Informing the Army’s Future Structure
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daftandbarmy
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Yup. They were awesome.
That BV was worth the trouble
No idea if they still use them or not though.
Dale Denton
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Format changed for ease of reading.
To break the specialization down further and spread out the Very-High Readiness (VHR) burden on people down even further, you could have each Regt. have an assigned speciality and rotate on a 3 month VHR schedule:
All are trained and proficient in Mechanized Infantry and split into FJAGs Light/Med/Heavy split.
Political win for a reinvention of a "cold war culture and organisation" and a bonus for cheaply re-equipping the 'grunts on the ground'.
Would buy gov't time to delay expensive mobile fires projects and would be an easy win and quick result compared to a Navy demanding 15 CSCs and RCAF demanding 88 jets.
To break the specialization down further and spread out the Very-High Readiness (VHR) burden on people down even further, you could have each Regt. have an assigned speciality and rotate on a 3 month VHR schedule:
1st Battalion have a specialization in Arctic warfare, LRRP and or/a Light Mounted Raider/Defender role.
Give them everything from the Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement (BV206 replacement) and Tactical Mobility Platform (MRZRs) projects.2nd Battalion has a specialization in all things airborne/heliborne (i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)
NEO specialists?3rd Battalion has a specialization in Amphib, Littoral and Beachhead fortification.all things airborne/heliborne (i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)
A pacific/counter Chinese policy tilt with a new LHA/LHD for HADR and totally non-violent stuffAll are trained and proficient in Mechanized Infantry and split into FJAGs Light/Med/Heavy split.
Political win for a reinvention of a "cold war culture and organisation" and a bonus for cheaply re-equipping the 'grunts on the ground'.
Would buy gov't time to delay expensive mobile fires projects and would be an easy win and quick result compared to a Navy demanding 15 CSCs and RCAF demanding 88 jets.
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Coming back to Force Structure from the General Officer excursion into the capabilities of the lower ranks -
Some examples from the USMC - 15 Man Squad (3x 4 man teams (4x Automatic Rifles with 1x M320), 1x Squad Ldr, 1x Asst Squad Ldr (Joint Fires Trained Observer)/Communicator, 1x Squad Surveillance operator) One team would be trained on demo and rockets and issued a Carl Gustav. One team would be trained in drone ops. One team would be trained in counter-drone ops. The Squad would also be issued an accurized rifle for the DMR.
:quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/UA3HJFJIXZBWXPFYOWJNEOSB5A.jpg)
www.marinecorpstimes.com
Meanwhile the Royal Marines
www.forces.net
Some examples from the USMC - 15 Man Squad (3x 4 man teams (4x Automatic Rifles with 1x M320), 1x Squad Ldr, 1x Asst Squad Ldr (Joint Fires Trained Observer)/Communicator, 1x Squad Surveillance operator) One team would be trained on demo and rockets and issued a Carl Gustav. One team would be trained in drone ops. One team would be trained in counter-drone ops. The Squad would also be issued an accurized rifle for the DMR.
15-Marine rifle squad: An exclusive look inside the future infantry
Your first look at the transformation of the rifle squad.
www.marinecorpstimes.com
Meanwhile the Royal Marines
Watch: What is the Future Commando Force?
The Royal Marines modernisation programme has seen the creation of a new unit, a new uniform, and new technology being tested.
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Take a look at the US Army Multi Domain Operations 2028
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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Coming back to Force Structure from the General Officer excursion into the capabilities of the lower ranks -
Some examples from the USMC - 15 Man Squad (3x 4 man teams (4x Automatic Rifles with 1x M320), 1x Squad Ldr, 1x Asst Squad Ldr (Joint Fires Trained Observer)/Communicator, 1x Squad Surveillance operator) One team would be trained on demo and rockets and issued a Carl Gustav. One team would be trained in drone ops. One team would be trained in counter-drone ops. The Squad would also be issued an accurized rifle for the DMR.
15-Marine rifle squad: An exclusive look inside the future infantry
Your first look at the transformation of the rifle squad.
Meanwhile the Royal Marines
Watch: What is the Future Commando Force?
The Royal Marines modernisation programme has seen the creation of a new unit, a new uniform, and new technology being tested.
Although it all sounds super sexy and hi tech, the role of the Royal Marine will really not change that much IMHO. They are not Special Forces, nor will they be utilized as such.
I'm sure it's all part of the sales job the Corps has to do to convince the MoD to spend money on upgrading their kit to the standard that similar US forces achieved over a decade ago.
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Man, I've no doubt that there is a great deal of marketing going on in these presentations.
But frankly I'm not really bothered if the Royals go to battle in a short bus or not. They may or may not be speshul.
