USS John S. McCain Collision 20 Aug 17

[MARS]

I'm surprised you're surprised.

From the time I first sailed on MARS II back in '08 to now, the rule has always been that the Radar is to be left in True Motion at all time, and you are only to switch it to Relative Motion for a few moments before switching it back.

When I sailed with the USN '09, they did it the opposite, and it made total sense to me. Why not leave the radar in a way that allows you to take one look and see if someone is going to hit you?

However, my personal opinion on that has now changed. With experience, you don't need relative motion lines. I kind take a quick look at radar, and based on our leader lines, I can make a quick and more-or-less accurate assessment of whether a close quarters situation is developping with another vessel. This cues me to read the CPA from ARPA, take bearing, and switch to relative motion. Since the radar is in true motion, I know which direction all these ships are actually facing, which helps me build an accurate mental picture in my mind, which you can't do with relative motion leaders on.

:2c:

/tangent

I went ashore in '04 and returned in '10 - lots of changes in that time, I think.

I agree with your point "with experience..." but that kind of mental assessment you described is completely 'experience' dependent, and an ideal way for the error chain to start.  A Wardroom full of pre-NOPQ Subbies in, for example, the Arctic, does not scream 'experience'.  Too often I have had an overly tired OOW - even occasionally, an experienced one - think he/she has hooked the appropriate contact, but in realty the tote was displaying info for some other contact.  That arises in part because the critical component - briefly switching to Relative Motion - doesn't always happen.

I am not against True Motion at all - it is particularly helpful when conducting Blind Pilotage and help to paint the rest of the picture in all circumstances.  I'm not sure there is a 'right' answer...

/end tangent

 

[FSTO]

copy that.  I am really curious as to how the Ops Room functions now.

Basically NAVORD 3136-0 covers Command, Charge and Control

http://marcom-comar.mil.ca/repository/navords/3000/3136-0-eng.pdf

The operations room supports the OOW in the safe navigation of the ship at all times.

So when the OOW says "I have charge" he/she will then give a control order to the operations room on how they are to report contacts. For example "Report all contacts with a CPA of 2 miles or less" would be fine along the coast or in the Strait of Juan de Fuca but is a little much when in open ocean and you haven't seen anyone for days. But in the Straits of Malacca you could be at the point of "report all contacts closing on a steady bearing" and still be overwhelmed with reports.

An experienced OOW will be well ahead of the ship in calling down visual (or radar) contacts to the Ops Room. Ops will then hook the contact and tell the OOW that they have a contact on report, the OOW will acknowledge the report and may give a control order or wait for Ops to gain tracking of the contact. The report will go something like this:

Ops "Bridge, OPs, Skunk 23 to report"
OOW "Report Skunk 23"
Ops "Skunk 23, bearing 350 (True bearings only from ops) range 6 miles, tracking 165, sp 15, CPA 265 (true bearing off the ship)
6 cables in 15 min, Skunk 23.
OOW "Roger, report skunk 23" (the OOW could say report at 3 miles but by just saying report Skunk 23, Ops will automatically update the report in 3 min)

Meanwhile the CO (if he is in his c ;Dabin or on the bridge) is listening to this report and as long as all the block reports are constant and the recommendations are sound he/she will not interfere (in a perfect world, some cannot help themselves! ;D )

At night these block reports shall be in the correct sequence. The CO maybe sound asleep but CnC is always on and if there is a contact that is within the parameters set by his/her night orders the OOW has to call with the following report.

OOW "Captain Sir, Officer of the Watch"
Captain (groggily) "Captain"
OOW "I have one visual and radar contact to report. I have one deep sea bearing Red 30 range 6 miles. We are 20 degrees on her Starboard bow and her bearing is drawing left. CPA will be on our Port 1/4 at one and half miles in 8 minutes. I am happy with the situation and intend to stand on."

Hopefully the CO has not fallen back asleep and he will say "Yes Please"


I will now be flamed by other MARS officers because I may have gotten a few things wrong or its not how things are done anymore!  :rofl:

 

[dimsum]

I will now be flamed by other MARS officers because I may have gotten a few things wrong or its not how things are done anymore!  :rofl:

Well...that just reminded me of those seemingly-endless nights transiting near TA Buoy outside Vancouver Harbour, dodging all of Seaspan's finest.

