Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Perhaps this is to allow the Divisional commander the option for the MPF battalion to maneuver independently somewhat like a Tank Battalion if facing a non-peer enemy that doesn't have an armour threat?

Using them "like a tank" is what everyone criticized about the MGS and similarly lightly protected direct fire support vehicles. That's why MGS were originally deployed in a platoon of three in a Stryker rifle company - to discourage "massing" as an armoured fist but to leave them as a support tool for the rifle company. Even distributing them as a company of MPFs with a brigade is flirting with slipping into "tank-like" tactics.

I can't really see a need to mass MPFs against non-peer enemies.

I think in a Canadian Divisional context a Tank Regiment would make sense for this slot.

My head is with a proper tank equipped armoured regiment in a heavy brigade as long as we continue with the pretense of having a full spectrum army. And I believe we should have at least one of those in Europe as a part of a NATO deterrent force. I tend to believe that we need more than one of those but recognize the reality of funding so one brigade will have to do for starters.

For me the greatest value that the MPF has is that it is lighter and more easily transported to a theatre and then easier to feed and water once it gets there, but, quite frankly you can provide direct fire support of the bunker busting or anti-armour type from man pack or light vehicles as well. To me the MPF falls into a very narrow niche that I really don't think is worth the cost. You could get all the benefit that the new MPF gives by putting a new fire control system into an old AMX-30 at the cost of a couple of tons more but at a tremendous per unit cost saving.

I think that the MGS was a bad choice for Canada in the '00s and the MPF is a bad choice for the '30s.

 

[Kirkhill]

Combat Support includes support weapons, but it does not mean support weapons. Pioneers and Recce are combat support. Engineers, artillery, and assault transport (helicopters or amphibians) are combat support.

Understood and agreed. But it seems that span of control issues, and their divergence in garrison and the field, seem to breed multiple wiring diagrams.

 

[Kirkhill]

Using them "like a tank" is what everyone criticized about the MGS and similarly lightly protected direct fire support vehicles. That's why MGS were originally deployed in a platoon of three in a Stryker rifle company - to discourage "massing" as an armoured fist but to leave them as a support tool for the rifle company. Even distributing them as a company of MPFs with a brigade is flirting with slipping into "tank-like" tactics.

I can't really see a need to mass MPFs against non-peer enemies.

My head is with a proper tank equipped armoured regiment in a heavy brigade as long as we continue with the pretense of having a full spectrum army. And I believe we should have at least one of those in Europe as a part of a NATO deterrent force. I tend to believe that we need more than one of those but recognize the reality of funding so one brigade will have to do for starters.

For me the greatest value that the MPF has is that it is lighter and more easily transported to a theatre and then easier to feed and water once it gets there, but, quite frankly you can provide direct fire support of the bunker busting or anti-armour type from man pack or light vehicles as well. To me the MPF falls into a very narrow niche that I really don't think is worth the cost. You could get all the benefit that the new MPF gives by putting a new fire control system into an old AMX-30 at the cost of a couple of tons more but at a tremendous per unit cost saving.

I think that the MGS was a bad choice for Canada in the '00s and the MPF is a bad choice for the '30s.

Here's the what if.

What if, in 2006, the choices available for Afghanistan were:

Leopard 2 MBT - 62 tonnes - 120 mm
Leopard 1 MBT - 42 tonnes - 105 mm L7
Booker MPF - 42 tonnes - 105 mm M35
Stryker MGS - 19 tonnes - 105 mm M68/L7

Leo 1s were immediately available and were used in Afghanistan.
The weight made them as deployable as the Booker and more deployable than the Leo 2
The weapon was identical to the MGS and the MPF in terms of terminal effects.

Why wouldn't the RCAC just have submitted UORs for the Leo1s to bring their onboard systems up to the standards of the Booker?

Personally I would have left the System of Systems (the MGS and the TUA at least) with the LAV Battalions and limit the LAV Battalion to C130 transportability.

 

[FJAG]

Having babysitter brigades for a division’s combat support is a relatively new phenomenon. They came about in part as a means to support regional or theatre capabilities in rotational COIN operations. Before that, when divisions operated as manoeuvre formations (as they are again expected to do), the combat support units were controlled directly by the Div HQ and they were supported directly from the division sustainment group/brigade.

