Infantry Vehicles

[Fabius]

I guess I am trying to see the "so what?" Doctrine is an agreed-upon set of fundamental principles on how we will fight. Our BG-level doctrine is sound, and we can execute it. Our CMBG-level doctrine is also sound, and it applies in what we are leading overseas (with variations, of course, for the local situation).

I do not see a need to adjust doctrine based on numbers of tanks? Why do you see that? If we had no tanks at all and no scope for allied tanks then we'd need to look at out combat team and battle group doctrine.

We have six LAV battalions that will be cycling through Latvia. This means that each Battalion will deploy once every three years. This includes the Battalion HQ. combat support company and the combat support company. If we surged another LAV Company Canada could field a rather doctrinal Mech Battle Group on its own.

I suspect the difference between you and @GR66 is that he is looking at the Canadian Army as an army at war with all of its units and formations, whereas you are looking at it in terms of a peacetime rotational deployment.

The CA has three tank squadrons and 18 infantry companies. If those infantry companies go to war anytime in the next 5 years as part of Canadian Army formations chances of them being in a square combat team or even a Sqn(-) or half Sqn will be slight.

Our tactical doctrine at the Cbt Tn and BG levels is sound but due to resources it starts collapsing at Bde and has utterly collapsed as a doctrine for how the Canadian Army will fight as an Army at War. Again simply due to resources and structure.

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

 

[Fabius]

If I was suddenly given a bunch of public funds to spend I would likely just buy 100 more LAV 6 and place a BG worth at JMRC Hohenfels for Level 5/6 training and as a surge BG.

The problem with the entire idea of exporting the Canadian Army’s collective training to Europe for L5 and L6 is that we would be further atrophying our ability to mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America and then deploy them.
As a surge BG that equipment set would be completely disconnected from the rest of the Canadian Army in Latvia.

 

[FJAG]

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

I'm 100% with you on this. It's a habit we picked up in Afghanistan. I'll trump your two battalions scenario with TF 3-07 which was headed by the RHQ of 3 R22eR. The TF's A Coy was formed by A Coy 1 R22eR; B Coy was formed by 2 R22eR's A Coy and C Coy was formed by 3 R22eR's A Coy.

When we look at the current Latvia eFP we have 9 bns with 27 rifle coys (assuming they are reasonably staffed) to draw on to fill a bn HQ, a rifle coy and parts of a CS coy. The artillery only has six 4-gun batteries to draw on to fill a 6-gun battery and the armoured really only has one tank regiment with three sabre sqns to field a 15-tank squadron. Obviously everyone is robbing Peter to pay Paul. This makes for a poor business model but is pretty much what the designers of the system were aiming for at the turn of the century when battle group-sized task forces were designed to be formed from a variety of coy-sized building blocks and JIMP-capable brigades from building block task forces.

Financial pressures and over-tasking were the driving forces behind this transformation. You've probably read the article in the CAJ a few years ago that discusses some of these issues and argues for an asynchronous army and revised MRP. The MRP has already been revised somewhat but asynchronicity, as proposed, still escapes the army. There is a long way to go, however, and there continues to be disagreement as to the right, or even the best, way forward.

The artillery has for quite some time relied heavily on reservists to fill roto positions. It continues to do so now that the deployment has become heavier but support for reserve force integration and training varies widely across the RegF and ARes brigades.

 

[KevinB]

The internet ate a rather long and detailed reply. I’ll be back later to reconstruct it.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The problem with the entire idea of exporting the Canadian Army’s collective training to Europe for L5 and L6 is that we would be further atrophying our ability to mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America and then deploy them.
As a surge BG that equipment set would be completely disconnected from the rest of the Canadian Army in Latvia.

We are already exporting our Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 for the mech units to Europe, and our Level 6 for the Light Battalions is exported to JPMRC/JRTC. Having a hypothetical BG vehicle set in Germany would allow for live fire (Graefenwhor) and fully-instrumented CT in a less-crowded (but admittedly still in demand) training centre than Latvia. I am not sure how this atrophies our ability mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America? Our deploying elements conduct CT up to and including Level 5 Combined Arms Team near their home garrison locations. If we needed to conduct Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 in Canada we could still do it. The folks that organize and coordinate the exported CT are still Canadian Army.

