Light vs Medium forces

[Kirkhill]

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The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.   They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.

Again, I'll disagree - the British Army has always maintained "specializations" or "niche capabilities" (not Niche Roles).   Their Infantry would rotate through various "capability sets" such as Jungle, Mountain, Armoured Infantry (Warrior), Mechanized Infantry (Saxon), Airborne, etc, etc.   As was mentioned on a thread on these boards, the Brits are moving away from rotation to a fixing "niche specialities" amongst units in the Army due to the problems associated with skills loss in constant reroling.

So we agree we disagree.  

Look, my read of the Brits, with their new structure, means that they will have 7 Warrior Battalions, 2 Parachute Infantry Battalions and maybe 1 or 2 Air Assault Battalions.  They might even dedicate some specialized medium battalions (6-9).  That means 7 armoured infantry, 9-13 Light Infantry with a particular transport specialization and 12 to 16 other Light Infantry battalions.  Any and all of those units will no doubt be involved in training for operations in different environments.  But the base-line unit is still the Light Infantry unit for all but the Armoured Infantry.

So, sure the Brits would rotate a unit to a "general purpose" or "constabulary" role, especially for units rotating through North Ireland.   But with our small resource base, this is not something I want to see us "niche capabilied" with, rather I'd focus on the two tasks (Light/Cav) which a far more relevent to combat capable forces.

But stability ops are precisely the ops that your combat capable forces are going to be deployed on.  That means that like a USMC MEU (Special Operations Capable), fighting the proverbial 3-Block war, you are going to be required to work across the entire spectrum of conflict.
MEU Missions (per Clancy: Marine)

Assaults - amphibious,  Raids (8 different kinds), Covert Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Specialized Demolitions, Fire Support Coordination, Guiding other units in, Military Operations in Urban Terrain, Security Operations (crowd control), Show of force, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Relief Operations, Civil Support and Training.... and I may have missed a few.  This Special Operations Capable force has such a wide range of Special Capabilities that it is Generally useful, regardless of the situation.  These are concurrent capabilities of a USMC Light Infantry Battle Group (which gets around by whatever means are available - helos, trucks or armoured tracks.  The skills are not lost, they are constantly practiced and confirmed prior to being designated SOC and allowed to deploy.

Quote
Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.   The Royal Marines are not Special.   They don't have much in the way of Special kit.   Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.   They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.   They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.   They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.   And they can mount raids. They are not Special.   They are Generalists.   Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.

However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.

They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.   This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.

I will whole-heartedly disagree here. The Royal Marines are in no way "General Purpose" - they are specialized as a SOC capable, strategically deployable Light Force.   As I've stressed many times, putting a RM Commando in Warriors and expecting them to do a Combat Team attack is foolhardy - they are "Bergen troops".   They didn't do this in Iraq, it was left to Heavy Force units to fight with Challenger IIs and Warriors.

See the argument above relative to the USMC MEU SOC.  Specialized skills that cover the entire range of operations that overlap with each other makes the RM and the USMC GENERALLY useful.  It is precisely because they can do so many things so bloody well that they are so valuable to their governments and their allies.

The RM is a "niche capability", all-arms unit focused on Light Amphibious Ops.   Their extremely rigorous "Commando Course" is demanding enough that, along with a Focus on Light Force capabilites (Commando 21 reflects this) and their intimate support of British Tier II and Tier I SOC units (the SAS, the SBS, and the 3 Cdo Bde Recce Troop) would qualify them as as a Tier III Special Operations Capable Unit (akin to US Army Rangers).

They are NOT a "niche capability".  Mention any operation in any environment that the Brits have been in since World War 2 and the Marines have been in it. Falklands, Malaya, Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Iraq.  Every job that any British Army infantry unit has done the Marines have done - including keeping the strife to a minimum in places like the Bogside by patrolling the streets.

You can't say that for the US Army Rangers.  THEY have their niche, and they stick to it.

The Marines are Generalists, and as I said if not the best then definitely among the best.  I will admit that they do indeed have a niche capability, and that capability defines them. It does not, however, restrict them.
 

The latest edition of the CMJ has good overview of SOC capabilities

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/home_e.asp

Clearly, stating that their "Generalists" is selling the RM short on what they can do and attributing to them things they can't do.

I do not sell them short.  Nor do I expect them to launch an armoured assault - I would expect them to cooperate with armoured forces, as they just did in Basra to clear out the town.

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So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.   Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.

The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.   It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.   It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.