That's partially correct. While the old US divisional structures did not have support brigades, they did have a DISCOMs (Divisional Support Commands) which held all of the divisions logistics and medical elements.

In Canada, while we never set these up, doctrinally the Cold War divisions support came from a "regimental" size structure called the DISGP (Divisional Support Group) to which the brigade service battalions belonged as well as additional transport, maintenance, supply etc battalions. We even defined the structure of a corps notionally to have a COSCOM (Corps Service Command) which would hold such things as a maintenance brigade etc.

Divisional structures where the various CS and CSS battalions reported directly to the division go back to WW2 days.

 

[FJAG]

Here's the what if.

What if, in 2006, the choices available for Afghanistan were:

Leopard 2 MBT - 62 tonnes - 120 mm
Leopard 1 MBT - 42 tonnes - 105 mm L7
Booker MPF - 42 tonnes - 105 mm M35
Stryker MGS - 19 tonnes - 105 mm M68/L7

Leo 1s were immediately available and were used in Afghanistan.
The weight made them as deployable as the Booker and more deployable than the Leo 2
The weapon was identical to the MGS and the MPF in terms of terminal effects.

Why wouldn't the RCAC just have submitted UORs for the Leo1s to bring their onboard systems up to the standards of the Booker?

Personally I would have left the System of Systems (the MGS and the TUA at least) with the LAV Battalions and limit the LAV Battalion to C130 transportability.

The Leo 1's fire control systems were perfectly adequate for the tactical employment they received in Afghanistan. The problem was mines/IEDs and to an extent the appearance of the odd recoilless rifle and the better quality RPGs. The issue was better protection which the Leo 2 M class offered.

MGS did deploy to Afghanistan with SBCTs. I think their performance was spotty and their problems more mechanical and tactical in nature. @TangoTwoBravo would have a much better understanding than I of their performance in combat.

This is a decent read on their first time employment in Afghanistan.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Por...institute/csi-books/StrykersInAfghanistan.pdf

It generally looks favourably on the MGS but does highlight the Strykers' vulnerabilities in general.

 

[McG]

That's partially correct. While the old US divisional structures did not have support brigades, they did have a DISCOMs (Divisional Support Commands) which held all of the divisions logistics and medical elements.

I believe I acknowledged the existence of this when I indicated that it directly supported all the combat support units that reported direct to the division. It is CSS and not CS.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Leo 1's fire control systems were perfectly adequate for the tactical employment they received in Afghanistan. The problem was mines/IEDs and to an extent the appearance of the odd recoilless rifle and the better quality RPGs. The issue was better protection which the Leo 2 M class offered.

MGS did deploy to Afghanistan with SBCTs. I think their performance was spotty and their problems more mechanical and tactical in nature. @TangoTwoBravo would have a much better understanding than I of their performance in combat.

This is a decent read on their first time employment in Afghanistan.

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Por...institute/csi-books/StrykersInAfghanistan.pdf

It generally looks favourably on the MGS but does highlight the Strykers' vulnerabilities in general.

It seems to me it is always good to know what your kit, of any type, can't do.

I am sure there are places the Leo 2 shouldn't go and situations in which it should not be used

 

[FJAG]

I believe I acknowledged the existence of this when I indicated that it directly supported all the combat support units that reported direct to the division. It is CSS and not CS.

Sorry. I thought you were alluding to the WW2 structures.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Here's the what if.

What if, in 2006, the choices available for Afghanistan were:

Leopard 2 MBT - 62 tonnes - 120 mm
Leopard 1 MBT - 42 tonnes - 105 mm L7
Booker MPF - 42 tonnes - 105 mm M35
Stryker MGS - 19 tonnes - 105 mm M68/L7

Leo 1s were immediately available and were used in Afghanistan.
The weight made them as deployable as the Booker and more deployable than the Leo 2
The weapon was identical to the MGS and the MPF in terms of terminal effects.

Why wouldn't the RCAC just have submitted UORs for the Leo1s to bring their onboard systems up to the standards of the Booker?

Personally I would have left the System of Systems (the MGS and the TUA at least) with the LAV Battalions and limit the LAV Battalion to C130 transportability.