I just got over those therapy sessions, btw.  >

 

[The Bread Guy]

Throwing this out there - one opinion, and not touching on the CNN-reported steering failure, but any thoughts from those who know naval things?

Hacking link to USS McCain warship collision? Expert says ‘I don’t believe in coincidence’
THE collision of a second US warship this year that has left 10 sailors missing points to the possibility of cyber espionage, an expert has warned.

THE collision of a second US warship this year points to the possibility of cyber espionage, an expert has warned.

The US Navy ordered an investigation Monday into its entire 7th Fleet, based in the Pacific, after the USS John S McCain was involved in a run-in with an oil tanker near Singapore.

(...)

US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis announced a pause in operations of the fleet so officials can take a deeper look at its performance, including personnel, navigation capabilities, maintenance, equipment, surface warfare training, munitions, certifications and how sailors move through their careers.

Navy Admiral John Richardson later clarified in a Twitter post that the review would include the possibility of cyber intrusion or sabotage, although there were “no indications right now”.

“But review will consider all possibilities,” he said.

Speculation has been building that the USS McCain was hacked ever since news broke about the collision.

Itay Glick, founder of cyber security firm Votiro said he had immediately become interested in the potential for cyber interference when he heard about the accident yesterday.

“I don’t believe in coincidence,” Mr Glick told news.com.au.

“Both USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald were part of the 7th Fleet, there is a relationship between these two events and there may be a connection.”

Mr Glick worked in the cyber-warfare unit of the Israeli intelligence agency for seven years and he believes countries like Russia and China may have the capability to launch an attack on the warships.

“China has capabilities, maybe they are trying things, it is possible,” he said.

He believes there are two main ways the warship could have been interfered with, including an attack on its GPS that impacted its navigation, or a malware attack on its computer network that gave it incorrect information which may stopped it from seeing the tanker.

Some have dismissed the idea the warship could have been subjected to a GPS spoof as unlikely, because the signal would have to be wide enough to affect dozens, if not hundreds of ships in the region.

But Mr Glick said there had already been evidence of this type of technology being used to set at least 20 ships off track in the Black Sea near Russia, and experts have speculated there is potential for it to be isolated to just one target ...

 

[Lumber]

Throwing this out there - one opinion, and not touching on the CNN-reported steering failure, but any thoughts from those who know naval things?

Sure, except we don't conduct collision avoidance using GPS. We use radar and gyro compass bearings. Neither of these are on a hackable networks.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Basically NAVORD 3136-0 covers Command, Charge and Control

http://marcom-comar.mil.ca/repository/navords/3000/3136-0-eng.pdf

The operations room supports the OOW in the safe navigation of the ship at all times.

So when the OOW says "I have charge" he/she will then give a control order to the operations room on how they are to report contacts. For example "Report all contacts with a CPA of 2 miles or less" would be fine along the coast or in the Strait of Juan de Fuca but is a little much when in open ocean and you haven't seen anyone for days. But in the Straits of Malacca you could be at the point of "report all contacts closing on a steady bearing" and still be overwhelmed with reports.

An experienced OOW will be well ahead of the ship in calling down visual (or radar) contacts to the Ops Room. Ops will then hook the contact and tell the OOW that they have a contact on report, the OOW will acknowledge the report and may give a control order or wait for Ops to gain tracking of the contact. The report will go something like this:

Ops "Bridge, OPs, Skunk 23 to report"
OOW "Report Skunk 23"
Ops "Skunk 23, bearing 350 (True bearings only from ops) range 6 miles, tracking 165, sp 15, CPA 265 (true bearing off the ship)
6 cables in 15 min, Skunk 23.
OOW "Roger, report skunk 23" (the OOW could say report at 3 miles but by just saying report Skunk 23, Ops will automatically update the report in 3 min)

Meanwhile the CO (if he is in his c ;Dabin or on the bridge) is listening to this report and as long as all the block reports are constant and the recommendations are sound he/she will not interfere (in a perfect world, some cannot help themselves! ;D )

At night these block reports shall be in the correct sequence. The CO maybe sound asleep but CnC is always on and if there is a contact that is within the parameters set by his/her night orders the OOW has to call with the following report.

