Report of the SC on National Defence: "Canada and the Defence of North America"

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Lots of implications for NORAD/NATO--US Navy may have big plans to expand underwater Arctic surveillance capabilities, both on North American and European NATO side (good graphics, further links at original):

The Navy Is Building A Network Of Drone Submarines And Sensor Buoys In The Arctic
As competition in the Arctic heats up, the Navy is looking to drastically increase its awareness of what is going on up there.

he U.S. Navy has awarded the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution a contract worth more than $12 million to develop unmanned undersea vehicles and buoys, along with a networked communications and data sharing infrastructure to link them all together. The project is ostensibly focused on developing a overall system to support enhanced monitoring of environmental changes in the Arctic for scientific purposes. However, it’s not hard to see how this work could be at least a stepping stone to the creation of a wide-area persistent underwater surveillance system in this increasingly strategic region.

The Pentagon announced the award of the contract in a daily notice on Sept. 29, 2020. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is managing what is officially called the Arctic Mobile Observing System (AMOS), which is also described as an “Innovative Naval Prototype” effort. ONR’s secretive Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature (NEMESIS) electronic warfare program and its work on an electromagnetic railgun, which you can read about, respectively, here and here, are also an Innovative Naval Prototype projects.

“The work to be performed provides for the design, development, integration and testing of an acoustic navigation network, a distributed communication system, gateway buoy nodes and unmanned vehicle capabilities to support the Arctic Mobile Observing System,” according to the Pentagon’s contracting notice. Woods Hole’s work under this contract is expected to wrap up by the end of the 2024 Fiscal Year.

ONR envisions the AMOS prototype as consisting of various kinds of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV), including fully-autonomous types, along with fixed sensors. All of this would be tied together through a series of communications and data sharing nodes, suspended underwater underneath buoys installed on the surface of the ice. “AMOS will be designed to persist/endure for 12 months, have a sensing footprint goal of 100 km [approximately 62 miles] from the central node and have 2-way Arctic communications (vehicle to vehicle, vehicle to node and node to shore),” according to an official project website…[read on]
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36821/the-navy-is-building-a-network-of-drone-submarines-and-sensor-buoys-in-the-arctic

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On NORAD from CDA Institute--start of report:

NORAD MODERNIZATION: REPORT TWO: DEFEAT CAPABILITIES

Introduction

NDIA/CDAI hosted the second of three webinars on 26 August 2020, intended to examine key capability requirements for the modernization of continental defence under auspice of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The goal was to allow experts from industry, academia, and government to break down silos and engage in direct conversations about North American continental defence challenges and what form NORAD modernization might take to address them. The forum was created to imagine the art of the possible. More specifically, the goal of these three events were to identify security gaps and brainstorm actionable solutions to the issues identified during the discussions.

12 August 2020: Domain Awareness/Sensors
26 August 2020: Defeat Capabilities
9 September 2020: JADC2/JADO

This second webinar focused on defeat mechanisms and brought together experts from government, academia and industry to discuss the rationale and requirements for kinetic and non-kinetic defence capabilities.

Military representatives presented a white paper template to industry representatives to structure the submission of short-, medium-, and long-term defeat mechanisms directly to NORAD J8 planners for further consideration, potential future confidential technical discussions, and possible operational endorsement. Given the urgency for enhanced sensing, short-term solutions were a major theme throughout the discussion.

NORAD Deputy Commander L. Gen Pelletier and Brig. Gen Pete Fesler provided introductory and closing remarks. A white paper overview was provided by Dr. Thomas Walker of Lockheed Martin. Co-director of the Network for Strategic Analysis and Professor of Political Science at Université du Québec à Montréal, Dr. Justin Massie served as a guest speaker. Maj Gen (USAF Ret) and VP Defence Support & Cyber Strategies for Stellar Solutions Inc., Harold “Punch” Moulton moderated a panel discussion that included:

Richard Foster, MGen (RCAF Ret), Vice President, L3Harris technologies
David Scott, Maj Gen (USAF Ret), Business Development Executive, Raytheon
Carol Zanmiller, CEO, Cosmic AES
Jerome Dunn, Chief Architect, NG Counter Hypersonics Campaign Launch & Missile Defense Systems, Northrop Grunmman

This report was produced by the CDA Institute in collaboration with rapporteurs affiliated to the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), a Department of National Defence MINDS Collaborative Network.