"More deployable" is an interesting concept. How do you think our vehicles got to Afghanistan?

The Leopard C2 actually had fantastic FCS including a very up to date thermal sight.

Regarding your question, in the land of the blind the one eyed man is king. Anything with a gun capable of destroying a grape drying hut while offering protection to its crew would have been helpful in the summer of 2006. If a troop of MGS had shown up I am sure they would have been put into the fight. But they didn't show up. What Leopard C2s offered in addition to firepower, though, was breaching/route clearance support. They could also take hits with their up-armour packages.

Leopard 2s amped up the protection. The Booker looks attractive, but if you can get a Booker into theatre you can also get a Leopard 2 into theatre.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Leopard 2s amped up the protection. The Booker looks attractive, but if you can get a Booker into theatre you can also get a Leopard 2 into theatre.

But the Booker is an 'Invasion Tank' that is supposed to support Airborne Infantry and, therefore, isn't supposed to survive for long.

Which is not something Canada needs, or wants, to do of course.

 

[Kirkhill]

"More deployable" is an interesting concept. How do you think our vehicles got to Afghanistan?

The Leopard C2 actually had fantastic FCS including a very up to date thermal sight.

Regarding your question, in the land of the blind the one eyed man is king. Anything with a gun capable of destroying a grape drying hut while offering protection to its crew would have been helpful in the summer of 2006. If a troop of MGS had shown up I am sure they would have been put into the fight. But they didn't show up. What Leopard C2s offered in addition to firepower, though, was breaching/route clearance support. They could also take hits with their up-armour packages.

Leopard 2s amped up the protection. The Booker looks attractive, but if you can get a Booker into theatre you can also get a Leopard 2 into theatre.

I broadly agree but on a mass basis a single C17 could deliver

one 120 mm gun in a Leo 2 or
a 105 on a Leo1 / Booker and a LAV III or
3x 105 on MGSs or Type 16 Maneuver Combat Vehicles or
1x 105 on an MGS and 2x LAV 6.0s.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Leopard 2s amped up the protection. The Booker looks attractive, but if you can get a Booker into theatre you can also get a Leopard 2 into theatre.

Ok. The answer to "what should non-MBT regiments in a future single-stream 4x4 RCAC be equipped with?" Shouldn't be a light tank.

Scratch the Booker, CV90105/120, Lynx 120 off the list- if we're going to send a tank/ 40tonne or more vehicle, might as well make it an MBT

By extension- scratch converting and off the shelf modern NATO IFV into a cavalry vehicle like the M3 from the M2- CV90MkIV, Griffin III, Lynx KF 41 are all heavy enough to fall into the "just make it an MBT" basket.

Options in the sub 30 tonne range
K21 Redback- call back to the cavalry Bradley- 25.6 tonnes. Brings 40mm + twin ATGM, tracked
LAV 6.0 105- ~28 tonnes, wheeled. Extra beef + lessons learned = leave the failures of the MGS behind it?
LAV 6.0 ARV/CFV - 30/35mm twin ATGM, wheeled
EBRC Jaguar- 25 tonne, 40mm CTA, twin ATGM wheeled

Go lighter? JLTV, or this newfangled cockerill?

Is wheeled vs tracked dictated? Minimum armament? Crew size?


Or, spend the next ~10 years committing and locking in to the single stream doctrine, while also creating a laundry list of reasons why it's sub-optimal to do so with non-MBT's in the mix and built the case for throwing the budget at a fully MBT RCAC?

 

[Kirkhill]

Ok. The answer to "what should non-MBT regiments in a future single-stream 4x4 RCAC be equipped with?" Shouldn't be a light tank.

Scratch the Booker, CV90105/120, Lynx 120 off the list- if we're going to send a tank/ 40tonne or more vehicle, might as well make it an MBT

By extension- scratch converting and off the shelf modern NATO IFV into a cavalry vehicle like the M3 from the M2- CV90MkIV, Griffin III, Lynx KF 41 are all heavy enough to fall into the "just make it an MBT" basket.

