Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M

[OldSolduer]

Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.

For FRY we went to Fort Ord. It was needed and necessary. A few of the troops used that training in Sep 1993.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London.   

 

[daftandbarmy]

What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London. 

And it took 20 years, and was one of the reasons that Britain delayed giving up 'National Service' post WW2.

And it's still not 'over', over. Seriously.

Regardless, this is a good read by Rand:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf

 

[Edward Campbell]

My favourite book on the topic is Brig Richard Clutterbuck's "The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam" published back in 1966.

As I recall it was a gift from and older, much more senior officer who was, probably, tired of my questions about the nature of counter-insurgency (a subject about which he had more than just a passing familiarity). Many, many of us were fascinated with what was happening in Viet Nam in the mid 1960s but we had too few experienced Canadian officers to guide us.

I am not happy with the notion that Malaya = Viet Nam or even than Malaya ≈ Viet Nam; they were both insurgencies but, there, especially after the French left with their tails between their legs, most similarities ended. That being said, how one "sees" an insurgency (top down or bottom up) matters, and I believe that the Brits, from Templar on down, understood what they really meant by "winning hearts and minds." Clutterbuck, for example, gives special emphasis to the role of the (native) village police constable as the very beating heart of a successful COIN campaign and he explains why the Army's job is to support and protect that constable ~ not the other way 'round. I'm far less convinced that "hearts and minds" was ever anything for than a slogan, to be repeated mindlessly, to e.g. Maxwell Taylor and William Westmorland.

At the very top, at the US president/UK prime minister level, I believe that John F Kennedy was more interested in the use of power than in the fate of Viet Nam or in America's interests in Asia. In London, however, Clement Atlee (1945-51) and Winston Churchill (1951-55) had many other more difficult issues than an insurgency in a far distant colony and they let their career civil servants, e.g. Sir Robert Thompson, and generals, e.g. Briggs and Templar, to sort things out ... the central government contented itself with supporting them, politically and logistically, as best it could. That may have been more good luck than good management but, I believe, it was a the key difference in the two campaigns.

A second fundamental difference, in my opinion, was in the nature of the two proconsuls: I remain convinced that Maxwell Taylor was, at best, a second rate general who just happened to have "good" political connections and a keen sense of self promotion while Gerald Templar was a solid, albeit unspectacular officer who a) inherited the basics of a good plan from Briggs; b) got GREAT strategic and policy guidance from Thompson and c) understood the very nature of that particular insurgency, which is to say that he actually understood and even somewhat sympathized with the legitimate grievances of the Malay-Chinese.

My  :2c:  the 1960s were long, long ago but 'The Long, Long War' is still worth a read.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.

The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)

The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.

 

[Blackadder1916]

An interesting discussion.  A couple of shorter pieces that may be of interest to the topic are:

Extracting Counterinsurgency lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan
https://rusi.org/commentary/extracting-counterinsurgency-lessons-malayan-emergency-and-afghanistan

And from DARPA/Rand circa 1972 (some interesting perspectives as the USA was still in Vietnam)

The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf

Plus,

Comparison of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War and Application of Lessons to Solve El Salvador Problems and Appropriate U.S. Military Assistance    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a182811.pdf

While not a very in-depth analysis, it does add a perspective of a Malaysian officer (my assumption due to his name) attending a US Army staff course in 1987.  It caught my attention because a few short years later, I had occasion to attended a US Army course where two of my fellow international (read foreign) students were a Malaysian Capt (doctor with Special Forces battalion) and an El Salvadoran Capt (Med Svc Corps but former Inf who transferred after being wounded).  During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.

And this which was reviewed favourably in Canadian Military Journal several years ago.
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl, University of Chicago Press, 2002

 

[Cloud Cover]

The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)

The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.

Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?

A lot, their jungles just aren't very close to their main enemy, and the primary threat to Australia's sphere of influence in that area: Indonesia.