Clearly, as the article by LtCol Wayne Eyre (which I linked to in the other Light Force thread) points out, there is a middle area where Light Force and Mech/Heavy Force capabilites can be complement eachother in the tactical or operational setting.

We all agree.

However, this doesn't mean that we should mix and match these two unique and seperate capabilites.

Maybe not mix and match, but having complementary capabilities that nest with each other in the middle zone will increase the combat power available over a larger range of applications.

As I argued above, the RM in no way sits on some middle ground - they, like other Light Forces (such as the US Rangers in Mogadishu)

They are not like US Rangers at all, as argued above.

can use vehicles for a administrative purposes (to move soldier, kit, weapons systems, or supplies if possible) but they in no way rely on the vehicles as a vital factor for tactical employment.

Precisely

The RM may not sit on the middle ground but they cover the field.  And that is the true indication of their excellence. Not that they are capable of filling a niche role, but that as a Light conventional Force they can excel at so many tasks and still be specialists in their primary niche capability.

It is relatively easy to train an individual to perform a single task, you can even train some people to handle a number of tasks, but to excel widely, that is a gift.

I believe that the CF in general and the infantry in particular is capable of excelling widely.

 

[McG]

Ok. At what point did I say anything about the Infantry and the Cavalry kicking around looking for jobs. My basic premise is that working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet. I also accept that close co-operation between guys on their feet and turreted vehicles requires constant practice and training. That is precisely the reason that I AGREE with you that the Mech force needs to be distinct from the Light force. For traditions sake I felt that the Mech Force is arguably a Dragoon Force and a Dragoon Force is a Cavalry Force and the Cavalry became the Armoured so let's back up and let the Armoured do its original job. So we agree on that. I think.

So, you've identified that "working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet" and based on that argument you have removed the infantry from the crew and replaced them with cavalry crewmen.  Then based on nostalgia, you replace the infantry in the back with crewmen as well and produce a nice new little empire for the armd corps.  Have I followed correctly?  Doesn't putting crewmen in the back run counter to your argument for putting crewmen in the turret?

 

[big bad john]

You all knew that I would jump in here didn't you!

First off, the RM is classified as a Special Operations Unit officially.  That is our primary task.  We have a number of specialized SO units within the RM, the SBS, Assult Squadrons, ect..  Our secondary task is as Light Infantry.  We are primarily tasked as LI in Iraq and Afghanistan, though there is the occasional SO tasking.  The SBS is tasked only as a SO asset.  

Now as examples of the LI role, look at the "Great Yomp" 45 Cdo made across East Falkland.  As an example of SO that is public knowledge, the support and training of the Kurds in Iraq.

I am not being very clear or coherent as it is late and I just sat through 4 hours of wedding planning.  They think the detainees in Gitmo have it rough, I never want to see anything to do with Bridesmaids dresses again.  I will review this once more and write something clear and detailed in the morning.

Kirkhill;

Maybe it is because of the hour, but you lost me halfway through your last post.  It was not clear to me when you were quoting or "speaking".

 

[Infanteer]

I see we agree on alot of basic principles here, so were off in the right direction.

A few points before carrying on:

1)  The numbers game is really irrelevant, as long as we both agree on capabilities (which we seem to).  Work with your numbers and make a proposal, I'll work with mine, and we'll let the court of popular opinion decide.  

2)

Here I disagree.   Field Marshall Slim had it right mate.   And the proof of that is to be found in 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne and the Stryker Brigades, in the USMC MEU (SOC) and in the entire British infantry corps.

82nd is not "normal infantry" - they are tasked as Airborne and are all Jumpers.
101st is not "normal infantry" - they are all Air Assault Qualified
Stryker Brigades are not "normal" infantry - that are well-trained, mechanized, combined arms team.
(I know you know all this, but I am doing it to prove a point)

What I gather (and correct me if I'm wrong) is that you are proposing to maximize the number of Infantry Battalions available for any task; as you said, some can fall out of planes, some can walk or drive a jeep, and the Armoured Corps can pick some up if need be.  By doing so we can ensure that the maximum amount of Forces are prepared for whatever task comes up.

I've disagreed with this "rotating" or "general purposing" - the Brits are moving away from it and the Americans haven't done it for decades (their Forces are focused on capability - airborne, air assault, armoured, cav, etc).  We, unlike the Brits and the Americans, cannot afford to cover all the bases - so we focus on those that we can make the biggest impact on.  I had hoped that the quote from Bland made it apparent that dedicating a small Force to such a wide array of tasks across the spectrum of View 1 Conflicts was an endless and unsatisfactory approach.

