I finally had a chance to read the article and think I have an alternate take on what he's taken from the Ukrainian lessons.
- He's concluded that unit frontages will have to dramatically increase due to the "transparent battlefield" created by the proliferation of drones and satellite imagery. As a result there is no longer the possibility of massing forces along traditional frontages.
- I don't think that this is reflected by the reality on the ground in Ukraine. I haven't seen anything that suggests to me that Brigades are being spread out along 100km frontages.
- There are a number of countermeasures that can be taken to reduce the effectiveness of enemy recce efforts to locate forces (engineer prepared positions, cammo, decoys, EW and AD)
- It is possible to disperse units enough (even fairly close to the front) to ensure that they are not vulnerable to mass fires from the enemy but only really vulnerable to more expensive (and less plentiful) precision fires.
- He seems to suggest that increased firepower, uncrewed systems, etc. deployed by units will be enough to compensate for their lack of point mass on the objective.
- The level of dispersion that he envisions prevents units from being close enough to support adjacent units without stripping away the remote fires they require to support their own offensive efforts and at the same time present the opportunity for the enemy to envelope and defeat isolated units if their efforts to isolate and suppress the enemy fails.
I would counter that concentration of forces is still possible within traditional frontages but agree that enemy AO that needs to be isolated and suppressed has been greatly increased (as a result of the increased range of enemy sense and destroy capabilities). So while a Brigade may still operate on a traditional 3-8km front the area they need to isolate and suppress may be the 100km front suggested by the author.
In order to achieve this I believe there needs to be a fundamental shift in the weight between Combat and Combat Support (and Combat Service Support) elements of a force. For example I envision needing:
- More engineering assets to prepare defensive and decoy positions along the front and the muster areas to both hide and protect allied forces from enemy recce and strike assets.
- Dedicated decoy/deception units in order to deceive the enemy as to the actual location and status if allied troops (decoys, smoke, engineered dummy positions, EM deception, smoke, etc.)
- Much more robust EW assets to interfere with enemy recce efforts and communications.
- Significantly greater AD assets of all ranges (both ground-based and airborne) to interdict aircraft of all types (from FPV's to fighters).
- Allied recce assets (ground, air, space, electronic, etc.) capable of identifying targets within the entire 100km isolation/suppression zone
- Enough precision strike assets to effectively target enemy assets throughout the isolation area.
- Enough mass fires to suppress enemy forces at/near the objective
Given the ability to provide the level of protection/deception to allow you to mass your Brigade along the 3-8km front and then isolate and suppress the enemy's 100km front there would be enough mass to seize the objective.
Furthermore, I believe the widely dispersed long-range precision recce and strike elements that make the front lines "transparent" require quite extensive central coordination to be effective and are much more effective against a fairly static front than against highly mobile forces. Once the enemy's 100km front is isolated/suppressed and an initial breakthrough is achieved, I'm guessing that the opportunity for maneuver warfare in the disrupted rear areas of the enemy would become possible.
$0.02