Options in the sub 30 tonne range
K21 Redback- call back to the cavalry Bradley- 25.6 tonnes. Brings 40mm + twin ATGM, tracked
LAV 6.0 105- ~28 tonnes, wheeled. Extra beef + lessons learned = leave the failures of the MGS behind it?
LAV 6.0 ARV/CFV - 30/35mm twin ATGM, wheeled
EBRC Jaguar- 25 tonne, 40mm CTA, twin ATGM wheeled

Go lighter? JLTV, or this newfangled cockerill?

Is wheeled vs tracked dictated? Minimum armament? Crew size?


Or, spend the next ~10 years committing and locking in to the single stream doctrine, while also creating a laundry list of reasons why it's sub-optimal to do so with non-MBT's in the mix and built the case for throwing the budget at a fully MBT RCAC?

Given the transport options if you are going under 30 tonnes then you might as well go under 18 tonnes.

At 30 tonnes, even 25 tonnes, you have to go with C17s or ships. The A400M is nominally 30 tonne capable but ... Airbus and not a lot of them.

The only real option smaller than the C17 is the Herc with a max of 20 tonnes. And on principle I like to leave a little margin in my calculations so, for me, that means keeping the vehicle below 18 tonnes which would be 90% of max.

A Herc could lift an older Bison or M113 or a couple of JLTVs or Scimitars.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Given the transport options if you are going under 30 tonnes then you might as well go under 18 tonnes.

At 30 tonnes, even 25 tonnes, you have to go with C17s or ships. The A400M is nominally 30 tonne capable but ... Airbus and not a lot of them.

The only real option smaller than the C17 is the Herc with a max of 20 tonnes. And on principle I like to leave a little margin in my calculations so, for me, that means keeping the vehicle below 18 tonnes which would be 90% of max.

A Herc could lift an older Bison or M113 or a couple of JLTVs or Scimitars.

My first thought, was to quote back your post about 1 vs 2+something else
My second thought, was to point out that anytime they're deploying long with LAV infantry your point is moot
My third thought, was to question whether or not there would be a situation where you deploying armour in support of LAV infantry and one of those 25 tonne options, and if there is, is it a big enough need for Canada?
My fourth thought was to think about JTLV's with 30mm/Javelin RS6
My fifth thought was to remember this picture , and wonder how close in weight that SHORAD module is to an anti-armour or multi-mission configured Moog RIwP

 

[Kirkhill]

My first thought, was to quote back your post about 1 vs 2+something else
My second thought, was to point out that anytime they're deploying long with LAV infantry your point is moot
My third thought, was to question whether or not there would be a situation where you deploying armour in support of LAV infantry and one of those 25 tonne options, and if there is, is it a big enough need for Canada?
My fourth thought was to think about JTLV's with 30mm/Javelin RS6
My fifth thought was to remember this picture , and wonder how close in weight that SHORAD module is to an anti-armour or multi-mission configured Moog RIwP

Many ways to skin cats.

But we only have 5 C17s, 12 C130Hs and 17 C130Js.

To my mind it comes down to how much capability can be crammed into the existing space.

Another aspect is that a small heavy force deployed in support of a light force in complex terrain is going to have more impact than that same small heavy force in a heavy force operating in open terrain.

A C17 with a medium troop as an adjunct to a light battle group delivered by C130s, I think, would be a considerable force multiplier in the right context.

 

[KevinB]

The CAF isn’t moving anything quickly by air, outside of Light Infantry.
It can jump a Light Inf Reg’t in one lift using everything (waiving peacetime seat restrictions).

It can airlift a Light Bde with some light vehicles and tube Arty

Vehicle movements for the CAF either need to be multi lift efforts or contract sealift — or phone a friend.

Realistically the only Heavy Forces Canada can count on are Pre-Deployed.

So one would think that would mean the CA would have some restructuring ideas to that purpose.

 

[Kirkhill]

The CAF isn’t moving anything quickly by air, outside of Light Infantry.
It can jump a Light Inf Reg’t in one lift using everything (waiving peacetime seat restrictions).

It can airlift a Light Bde with some light vehicles and tube Arty

Vehicle movements for the CAF either need to be multi lift efforts or contract sealift — or phone a friend.

Realistically the only Heavy Forces Canada can count on are Pre-Deployed.