Executive Summary

North American defence is evolving to meet the challenges posed by hypersonic glide vehicles, new generation cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems. These threats require defeat capabilities that go beyond intercepting incoming missiles (“arrows”) to striking the launch platforms themselves (“archers”). Defeat mechanisms are part of the tripartite system concept integrating all domain awareness and joint all domain awareness and command and control (JADC2) in a layered multi-domain architecture that can track threats from “cradle to grave” in a continuous “kill chain.”

The evolution of NORAD within this defence architecture involves expanding its deterrence by denial capability, possibly into an offensive role. Canadian domestic politics traditionally opposed participation in defeat capabilities deployed by the United States, such as ballistic missile defence (BMD). Canada must decide where to prioritize its NORAD modernization efforts, whether to focus on all domain awareness and JADC2, or find niche capabilities in defeat mechanisms.

Defence industry experts offered their advice for achieving effective defeat mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms require a layered defence, specifically sensor redundancy to direct interceptors and a ‘shoot-assess-shoot’ shot doctrine to ensure NORAD has the requisite number of interceptors to deal with incoming fire. NORAD effectiveness could be improved by developing the capability to destroy adversaries’ weapons platforms before they launch. Industry solutions for catching up with adversaries in hypersonic technology include rapid prototyping to bring capabilities to the field quicker, tweaking technology designed for one mission to another, finding cost-saving ways to integrate technologies by upgrading systems and make them more stable, branching new technology off of previous models, and changing model processes through disruptive technology.

Many of the technologies that will fully enable NORAD’s fusion of all domain awareness and defeat mechanisms through JADC2 are still in development. Experts argued that Canadian industry had opportunities to contribute to NORAD modernization in data sciences, specifically artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). Canadian industry also perceives opportunities in developing non-kinetic defeat mechanisms that could first supplement and then supplant kinetic missiles…
https://cdainstitute.ca/norad-modernization-report-two-defeat-capabilities/

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MarkOttawa

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Start and finish of paper by Prof. Andrea Charron, note also cyber:

The United States Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy, Space the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy, Space Force, the Unified Command Plan Force, the Unified Command Plan and the Implications for Canada and the Implications for Canada

Canada’s wish has come true. For years, the United States seemed to completely ignore the Arctic, even forgetting it was an Arctic state. Canada had to convince the United States to join the Arctic Council in 1996. In the background, NORAD regularly surveilled the Arctic and Canada and the United States exercised in the Arctic, albeit more tactically than strategically, and not for extended periods of time. Fast forward nearly twenty-five years later and the United States has concluded that the Arctic is now one of the most geostrategically important regions in the world. In rapid succession, the United States has released more Arctic strategies, including the first ever United States' Department of the Air Force's Arctic Strategy. What does this latest strategy portend for the future and specifically for Canada? What does the creation of U.S. Space Force and the U.S. Unified Command Plan suggest for Canada in the future? Will this be a case of regretting or embracing the increased United States'attention to the Arctic?

The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy “North Star”

Officially launched on 21 July 2020, the Department of the Air Force's Arctic Strategy, dubbed “North Star”,1 has four lines of effort: 1) Vigilance in all domains; 2) Projecting power through a combat-cred-ible force; 3) Cooperation with allies and partners; and 4) Preparation for Arctic operations. Efforts 1 and 3 are germane to Canada, to NATO allies and partners and will be celebrated. Efforts 2 and 4 portend changes to current Canadian thinking about the Arctic for the future. As argued by Lindsay Rodman, the Pentagon’s 2019 Arctic Strategy marked a pivot by the United States to the Arctic and opened the door for more allied assistance.2 The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy helps to cement that pivot and highlights how important it is for allies and partners, including indigenous peoples, to work together given limited infrastructure and a vast geography; interoperability is key. North Star also brings into sharper focus the role of space as a particularly important domain for the Arctic. Canada can expect more opportunities to exercise in the Arctic (and for longer periods of time) and there is an expectation that the CAF will keep up with the new tempo that comes when the Unit-ed States is strategically engaged in a region.