We focus in on "Light Force" and "LAV CAV" capabilities (which are both suitable for a variety of different roles and tasks)  In my limited time in the Army, I've worked with British, Dutch, and Americans (NG) in both Training and on Operations and one thing I know we have as our "center of gravity" is a very highly trained soldier.  I am confident that we can turn out the highly trained Light Soldier (and his Cav counterpart) as LtCol Eyre described earlier.

The main intention of this "focusing" is that we'll turn out two very different doctrines, tactics, techniques, skill sets, Tables of Organization and Equipment, etc, etc.  Light Force doctrine cannot be built with the intention of making sure sections can fit into carriers for tactical battle - just as Cavalry doctrine cannot be built around being a transport organization (its a fighting organization).  As well, McG has pointed out that we can't expect our support assets to jump between capabilities.  Of course, interoperability will be required for certain missions (the Aussie article has good examples of the ASLAV Cav working with the SASR and the Commando Regt) - but each Force has its own "game" to worry about.

This is a fundamental principle in designing my principal (I've certainly expounded on it enough here) and the fact that a variety of people here from across the spectrum of rank and experience seem to support it to some degree is encouraging me to stick to my guns and further develop the idea.

For now, I guess we can agree to disagree on this matter and continue on.  There is no point in turning this thread into a "Spin Cycle" of what Infantry do.  ;D

Since we DO agree on the fact that Infantry and Cavalry are two different skill sets, perhaps we should move this thread along into identifying the differences that eachside will have to focus on and what the limitations and applicability of these differences means for Force Employment

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Kirkhill]

Not crewmen McG - Cavalrymen. Cavalrymen that ride in vehicles that other Cavalrymen crew and that fight alongside each other daily.  Isn't that what you said you wanted, intimate relations between the Mounted and the Dismounted?

All I have done is handed the entire task over to the blackhats. You Sappers will then have to organize yourselves to support 3 infantry battalions and a cavalry regiment and put your mobility gear into the cavalry support squadron.

And its not "nostalgia".  Its trying to find a path through this thicket of brambles hung with different coloured berets and badges.  It may be a blackhat empire but is that what this is really all about? Protecting Rice Bowls as somebody put it?  Or making sure that everybody gets a shot at the next operation?

Because if it is then gawdelp the lot of you.  I am sure there is enough to go around to keep everybody happy.

Big Bad John, Congratulations and Condolences.  I will try to go back and clean up the submission.

Night.

 

[Infanteer]

Ok. This is getting silly.

First off, thanks BBJ for proving me right with regards to the RM.  They, like the Rangers, are a SOC unit.  Just because the British Government chooses to use them a bit more liberally then the US doesn't change their role and their organization.

Other then that, I think we're starting to ruin this thread with gargantuan spin cycle posts, so I'm not going to keep on arguing on these matters.  What I will do is follow the advice of PBI and BBJ and form my rantings into a cohesive proposal.

The court of public opinion can then be the judge and move the thread along.

Infanteer

 

[McG]

Not crewmen McG - Cavalrymen. Cavalrymen that ride in vehicles that other Cavalrymen crew and that fight alongside each other daily.  Isn't that what you said you wanted, intimate relations between the Mounted and the Dismounted?

You are playing word games.  Have you kicked the all the infantry out of the LAV and replaced all the infantry with different cavalry MOC pers (because working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet), or do you have both crewmen and infantrymen in the LAV (but refer to them as cavalrymen based on a regimental identity)?  The second option is consistent with your arguments.  The first option is not.

 

[Kirkhill]

I have armoured MOCs in the front and infantry MOCs in the back all wearing the Cavalry capbadge and a black beret.

 

[McG]

Well, with that little bit of clarity, we really are not that far appart.  There is universal agreement that we need dedicated light and medium mechanized forces (though we debate that the ratio should be 3:9, 6:6, or 9:3).  There is universal agreement that the medium force needs both infantry and cavalry (crewmen) elements (though the ratio of sub-units is not necessarily agreed on).  I also see a role for a light cavalry in the light force, but have not put much thought into its size or organization.

 

[Zipper]

My god, I think its close to concensus ;D

I think the "General purpose" is getting to mixed up with the "specialized".

Can not a specialized soldier do a general tasking? As the RM's do?

