Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Halifax Tar]

Regardless, the job isn't that complicated and a good Class B team could easily do the job IMHO.

I think you're correct.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Yes, they used to be very strong.
ABCA used to be a real thing.
The TEAL conferences meant something.
(tactics, equipment and logistics). However as Canada has faded from relevance in matters of Military, so has the importance of having Canada at meetings ...

ABCA and AUSCANZUKUS/CCEB were, I can say withy reasonable authority, the g old standard for military standardization in the 1960s, '70s, and 80s. Almost every single NATO C3 STANAGb that mattered began life as either ABCA QSTAG or a CCEB proposal. The reason was simple: small teams (four or five) have an easier time reaching agreements re: standards than do large (10+) ones.

Canada was key player; we were, for a very long generation that worlds-leader in multi-channel, point-to-point tactical radios and in some aspects of ECM resistant waves forms - especially ultra-wide band. The Brits were light years ahead in area systems and there Americans were top of the heap in control and management systems and in computers.

We had weaknesses - but nothing as weak as NATO - in our failure to get the Americans to drop their area system plans in favour of something akin to what the Brits were building. But that was a political-industrial issue (Ike's "military industrial complex" and its allies in Congress) not a strictly military one - several American generals and senior pentagon officials wanted to dump the US Army's failed AN/TCC-38 and 39 projects long before they went in to the trash.

I retired in the 1990s. The five-nations CCEB was still the acknowledged (by the ITU) standers body for military spectrum management. We, CCEB, even dealt, sometimes even collegially, with the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, professionally if not collegially, with the Russians.

 

[FJAG]

If the Regs are short of people, why waste them in an ongoing drain on resources like supporting the A Res?

The ultimate goal of Reg F troops embedded in a part time organization should be to lead the part timers to a position of self-reliance, in an OMLT-like way.

There are two fundamental problems.

The first is that supporting the ARes is a full-time, non-ending job. They cannot achieve self-reliance under the current construct. The job of senior leaders (and by that I start at the Maj/MWO level) is too complex to be learned on truncated courses and on part-time experience. There will never be a moment where one of the ARes units hits a climax and one can say, "Okay. These guys have got it and they're good to go for eternity". The gene pool is too small, the turn-over to great, and the skill sets necessary to "mange them" to high. You need full-timers, but not just any old full-timer, you need ones who have gained their own experience and knowledge in a full-time environment. You might get by with part-time captains and warrant officers and below but that's it.

That brings us to problem 2. The NDA makes it clear that full-time continuing is RegF. Unless you are prepared to create Class A and Class B RegF service divisions where Class A is what we consider today's RegF and Class B is a restricted service class of RegF that works with the reserves, you are required - by law - to make all full-timers RegF. Yup. We've been dicking around with a wink, wink, nudge, nudge system with our ResF Class Bs for decades now but that doesn't make it right and its one of those things that we simply avoid addressing because the outcome would be disastrous for the the CAF as a whole.

"If the Regs are short of people" definitely needs to be addressed. But in a serious fashion. Your suggestion is a finger in the dyke solution that merely temporarily resolves one problem by compounding another. We have, over the last half century dropped into a system where the ResF is only able to generate semi skilled soldiers to plug in as augmentees in larger units and we have created a species of low level ResF staff officers that fill administrative cubicles across Canada. We've done that at the expense of any ability to grow or expand the force in an emergency. That ought to be found troubling by any and all professionals.

Crap - that sounds preachy. But I'll let it ride. I'm feeling particulalry snarky today.

 

[dapaterson]

There are two fundamental problems.

The first is that supporting the ARes is a full-time, non-ending job. They cannot achieve self-reliance under the current construct. The job of senior leaders (and by that I start at the Maj/MWO level) is too complex to be learned on truncated courses and on part-time experience. There will never be a moment where one of the ARes units hits a climax and one can say, "Okay. These guys have got it and they're good to go for eternity". The gene pool is too small, the turn-over to great, and the skill sets necessary to "mange them" to high. You need full-timers, but not just any old full-timer, you need ones who have gained their own experience and knowledge in a full-time environment. You might get by with part-time captains and warrant officers and below but that's it.

That brings us to problem 2. The NDA makes it clear that full-time continuing is RegF. Unless you are prepared to create Class A and Class B RegF service divisions where Class A is what we consider today's RegF and Class B is a restricted service class of RegF that works with the reserves, you are required - by law - to make all full-timers RegF. Yup. We've been dicking around with a wink, wink, nudge, nudge system with our ResF Class Bs for decades now but that doesn't make it right and its one of those things that we simply avoid addressing because the outcome would be disastrous for the the CAF as a whole.