Given the harsh operating conditions and geography of the Arctic pole, which limits the usefulness of ground-based radars, space-based satellites are essential for providing a better picture of what is happening on the ground, in and on the world’s oceans and in the air. Air and space are essential in the Arctic as they are the fastest avenue of approach.3 Via the air is also the only way to get assets and personnel in the right position at the right time in many cases. What North Star highlights, however, is that allies can no longer think about operating in one domain at a time; air, aerospace, space, cyber, maritime, land and even the cognitive space (think, propaganda and misinformation operations) need to be considered together. This is the focus of the binational Evolution of North American study (EvoNAD) advised by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Gone are the days of navy personnel, for example, focusing solely on the maritime environment – everyone must work jointly (with other services), combined (with allies) and in all domains – indeed, joint all domain awareness, command and control, communication and targeting are the new goals for the United States and allies will be expected to contribute and keep up.

Why the Arctic and why now?

The USAF has contemplated an Arctic strategy before, but only now has it come to fruition. One of the reasons is that Space Force – now active and another service within the U.S. Department of the Air Force – will be the force generator for space experts for USPACECOM in particular, but also for USNORTHCOM and NORAD and for other combatant commands. USNORTHCOM is responsible for both warning and defeating inbound space threats; NORAD assists only on the warning side. In either case, more space experts are bound to be helpful, especially in an Arctic context, with fewer surveil-lance assets. The other reason for the timing of North Star is that the approaches to the Arctic are trifurcated among three geographic combatant commands (USNORTHCOM, EUCOM and INDOPACOM). The seams between these commands can be exploited by competitors. An overarching view and approach to the Arctic helps reduce the significance of these seams. USAF and Space Force don’t own any operational execu-tion but they do operate across command seams. Canadian military personnel can expect to be working with Space Force personnel in the future, especially in exercises and operations that involve the Arctic. There is also an expectation that allies and partners can ensure that data arrives and is analysed “at the speed of relevance”, which means that the speed, accuracy and context of the information and intelligence allies contribute and process will contribute, in some way, to U.S.' priorities. The question becomes: can Canada keep up and contribute to this new way of thinking? While many fixate on the need to upgrade the North Warning system, the launch of North Star and inclusion of space as an important component of the strategy suggests that a rethink of U.S. military architecture is under way and with it, new doctrine which could have monumental knock-on effects for Canada – chief among them, Canada’s participation in and future of NORAD [emphasis added].

Space Force as a Pressure for Canada?
...

Lessons from increased United States Attention in Other Domains

Of course Canada has faced the pressure of “keeping up” before with the creation of USCYBERCOM.  USCYBERCOM has lessons for Canada on what to expect given changing U.S. architecture and priorities. Two recent factors suggest that the creation of Space Force and the latest Arctic Strategy may raise U.S. expectations of allies’ commitments and contribution to the space domain and they will be higher than they have been with the cyber domain [emphasis added]. The first reason, of course, is the growing power competition and perceived vulnerability of the United States to China especially – the most anticipated competitor to the United States. When Cyber Command was created in 2008 (as a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM and then as a “dual-hat” arrangement between NSA and USCYBERCOM), the world was recovering from the global recession – China and Russia were not the concerns they are today and sanctions seemed to limited North Korea and Iran’s nuclear and cyber weapons' ambitions. Today, the United States is far more concerned about the capabilities of Russia and China as well as their intentions to reshape the liberal world order. If the United States is to maintain military superiority, the United States must outpace the capabilities of peer competitors and plan how to de-ter a change in the current order. While Canada also expresses concerns about China and Russia, the 2017 Strong, Secure and Engaged defence policy is more muted about pointing fingers [emphasis added].

Cyber, however, is the domain that Canada noted required more attention as a function of the United States' heed. Canada created a cyber operator occupation in 2017.8 At the same time, President Trump elevated USCYBERCOM to a unified (functional) combatant command [emphasis added].9 It is mainly a force employer, meaning it draws its personnel from military service cyber components.  In very simple terms, personnel come to CYBERCOM ready to go; it is in the business of operating, not training.10 In contrast, Space Force is mainly a force generator and this points to the second factor and pressure point for Canada. Space Force trains and exercises space experts for them to reside within commands and forces – it is in the business of growing the numbers of space experts. Given that focus, Canada is likely to feel more pressure to do the same because training and force generation is concentrated in the RCAF, rather than across several military services as is the case for cyber. The RCAF is intimately connected to NORAD which is tied to USNORTHCOM and the United States' pivot to the Arctic. Given the importance of space assets to provide all domain awareness in the Arctic and given the ris-ing great power competition, allies around the world can expect that the United States will pay more and more attention to the Arctic  and preference the space domain for more surveillance options given the outdated NWS and the length of time it will take to create a new multisystem replacement.11 As NORAD has a vital  aerospace warning mission mainly focused on the Arctic approaches, Canada would be wise to pay heed to the Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy and consider ways to generate more space experts (and cyber) in the future to remain a valued, binational partner.
https://uwaterloo.ca/defence-security-foresight-group/sites/ca.defence-security-foresight-group/files/uploads/files/dsfg_charron_policypaper_october_2020.pdf