So one would think that would mean the CA would have some restructuring ideas to that purpose.

You keep saying this stuff....

Canada's air fleet is going to be:

9x A330
5x C17
17x C130J30

Assuming 12 hour out of 24 availability, comparable to civvy fleet standards, then in one week, 84 hours, flying out to Prestwick loaded and deadheading back, the RCAF could launch 42 A330 sorties, 59 C130J30 sorties and 22 C17 sorties.

That means that in one week the RCAF could park in Prestwick
12,159 troops and 26,391 m3 of cargo weighing about 4000 tonnes

That cargo could be:

1200 463L Pallets or up to
1000 MRZRs or up to
300 JLTVs or up to
120 LAVs or up to
22 Leo2

Or some combination of all of the above.

They could also park 2 out of the 5 C17s and 6 to 12 of the C130s on the ramp at Prestwick for tactical deployment of those troops anywhere in Europe.

And the A330s and the other C17s and C130s could continue the supply conveyor indefinitely.

Just as in Afghanistan the first contingents would be light but they could be heavied up over time.

 

[GR66]

You keep saying this stuff....

Canada's air fleet is going to be:

9x A330
5x C17
17x C130J30

Assuming 12 hour out of 24 availability, comparable to civvy fleet standards, then in one week, 84 hours, flying out to Prestwick loaded and deadheading back, the RCAF could launch 42 A330 sorties, 59 C130J30 sorties and 22 C17 sorties.

That means that in one week the RCAF could park in Prestwick
12,159 troops and 26,391 m3 of cargo weighing about 4000 tonnes

That cargo could be:

1200 463L Pallets or up to
1000 MRZRs or up to
300 JLTVs or up to
120 LAVs or up to
22 Leo2

Or some combination of all of the above.

They could also park 2 out of the 5 C17s and 6 to 12 of the C130s on the ramp at Prestwick for tactical deployment of those troops anywhere in Europe.

And the A330s and the other C17s and C130s could continue the supply conveyor indefinitely.

Just as in Afghanistan the first contingents would be light but they could be heavied up over time.

I don't think our airlift capacity can be calculated as simply as you suggest. You assume a single focus for the fleets that realistically won't exist. There are domestic and international support needs requiring transport that won't stop when a conflict starts. The personnel and materials/vehicles to be moved to theatre will be spread around the country and will affect the "efficiency" of the loads being transported.

We may need to deliver to dispersed locations or slow our rate of deliveries for various reasons (risk to the receiving airfields, not wanting to have too much materiel accumulating in a single location (target), capacity of the facilities - especially if allies are using the same airfields, etc.

Presumably in a major conflict the RCAF and RCN will have their own requirements for those transport aircraft. Bombs, missiles, parts, etc. have to get to their operating areas as well. The MRTT's may/will be required in the AAR tanker role, etc.

Suddenly the hypothetical lift capacity of the RCAF to support a surge deployment of the CA isn't what you may envision. On the bright side the most probable conflict requiring a major surge capacity for the CA (Russia) can be somewhat solved by pre-positioning of equipment and materiel in theatre. A war with China is going to be primarily a RCN/RCAF show. Other possible conflicts (Iran, North Korea, etc.) are less likely to require a rapid Brigade+ deployment.

Personally I think focusing on some hypothetical major air deployment of the CA doesn't make sense. There are many other areas that deserve the attention over this. Tailoring our vehicle selection to an unrealistic airlift capacity I think will actually result in a less effective force. If light forces make sense outside the ability to fit those vehicles inside a particular aircraft then fine...but don't limit your vehicle choices based on how many can fit in our limited number of transport aircraft.

That being said, I'm 1000% in favour of Canada significantly increasing our airlift (and sealift) capacity. Frankly NATO is lacking the capacity to deploy and support its armies more than it is lacking combat forces. An additional airlift squadron for the RCAF would likely have more benefit to NATO than an additional Infantry Battalion.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think our airlift capacity can be calculated as simply as you suggest. You assume a single focus for the fleets that realistically won't exist. There are domestic and international support needs requiring transport that won't stop when a conflict starts. The personnel and materials/vehicles to be moved to theatre will be spread around the country and will affect the "efficiency" of the loads being transported.