"If the Regs are short of people" definitely needs to be addressed. But in a serious fashion. Your suggestion is a finger in the dyke solution that merely temporarily resolves one problem by compounding another. We have, over the last half century dropped into a system where the ResF is only able to generate semi skilled soldiers to plug in as augmentees in larger units and we have created a species of low level ResF staff officers that fill administrative cubicles across Canada. We've done that at the expense of any ability to grow or expand the force in an emergency. That ought to be found troubling by any and all professionals.

Crap - that sounds preachy. But I'll let it ride. I'm feeling particulalry snarky today.

Assuming that any of the CAF leadership has ever bothered to read the NDA is an interesting flex. And even if they did, assuming that they paid attention...

 

[Kirkhill]

BLUF:

Our hardware-heavy expenditure seems myopic when juxtaposed against this rapidly evolving landscape of warfare. The UK cannot hope to match our peer-adversaries, Russia and China, tank for tank, or ship for ship. It must seek continued superiority in the realm of technology and innovation.
Hardware, no matter how advanced, operates on lengthy capability cycles. The time taken to develop, procure, and deploy traditional weapons stretches over years or even decades. Once in action, this hardware enters a steady degradation phase, awaiting the next upgrade cycle. In contrast, software and AI can be updated rapidly in response to shifting battlefield conditions, sometimes within days and weeks, and retrofitted to legacy hardware to revitalise capabilities.
While leaders have spoken for decades about deterring our enemies and winning through technological superiority, this is simply not reflected in budgets. The big programmes are already defined for the coming decades, with software and AI often treated as an add-on at best. One symptom of this approach is that programmes bundle hardware and software together, with one “prime” supplier responsible for providing both, despite the fundamental differences in skills and systems required. Only with a radical reprioritisation can the UK operate at the cutting-edge.
If the UK is to ensure its safety and maintain its position on the global stage, it must pivot, and pivot rapidly, to integrate software and AI as the linchpins of our defence strategy.

Applies to ABCA generally. Not sure how it applies to the Swedes and the Finns. They seem a lot more agile. And the Easterners on the Russian border, especially those north of Ukraine, all seem to be motivated these days.

Ukraine shows Britain is falling behind in the new cold war. We must adapt – or face defeat​

The wars of the future will be dictated by technological superiority – and artificial intelligence
JAMES LAWSON12 September 2023 • 1:31pm

Those who cannot adapt to change are doomed to be outmanoeuvred by those who can. The nature of warfare is rapidly evolving, and Britain faces a choice: will it lead in the development of software-driven defence, or be left helpless in front of its adversaries?
The war in Ukraine provides a stark illustration. Software and artificial intelligence are playing a pivotal role alongside traditional 20th century attrition warfare. While the volume of troops, hardware, and firepower still matters, it’s the integration of advanced technology that’s giving Kyiv its cutting edge. Ukraine has managed to resist the greater size of the Russian army with donated Western equipment, and home grown technological superiority.
Locally developed software like “Kropyva” and “Delta” have played a pivotal role, allowing Ukraine to map the battlefield in real-time, with insights from a wide range of intelligence sources, sensors, satellites and drones. For artillery fire they use drones to swiftly identify Russian positions, compressing the “kill-chain” (the time it takes to identify and neutralise enemy targets). Such tools have allowed them to concentrate forces at critical junctures, flipping the odds even when vastly outnumbered.
To counter Ukrainian efforts, Russia is using electromagnetic attacks to disrupt networks and block GPS, preventing drones from accurately positioning. Moscow’s forces are learning too, and are already much faster at directing artillery fire than their Nato equivalents. Attacks with Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones have stepped up. And the weapons manufacturer, Kalashnikov (famous for making the AK-47 rifle) has provided a variety of unmanned vehicles, boasting the use of artificial intelligence to automatically identify targets.
Other adversaries are watching. China has already developed AI pilots capable of outperforming human counterparts, and mastered drone swarms that can overwhelm traditional air defences. These innovations are not just for show; they could reshape a potential conflict with the West.
This week, as London plays host to the Defence & Security Equipment International (DSEI), the world’s largest defence event, Britain has an opportunity to lead the way for the West. The Future Tech Hub at the event, dedicated to new-age warfare tools, has tripled in size since 2021. Yet while British industry promotes innovation, the gap between what is available and what is delivered is growing. The Ministry of Defence is spending disproportionately on traditional equipment and platforms.
As UK defence funding remains ever constrained, with troop numbers steadily dwindling, the need to equip our forces with the best tools to properly support them is undeniable. Investing in AI is critical to protecting our prosperity at home too. As an island nation, Britain must deter the enemy at sea, protecting our shipping routes and critical national underwater infrastructure such as internet cables and gas pipelines. Here, AI will determine which submarine detects its enemy first, and whether our ships are able to repel swarm attacks.
Our hardware-heavy expenditure seems myopic when juxtaposed against this rapidly evolving landscape of warfare. The UK cannot hope to match our peer-adversaries, Russia and China, tank for tank, or ship for ship. It must seek continued superiority in the realm of technology and innovation.
Hardware, no matter how advanced, operates on lengthy capability cycles. The time taken to develop, procure, and deploy traditional weapons stretches over years or even decades. Once in action, this hardware enters a steady degradation phase, awaiting the next upgrade cycle. In contrast, software and AI can be updated rapidly in response to shifting battlefield conditions, sometimes within days and weeks, and retrofitted to legacy hardware to revitalise capabilities.
While leaders have spoken for decades about deterring our enemies and winning through technological superiority, this is simply not reflected in budgets. The big programmes are already defined for the coming decades, with software and AI often treated as an add-on at best. One symptom of this approach is that programmes bundle hardware and software together, with one “prime” supplier responsible for providing both, despite the fundamental differences in skills and systems required. Only with a radical reprioritisation can the UK operate at the cutting-edge.
If the UK is to ensure its safety and maintain its position on the global stage, it must pivot, and pivot rapidly, to integrate software and AI as the linchpins of our defence strategy.

