Is the US on the brink of a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan?

[Kalatzi]

Sad to say not just his.

The public will certainly not be privy to it, unless events start to happen.

I only hope that contingency plans are afoot to get as many of  our Afghan allies out and settled, if needed.

That said, I don't think it's a given that the Taliban will simply overrun the place and send things back to normal.

If we think of the Afghan Security forces as a revitalized Northern Alliance, from the first campaign, supported with Western Air and other assets ...

Failing that that support a side(s) in the developing civil war.

 

[tomahawk6]

Karzai's comments today were not very helpful when he called US troops "demons".

 

[exabedtech]

Karzai's comments today were not very helpful when he called US troops "demons".

What option does he have?  Distancing himself from NATO in general and the US in particular will be essential to his survival.  Expect his rhetoric to reach new heights over the few few months while he negotiates for cash behind the scenes.

He knows, just as we know, that this one is lost and its time to plan for what is to come.

 

[armyvern]

Good gawd. Can I post an opinion in this thread still?

Note: I have no staff college experience and will not write big words as if I do for that means nothing; so, if that invalidates my opinion just let me know now and I'll avoid wasting my time.

 

[tomahawk6]

Actually the war is not lost however,there may be another less intrusive way for us to acheive our aims. The way forward IMO is going back to using special ops and air power to attrit the taliban. Buy help where we can. Afghanistan is a feudal society perhaps we should take advantage of that.

 

[dogger1936]

Tactical military success is irrelevant if it does not achieve your strategic aims.  If those strategic aims are ill-conceived or poorly considered, military prowess does not matter.

I seem to recall that the first principle of war (Canadian doctrine) is "Selection and maintenance of the aim".  Lacking a clearly enunciated political aim for the end-state in Afghanistan, how do you measure success?

Bang on.

It's something we lacked huge. Aside from go out get in TIC secure a place then retreat out of it due to the inability to hold ground; it never seemed like there was any aim outside of the small missions to deny ground etc. Yeah sure we killed a ton of Taliban; it didn't seem to slow them down a bit.

I've thought about it quite a bit and your quote above nails it. We lacked any form of aim after the initial invasion. Minus catch phrases like support the Karsai government...things never changed from what I seen so how come our aim didn't.

It was clear in 07 things were not gonna slow down IRT Taliban support by locals or their supply of soldiers(did anyone meet anyone out in the countryside who hated the Taliban more than us? I didn't)

Aside from some battle hardened troops what did our nation get out of over a decade of fighting. Looks like defeat to me anyway.

 

[exabedtech]

Actually the war is not lost however,there may be another less intrusive way for us to acheive our aims. The way forward IMO is going back to using special ops and air power to attrit the taliban. Buy help where we can. Afghanistan is a feudal society perhaps we should take advantage of that.

Step one might be to clearly define those aims.  If you can't sum it up into something under 7 or 8 words, then you simply do not have a clear objective. 
'Destroy the Taliban' sounds kinda nice, but if you miss with one bomb, you just pissed off enough people to generate dozens/hundreds of new taliban recruits.  Bombs have a way of making enemies more easily than they make friends. 

 

[Journeyman]

Step one might be to clearly define those aims.  If you can't sum it up into something under 7 or 8 words, then you simply do not have a clear objective. 
'Destroy the Taliban' sounds kinda nice, but if you miss with one bomb, you just pissed off enough people to generate dozens/hundreds of new taliban recruits.  Bombs have a way of making enemies more easily than they make friends.

OK; I think it's a great game-show you've suggested, so you're the first contestant.

While not being distracted by Vanna White, to say nothing of those IEDs or KAF having Timmies,......you have  7 or 8 words to sum-up a Canadian-style mission in Afghanistan; try to include "destroy the Taliban" and "don't miss with one bomb."      GO!! *


Oh, and because you're a first-time contestant, those 7-8 words can all be in the same language. Now giddy-up.

I look forward to the wisdom from the 'cheering-section'  :



* Not a reference to Jordan. 

 

[armyvern]

Every strike, annihilate forever only the Taliban.

Edited to add:
Not even limited to mere "bombs"!! Where the hell is my bonus round prize at?