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No, Virginia, the Arctic is not a hotly-contested region like the South China Sea, and China is not a big deal up there at this point--three paras from a major article at War on the Rocks (further links at original):

Why the Arctic is Not the ‘Next’ South China Sea

The South China Sea and the Arctic are increasingly grouped as strategic theaters rife with renewed great-power competition. This sentiment permeates current affairs analysis, which features geopolitical links between the two maritime theaters. And these assessments are not resigned to “hot takes” — the linkage features at senior policy levels, too. Consider, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s rhetorical question, “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”..

in the Arctic, balance-of-power realities and great-power politics are not new. The region is no stranger to geopolitical competition — it was a crucial battleground during the Cold War, as it is the shortest distance for missiles to fly between the United States and Soviet Union. Further, the Arctic represented a key flank for NATO and strategically critical sea line of communication for wartime replenishment between Europe and North America. Since the Cold War, regional cooperation and U.S.-Russian ties have remained somewhat siloed from tensions beyond the Arctic. While new players and prizes have emerged in the Arctic “great game,” regional cooperation remains. Of course, the preexisting U.S.-Russian power balance in the Arctic is an important consideration when adding Beijing to the Arctic power mix. U.S. Arctic policy in recent years has been revived as part of a broader focus on renewed great-power competition. Under the Trump administration, there has been a litany of Arctic updates — the Department of Defense, Air Force, and Coast Guard have all tabled new arctic strategies...

Overall, the South China Sea and the Arctic are very different maritime regions with distinct geopolitical characteristics. China is clearly borrowing from the great-power exceptionalism playbook in the South China Sea. Yet while Beijing has articulated a clear strategic interest in the Arctic, a replication of its South China Sea play book in the Arctic is highly unlikely. Maritime exceptionalism in approaches to UNCLOS are localized and interest-based according to geography, rather than generalized and values-based seeking wholescale revision of the “rules-based international order.” This has implications for understanding challenges to multilateral governance of the global commons, particularly for how states seeking to preserve norm-based standards should calibrate their policies according to specific geographical regions, rather than relying upon a generic appeal to a “rules-based order.”

Elizabeth Buchanan is a lecturer of strategic studies at Deakin University delivering the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Australian War College. She is a fellow of the Modern War Institute at West Point and was previously a visiting maritime fellow at the NATO Defense College. Her book Red Arctic is forthcoming with The Brookings Press. She tweets at @BuchananLiz.

Bec Strating is the executive director of La Trobe Asia and a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. Her most recent monograph, Defending the Maritime Rules-based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea Disputes, was published by the East West Center in 2020. She tweets at @becstrating.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/why-the-arctic-is-not-the-next-south-china-sea/

Earlier from Elizabeth Buchanan:

Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities/

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I think this article is bang on:

Washington should chill out over Russia’s Arctic ambitions

One day before the U.S. election, Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the commissioning of a new diesel-electric icebreaker ship, the Viktor Chernomyrdin, which is the most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker in the world. Just two weeks prior, another ceremony announced the entry into service of an even larger and more formidable icebreaker, appropriately named Arktika.

Over the past couple of years, NATO has undertaken major naval forays into the Barents region and also put on large-scale exercises in the High North. Senior U.S. military officials and diplomats, moreover, have suggested that that Russian (and Chinese) activities in the Arctic constitute a major threat that requires a robust U.S. military response in the form of new deployments and new capabilities. U.S.-Russian military tensions have been increasing in nearly every geographic domain over the last several years, but with a new administration entering the White House, certain assumptions about “great power competition” deserve much closer scrutiny.

At first glance, the brand-new, nuclear-powered Arktika-class Russian icebreaker could be interpreted as stark evidence of the Kremlin’s determination to build up its capabilities to control the “roof of the world.” It is now the largest and most powerful icebreaker in operation. According to a report from the Russian-language newspaper Izvestiya, Arktika already sortied to the North Pole in early October, breaking through 3-meter ice en route.