---

James Lawson is director of programmes at the defence company Helsing

 

[KevinB]

I think the article by James Lawson is myopic in its own right.

While he correctly notes that "Hardware, no matter how advanced, operates on lengthy capability cycles. The time taken to develop, procure, and deploy traditional weapons stretches over years or even decades. Once in action, this hardware enters a steady degradation phase, awaiting the next upgrade cycle."
He then misses the boat by continuing that "In contrast, software and AI can be updated rapidly in response to shifting battlefield conditions, sometimes within days and weeks, and retrofitted to legacy hardware to revitalise capabilities."

Older equipment is not really able to be retrofitted. Newer systems are being designed with open architecture to allow seamless upgrading.

At the end of the day, Drones etc are just a variation on a theme, and counters exist and are expanding, the demise of the tank or destroyer is not upon us at all, humans and equipment are still needed to successfully fight a war.

 

[markppcli]

And, based on the level of complexity of the work they are required do, most of them could easily be Class B reservists v.s. Reg F...

Sort of ignores the point that part of RSS job is making sure those far club reserve units in Kamloops, Kenora, Prince Albert, ect aren’t getting too off the rails.

 

[dapaterson]

...and there are already regulatory provisions deeming certain Res F members to be Reg F for the purpose of superannuation benefits...

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the article by James Lawson is myopic in its own right.

While he correctly notes that "Hardware, no matter how advanced, operates on lengthy capability cycles. The time taken to develop, procure, and deploy traditional weapons stretches over years or even decades. Once in action, this hardware enters a steady degradation phase, awaiting the next upgrade cycle."
He then misses the boat by continuing that "In contrast, software and AI can be updated rapidly in response to shifting battlefield conditions, sometimes within days and weeks, and retrofitted to legacy hardware to revitalise capabilities."

Older equipment is not really able to be retrofitted. Newer systems are being designed with open architecture to allow seamless upgrading.

At the end of the day, Drones etc are just a variation on a theme, and counters exist and are expanding, the demise of the tank or destroyer is not upon us at all, humans and equipment are still needed to successfully fight a war.

There is a long gap between seamless and impossible. Computers are getting smaller as are effectors like valves and servo- motors. The problem becomes simpler if you pull a person from their seat and create space.

If 1970s aircraft can be turned into unmanned targets, modern trucks can be retrofitted with autonomous driving systems that work alongside the driver and 1970s L119s can have modern targeting systems added to them then there is a lot that can be done within the constraints of the existing fleets.

Another reason why @FJAG is right about retaining "obsolete" systems.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

At the end of the day, Drones etc are just a variation on a theme, and counters exist and are expanding, the demise of the tank or destroyer is not upon us at all, humans and equipment are still needed to successfully fight a war.