 

[Infanteer]

What qualifications and experience do you hold, or research have you done, that lead you to hold those opinions on the matter?  I'm keen to know.

I suggest reading a couple of books that may disabuse you of the notion that the operational level of war wasn't around before the big, bloated Yanks dreamed it up.  They're both little-known works, unfortunately - Vom Krieg, and The Art of War by Baron de Jomini.

Actually, Dapaterson is probably quite accurate with regards to the idea of the operational level of war - it is a new, and probably useless, concept from Leavenworth.  See here for a superb explanation.  Hew Strachan, a bit of a contemporary giant on the subject, also writes about it in numerous articles.  A good, contemporary example is "Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal the Operational Level of War" in Survival, 52:5, pp 157-182.

A simple challenge is to define strategy and to define tactics and then explain what "an operational HQ" or someone "working on the operational level" actually does.  Chances are, he is doing tactics or strategy.

You make reference to Clausewitz and Jomini with regards to an "operational level of war", but neither author dealt with that concept.  Please indicate specifically where Clausewitz spoke of an operational level of war, as I am quite familiar with his works.

However, Dapaterson is wrong with regards to the non-existance of the operational art.  The operational art is the mechanism that links engagements to meet strategy.  The existance of the operational art does not imply there is an operational level, as operational activities exist within the realm of tactics.

 

[a_majoor]

It is always easy to see how things could have/should have been done in hindsight.

Had I been Generalissimo, the center of effort would have been the schools and getting as many Afghan children/young adults educated as possible, using western methodology. If we assume a start date of 2005 (when Canadian forces moved back into Kandahar) then the presumptive end date would be 2015, when we would start graduating large cadres of educated people into Afghan society who could make changes internally.

What screwed up the American military effort was the fact they arrived with an announced end date. Taliban propaganda had a field day with this ("They have the watches, we have the time"), and of course who was going to stick their neck out to support the US/ISAF effort if you knew your protectors were going to leave by a certain date. Better to keep your head down and wait. Militarily, the Americans were doing the right thing; bottling up the Great Sangin Valley in Helmand Province really slowed down the Taliban logistics pipeline, and allowed allied (British and Canadian) forces to focus their efforts in smaller AO's. If there was an understanding the US (and allied) forces were to stay for the long term, allied with an intensive "tache d'huile" effort in the secured zones, then we would have seen something that could be viewed as a victory, or at least creating a stable society which would be able to resist the Taliban and similar movements.

 

[Kalatzi]

I think this is an interesting anecdote, that may have some bearing.

Courtesy of Carl Prine, reproduced under the fair dealings of the copyright act.

By Carl Prine Thursday, March 22nd, 2012 9:21 am
Posted in On History, On War

I got a note yesterday from one of my favorite soldiers – U.S. Army Gen. (ret.) Volney F. Warner.

For those youngsters out there who don’t know their history, Warner is one of the great heroes of the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  He won’t tell you this, so I will:  Two Silver Stars, a Distinguished Flying Cross and three Bronze Stars with Valor, plus several other valor and service  awards of the highest order.

He entered our war in Southeast Asia early.  He became a Province Senior Advisor in South Vietnam in 1963.  When he returned to the U.S. in 1965 he was the Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs.

He later commanded a brigade in Vietnam, the 9th Infantry Division, XVIII Airborne Corps and REDCOM, the forerunner to SOCOM.

His sons and granddaughters also became highly respected heroes of this nation.  In fact, the Warner clan might be one of this democracy’s great martial dynasties, even if they don’t think in those terms because they’re perhaps some of the most decent and humble people you’ll likely meet.

GEN Warner was reading the blog the other day and noticed me talking about the excellent dissertation, and later book, by U.S. Army Col. Gregory Daddis and we got to talking about how one measures progress or failure in a murky COIN war because GEN Warner appears in the book just as surely as he was a central figure in the conflict.

I asked him if I could reprint part of the back-and-forth we had because he talks about an event few people seem to remember – long weeks of closed, highly secret discussions by representatives of America’s national security agencies to come up with some sort of metrics to chart the war in Vietnam.