And as for the Armoured vs Infanrty in the vehicles (LAV's). I think we drop both those names for now, adapt the black beret, and call them Calavry. I would even add in the RCHA boys to make sure everyone felt included.

As for the idea of light Cavalry in the light forces, I'm not sure I understand? Is that somthing like the British Para's and their use of light vehicles? If so, then yes. They would need that capability for sure.

 

[big bad john]

We have consensus!!!   Next problem...


Any specialist Marine also does General Duties.  Everything from LI to teaching to cutting the grass. 

For Wheeled vehicles you gentlemen had me 3 pages back.

 

[Zipper]

Heh. I have a buddy in the RM. I'm more then sure that when he gets home on leave, he'll be doing more then just the grass. ;D

Ok, I'm going to ask this again. What is the chance of all this talk being considered higher up?

I ask this because I see that the Army is not going in any of these directions. I see us forming DFS and recce regiments for the Armoured. I see the Infantry still trying to be mechanized in light vehicles without tank support. Thus generalized. I see us getting rid of our mechanized Artillery.

So if we look at what has been discussed here with 6:6 and 9:3 and such. Wouldn't our army look more like 2:1:3:6?

2 Armd recce/1 DFS/3 light coy/6 mech inf coy doesn't seem to me to be sustainable if presented with a prolonged deployment?

Maybe I'm wrong with the above numbers. But it still doesn't seem to work.

Considering how far I've come as far as understanding and acceptance of alot of the ideas here, I would like to hope that some of the above in this thread is possable as it presents a very bright light to the end of the tunnel.

Thanks

 

[McG]

Ok, I'm going to ask this again. What is the chance of all this talk being considered higher up?

I think the best thing in favour of all these proposals (in all their differences and similarities) is that the additional soldiers are not critical to implementation.  However, more soldiers would make the proposed forces more successfull.

 

[Zipper]

However, more soldiers would make the proposed forces more successfull.

Considering the fact that our forces are well below there "offical" on paper strength anyway. The addition of 5000 on top of that number would mean your actually trying to recruit say from 7000-11000 new troops. Wouldn't you say?

 

[Infanteer]

Both McG and I have been making our proposals along lines of what we have on hand, right now.

If we were to get the go ahead for extra numbers, I think that they would go to filling our the existing TO&E's and shoring up supporting assets (from Combat Engineers to CSS) to provide more depth to the "2 Task Forces Deployed Indefinitely with a surge capability for a Brigade".

Strengthing our current units would be far better for enhancing capability then raising a handful of new, and equally hollow, ones.

 

[Zipper]

Strengthing our current units would be far better for enhancing capability then raising a handful of new, and equally hollow, ones.

Agreed. Cannot wait to see your papers.

 

[Infanteer]

So, as I was suggesting to McG, in a Cavalry Regiment you would have graduates of the Infantry School and the Armoured School combined into a Regiment independent of either school. Likewise the Regiment would incorporate gunners as members of the Regiment, trained at the Artillery School. Similarly with the Engineers and Service Support.

Would Cav "Dismounts" necessarily be Infantry?   Since they are working on the Cavalry, I had something more in line with a new MOC, similar to the US 19D "Cav Scout".

 

[McG]

Is that not just effectively a mechanized infantry MOC?
As long as our light forces are not grouped in the same regiment, I would not recommend splitting the infantry MOC into a light MOC and a mech MOC.

 

[Infanteer]

Is that not just effectively a mechanized infantry MOC?

The American Army sees them as two different creatures (One is Infantry and one is Cavalry):

Cavalry Scout (19D)
   
The Cavalry Scout is the commander's eyes and ears on the battlefield. When information about the enemy is needed, they call on the Scouts. They are responsible for reconnaissance and you will learn about various weapons to include explosives and mines. Cavalry Scouts engage the enemy with anti-armor weapons and scout vehicles in the field, track and report enemy movement and activities, and will direct the employment of various weapon systems onto the enemy.

Here are a few of the duties of a Cavalry Scout:

- Secure and prepare ammunition on scout vehicles
- Load, clear and fire individual and crew-served weapons
- Perform navigation during combat
- Serve as member of observation and listening posts
- Gather and report information on terrain, weather and enemy disposition and equipment
- Collect data to classify routes, tunnels and bridges
- Employ principles of concealment and camouflage

They used to have a specific 11M MOS code for Mech Inf, but now they are all 11B Infantry - however, the distinction remains the same:

Infantryman (11B)

The infantry is the main land combat force and backbone of the Army. It's equally important in peacetime and in combat. The Infantryman's role is to be ready to defend our country in peacetime and to capture, destroy and repel enemy ground forces during combat.