Drones are emulating the introduction of aircraft in WWI, except for the suicide bit.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the article by James Lawson is myopic in its own right.

While he correctly notes that "Hardware, no matter how advanced, operates on lengthy capability cycles. The time taken to develop, procure, and deploy traditional weapons stretches over years or even decades. Once in action, this hardware enters a steady degradation phase, awaiting the next upgrade cycle."
He then misses the boat by continuing that "In contrast, software and AI can be updated rapidly in response to shifting battlefield conditions, sometimes within days and weeks, and retrofitted to legacy hardware to revitalise capabilities."

Older equipment is not really able to be retrofitted. Newer systems are being designed with open architecture to allow seamless upgrading.

At the end of the day, Drones etc are just a variation on a theme, and counters exist and are expanding, the demise of the tank or destroyer is not upon us at all, humans and equipment are still needed to successfully fight a war.

PS

I agree humans are necessary to fight wars. But what does it take to whittle the struggle down to the last two exhausted survivors grappling in the rubble?

Machines help humans kill humans faster. Other machines help humans kill machines. When all the machines are gone you will get your girl on girl fight.

 

[KevinB]

PS

I agree humans are necessary to fight wars. But what does it take to whittle the struggle down to the last two exhausted survivors grappling in the rubble?

Machines help humans kill humans faster. Other machines help humans kill machines. When all the machines are gone you will get your girl on girl fight.

No disagreement - but as you point out a lot of the older equipment can be converted to autonomous - but it is still older, and not as effective as modern systems, plus if your Canada you don'y have enough equipment period to go around, old or new...

 

[Kirkhill]

No disagreement - but as you point out a lot of the older equipment can be converted to autonomous - but it is still older, and not as effective as modern systems, plus if your Canada you don'y have enough equipment period to go around, old or new...

Especially on the Canada bit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Drones are emulating the introduction of aircraft in WWI, except for the suicide bit.

The casualty rates might prove you wrong there

Bloody April - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

There is literature on span of control and what can be effectively handled by actual human beings. This holds true even when the human being is enabled by a staff.

A commander can have a relatively narrow span of control but still employ Mission Command.

People talk about "flattening the command structure," but nine independent platoons are not the same as three companies.

ps - our current doctrine states that commanders are best able to have a span of command of a maximum of five direct subordinates

How does that conform with the expectations of Brigade Gp commander? And does some of the load get carried by National Support Elements such as forward deployed components of 1 Div and 6 CCSB? Do they add to or subtract from the "Brigadier's" span of control?

And I am using the term Brigadier in the same sense sailors use the term Captain - the person in command of the Brigade regardless of actual rank.

 

[Kirkhill]

This article is specifically about Ukraine but I think it holds more broadly. It ties into my thoughts about defensive bubbles and frigates in the desert.

Why improve Ukraine’s deep-strike capability?​

By John Hoehn, Hunter Stoll and William Courtney
Sep 18, 12:14 PM

Ukrainian troops fire a BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher toward Russian positions at a front line near Bakhmut in the Donetsk region on June 20, 2023. (Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images)
As the counteroffensive progresses, Ukraine’s leaders are giving higher priority to striking Russian targets beyond the immediate battlefield. They urge the West to provide modern fighter jets, like the F-16, and longer-range rocket artillery, like the ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System. Both weapons now seem likely to enter the fight this year or next. How will they help Ukraine?
Throughout the war, Russian forces have relied heavily on artillery, consistent with their doctrine of emphasizing cannon and rocket artillery to wear down an enemy. NATO, in contrast, leverages its air forces, which are usually technically superior to Russia’s. Aircraft offer more flexibility and can attack multiple targets in a single sortie. Survivable air power can strike strategic and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines.

Until recently, the U.S. appeared hesitant to provide deep-strike arms. Allied initiative may have helped overcome this reticence. After Denmark and the Netherlands offered older F-16s, the Biden administration agreed to the transfer and offered help with pilot training. Allied provision of F-16s can be attractive to the U.S. because costs are shared.
Earlier, the White House seemed to fear that dispatching combat aircraft to Ukraine might cross a Russian red line, perhaps even prompting threats of a nuclear response. The United States rebuffed a Polish bid to send used MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine.
Other NATO allies also have decided that providing deep-strike weaponry is important for Ukraine’s defense and worth any risk of escalation. Recently, the British and French sent air-launched Storm Shadow and Scalp cruise missiles, respectively. Some of Ukraine’s fleet of aging Soviet-era fighters have been modified to carry them.