Russia is the only Arctic country that produces nuclear icebreakers. But these extraordinary ships do not come cheap, with a price well in excess of $1 billion per hull. It is important, moreover, to see that the new Russian nuclear icebreaker is not a “one off” of purely symbolic significance. Two more of these ships, Sibir and Ural, are launched already. A fourth ship in this class, Yakutia, is now being built, while the fifth hull, Chukotka, will soon be laid down. In addition, preparations are underway in the Russian Far East to start building an even larger class of nuclear icebreaker.

These hulking ships are the basis for building the Northern Sea Route, or NSR. That route shaves off several thousand kilometers of navigation for ships plying the essential route from Asia to Europe. Notably, Chinese investment in the “Polar Silk Road” through the Yamal gas field has contributed substantially to both the viability of the NSR as well as to cleaner skies in China, since the Middle Kingdom has continued its timely shift from coal to cleaner-burning natural gas.

To be sure, there has been a military component to Russia’s emergent strategy for the Arctic. The Kremlin created a new Arctic command back in 2014. Some new bases have been established, and older bases have been upgraded. Bombers have recently made visits to some of these remote bases. A new military “combat icebreaker” class was launched in St. Petersburg back in fall 2019.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that Russia has about 24,000 kilometers of Arctic coastline. For decades, this remote wilderness has been neglected and only thinly defended. One can hardly accuse the Kremlin of “aggression” when its small deployments have all been to its own territories. These deployments, moreover, can also be justified as quite necessary for the safety of ships plying the NSR or to respond to an environmental emergency. And it is far from clear that a few hundred soldiers bunking in an Arctic Trefoil and staring at walruses on Alexandra Land are a threat to anyone in particular. Nor can American strategists argue with a straight face that ships navigating the NSR along Russia’s Arctic coastline and complying with Russian law to submit information regarding navigation plans somehow constitute a threat to the liberal trading order.

True, Russia-China military collaboration in the Arctic must be watched closely, but that cooperation remains hypothetical at present and will likely remain so, unless there is a deepening of the “New Cold War.”

American strategists must recognize that all those billions in Russian funds allocated to fund unarmed icebreakers could also have been spent on Russian aircraft carriers or on its submarine force. Rather, the Kremlin has taken a page from China’s book and pursued commercial profits and development over military superiority. Such commercial (vice military) impulses are to be encouraged.

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden should reevaluate relations with Russia in an environment free from partisan rancor. In doing so, he should look well beyond puerile issues regarding stolen emails, social media absurdity and opposition research shenanigans.

By contrast, three genuinely grave issues should be on the Russia agenda for the incoming president: revitalizing arms control; striving to reach basic agreement on regional security hot spots from Libya to Belarus to North Korea; and emphasizing the imperative to address climate change.

It is on the latter issue specifically that Washington should be pressing Moscow. In that regard, the new president-elect should include a cooperative agenda for the Arctic that allows for development but that aims primarily to safeguard the environment. Bending “great power competition” toward great power cooperation will not only help solve the world’s most pressing problems, but also enable the prioritization of healing and also nation-building at home.

Lyle Goldstein is a research professor at the U.S. Naval War College, where he founded the China Maritime Studies Institute. He also works with the college’s Russia Maritime Studies Institute. The opinions in this article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect any official assessment of the U.S. Navy.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/11/13/reflecting-on-future-us-russia-relations-through-the-lens-of-the-high-north/

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I agree with you Mark, the article is bang on in my opinion too.


Not enough people - whether it's the general population or even the politicians that are involved in policy, have taken the time to look at a globe.  Even fewer have taken the time to look at a map specifically of the arctic region.

While there will be the possibility of interaction with Russian government entities in the arctic as the arctic opens up, they aren't anywhere near as close to us as the media seems to indicate.  And they do have every right to develop their own natural resources inside their own territory.


If there was some kind of disaster, such as an airliner going down - or even a ship in distress - the Russians have the physical capability to respond.  Neither we, nor the Americans, do.

(I'm not referring to an airliner going down the way it did during Operation Nanook a few years back.  I'm referring to one having an emergency even further north, in that sweet spot where Russian & North American territories start to meet.)
 

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The coastline to watch is large but technology and citizen soldiers can help. We have had issues with the Russians messing with the crab fleet. Civilian fishermen need to be watched/protected They a by the Coast Guard. But they are stretched thin.
 