OOW "Captain Sir, Officer of the Watch"
Captain (groggily) "Captain"
OOW "I have one visual and radar contact to report. I have one deep sea bearing Red 30 range 6 miles. We are 20 degrees on her Starboard bow and her bearing is drawing left. CPA will be on our Port 1/4 at one and half miles in 8 minutes. I am happy with the situation and intend to stand on."

Hopefully the CO has not fallen back asleep and he will say "Yes Please"


I will now be flamed by other MARS officers because I may have gotten a few things wrong or its not how things are done anymore!  :rofl:

Great info, tks! 

 

[The Bread Guy]

Sure, except we don't conduct collision avoidance using GPS. We use radar and gyro compass bearings. Neither of these are on a hackable networks.

And the steering?

 

[FSTO]

And the steering?

Gyro and compass as well. But you can feed the GPS into the auto-steer .

 

[Lumber]

Gyro and compass as well. But you can feed the GPS into the auto-steer .

Woe be unto he who is OOW and makes THAT call and the CO finds out.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Woe be unto he who is OOW and makes THAT call and the CO finds out.

Not uncommon outside the Navy to set a course and let the autosteer do it's thing.  Apparently that's how the AORs rolled as well.  Ours have the deadband set too tight and the gain too high to be useful.

As an aside, as a non-experienced pump kicker type, one thing to keep in mind is all the OROs (the officer in charge of the ops room) is also an experienced OOW.  Some can be knobs, but generally they work with the OOW to make sure everyone is on the same page and the ship stays safe. 

As an aside, really weird talking to the American engineering officer and realizing they have no idea what is going on with the plant (as they are OOWs doing this as a secondary duty instead of a dedicated, trained engineer) , so the Chief is the go to for any technical questions.  All their techs are really swept up though.

 

[FSTO]

As an aside, really weird talking to the American engineering officer and realizing they have no idea what is going on with the plant (as they are OOWs doing this as a secondary duty instead of a dedicated, trained engineer) , so the Chief is the go to for any technical questions.  All their techs are really swept up though.

There has (still is?) been a debate within the USN of having dedicated engineering officer similar to the Commonwealth Navies. There are valid arguments for and against the way we do business vs the USN way. 

 

[Lumber]

As an aside, really weird talking to the American engineering officer and realizing they have no idea what is going on with the plant (as they are OOWs doing this as a secondary duty instead of a dedicated, trained engineer) , so the Chief is the go to for any technical questions.  All their techs are really swept up though.

Oh yea, when I was on the Arleigh, the "CHENG" (Chief Eng) was a Lt(N) who was always discussing with the other Lt(N)s trying to figure out if the enlisted men were bullshitting him or not. "Oh no, we can't do that, Sir", or "Oh, yea, that's perfectly fine, well within tolerances" were common things he just couldn't fully believe in.

 

[Lumber]

As an aside, as a non-experienced pump kicker type, one thing to keep in mind is all the OROs (the officer in charge of the ops room) is also an experienced OOW.  Some can be knobs, but generally they work with the OOW to make sure everyone is on the same page and the ship stays safe. 

;D

T-23 Minutes until collision, the 2nd OOW has been observing a contact closing on a steady bearing for the last 10 minutes. He's been tracking it visually and by radar, and has a solid plan to alter the ship to avoid collision. He's prepared a block report and practiced it with the OOW, and he's ready to call the Captain, and start earning the Captain's trust that he has situational awareness, knows his rules, and can keep the ship safe.

T-22 Minutes until collision, the 2nd OOW lifts the receiver, ready to speak the iconic words "Captain, Sir, 2nd OOW!", when suddenly over the speakers her hears the ORO's voice calling up from the Operations Room on the Ops Radio Net, the same net that the Captain is also listening to, and he hears:

"Hey there, OOW, what's your plan for this contact on our port bow?"

2nd OOW: "Oh, for f*kk's sake!"

 

[Lumber]

/tangent

I went ashore in '04 and returned in '10 - lots of changes in that time, I think.