Ukrainian attacks on logistics depots behind the front lines have resulted in Russia losing thousands of artillery shells along with fuel and other equipment. In devastating strikes on Crimea’s Sevastopol port, Storm Shadows, Scalps and seaborne drones may have seriously damaged a large Russian landing ship, diesel submarine and shore infrastructure.
As Ukraine transitions to European-provided F-16s, it will gain access to more advanced cruise missiles, such as the low-observable Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Additional types of missiles might also help Ukraine hold at risk strategic Russian staging areas.
Russia’s air defense environment is one of the world’s most challenging. It could be risky for Ukrainian F-16s to fly deep into the battlefield and/or operate for long periods over Russian forces. Partly for this reason, ground-launched missiles are an essential complement to air power; they can be launched at any time and generally have increased survivability relative to manned combat aircraft.
Fast-flying ballistic missiles are especially survivable due to their speed and maneuverability, though they have less range compared to cruise missiles. A longer-range ballistic missile capable of precision attack, the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, can be fired from multiple launchers. Ukraine possesses several kinds, such as the U.S.-made M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

The U.S. has been reluctant to provide ATACMS in part because stockpiles are limited while the Army awaits its replacement, the Precision Strike Missile. The Biden administration now hints that it may provide ATACMS. If it takes this step, however, Ukraine might receive only a few dozen missiles.
The U.S. could facilitate delivery of more ATACMS by allowing the re-export of European-owned systems. Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey have ATACMS. Last year, Lithuania and Estonia signed purchase agreements.
Coordinated deep-strike capabilities — air-launched and ground-launched — will be most effective in degrading Russian forces and operations. Using air and ground launchers would force Russian commanders to devote substantial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to attempt to find these systems. The commanders would have to divert these capabilities from other efforts.
In some cases, Ukraine might need to make hard choices. Since the U.S. may have a limited stockpile of deep-strike missiles like the ATACMS and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Ukraine might not receive as many deep-strike arms as it wants.
John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at the think tank Rand and a former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service. Hunter Stoll is a policy analyst at Rand and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at Rand and was the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

If I understand what I read about Afghanistan and the C-RAM mission part of C-RAM was not just knocking down incoming bullets but tracing their source and engaging the source with Counter-Battery fire.

If I extrapolate from there, the defence of a locality to the defence of a country, or a region, then part of GBAD would be Counter-Battery fire.
That is starting to sound to me as a rationale for 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) to incorporate a Precision Fires capability commensurate with the range of its GBAD capability. Commensurate to me means that, depending on the size of the bubble being protected (the extreme limits of the SAMs as deployed) and the nature of the incoming threat being tracked, that the regiment have an ability to counter the firers at extreme range so as to push them as far back from the bubble as possible.

What is that range? Well a HIMARS truck can carry a load that can push that range out to 50 km, 150 km or 500 km depending on the missiles loaded. That same truck carrying a Sky-Sabre type of set up can create a SHORAD/MRAD bubble of 20 to 100 km. Open source information suggests that the Israeli Elbit ELM-2084 MMR supplied to Canada by Rheinmetall

can detect up to 1,100 different targets simultaneously at a maximum range of 470 km. [iii] The radar system consists of high mobility features that allow it to be moved on short notice.

That 470 km would correspond nicely with the 499+km open source range of the HIMARS launched PrSMs currently being introduced.

....

Poland's buying spree of HIMARSs, Chunmoos, NSM launchers and GBAD systems strongly suggests to me that Poland is intent on creating a bubble over its head and around its borders.

If Poland were to place PrSMs on its borders it would push the neighbour's forces back 500 km. But that would be an unfriendly act and probably invite retaliation. The saw off would be to assume the neighbour has an equivalent 500 km capability and put 500 kms between the two opposing systems. That would leave a 500 km wide Cordon Sanitaire between the two systems centred on the border. That would, in turn, mean that the systems would stand back 250 km from the border. Communities, and forces, could inhabit the Cordon Sanitaire if their offensive ranges were shorter. Those forces and communities could also be equipped with their own local GBAD systems and be considered non-threatening.

....

Back to 4 (GS) Regiment.

Suppose the regiment had the ability to deploy its 470 km radar along with 20-100 km SAMs and 50-500 km PSSMs. Would that be a useful deterrent capability for a friend? Or a reserve capability useful to have on hand in Canada in case the geopolitical situation changed and Canada needed to act locally?