MarkOttawa

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tomahawk6 said:
The coastline to watch is large but technology and citizen soldiers can help. We have had issues with the Russians messing with the crab fleet. Civilian fishermen need to be watched/protected They a by the Coast Guard. But they are stretched thin.

The CCG does not do the actual protecting--they provide the vessels (platforms) for enforcement officers (Fisheries, RCMP) to do that.

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MarkOttawa said:
The CCG does not do the actual protecting--they provide the vessels (platforms) for enforcement officers (Fisheries, RCMP) to do that.

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Should we not give them that power to free up the other two agencies?
 

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MilEME09 said:
Should we not give them that power to free up the other two agencies?

And maybe the CF's too? Adding a constabulary role to the CCG always seems to hit a road block or two even at just the discussion stage.

With regard to the Northern Sea Route it bears watching going forward as this year there has been an extended period where ships were able to transit while completely avoiding Russian waters
 

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suffolkowner said:
And maybe the CF's too? Adding a constabulary role to the CCG always seems to hit a road block or two even at just the discussion stage.

With regard to the Northern Sea Route it bears watching going forward as this year there has been an extended period where ships were able to transit while completely avoiding Russian waters


It's going to require a shakeup of the CCG leadership & some common sense from Parliament to make it happen.

There needs to be a cultural shift at the top, and I don't think that'll happen until some of the senior leadership of the CCG retire.  They've had entire careers with a certain culture within the CCG, it'll be hard to change that.


But asking our Coast Guard to actually be able to guard something isn't too much to ask...  :2c:
 

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CBH99 said:
It's going to require a shakeup of the CCG leadership & some common sense from Parliament to make it happen.

There needs to be a cultural shift at the top, and I don't think that'll happen until some of the senior leadership of the CCG retire.  They've had entire careers with a certain culture within the CCG, it'll be hard to change that.


But asking our Coast Guard to actually be able to guard something isn't too much to ask...  :2c:

There has been quite a few former Senior RCN pers who have joined the CCG. Maybe a bit of cultural shift is on its way?
 

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RCN CSC's SPY-7 Aegis radar missile-defence capable and Raytheon SM-3 could be carried in VLS:

US successfully intercepts ICBM with ship-launched missile in historic test
The U.S. now has another defense system defending against North Korean ICBM’s.

In a first-of-its-kind test, the United States has successfully used a small ship-fired missile to intercept a target Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), according to the Missile Defense Agency. The successful test shows the U.S. military now has another missile defense system capable of defending against North Korean ICBM’s aimed at the United States.

“The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and U.S. Navy sailors aboard an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System-equipped destroyer intercepted and destroyed a threat-representative Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) target with a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA missile during a flight test demonstration in the broad ocean area northeast of Hawaii [emphasis added], Nov. 16,” said a statement from the Missile Defense Agency.

A target ICBM missile launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean traveled thousands of miles towards the body of water between Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States mainland.

The destroyer USS John Finn that was positioned in those waters then fired an SM3 missile that successfully intercepted the target ICBM. The interceptor missile was directed towards its target using tracking information provided by an array of sensor systems designed to monitor any incoming missile attack on the United States.

The successful intercept marked the first time that a target ICBM had been intercepted by a ship-launched interceptor missile.

Previous interceptor tests have been carried out with the much larger Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles based in Alaska and California that are designed to prevent a North Korean ICBM attack on the United States...
https://abcnews.go.com/US/us-successfully-intercepts-icbm-ship-launched-missile-historic/story?id=74248760

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Congress now noticing NORAD/North Warning System--US armed services are furiously active outlining plans to take part in what I call “the Arctic policy party” (see this article at War on the Rocks on the need to coordinate the US’ military–and civilian–Arctic efforts: “Focusing the Military Services’ Arctic Strategies“).


The latest one is the US Army; I discovered the Congressional interest in NORAD/North Warning system in the article on the army below. If that interest persists, indeed grows, the pressure on Canada to start DOING SOMETHING may really mount–especially as the Biden administration might well look favourably on pushing ahead with a necessary and defensive military renewal. Here’s what Congress has done, note the focus on cruise missiles:


Army chief teases new Arctic strategy
…Congressional appropriators provided $100 million for the U.S. North Warning System in the fiscal 2021 defense spending bill and is requiring the Pentagon to provide a report on the status of the system to include its operational integrity and what technology is used by the system compared to technology necessary to detect current and anticipated threats, particularly cruise missiles. The North Warning System is a joint U.S. and Canadian early-warning radar system for North American air defense.