I suspect that if might inform our ongoing debate over metrics in Afghanistan, too.

Let me set the stage:  In October of 1967, Warner was serving under Amb. William Lenhart.  Lenhart had replaced Bob Komer as Presidential Advisor when “Blowtorch” sojourned to Saigon to head pacification operations as GEN William Westmoreland’s deputy.  The U.S. had become entrenched deeper in the war and Lyndon Johnson, under increasing pressure from the various media,  wanted to know when and if we were winning.

I’ll let GEN Warner take it from here…

*****

Volney F. Warner in his own words

During my assignment among the mighty at the White House of the 1960s we pacification staffers occasionally received Presidential guidance and directives.

On one such occasion, a Vietnam expert was selected from each arm of government:  State, USAID, CIA,  Pentagon, etc.

We sequestered at the Agencies’ Vint Hill Farms,  and we were tasked to come up with a Dow Jones Index suitable to measure progress in Vietnam.

Correspondent Apple  caused this by continually referring to the glass half full. However the President wanted a more precise, less liquid metric. I was the Palace representative for the group.

NSC Rules: No phones. No private automobiles. No external communication of any type. No telling where you are or what your mission. No liquor. Stay at it until you get it right. By order of!!!

We screamed. We verbally sparred. We almost came to blows. Two weeks went by with nothing to report other than sleepless nights and verbal bruising.

For example, we contrived equations such as corn/pig distribution numbers plus body count minus US casualties plus hamlet evaluation survey scores with K as an independent variable to represent all other unidentified variance.

We tried Chi-squared analysis of variance distributions.

We did regression analysis.

Those mathematicians among us had a ball educating us finger-counting word-mongers.

Finally, in desperation, after three weeks of argumentation without positive result, we entreated our CIA senior supervisor to let us return to the world. He relented and got an OK from the Palace to send White House sedans for our pick up and departure.

Just as in the real Vietnam: We tried everything. Nothing worked. So we just gave up and went home!"

 

[dogger1936]

It is always easy to see how things could have/should have been done in hindsight.

Had I been Generalissimo, the center of effort would have been the schools and getting as many Afghan children/young adults educated as possible, using western methodology. If we assume a start date of 2005 (when Canadian forces moved back into Kandahar) then the presumptive end date would be 2015, when we would start graduating large cadres of educated people into Afghan society who could make changes internally.

We couldn't hold onto COP's. How do you figure we could have kept schools running that would have not been a. demolished upon construction b. Turned into a Taliban madrassa c. Taliban would have just told everyone not to go or they die

While education is important we couldn't even get security figured out.

 

[dogger1936]

Personally I think we stretched out resources mush too thin. We should have picked specific areas and isolated them. Cordon an area, clear it, issue id and deny entry to anyone without ID and search. THEN we could have pumped money into the local mosque, built schools, and protected the population from Taliban influence. We also could have had positive interactions with the townspeople. Instead of the 2007-2008 war where the only time most civilians seen us was when we were attacking the Taliban in their villages and then turning around and leaving the next day.

I think Canada`s biggest failure was not admitting we did not have the manpower to control the area given to us. 300-400 actual troops for zhari-panjuai didnt allow us any ability to spread out for more than a week sojourn into a village before returning to our COP`s and FOB`s allowing the Taliban to move in and exploit the maneuver damage we caused each village; and to help fix the place in our absence.

We could have been successful I believe if we focused all our resources into Panjuai proper. We could have made it a modern town with highly educated people; and prevented taliban influence and attack. We could have built on the law and security and had it maybe to a point where we could have moved into other nearby villages and with the example of panjuai and it`s local support; did the same thing.

Instead we went into a huge area with minute amounts of combat troops and daily fought the enemy who were living in the villages providing law and security and government and in some cases schooling as well. We were the guys coming into their villages causing problems from yet another copy paste orders format froma previous tour.