Related thought.

Does 4 (GS) Regiment have to limited to 4 or 5 batteries if some batteries are going to be detached for independent duties protecting dispersed localities in a larger air defence network like, for example NORAD, or the Latvian or Ukrainian Air Defence System, or attached to a deployed Canadian Brigade Group?

Following on from the US Combat support organization that sees the Brigade Battalion having 10 or so companies but most of them are detached and under the operational control of the units they are supporting.

And how many of those detachable firing batteries could be manned by Reserve units? The forward deployed batteries and the immediate reaction batteries I would think should all be Regular Force batteries.

 

[FJAG]

Let me just address a few points from this.

If I understand what I read about Afghanistan and the C-RAM mission part of C-RAM was not just knocking down incoming bullets but tracing their source and engaging the source with Counter-Battery fire.

Counter battery fire in Afghanistan was very limited for much of the time. The problem wasn't target acquisition, it was confirming status of life in the target area so as to determine the risk of collateral damage and the resultant hold on returning fire. That's not quite the same situation as a high intensity conflict scenario but merely points out that Afghanistan is a poor analogue for Ukraine situation.

If I extrapolate from there, the defence of a locality to the defence of a country, or a region, then part of GBAD would be Counter-Battery fire.

Don't confuse "would" with "could." The fact that something might be technically feasible is not the same as saying it is practical.

That is starting to sound to me as a rationale for 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) to incorporate a Precision Fires capability commensurate with the range of its GBAD capability. Commensurate to me means that, depending on the size of the bubble being protected (the extreme limits of the SAMs as deployed) and the nature of the incoming threat being tracked, that the regiment have an ability to counter the firers at extreme range so as to push them as far back from the bubble as possible.

It's not 100% clear to me what you are actually proposing, but it sounds like having 4 RCA(GS) capable of knocking the incoming projectile out of the air with its GBAD capability and also striking the launcher with its CB capability. Or, at the very least, forcing the enemy to put its launchers outside the range of our ability to CB.

What is that range? Well a HIMARS truck can carry a load that can push that range out to 50 km, 150 km or 500 km depending on the missiles loaded. That same truck carrying a Sky-Sabre type of set up can create a SHORAD/MRAD bubble of 20 to 100 km. Open source information suggests that the Israeli Elbit ELM-2084 MMR supplied to Canada by Rheinmetall


That 470 km would correspond nicely with the 499+km open source range of the HIMARS launched PrSMs currently being introduced.

....

Poland's buying spree of HIMARSs, Chunmoos, NSM launchers and GBAD systems strongly suggests to me that Poland is intent on creating a bubble over its head and around its borders.

If Poland were to place PrSMs on its borders it would push the neighbour's forces back 500 km. But that would be an unfriendly act and probably invite retaliation. The saw off would be to assume the neighbour has an equivalent 500 km capability and put 500 kms between the two opposing systems. That would leave a 500 km wide Cordon Sanitaire between the two systems centred on the border. That would, in turn, mean that the systems would stand back 250 km from the border. Communities, and forces, could inhabit the Cordon Sanitaire if their offensive ranges were shorter. Those forces and communities could also be equipped with their own local GBAD systems and be considered non-threatening.

There's a point when considering factors in an estimate where you have to ask "So what?". I've done that here without any meaningful COA popping up.

Back to 4 (GS) Regiment.

Suppose the regiment had the ability to deploy its 470 km radar along with 20-100 km SAMs and 50-500 km PSSMs. Would that be a useful deterrent capability for a friend? Or a reserve capability useful to have on hand in Canada in case the geopolitical situation changed and Canada needed to act locally?

Related thought.

Does 4 (GS) Regiment have to limited to 4 or 5 batteries if some batteries are going to be detached for independent duties protecting dispersed localities in a larger air defence network like, for example NORAD, or the Latvian or Ukrainian Air Defence System, or attached to a deployed Canadian Brigade Group?

4 RCA(GS) is dealing with a number of developing issues and has organized itself accordingly. 127 Bty covers airspace coordination and in fact has a team already in Latvia doing just that. It is also involved in converting to the GBAD role. 128 Bty runs the MRRs and 129 Bty the SUAS.

ASCC and GBAD are a natural fit. ASCCs already have the ability to integrate radar pictures from multiple sources through ADSI (Air Defense System Integrator) regardless whether it is a Canadian MRR or some other forces's systems.