The bill also requires the Defense Department to come up with a plan to modernize capability to defend the homeland against cruise missiles including the modernization of the North Warning System…

I’ve seen nothing public to indicate that attention has been paid in Canada to these actions. I see them an indication that we had really better be getting our renewal act in gear before some hard hammering starts coming from the Americans.

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MarkOttawa

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Congress now noticing NORAD/North Warning System--US armed services are furiously active outlining plans to take part in what I call “the Arctic policy party” (see this article at War on the Rocks on the need to coordinate the US’ military–and civilian–Arctic efforts: “Focusing the Military Services’ Arctic Strategies“).


The latest one is the US Army; I discovered the Congressional interest in NORAD/North Warning system in the article on the army below. If that interest persists, indeed grows, the pressure on Canada to start DOING SOMETHING may really mount–especially as the Biden administration might well look favourably on pushing ahead with a necessary and defensive military renewal. Here’s what Congress has done, note the focus on cruise missiles:






I’ve seen nothing public to indicate that attention has been paid in Canada to these actions. I see them an indication that we had really better be getting our renewal act in gear before some hard hammering starts coming from the Americans.

Mark
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Biden admin starting to put pressure on Trudeau gov't over NORAD modernization, North Warning System--our gov't still basically dithering, not willing to commit serious bucks. At the Wall St. Journal:

Cold War-Era Defense System to Get Upgrade to Counter Russia, China
The U.S. and Canada move to modernize a missile-surveillance system in the Arctic that officials say is outdated

The U.S. and Canada plan to modernize a network of defense satellites and radar in the Arctic, in a bid to counter a growing military presence in the north from Russia and China.

President Biden asked Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to ramp up Canada’s spending on defense, including an upgrade of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, commonly known as Norad, during a bilateral meeting between the two leaders on Tuesday, according to an official familiar with the discussions.

Norad was a central part of the U.S. and Canadian military’s Cold War deterrence strategy against the former Soviet Union. Consisting of satellites, ground-based radar, and air-force bases located mostly in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic, the surveillance system was designed to give the military allies notice of any impending attack from the north.

The system, once state-of-the-art, has since become outdated. New missiles being deployed by Russia and China can travel at more than five times the speed of sound and fly much farther than their predecessors, which would overwhelm the existing surveillance network, said Michael Dawson, who served as Canadian political adviser to Norad command in Colorado from 2010 to 2014…

President Biden made a pointed reference to Norad in his public comments after the Tuesday meeting, Mr. Biden’s first bilateral with a foreign leader since his election. He said the countries had agreed to modernize the system, which is jointly controlled by both governments.

…On Friday, the U.S. State Department listed the defense system as one of the priorities for the U.S. and Canadian bilateral relationship, ahead of a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Mr. Trudeau along with other senior officials.

“We welcome Canada’s reinforced commitment to Norad as we modernize the command to meet new global security challenges,” said the department in a fact sheet issued before Mr. Blinken’s meeting Friday, via videoconference, with Canadian officials [see below for Canadian readout of meeting]…

Though Canada committed in 2017 to boost defense spending by 70% over a decade, Mr. Trudeau’s government hasn’t set aside any money specifically to update the Arctic warning system, a project that could cost the country $6 billion—roughly 40% of the $15 billion estimated cost, said James Fergusson, deputy director of the University of Manitoba’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

That money would represent a major commitment for Canada…

Canadian officials have publicly acknowledged the importance of the upgrades.

“Now is the opportunity to really ramp things up,” Canada’s defense minister, Harjit Sajjan, said in a late January interview. Mr. Sajjan also discussed the modernization with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during a call in January…

Behind the scenes, officials in both countries have worked on projects aimed at best updating the technology [of the North Warning System] required to protect the continent’s airspace, said John McKay, a Canadian legislator and co-chairman of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense—a U.S.-Canada group that advises the country’s leaders on North American defense…
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cold-w...t-upgrade-to-counter-russia-china-11614438048

Canadian readout of Blinken/Garneau virtual meeting made no mention of NORAD, just says this:


As agreed upon by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau, both leaders are working on a future joint meeting of foreign and defence ministers and secretaries in which continental security cooperation will be discussed in greater depth…
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-aff...teral-meeting-with-us-secretary-of-state.html

REALLY THIN, eh?

Mark
Ottawa
 
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