That, IMHO, is beside the point.
The point is that what used to be special is becoming more generic. Common soldiers are being asked to do things that used to be speshul. They are being asked to operate in manners that were uncommon to line troops a decade or two ago.. And the prospect of them operating in those older manners is receding. Yes there may be occasional need for the "traditional" operations but, in practice, the demand for those traditional services has been decreasing while the speshul dispersed operations have trended upwards.
Your experience in NI with the 4 man team may be exemplary of the new working environment but I think it is safe to say that not every army (or navy) has experienced operations the same way and still track with their traditional squad/section structure.
The Armies of the world still generally hew to a 6 to 10 man section.
The US Marines have had a lot of experience operating as three fire teams under a squad leader.
Now they are operating as three fire teams under a command cell.
The Royals appear to be looking at two fire teams and a command cell or team as one of their solutions.
My suspicion is that the armies are evolving in parallel with their evolution from lines of muskets to everyman a skirmisher with a long range smokeless rifle. That which was special is becoming a new norm.
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Doctrine defines Capabilities, Capabilities define Requirements, etc
(in theory)
As tools get added to conventional forces - they are more flexible to assist in former SOF only roles - it doesn't mean that was Special is the new norm -- longer range radios, night vision and ISR capabilities allow conventional forces to operate in a more dispersed environment - and as we have seen from Afghanistan a lot of trickle down tasks ended up in conventional forces -- the US ARMY SFA Brigades, Canadian OMLT/P-OMLT. Heck Afghanistan should have been the centerpiece of SOF/Conventional operations - instead of being inverted and botched.
I don't think that Special Operations are becoming the new conventional norm - but that missions that used to be tasked to SOF outside the "27" key SOF Mission sets which US SOCOM has now distilled into 12 core SOF functions - and honestly it is a an odd list (I suspect SEAL butchery was at play again).
Someone quick tell the Rangers that Airfield seizure didn't make the cut as a specific task cutout, and got lumped into DA
- Direct Action
- Special Reconnaissance
- Unconventional Warfare
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Civil Affairs Operations
- Counterterrorism
- Military Information Support Operations
- Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Security Force Assistance
- Counterinsurgency
- Hostage Rescue and Recovery
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Of those 12 depending on how you slice the pie - only MISO and HRR are really only SOF specific as while DA sounds cool, it is a Raid, so depending on the level of complexity it may be a SOF mission or not, and SR Missions are really only SOF specific when they get into Low Vis and non permissive AO's.
But for a long time digital and SAT radios, thermal sights, dual tube NV, MFLD and suppressors where SOF only items, or SOF only had access to ISR feeds - after SOF have proved technologies - the cascade effect has occurred - and lead to more capable and employable conventional forces. In turn those more capable forces - are no longer constrained by older doctrine, and the cycle continues.
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Missed you Kevin. Glad you're back.
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Glad to be back.
Part of the issue with Canada is the idea that each of the 3 Infantry Regiments should each get an equal slice of the pie, despite it being geographically foolish. It also makes the Brigade Groups while "equal" not suited for deployment as a Brigade Group.Format changed for ease of reading.
To break the specialization down further and spread out the Very-High Readiness (VHR) burden on people down even further, you could have each Regt. have an assigned speciality and rotate on a 3 month VHR schedule:
1st Battalion have a specialization in Arctic warfare, LRRP and or/a Light Mounted Raider/Defender role.
Give them everything from the Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement (BV206 replacement) and Tactical Mobility Platform (MRZRs) projects.
2nd Battalion has a specialization in all things airborne/heliborne (i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)
NEO specialists?
3rd Battalion has a specialization in Amphib, Littoral and Beachhead fortification.all things airborne/heliborne (i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)
A pacific/counter Chinese policy tilt with a new LHA/LHD for HADR and totally non-violent stuff
All are trained and proficient in Mechanized Infantry and split into FJAGs Light/Med/Heavy split.
Political win for a reinvention of a "cold war culture and organisation" and a bonus for cheaply re-equipping the 'grunts on the ground'.
Would buy gov't time to delay expensive mobile fires projects and would be an easy win and quick result compared to a Navy demanding 15 CSCs and RCAF demanding 88 jets.
Secondly is people thinking they can have a budget for multiple roles for units outside CANSOFCOM. Frankly there isn't time to train on multiple skill sets for a larger force either.
When 3 PPLCI was chucked thru the blender (10/90 Total Force) and left BC to be reconstituted in Edmonton, the only viable Amphibious training area was lost - when 1 PPLCI was moved from Calgary - the practical distance to the Mountains jumped.