To my knowledge there is no system set up to integrate 4 RCA(GS) into the CB fight. Technically we could do so to the limits of the M777 range or allied rocket systems. Whether we are working on that or not, I don't know. There are a lot of moving parts right now in 4 RCA(GS) and whether this is a high enough priority at this point is a question.

You should be aware that 4 RCA(GS) also has the role of providing the fire support coordination element for 1 CA Div (if it is ever needed). Ordinarily CB on an industrial scale starts at Div with the Div arty intelligence cell therefore the doctrine and building blocks to integrate air defence and CB exist doctrinally within the regiment. The residual question in my mind is how to technically deal with the two functions - the fact that they can be integrated does not mean that they should be. The simple question that I have is "will one coordinating cell" be overwhelmed by the data they will have to deal with during a complex attack - would it therefore be better to separate the functions while still using the same radar sources. I don't know the answer to that and only extensive studies and trials will be the answer.

Following on from the US Combat support organization that sees the Brigade Battalion having 10 or so companies but most of them are detached and under the operational control of the units they are supporting.

Let me start off by saying that I agree with @TangoTwoBravo on the five unit rule of thumb. When it comes to things like AD or CB one shouldn't confuse command and span of control of manoeuvre units and the coordination of multiple nodes of semi-independent systems like a large air defence network or integrating forward CB sensor units with firing batteries across the area of operations.

Artillery in general and air defence in particular were designed to be large scale integrated networks of multiple resources. (Think of the movies with fighter command headquarters with woman pushing around little markers on a giant map of England during the Battle of Britain.) I think that the coordination function can be completely wide-spread.

There is still a rule of five and a hierarchical structure needed for artillery which is based primarily on the need to support individual battalions and brigades and the logistics support to such firing units. The demand is high and complex and cannot be properly effected from a single point. For artillery, the rule is that it is commanded at the highest level but controlled at the lowest. There may very well be dozens of firing nodes that are coordinated, but they still need to be "managed" (every thing from siting individual launchers, providing for their security and maintaining them with ammo, food, water and fuel) at the local node level. The dispersion of those elements only complicates matters. The question of whether one regiment can adequately manage 3 or 8 firing batteries depends on many things but three to four firing batteries supported by one command and control cell and one service support battery is a reasonable compromise for a manageable regimental structure. An AD or a CB system tied to multiple sensors could, however, coordinate multiple regiments.

And how many of those detachable firing batteries could be manned by Reserve units? The forward deployed batteries and the immediate reaction batteries I would think should all be Regular Force batteries.

Again, semantics and context.

Technically, most AD and artillery firing batteries could be manned in large part with reservists. Most tasks are reduced to simple mechanical or computer based skills. Technical support is mostly component replacement. (No one repairs TVs anymore either). I'm a firm believer in a battery manned by a small core of RegF leaders and a large group of ResF "workers" is highly practical and fiscally desirable.

The question of quick reaction batteries or forward deployed batteries is a different one.

Assuming that you have a mixed organization of RegF and ResF AD gunners, I see no reason that your forward deployed force couldn't in large part be ResF gunners on one year or more volunteer Class C callouts. In Afghanistan the figure was around 15% ResF in deployed gun batteries, mostly on the gun line itself. There's no reason not to go higher in a peacetime scenario assuming availability.

The question for quick reaction forces is the same. Units going into quick reaction cycles have lead up training and, again, Class Cs (or even B's) could be part of a QRF unit's rotation.

I think the real limiting factor for an army as small as ours is that the leadership element required to run the system needs a career base to develop through. When we had 4 AD Regt there were close to 500 RegF and 500 ResF gunners in the system. That was enough RegF gunners to develop individual gunners to the LCol and CWO rank level. We even had AD IGs and AIGs. If we're down to a hundred or even two hundred or so AD positions, it becomes much, much more challenging.

I don't see that as an impediment to also having ResF air defenders and IMHO, we need to do much better to have a reserve component designated to support 4 RCA(GS) in its various functions including, and especially, the SUAS which, again IMHO, should be a precursor to loitering munitions and UCAVs. To be honest, I think we need another regiment entirely: we need both an AD regt (to integrate all the ground based AD functions across the army) and a GS regt (to run the deep precision munitions fight from loitering munitions to HIMARS).

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

How does that conform with the expectations of Brigade Gp commander? And does some of the load get carried by National Support Elements such as forward deployed components of 1 Div and 6 CCSB? Do they add to or subtract from the "Brigadier's" span of control?