I agree with your point "with experience..." but that kind of mental assessment you described is completely 'experience' dependent, and an ideal way for the error chain to start.  A Wardroom full of pre-NOPQ Subbies in, for example, the Arctic, does not scream 'experience'.  Too often I have had an overly tired OOW - even occasionally, an experienced one - think he/she has hooked the appropriate contact, but in realty the tote was displaying info for some other contact.  That arises in part because the critical component - briefly switching to Relative Motion - doesn't always happen.

I am not against True Motion at all - it is particularly helpful when conducting Blind Pilotage and help to paint the rest of the picture in all circumstances.  I'm not sure there is a 'right' answer...

/end tangent

The only thing I will say to this is that the Captain should be giving tickets to those who have this kind of keen eye and spatial awareness; not those who don't.

Alas, some people never get it, and after 2 years, they need to get people out the door and into those important staff jobs.

 

[FSTO]

;D

T-23 Minutes until collision, the 2nd OOW has been observing a contact closing on a steady bearing for the last 10 minutes. He's been tracking it visually and by radar, and has a solid plan to alter the ship to avoid collision. He's prepared a block report and practiced it with the OOW, and he's ready to call the Captain, and start earning the Captain's trust that he has situational awareness, knows his rules, and can keep the ship safe.

T-22 Minutes until collision, the 2nd OOW lifts the receiver, ready to speak the iconic words "Captain, Sir, 2nd OOW!", when suddenly over the speakers her hears the ORO's voice calling up from the Operations Room on the Ops Radio Net, the same net that the Captain is also listening to, and he hears:

"Hey there, OOW, what's your plan for this contact on our port bow?"

2nd OOW: "Oh, for f*kk's sake!"

Yep, sometimes the ORO can be your best friend or your worst enemy.

 

[tomahawk6]

The BST 21 simulator is how the Navy trains their recruits headed for duty on a Burke class DDG.

http://www.militarynews.com/norfolk-navy-flagship/news/from_the_fleet/destroyer-simulator-trayer-commissioned-at-rtc/article_f5e54aba-5870-5034-bdef-d420e7410b90.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQCh1mLTIGk

 

[GAP]

Head of Navy's 7th Fleet to be relieved of duty after second deadly mishap in Pacific
Published August 22, 2017 Fox News

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/22/head-navys-7th-fleet-to-be-relieved-duty-after-second-deadly-mishap-in-pacific.html

The U.S. Navy will relieve the commander of its 7th Fleet from duty after the fleet suffered its second deadly mishap in less than three months, a U.S. defense official confirmed to Fox News.

An official statement from the Navy regarding the relief of Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin was expected late Tuesday night. The decision was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

 

[tomahawk6]

I thought this might happen,its only fair if you hold skipper to a zero mistakes standard, its only fair for the Fleet Commander to be so judged. I have long felt the Navy was too quick to relieve a skipper, make it a lesson to learn from instead of a career ending hit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Head of Navy's 7th Fleet to be relieved of duty after second deadly mishap in Pacific
Published August 22, 2017 Fox News

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/22/head-navys-7th-fleet-to-be-relieved-duty-after-second-deadly-mishap-in-pacific.html

The U.S. Navy will relieve the commander of its 7th Fleet from duty after the fleet suffered its second deadly mishap in less than three months, a U.S. defense official confirmed to Fox News.

An official statement from the Navy regarding the relief of Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin was expected late Tuesday night. The decision was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Doesn't happen enough IMHO:

General Failure

Looking back on the troubled wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many observers are content to lay blame on the Bush administration. But inept leadership by American generals was also responsible for the failure of those wars. A culture of mediocrity has taken hold within the Army’s leadership rank—if it is not uprooted, the country’s next war is unlikely to unfold any better than the last two.

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/

 

[tomahawk6]

Singapore says the tanker was visible on VTIS but not the McCain. AIS on the McCain was turned off for security reasons. The article raises the hacking theory.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/us-destroyer-collision-uss-john-s-mccains-presence-undetectable-before-tragedy-struck-says

SINGAPORE - Singapore authorities did not detect the presence of US warship John S. McCain before its collision with an oil tanker in Singapore waters on Monday (Aug 21) morning, surfacing a possible cause for the accident.

The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) told The Straits Times that its Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) had detected only the presence of the tanker, Alnic MC.

The monitoring system detects and tracks vessels via their radar or the Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, which all commercial ships have to switch on but warships are exempt from doing so.