPD of some kind, like the Fearless,  to operate with STUFT (Ships taken up from trade) shipping, to cross deck troops from ferries etc on to the flight deck for airmobile landings on tough stretches of coastline where it would be impossible to land a LCVP or LCU, which pretty describes much of Canada's coastline. This would also provide the Bde/BGp HQ:

http://www.axfordsabode.org.uk/pdf-docs/fearles7.pdf

But we might be able to find a suitable coast guard or navy vessel to fill the 'flight deck'/TOC role. However, having flown from the Fearless a few times it was a pretty darn slick setup. From start to finish, we were able to cossdeck a full rifle company, with all weapons and bergens, from a Danish ferry to the flight deck and lift them into an LS, all in about an hour. Of course we had the most excellent Sea King to fly on, which was roomy, powerful, all weather and accurate!


And as for the PO check on the shuffle board, it would be essential to lease the Danish ferries we often deployed in, which always came fully equipped with lovely stewardesses, full shuffle board rig, theatres, fitness facilities, and excellent bar facilities which never seemed to close regardless of the sea state!

 

[ArmyRick]

My earlier proposal for an "Assault Landing" Squadron at 4ESR is very similar to 1 Assault Group RM (much smaller though)

 

[Kirkhill]

Rick and D&B:

Is this close to the skill set you could amplify?

Soldiers, boats and waterjets.

 

[lethalLemon]

Rick and D&B:

Is this close to the skill set you could amplify?

Soldiers, boats and waterjets.

Ooooohhh that looks like fun.

We can all dream of having a "Marine Force" but the thing that pulls people to the USMC... is the history.

 

[ArmyRick]

I personally find the Royal Marines more fascinating. The truly are the few, the elite and definately the proud. Not to mention there cap badge loooks really cool.

Some of the RM I have met (No not including Big Bad John) were pretty switched on and good guys to work/party with.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I personally find the Royal Marines more fascinating. The truly are the few, the elite and definately the proud. Not to mention there cap badge loooks really cool.

Some of the RM I have met (No not including Big Bad John) were pretty switched on and good guys to work/party with.

I would suggest that the RM doctrine (land where the enemy is not) is closer to our own than that of the USMC (land head on at the enemy). It's cheaper too, in more ways than one.

 

[Chilme]

I think it is safe to say that a Canadian "Force" mirror around that of the USMC would be far beyond Canadian resources and needs.  I think it is also pretty safe to say that a small specialized marine force that is uniquely Canadian is something the CF could benefit from having (Keeping in mind that the term "Force" has no size designation assigned to it).  Size should be based on all possible factors.  One must also not underestimate the benefit of having a specialized elite group (like the RM) for a particular role, whether it is Marine or anything else.  People want to be part of something important, something specialized, something elite. Look at how many people aspire and work their tails off to have a chance at JTF2


In the end, Canadian troops shouldn't have to depend on loaned equipment to operate in a number of places within our own borders and abroad.

 

[aesop081]

In the end, Canadian troops shouldn't have to depend on loaned equipment to operate in a number of places within our own borders and abroad.

In the same breath, we cant have everything either. A realistic requirements assesment decides if investing in amphib equipment is needed. Is there a realistic threat to Canadian teritory that requires and amphib response ? How likely are we to carry out an amphib forced-entry operation abroad and how likely is it that we would do it without US involvement ?

 

[ArmyRick]

Your probably 5 times more likely to do an amphibious operation (NOT the WWII D-Day scenario) than you are an airborne (static line parachute) operation

Yet we retain the para capability?

If you read my earlier post, my suggestions would be pennies in a bucket out of the defence budget BUT no, we have too many people throwinng in their brillant ideas.

Please keep it simple. BTW, did we not send ships down to Haiti? That would be an amphibious operation

Did we not send a ship to rescue canadians stuck in Lebano in 2006? Amphibious op

Somalia, we had a ship off shore as support to the Airborne Regiment, not exactly amphibious op, but the support measure there (over the horizon).

In Yugoslavia, it would have been nice to have a means of extracting our pers if things got really ugly (luckily they didn't).

I emphasize again, I beleive we are far more likely to do an amphibious op than an airborne op. A very limited size engineer squadron with landing craft and rigid raiders would give us that capability with minimal expense and few pers required (expand the engineer trade by 60 pers?). I also reccomended only an unit advisor/instructor course and NO basic course.

No, lets not go making this into some elite unit or we risk turning this something getting out of control.

Let me sum up. If we do this, it must be at minimal fuss and mess. KEEP IT SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE!!!