We may need to deliver to dispersed locations or slow our rate of deliveries for various reasons (risk to the receiving airfields, not wanting to have too much materiel accumulating in a single location (target), capacity of the facilities - especially if allies are using the same airfields, etc.

Presumably in a major conflict the RCAF and RCN will have their own requirements for those transport aircraft. Bombs, missiles, parts, etc. have to get to their operating areas as well. The MRTT's may/will be required in the AAR tanker role, etc.

Suddenly the hypothetical lift capacity of the RCAF to support a surge deployment of the CA isn't what you may envision. On the bright side the most probable conflict requiring a major surge capacity for the CA (Russia) can be somewhat solved by pre-positioning of equipment and materiel in theatre. A war with China is going to be primarily a RCN/RCAF show. Other possible conflicts (Iran, North Korea, etc.) are less likely to require a rapid Brigade+ deployment.

Personally I think focusing on some hypothetical major air deployment of the CA doesn't make sense. There are many other areas that deserve the attention over this. Tailoring our vehicle selection to an unrealistic airlift capacity I think will actually result in a less effective force. If light forces make sense outside the ability to fit those vehicles inside a particular aircraft then fine...but don't limit your vehicle choices based on how many can fit in our limited number of transport aircraft.

That being said, I'm 1000% in favour of Canada significantly increasing our airlift (and sealift) capacity. Frankly NATO is lacking the capacity to deploy and support its armies more than it is lacking combat forces. An additional airlift squadron for the RCAF would likely have more benefit to NATO than an additional Infantry Battalion.

I encourage everyone to try their hand at arithmetic. Then the discussions can start.

 

[FJAG]

Your figures presuppose 100% aircraft/crew availability which will not happen and the force being landed is too large for people and too small for cargo. It begs the whole question though: what is the force you wish to land and where. Distance is a critical factor as is the capability at the far end for receiving and deploying the force. @GR66 brings up some factors that come into play. Math isn't the problem. Its reality that's the bitch.

Let's for a second assume we're going to Europe. If so there is very clearly a seaborne option. A RORO/Ocean ferry operates at roughly 30-40 kph cruising speed. The 5,000 km journey can be covered in 5-7 days sea travel. Like airborne shipping there is a very major logistics effort involved in staging and loading the cargo. The people are the easiest component. Vehicles and especially palletized or containerized cargo not so much.

If anyone here thinks that we can move a light battalion in anything under 96 hours they are pretty much mistaken. In addition, before we deploy there is a very long decision cycle that needs to be gone through before the force is launched. A lot of activity can be accomplished to prepare during this decision phase including positioning force for sea-lift.

What I'm really trying to get to is that air isn't the only option. If it takes a week to fly a given force over then you can ship it by sea in a week so long that there is a viable, frequently rehearsed staging and loading plan in place to make it happen. This could even be true for our big bugbear of stopping the Russian horde at the Latvian border. Like Ukraine there will be a build up period which creates a political decision game of: will we/won't we deploy?

Where @KevinB and I are completely in sync is that if you have a mission like Latvia, where you feel you may have to deploy very rapidly then prepositioned equipment and war stocks are the best answer. The easiest deployment (as REFORGER proved over and over again) is taking a given number of soldiers with nothing but their personal kit and the odd battle-box on a fleet of military and contracted civilian aircraft and land them on a completely equipped brigade, division or corps. You can probably do that in 48 hours if the proper plans and processes in place.

Unfortunately, I think Canadians are dilettantes when it comes to strategic, rapid-rection moves. We saw that with the CAST combat group decades ago when we had many months to prepare for moving a brigade group. We look at these things as ad hoc administrative problems. It's been a very long time since I saw the plans for moving ACE and CAST but my guess is the plans for whatever contingency plans exist these days aren't even as well developed as those were and the joint exercising of them probably does not take place outside of computer simulations (if that). We may have some available planes to load but we do not set up to utilize them at scale.

The problem is complicated exponentially if we are considering a deployment into any other theatre other than Latvia where we do not already have a base presence to build on. Anything greater than deploying a light battalion with some enablers into a low-intensity situation would be challenging for Canada.