The following are some duties expected of Infantrymen:

- Perform as a member of a fire team during drills and live combat
- Perform hand-to-hand combat
- Aid in the mobilization of vehicles, troops and weaponry
- Assist in reconnaissance missions
- Operate two-way radios and signal equipment
- Process prisoners of war and captured documents
- Learn to use, maintain and store various combat weaponry (rifles, machine guns, anti-tank mines, etc.)

From what I can discern, the Australian ASLAV Cavalry do it the same way as well:

Crewman Australian Light Armoured Vehicle
(ECN063)
Army

Job Description
The Crewman Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) is employed in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) which provides armoured mobility and firepower on the battlefield. It is equipped with a range of tracked and wheeled armoured fighting vehicles, which provide mobility, communications, endurance and combat power.

There are currently three types of Armoured Corps unit:

The Tank Regiment operates the Leopard main battle tank. The Regiment's manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. Its main role is to provide close combat protection.

The Cavalry Regiments operate the ASLAV and M113A1 family of vehicles. A Cavalry unit's manning and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks ranging from medium reconnaissance and surveillance through to providing security and conducting offensive, defensive or delaying actions.

Armoured personnel carrier units provide armoured mobility and protection for infantry soldiers and are equipped with M113A1 tracked armoured personnel carriers.

The Crewman ASLAV is a soldier who drives and helps to maintain the ASLAV in tactical situations and operates the communications equipment in the vehicle.

Employment Training
Crewman ASLAV Course: 56 days (Full-time Entry)

After completing military (recruit) training, you will undertake a 56 day Crewman ASLAV course which will consist of Corps Indoctrination, Communications phase followed by Driving and Servicing at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria.

Course Duration - Reserve (Part-time Entry)

There are three options available for the completion of training:

1. 56 days continuous (as per Full-time Entry) at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria;
2. Complete one or more modules of training within the 56 day continuous course at the School of Armour, Puckapunyal, Victoria, and the remainder conducted continuous/non-continuous (as per local training program), undertaken regionally; or
3. All training conducted as per local training program, all undertaken regionally.

After a period of service as a driver in a Cavalry Regiment you will be eligible to be trained as an ASLAV Crewman Specialist Gunner or Crewman Specialist Dismounted / Crewman Specialist Surveillance Operator.

Now, these represent two approaches to training "Cavalry Dismounts".   The Americans grant them a specific MOS Code as part of the 19-series, allowing Cavalry Drivers to focus on vehicles.   The Aussies have trained "Cavalry Soldiers" who should be able to do all aspects of the Cav trade.   I am willing to bet that the Aussie position is the better and more viable route to take, especially in our position.

I was figuring that since we, in a proposal, are separating Force Capabilities into "Light Force" and "Cav Force", we may as well let the "Cav School" focus on training Cavalry tactics and doctrine and letting the "Infantry School" (of which Light Force is based around) focus on light tasks - this will allow the "Cav" officer to be the phased into the "Maneuver NCO" that we've discussed on these threads, while the Infantry Officer can forego Phase IV and focus on Light Force leadership capabilities.   Trades that support these two maneuver functions, whether they be Combat Arms (Engineer, Arty), CS, or CSS will get a "Regimental Indoc Course" upon being posted to their "Regimental Formations, which will focus them on the specific "Light" or "Cav" environment that they will operate under.

If the Army were to readopt tracked vehicles and tanks and we were to move back to "Combat Team" attacks and Heavy Battle capability, then I could see diversifying the Infantry to fill out "Mech Infantry" tasks - until then, I see maintaining the idea of "Mech Inf" as superfluous for our Army right now - a Cav function is much more appropriate.

Infanteer

 

[Infanteer]

Disclaimer:   I realize the American 19D doesn't list the following roles that Mech Infantry perform:

- Perform as a member of a fire team during drills and live combat
- Perform hand-to-hand combat

Under my "Every soldier a Rifleman First" Principle, this is a task that is in the job descriptions of every soldier, regardless of trade; it should be something that every soldier is taught on Basic, refreshed yearly in "Soldier First" exercises, and maintained by a CS/CSS "Force Protection NCO" which Matt Fisher once proposed (I'll try to find it and post it).

Naturally, the maneuver arms of the Army, the Cav and Light force units, will focus on these skills and be more trained and proficient with regards to tactics, techniques, drills, etc, etc.