Thinking is encouraged but over thinking must be discouraged.

 

[Kirkhill]

"This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree".

Field Marshall Slim Commander 14th Army Burma.

The man is my personal hero because he made do with what he had........... and succeeded.

 

[Chilme]

In the same breath, we cant have everything either. A realistic requirements assesment decides if investing in amphib equipment is needed. Is there a realistic threat to Canadian teritory that requires and amphib response ? How likely are we to carry out an amphib forced-entry operation abroad and how likely is it that we would do it without US involvement ?

Here are a few recent example: Haiti, Op Nanook,  Op Lama in NFLD

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

In order to develop and maintain a marine capability you will have to figure how to get the Army and the Navy to work together willingly.  The environments don't work together in a joint manner unless deployed; and then that is only in an adhoc manner (not deliberate). 

On offer, the parachute capability.  The idea that the three light infantry battalions have three full up and ready to go para capable companies is a myth.  Indeed they rarely get access to aircraft to conduct individual refresher jumps not to mention collective training at the platoon and company level.  The problem is access to aircraft.  Take Petawawa as an example.  Trenton is just down the road so to speak yet the last 3 - 4 jumps scheduled since August with Hercs have been cancelled.  The AF has its own set of priorities and parachuting is not one of them.  However the Army needs the AF to parachute.  If an urgent operational requirement popped up which required parachuting a company into another country for some reason it would happen but the execution wouldn't be pretty.

So, unless the CF puts a priority on joint force generation, this marine capability will slowly sink beneath the waves. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Chilme, to be fair to CDN Aviator, the examples you give are not "forced-entry".

And perhaps, to enlighten the discussion, here are a few pointers on current amphibious ops.

Fist of all forget your WWII movies of D-day and Marines landings in the Pacific. The more recent and appropriate examples of  large amphibious ops are Grenada, by the US Marines, the Falklands, by British RM's and the Army, the Marines landing in Mogadishu and the "threatened" landings of the Gulf war (first).

Their common points:

1- No "wall" to breach or atoll Fortress to attack head on. because there are no situation out there that currently involves huge armies fighting each other to death in a world domination struggle. And there is little chance of that in a foreseeable future. If it came to that, we would have time to observe and note it and build up the response forces.

2- use of modern tools to carry out the operations, which means not just landing on a flat beach with "Higgins" boats. Vertical envelopment is used massively (helicopters), air-cushion landing crafts that give you speed and capability to disgorge away from the beach itself, and AAAV's that can motor to shore and turn into a "LAV" right away etc. These give the capacity to pick spots away from the defended portions of the coast, select your "landing" area from a wider type of appropriate terrain and to carry out inland raids (via vertical env.) in support of other type of operations.

ArmyRick mentions Somalia and Yugoslavia. In Somalia, the Navy was on the ground before the Airborne! They landed at the airfield in Sea-King helicopters before anyone else to ensure the airfield was capable of accepting the landing planes and to set up comms and radars. In Yugoslavia, you may remember that the US had a pilot shot down over the wrong side. Who got him out? Yes, the Marines operating with their helicopters from an offshore amphibious ship. In Lebanon, we Canada did not use warships, as we did not have them, but many other nations did.

So yes, there is a requirement for such support (so much so that there is a huge revival in the type in France, Germany, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, Australia, Korea and Japan) for the army. And in Canada our two main purpose for such ship would be Support ops abroad and, most importantly as mobile base of operations in the Arctic archipelago. These are the only things that will provide you, in one place, with instant barracks for 500 soldiers, a fully equipped airfield for about 12 to 16 helicopters, a second echelon hospital and all the comms/ops room you need for staff. The whole thing is mobile so you can go from point A to B without repacking everything and shipping it over everytime.

ArmyRick is both correct and wrong in his last post: it is not sufficient to have a few extra engineers with boats. Landing crafts and raider bots don't travel by themselves to their destination over long distances. You must have a way to deploy them and that way is amphibious ships - which means the Navy - and since the Navy already has people (Boatswains, Marengs and sigs) that know how to operate these boats, there is no need to train anyone else. That is the wrong part.

What he got right, however is that there is no requirement for any specialised unit: The army unit that would be embarked can very quickly be taught whatever little extra knowledge they need to have to successfully carry out their job (for instance, in a heliported landing, they already know how to get on or off a helicopter from their basic training, all you need to do is teach them the routes to take on board so they don't end up in the way of air pers or Navy pers or go the wrong way and get their head cut off). Similarly, airforce personnel requires little in terms of extra training before they can safely operate from an amphib.