Army Medic,
Believe it. As OC Cbt Sp Coy 3 PPCLI, I was sufficently "connected" within the BG HQ to know exactly what was going on regarding kit as well as everything else that affected the BG before, during and following the deployment.
I could relate numerous stories of borderline criminal betrayal by the Land Staff at NDHQ regarding kit for the first Afghan deployment. E-mail exchanges between Adm Coy 3 PPCLI, Cbt Sp Coy 3 PPCLI, and NDHQ DLR exist which do not cast a positive light on the Army procurement system. Big surprise, eh?
Perhaps an example is in order. We ordered something so simple as Surefire flashlights with a pressure-activated switch back in October 2001, in anticipation of our deployment. We were told "wait for it, they will be delivered in-theatre no later than April 2003". The April promise carried on after we deployed in Jan 2002, and continued until April (and our first battalion combat air assault) had come and gone. In May 2002, our 2IC Adm Coy asked DLR what the hold-up was. The answer was that there was such a demand for the product, that the Canadian Army was way down the priority list for delivery. We probably wouldn't see them. Our 2IC Adm Coy got so frustrated that he called Surefire Inc in the USA directly by satphone. They rep he talked to told him that they could have 1200 Surefires with mounts in-theatre via DHL (think international Purolator, flying directly into Kandahar 2x per week) within 10 days. All we need to provide was a credit card number. So much for being at the back of the line....
Or how about another example? The commander Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia (JTSFWA) BGen Gauthier visited the Battlegroup in Kandahar in May 2002. I personally asked him why I had read in the on-line Winnipeg Sun that the first production run of Arid Regions CADPAT was done, yet was not available to the Battlegroup for combat operations. BGen Gauthier's response was that I must be wrong. Hmmmm - don't think so. A week after the General departs, our LO in BG HQ gets a "brown envelope" via e-mail from a buddy in Petawawa confirming that 1200 sets of AR CADPAT are stockpiled at base clothing stores in anticipation of a 3 RCR roto. The clothing could have been DHL'ed to 3PPCLI BG within 10 days. But instead, the government waffled over a rotation and DND kept a close hold on the desert CADPAT uniforms. 3 PPCLI BG launched its final combat operation into Zabol Province on "Canada Day", July 1st 2002. The "powers that be" had elected not to send us the uniforms we needed because they were too frigging cheap to write them off for the final month of combt operations. Had anyone taken a shot, it would have been grounds for a class-action lawsuit against the federal government.
There are numerous other examples of how 3 PPCLI BG was left out to dry during the Army's first deliberate combat operation since Korea. I could quite literally, go on and on. It is embarassing, and utterly shameful.
Quite frankly, if it hadn't been for our "parent" U.S. Brigade taking care of us with loans of armoured HMMVWs, MREs, etc, etc, we'd have been royally screwed. The Canadian "system" failed 3 PPCLI Battlegroup repeatedly, and if not for the good graces of our U.S. comrades, catastrophically. Al NDHQ cared about was whether or not we would "ruffle feathers" in the media by doing something stupid. NDHQ was an impediment to progress in Afghanistan. They offered nothing of value. Zero, zip, nada, zilch. If anything, they were a completely superfluous pain in the *** .
I won't even get into the utterly ludicrous direction we received for an alcohol policy governing our sole, 3-day R&R in *****. Wll, OK - yes I will. It amounted to a total of three days off in 6 months of offensive and defensive combat ops. 3 x deliberate battalion air-assaults against a (supposedly) determined enemy, constant threat of rocket, mortar and truck-borne IED attacks during 6 months of defensive operations at KAF, endless mounted & dismounted combat patrols through the most heavily mined real estate in the world, covert OP insertions and extractions, etc, etc. Living 2 men in a 40man recce tent for 6 months, eating IMPs/MREs every day, etc, etc, etc. And then when we devise a 3-day R & R rotation to *****, the direction from NDHQ is "2 per man per day" because the Airforce is stationed in ***** and it is therefore deemed to be an "operational theatre". Give me a frigging break.....The only danger in ***** was alcohol poisoning if you happened to be in the Airforce, living in a (I **** you not) 4-star hotel on a per-diem. And they told us 2 per man per day, so as not to upset the Airforce types in their 4-star hotel rooms.....
Well, I could go on and on, but I no doubt already sound like a whiner. Be that as it may, everything I've said here is the honest truth from the perspective of a senior officer in 3 PPCLI BG. If "they" want to fry me, they can fill their friggin boots. Quite frankly, I could give a flying ****.
I just hope that the next crew gets better support from NDHQ while they are directing traffic and dodging car-bombs in Kabul. Lord knows, 3 PPCLI BG didn't get squat aside from panicked questions from the "grown-ups" when we were out there actually trying our ****ed best to kill terrorist scum-bags. Let's all hope that 2 CMBG has a better go.
Bartok