Canada failed in Panjuai from what I seen. The combat troops did what we could with what we had.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Personally I think we stretched out resources mush too thin. We should have picked specific areas and isolated them. Cordon an area, clear it, issue id and deny entry to anyone without ID and search. THEN we could have pumped money into the local mosque, built schools, and protected the population from Taliban influence. We also could have had positive interactions with the townspeople. Instead of the 2007-2008 war where the only time most civilians seen us was when we were attacking the Taliban in their villages and then turning around and leaving the next day.

I think Canada`s biggest failure was not admitting we did not have the manpower to control the area given to us. 300-400 actual troops for zhari-panjuai didnt allow us any ability to spread out for more than a week sojourn into a village before returning to our COP`s and FOB`s allowing the Taliban to move in and exploit the maneuver damage we caused each village; and to help fix the place in our absence.

We could have been successful I believe if we focused all our resources into Panjuai proper. We could have made it a modern town with highly educated people; and prevented taliban influence and attack. We could have built on the law and security and had it maybe to a point where we could have moved into other nearby villages and with the example of panjuai and it`s local support; did the same thing.

Instead we went into a huge area with minute amounts of combat troops and daily fought the enemy who were living in the villages providing law and security and government and in some cases schooling as well. We were the guys coming into their villages causing problems from yet another copy paste orders format froma previous tour.

Canada failed in Panjuai from what I seen. The combat troops did what we could with what we had.

I would suggest that the Canadian Army, and through it the Government of Canada, knew full well that our resources were limited and inadequate.

I would guess that we, the Government of Canada and the Canadian Army, communicated our concerns to ISAF and NATO and, still guessing, that we suggested that more troops, from other countries, were required.

We all know that no other troops showed up until too late.

Too little, too late ... but Canada didn't fail, not in battle and no on its own, we were part of a much broader failure.

 

[a_majoor]

Dogger, you are describing exactly the sort of "tache d'huile" effort that "should" have been done. I believe we did have the sort of resources to do this, although from a political/domestic politics viewpoint, it would not seem very dramatic or successful. Our NATO partners and the opposition would be constantly after the Govenment and military saying "what, that's all?" rather than watching and waiting for the results. (Remember, in my estimation we would still be there until 2015 as a minimum...)

This is a bit like the process of childbirth. You don't get faster results by putting nine women on the project.

 

[dogger1936]

E.R I hope thats the case. I hope sometime in the future some of our leaders came forward and said with 300 people we cannot deny the enemy anything for any extended period of time, defeat them, or make progress at all. We were not sparta.

With our manpower thucydides I believed when I was there that it was the only way forward. All our missions seemed like pointless repeats of past tours; down to the fact of having a different Callsign from the previous year not omitted from time to time.

The mission as a whole left the few troops we had isolated within the evil Hesco walls of the invaders while the Taliban paraded through the streets and lived all around us farming in their downtime.

At first I thought there was a bigger picture to it all that I was missing. What was I doing there? What purpose was my mission? What I learned was a lot of catch phrases like "disrupt, deny" added into a statement about the govt of Afghanistan really were nothing but catch phrases. We couldn't deny anything. We could only disrupt for a day. Sure we could kill a few but in reality how much did it help? It didn't aside from keeping us alive in situations.

I believe if we had a obtainable goal we could have achieved something on a small scale. Our mission to clear Taliban out of a Taliban stronghold (where it started!) where everyone was Taliban was a 100% failure.

Maybe if we did section off a small no Taliban zone we could have made the rest of the area want our help.

The fact was I never seen 1 person in that AOR want our help or wanted us there.

 

[Kalatzi]

A book that I found very interesting is "The Savage War" By Murray Brewster.

I feel that the author paints a very positive picture of the troops.

The writing style is good and can be biting, reserves most of his criticism for the bureaucrats, and politicians.

The line that sticks in my mind is his description of the Canadian involvement as Ä Broadway Musical Spectacular without a choreographer".

 

[blacktriangle]

Did anyone honestly think we could "win" in Afghanistan? Even if we could all agree on what definition constitutes a "win"?

 

[Sythen]

Did anyone honestly think we could "win" in Afghanistan? Even if we could all agree on what definition constitutes a "win"?

Yes, before my tour I believed the Afghan people wanted peace and stability. After my tour, I knew they didn't care so I stopped believing.