When CABC was changed to whatever it is now - and moved from Edmonton to Trenton - the fact the MOI cadre went too was beyond moronic.
2 PPCLI moving from Winnipeg to Shilo got them a training area.
When 1 RCR moved from London - at least it got a decent training area in Petawawa.
None of the Brigades even have all three Infantry BN's colocated (- edit I may be wrong with the 22eR - and admittedly don't care enough to see if they are all in Valcatraz.
But the end state is the Army hasn't given any though to sensible training locations for it forces in quite some time.
You are much better suited to aligning the Regiments toward a role - as opposed to aligning the different #'rd battalions.
But you also much understand while there is still a requirement for static line jumping in Conventional Forces - the application of HAHO/HALO etc beyond a Pathfinder Det is not warranted - the entire goal of static line jump is to get folks into target where you want them - the entire idea of HAHO/HALO is to give the jumper an ability to alter his course to a DZ (Simplification - but good enough for this discussion).
Lets look at a Hypothetical Mission for NEO in a semi non permissive environment -
Bad people have started to take over a country - and you have many folks stuck - and now the bad people have control of all the airports in the country.
TO seize an airfield you drop the Para Coy's from the 3rd Bn's (very practical right - lets stop here to get 3VP's, oh stop here to get the Royal, and a stop here to get the Vandoo Company,,,) and drop them on the airfield -- -
Depending on the size of the airfield - it may be a company task - or require more than 3 companies (and remember no HQ or real support since the disbanding of the CAR)
Airfield seizures are generally costly -- and frankly that's why you have Rangers
You don't want to waste CSOR on an Airfield seizure when they could be assisting JTF-2 in securing hostages or sensitive items, as well as your QRF.
GR66
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Going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...
There seem to be two views on force structure. Some propose more dispersed structures with more vehicles and sensors/weapons but less "rifles", while others support the view that you need "weight" in a peer conflict and that means more boots on the ground.
Most day-to-day operations probably support the former, while the risk of conflicts with a peer enemy probably support the latter.
Instead of having dedicated Light/Medium/Heavy units in varying proportions of Reg Force and Reserve units (depending on how likely you believe a peer conflict is to happen), what if you could have a force structure that is flexible and can change from one type to another depending on the threat environment?
The Canadian Army is actually heavy on Armoured Recce squadrons in relation to our doctrine, but Recce units are exactly what you need if you're going to conduct dispersed operations (perhaps mixing in UAV/Loitering munition platforms with our Recce/Surveillance vehicles).
You could replace one of the Infantry Companies in our LAV Battalions with a Recce Squadron and at the same time drop the 2nd Fire Team from each Infantry Section to give you the kind of Cavalry Battalion that should work well in Counter-Insurgency/Security Assistance type deployments (which are likely to be the most common types of deployments the Canadian Army is likely to face.
The LAVs from the Infantry Companies that have been displaced by the Recce Squadrons could be provided to the Reserves in each area to give them a platform to train on .
By grouping together existing Reserve Infantry Regiments into Reserve Brigades (with each Reserve Regiment in Company strength) you could create ongoing affiliations between Reg Force Companies and Reserve Regiments where the Reserve Regiments could Force Generate Infantry Fire Teams which could augment the Reg Force Sections as required for deployments where the more dispersed initial structure is not suitable.
In the case of a major conflict where full mobilization of the Reserves is required, each Reserve Infantry Brigade could be responsible for sending augmentees to bring up the strength of the existing Sections and could also be possible to mobilize a 3rd Battalion for each Regiment using the "Training" LAV Company vehicles.
The system could look something like this:
There seem to be two views on force structure. Some propose more dispersed structures with more vehicles and sensors/weapons but less "rifles", while others support the view that you need "weight" in a peer conflict and that means more boots on the ground.
Most day-to-day operations probably support the former, while the risk of conflicts with a peer enemy probably support the latter.
Instead of having dedicated Light/Medium/Heavy units in varying proportions of Reg Force and Reserve units (depending on how likely you believe a peer conflict is to happen), what if you could have a force structure that is flexible and can change from one type to another depending on the threat environment?
The Canadian Army is actually heavy on Armoured Recce squadrons in relation to our doctrine, but Recce units are exactly what you need if you're going to conduct dispersed operations (perhaps mixing in UAV/Loitering munition platforms with our Recce/Surveillance vehicles).
You could replace one of the Infantry Companies in our LAV Battalions with a Recce Squadron and at the same time drop the 2nd Fire Team from each Infantry Section to give you the kind of Cavalry Battalion that should work well in Counter-Insurgency/Security Assistance type deployments (which are likely to be the most common types of deployments the Canadian Army is likely to face.
