I suspect that if the Reserves had (modern) equipment and a defined role, that recruiting would not be so much of an issue.
I suspect you are right that it would fix most of the issues, and it's something that should be achievable for a rich country like Canada. The problem is, what roles, and how expensive is the kit? Can't be issuing the troops "Cadillacs"...
There are 38 million people in this country. Hundreds of thousand volunteer to coach hockey. We're looking for 20-25,000 at any given time. Surely we can generate that if we give them a good product to join. Will it work with what the Army currently offers? Let's just say that bad as it is we still have 10-15,000 at any given time. I have zero doubt that with a properly restructured, led and equipped force you will get the numbers needed.
I have none of the faith you do that tens of thousands of Canadians will turn up to parade in full kit just because it's shiny new kit, and the boss has done better DLN courses.
As for regulars leaving to fill out reserve units with a leavening of experience; it all depends on how you incentivize it and run it.
If you're kicking out people from their full-time job because you don't have room for them in the new smaller RegF army, what do you think would incentivize them in numbers sufficient to matter to stick around and play at their old job on the weekends?
Also, if they had what it takes to be the best leaders, they'd have been picked up by the RegF to stay on full-time...
That said, I agree that the ResF needs help, and like
@KevinB said, it needs a defined
realistic role. Capabilities that can be done part-time, and serve a purpose are great for them, capabilities that need full-time people to maintain skills, not so much. I also think the CAF needs to work harder to make transitioning RegF-> ResF, and ResF->RegF a lot easier.
And the cadet movement was massive and designed to teach drill and marksmanship to children so as to create a valuable precursor for a levée en masse military force capable of repelling the rapacious Americans. And not withstanding the social nature of those Militia regiments, they still produced the core of the Army's officers and other ranks that volunteered to go to war in large numbers not once but twice and who continued to volunteer to back up the regular army in the field for seven decades since.
The Militia Myth rears it's ugly head again!
Those Militia officers were on the books full-time for years before they were leading troops in battle in WWII, they were RegF by that stage, little different from the RegF Lts and Capts leading troops in Afghanistan. That they had been part of a social club prior to the war wasn't likely a significant factor in their performance during the war.
The coaching analogy was merely to say that we are a country where volunteerism and devoting one's spare time to an activity that benefits the community is not dead. Create an organization that has demonstrable value and there will be more than enough participants in it.
It's a false comparison, many volunteers with organizations for kids leave when their kids leave. They have to be up and at the rink already for their kid, might as well do something while they are there. Some stick around, but likely at about the same percentage as people who choose to be in the ResF for 20+ years.
I know I keep harping on this but for me this is a very simple issue of math.
As long as the CAF put the vast number of its eggs in the RegF basket it will keep shrinking and lose capability after capability until it becomes irrelevant and incapable of providing security for the nation. The only way to up the personnel strength and the quality and amount of equipment is to find savings in personnel costs. This requires a massive downsizing of the CAF's administrative overhead and to increase the quality and quantity of the ResF. If anyone can come up with any other viable scheme other than "increase the budget" I'd be happy to hear it and get on board.
That will happen regardless of whether it's a small professional full-time force, or a social club with guns if Canadians and the GoC don't start to take defence seriously. Flipping positions to ResF might slow the degradation slightly, but eventually even those part-timers will be viewed as an expensive luxury. So rather than a small full-time force with delusions of grandeur, we'll have a slightly larger, more dispersed force of part-timers with delusions of grandeur.
Fixing the CAF requires a strong ResF, but it also requires a strong RegF, with sufficient funding and public support.