They have an interesting alliance with Singapore too.

 

[pbi]

During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.

Last year I was part of a team from CASC which delivered a Campaign Planning Course at several international locations, in support of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation. One of the places we did the course was at the Colombian Army's Combined Arms Centre in Bogota. I had the opportunity to work closely with a Col of Artillery of the Colombian Army  who shadowed us on behalf of their CAC.

Apart from being an extremely knowledgeable and professional officer with bags of combat experience (both as a Gunner and "dismounted" in the Inf Role) he was very knowledgeable about COIN, specifically the nasty war against FARC and the FLN. Not only was he fully versed in the tactics of it, but he clearly understood the strategic and political implications in the Western Hemisphere. It was a real honour and professional experience to have met him. (and had a few drinks...!!! [cheers]

I was so impressed by him that I felt he would be an excellent speaker on COIN at CACSC, if only to break the habit of Brit or US speakers. I suggested his name to the Cmdt of CACSC, who received it well but I'm not sure what happened after that. There are many perspectives on COIN and they aren't all from the Anglosphere.

 

[pbi]

A lot, their jungles just aren't very close to their main enemy, and the primary threat to Australia's sphere of influence in that area: Indonesia.

They have an interesting alliance with Singapore too.

Yes: they used to call the Indonesian-based enemy  "Mesaurians".

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yes: they used to call the Indonesian-based enemy  "Mesaurians".

I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.

Go big or go home?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Go big or go home?

Definitely. They had M79s apparently but were usually instantly outgunned, so they apparently took to launching an immediate assault so they could close the distance quickly before the mortars could range on them.

I heard similar experiences from guys who faced enemy troops equipped with AK 47s in the jungle. Up close, 7.62 x 39mm is the same caliber and has a pretty similar capability as a C6, so they had to develop drills where the C6 was near the front of the 'snake' so they could match the bad guys' firepower and close quickly.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I met some guys who had been in various dust ups against the Indonesians. They were apparently tough  jungle fighters who like to deploy their 60mm mortars immediately during contacts, which was alarming to say the least.

Clearly they didn't get the memo that infantry run mortars are obsolete........

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Tangent. I went through the original article, which was fun to do after two years.

I recently served for a year in a UN mission. I was an unarmed patroller for four months (great fun) and then Chief of Operations for eight months (hard work). We were a small observer mission OPCON to a much larger armed mission (a divisional structure with 10,000 troops, a helo sqn and a naval task group). I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.

UN peacekeeping has evolved since the 90s. Our experience in Afghanistan would not be a hindrance in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Tough, disciplined, well-led and well-equipped troops will always be an asset to the UN wherever they come from. Three of the battalions in the force that I worked alongside were from NATO nations with long-standing commitments to Afghanistan. I was always happy to see them. I reflected at the time that a Canadian BG would have done extremely well, as would a Canadian Bde as a Sector HQ and our Div as the core of the Force HQ. The BG would have to go through a training program that would start with conventional combined arms training and culminate in a realistic UN-based exercise, but we are very good at generating and training battle groups.

The senior leadership and staff officers would benefit from some professional development (PD) regarding UN integrated missions and the vital role of UN civilian staff on such missions - nothing too difficult for leaders trained in the comprehensive approach for Afghanistan. Some officers and NCOs would benefit from more detailed PD (those in the G9 world) but again, nothing too complicated. If I was able to navigate the integrated HQ then anybody can.

It would be an adjustment to be an impartial UN peacekeeper, but there is a road to deployment to allow you to get in the mindset. I am not saying that we should or should not do this, but rather that our leadership and troops would excel at it.

Back to talking about mortars in the Malayan jungles...

 

[pbi]

... I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.

UN peacekeeping has evolved since the 90s. Our experience in Afghanistan would not be a hindrance in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Tough, disciplined, well-led and well-equipped troops will always be an asset to the UN wherever they come from.