And I am using the term Brigadier in the same sense sailors use the term Captain - the person in command of the Brigade regardless of actual rank.

Brigade Commanders have training and experience and are enabled by a staff and arms advisors. The load required for synchronization of combat power at that level is considerable, but they have staff to help. They have CO Guns, CO Engineers and CO Svc Svc Bn as advisors, each with their own staffs. CO Svc Bn with their Log Ops can relieve the Bde Comd of spending too much time on the rear battle. CO Guns and their staff can loop in all manner of support without burdening the Bde Comd with details and help bring something of a deep battle to life for the Bde (limited as it may be). CO Guns is also in the close fight and the rear fight, so we shouldn't think of them as just the deep battle.

Span of control, though, is still a reality. We are humans with everything that goes with that. I think that the literature offers that a span of control should be between 3 and 7 reports.

Can a staff and arms advisors/attachments make span of control worse? I suppose so. Not all help is helpful. A commander could be overwhelmed by process and experts, but they shouldn't let that happen. Staff should be as small as they can be and as large as they need to be. Some capabilities make great sense at one level but maybe not at another. One operation may have a great demand on a specific capability that the next operation does not. In a COIN planning cycle I would expect the G9 to get lots of face time during wargames. In a conventional fight maybe not so much. Maybe they are not even there.

To the other part of your question, 1st Cdn Div could be providing the core of the NCE. The Bde Comd could be the national commander, or there could be another officer filling that role. There are several C2 options for deployed operations. 6 CCSB is not a deployable Bde HQ. They could force generate an element for the deployed CMBG, and they experimented with different models between 2021 and 2023.

I get the feeling I am not answering your real question, though, as I am not sure that I know what it is?

 

[Kirkhill]

Brigade Commanders have training and experience and are enabled by a staff and arms advisors. The load required for synchronization of combat power at that level is considerable, but they have staff to help. They have CO Guns, CO Engineers and CO Svc Svc Bn as advisors, each with their own staffs. CO Svc Bn with their Log Ops can relieve the Bde Comd of spending too much time on the rear battle. CO Guns and their staff can loop in all manner of support without burdening the Bde Comd with details and help bring something of a deep battle to life for the Bde (limited as it may be). CO Guns is also in the close fight and the rear fight, so we shouldn't think of them as just the deep battle.

Span of control, though, is still a reality. We are humans with everything that goes with that. I think that the literature offers that a span of control should be between 3 and 7 reports.

Can a staff and arms advisors/attachments make span of control worse? I suppose so. Not all help is helpful. A commander could be overwhelmed by process and experts, but they shouldn't let that happen. Staff should be as small as they can be and as large as they need to be. Some capabilities make great sense at one level but maybe not at another. One operation may have a great demand on a specific capability that the next operation does not. In a COIN planning cycle I would expect the G9 to get lots of face time during wargames. In a conventional fight maybe not so much. Maybe they are not even there.

To the other part of your question, 1st Cdn Div could be providing the core of the NCE. The Bde Comd could be the national commander, or there could be another officer filling that role. There are several C2 options for deployed operations. 6 CCSB is not a deployable Bde HQ. They could force generate an element for the deployed CMBG, and they experimented with different models between 2021 and 2023.

I get the feeling I am not answering your real question, though, as I am not sure that I know what it is?

You are answering my questions. For a change I am trying to listen and gather info.

 

[KevinB]

@TangoTwoBravo that last post just nailed the point of why I despise the NSE/NCE setup.

Yes there needs to be a higher command and support structure, but as Bde’s and Divisions are maneuver elements, that a true NSE or NCE is realistically to be found at Corps or Higher Levels, as Bde and Div don’t have all of the necessary enablers to be a rear link.
Div HQ should easily be able to field a NCE for a Bde, but a Div support Bde won’t (shouldn’t?) have all the necessary resources or personnel to conduct a NSE, at least on a combat mission.
Afghanistan was an aberration as well as an example as there was a giant footprint in Kandahar, and Bagram from Allied forces, so for Kandahar deployments it makes sense. But for Kabul, the NCE and NSE was just kind of floating - and had more been required the pittance at Camp Julien would not have been able to support the forces there.

I would think that it would be better to imbed the NCE and NSE into the next higher formation that a Canadian entity is part of - (also why I’m a fan of attaching to a US or UK Div- primarily US,) .