The LAVs from the Infantry Companies that have been displaced by the Recce Squadrons could be provided to the Reserves in each area to give them a platform to train on .
By grouping together existing Reserve Infantry Regiments into Reserve Brigades (with each Reserve Regiment in Company strength) you could create ongoing affiliations between Reg Force Companies and Reserve Regiments where the Reserve Regiments could Force Generate Infantry Fire Teams which could augment the Reg Force Sections as required for deployments where the more dispersed initial structure is not suitable.
In the case of a major conflict where full mobilization of the Reserves is required, each Reserve Infantry Brigade could be responsible for sending augmentees to bring up the strength of the existing Sections and could also be possible to mobilize a 3rd Battalion for each Regiment using the "Training" LAV Company vehicles.
The system could look something like this:
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One needs to be realistic with the CF.
3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.
The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.
Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.
IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.
Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
As well as the Vandoo BN's. Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.
This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.
Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.
FJAG
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Kevin - welcome back.
In your absence (although maybe you've been following some of these threads) we've been hashing around the Army's force structure quite a bit.
Just to capsulate some of that, there's been a fair bit of discussion about the fact that the Army's current three symmetric brigades is a poor structure for many reasons. While there is some disagreement on what should be the right structure, I tend to side with this article found in the most recent Canadian Army Journal on pg 48. We need an asymmetric force with a light, heavy and medium capability. I tend not to go into details of the forces' internal structures as that ought to be a product of a doctrine which we haven't examined or written yet.
My own views also tend to straddle the view that we have entirely too many human resources wasted on the administration of the total force. By administration I mean the bureaucracy behind administration and not the logistics and sustainment side which I consider to be under resourced. I tend to believe that for some 26 billion dollars per year Canada should have greater defence outputs than it can currently muster. One way of converting wasted dollars into better capabilities is to cut the very high volume of full-time positions currently allocated to administrative overhead and reallocate the funds to equipment which is desperately needed. A military is a balance of the right expenditures on personnel, equipment and operations and maintenance and currently Canada's high personnel expenditures cripple the other two components.
In hand with that is to strengthen the reserve force to make it more capable. We do need personnel but many of them can be "in reserve". That requires a bottom up redesign of the entire reserve (and in large measure the regular) organization. For your light reading I've published an article in the Canadian Military Journal on the subject which gives a snapshot view of the issues involved. I've never been too fond of that article because of it's space restraints so developed it into a short book - Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis.
Cheers - and once again, welcome back.
Question about your proposal above (which I find practical & doable, and a better use of our current resources)
You mention making 1 and 3VP + 1 and 3RCR into strict light infantry battalions that are jump capable. Then you mention pushing the LAV's to flush out 2VP and 2RCR, partially because they are both located at decent training sites.
Are you suggesting reducing the number of LAV's available to 1 and 3 battalions, both VP and RCR? Or eliminating them entirely from those units, and pushing them to 2VP and 2RCR to be LAV heavy units with a decent number of spare vehicles/parts?
And lastly, what does OBE mean?
Edit - I know it's been mentioned above, but it's genuinely good to see you back here & that you're safe. I always enjoy reading & learning from your posts.
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snip
Thx Appreciate that -- I had glanced at the CAJ Article - and a few other documents when I had to go over the US ARMY 2028 "White Paper" to make sense of it for someone else on another project.
I hate the font though, very oddly I missed the author on the Asymmetrical Force on my first read, and I will love to disagree with him elsewhere.
I don't have a Kindle - I am going to get the book on paperback.
I would remove the LAV's from the LIB's entirely -- maintenance and proficiency training on them and their crews robs time (and $) that could be used to expand capabilities of LIB - maybe call them LI-SOC (Special Operations Capable) or perhaps a better term for Canada (and not to give CANSOF heartburn) would be LI-SOA (Special Operation Assistance) Forces
OBE - Other than Order of the British Empire
Overtaken By Events.I was tempted to say gone the way of the Dinosaur - but figured OBE was less contentious.
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Also like what was done for Somalia with the CAR - there is nothing stopping LI forces from being GUBs in a LAV if the mission requires.
JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.
But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position
JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.
But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position
FJAG
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Thought that you might...., very oddly I missed the author on the Asymmetrical Force on my first read, and I will love to disagree with him elsewhere.
MilEME09
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And to support such a move we need light air deployable heavy weapons as well.
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A Light Heavy Weapon? Is that a Medium?
Or are you talking about an unarmoured large calibre weapon?
MilEME09
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Un armoured or light armoured heavy weapons, light vehicles with TOW, HMGs, or if we ever went down that route again pac howitzers
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