It would be an adjustment to be an impartial UN peacekeeper, but there is a road to deployment to allow you to get in the mindset. I am not saying that we should or should not do this, but rather that our leadership and troops would excel at it.

I am also 100% sure these observations are correct, even though I am well past my best-before date. These were always my observations on my UN missions. I really don't see how anything else can be true. I recently read an article concerning the UN's intentions to improve the security of it's peacekeepers.The article included this paragraph:

These include (1) changing mindsets so that personnel are aware of the risks and empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks; (2) improving capacities so that the mission and personnel are equipped and trained to operate in high-threat environments; (3) achieving a “threat sensitive mission footprint” that is aligned with mission mandates and limits the exposure of the mission to threat; and (4) enhancing accountability to ensure that those able to take actions to prevent fatalities and injuries live up to their responsibilities.

Or, in other words, pretty much what you would expect from a disciplined professional army with a solid basis in combat training (as T2B suggests), but with the usual TMST to orient to the task at hand.

IMHO it is very important to consider the approach and mindset that Prof Dorn (and others like him...) likely come from.  I will hazard a guess that this includes a visceral opposition to the Afghan War; a dislike and suspicion of the US military; and an almost religious view of the UN. I could be wrong but I bet I'm not.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Tangent. I went through the original article, which was fun to do after two years.

I recently served for a year in a UN mission. I was an unarmed patroller for four months (great fun) and then Chief of Operations for eight months (hard work). We were a small observer mission OPCON to a much larger armed mission (a divisional structure with 10,000 troops, a helo sqn and a naval task group). I think that our military is actually well-prepared for peacekeeping, although of course we'd have to conduct training for a mission. You'd do that for any mission.

UN peacekeeping has evolved since the 90s. Our experience in Afghanistan would not be a hindrance in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. Tough, disciplined, well-led and well-equipped troops will always be an asset to the UN wherever they come from. Three of the battalions in the force that I worked alongside were from NATO nations with long-standing commitments to Afghanistan. I was always happy to see them. I reflected at the time that a Canadian BG would have done extremely well, as would a Canadian Bde as a Sector HQ and our Div as the core of the Force HQ. The BG would have to go through a training program that would start with conventional combined arms training and culminate in a realistic UN-based exercise, but we are very good at generating and training battle groups.

The senior leadership and staff officers would benefit from some professional development (PD) regarding UN integrated missions and the vital role of UN civilian staff on such missions - nothing too difficult for leaders trained in the comprehensive approach for Afghanistan. Some officers and NCOs would benefit from more detailed PD (those in the G9 world) but again, nothing too complicated. If I was able to navigate the integrated HQ then anybody can.

It would be an adjustment to be an impartial UN peacekeeper, but there is a road to deployment to allow you to get in the mindset. I am not saying that we should or should not do this, but rather that our leadership and troops would excel at it.

Back to talking about mortars in the Malayan jungles...

Our military has always been prepared however, as we've seen in places like Somalia and FRY, our political masters - and the Canadian public to whom they answer - are not.

As this article suggests, one caution about Malaya (if I can head back into the green vomit briefly) is that:

"To attempt to borrow lessons from the Emergency is to ignore the fact that many of the strategies practiced by the British would be considered abhorrent by Western liberal sensibilities today, including the forcible resettlement of populations."

http://warisboring.com/were-getting-the-malaysia-counterinsurgency-all-wrong/

 

[pbi]

As this article suggests, one caution about Malaya (if I can head back into the green vomit briefly) is that:

It's probably also worth repeating that Malaya presented a set of unique circumstances which probably won't be repeated exactly again, and which IMHO tended to work in favour of the British. But, definitely one of the very key factors that aided the British was an army consisting either of units which were composed wholly of professionals; or of National Servicemen led by cadres of professional officers and NCOs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Not to mention with that resettlement came a path of citizenship and land rights, which few of the people moved enjoyed prior to Emergency.