The hypothetical equipment in Germany would be disconnected from Latvia. But it would a lot closer to Latvia for a surge than it would be it was in Canada. It would require custodial personnel. Moving from Hohenfels to Riga would be a deliberate move, but at least the staging of the flyover troops on the equipment would be in our (NATO) operational depth.

But this is all in an imaginary world where we get an extra BG set of vehicles.

 

[ArmyRick]

The internet ate a rather long and detailed reply. I’ll be back later to reconstruct it.

The old internet ate my homework excuse? Back in my day we blamed our dogs for that, sonny. Sorry Kev, but thats a F on this assignment.

 

[ArmyRick]

Deleted duplicate post. Internet tried to eat my response.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I suspect the difference between you and @GR66 is that he is looking at the Canadian Army as an army at war with all of its units and formations, whereas you are looking at it in terms of a peacetime rotational deployment.

The CA has three tank squadrons and 18 infantry companies. If those infantry companies go to war anytime in the next 5 years as part of Canadian Army formations chances of them being in a square combat team or even a Sqn(-) or half Sqn will be slight.

Our tactical doctrine at the Cbt Tn and BG levels is sound but due to resources it starts collapsing at Bde and has utterly collapsed as a doctrine for how the Canadian Army will fight as an Army at War. Again simply due to resources and structure.

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

I won't speak for GR66, but I am looking at our doctrine in the context of our operational remits. If we tried to field the entire Canadian Army as-is as a Division today we would have plenty of problems. I was part of a Corps-level exercise with allies a few years ago were we explored that concept, fielding pretty much the entire CA with existing equipment (more or less). I will just say that our commitments (which drive the operational requirements) should be made with within our means. If a higher scale of commitment is required then that should drive more equipment (or troops etc).

Even if we had more tank squadrons I don't think we'd see too many "square" combat teams on operations. It is unlikely that a Battle Group commander (especially a infantry heavy BG with a single squadron) would put the bulk of his combat power under two Majors with one of them in charge. We do it on the Combat Team Commander Course because it makes us happy in that little vacuum and lets us see what a Major can handle in terms of span of control.

It would be great if we had at least three more tank squadrons, trading in three "recce" squadrons to achieve that. Would cutting our existing tank squadrons in half achieve something if we have to deploy more than a BG? Perhaps. That would be something to consider through a doctrinal and professional ethics lens. The same would apply to fielding Leopard 2A4s on operations.

I will say that our LAV battalions are useful without too many attachments for operations other than large scale combat operations. They are also useful for security tasks without too many attachments within a LSCO-context.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm 100% with you on this. It's a habit we picked up in Afghanistan. I'll trump your two battalions scenario with TF 3-07 which was headed by the RHQ of 3 R22eR. The TF's A Coy was formed by A Coy 1 R22eR; B Coy was formed by 2 R22eR's A Coy and C Coy was formed by 3 R22eR's A Coy.

When we look at the current Latvia eFP we have 9 bns with 27 rifle coys (assuming they are reasonably staffed) to draw on to fill a bn HQ, a rifle coy and parts of a CS coy. The artillery only has six 4-gun batteries to draw on to fill a 6-gun battery and the armoured really only has one tank regiment with three sabre sqns to field a 15-tank squadron. Obviously everyone is robbing Peter to pay Paul. This makes for a poor business model but is pretty much what the designers of the system were aiming for at the turn of the century when battle group-sized task forces were designed to be formed from a variety of coy-sized building blocks and JIMP-capable brigades from building block task forces.

Financial pressures and over-tasking were the driving forces behind this transformation. You've probably read the article in the CAJ a few years ago that discusses some of these issues and argues for an asynchronous army and revised MRP. The MRP has already been revised somewhat but asynchronicity, as proposed, still escapes the army. There is a long way to go, however, and there continues to be disagreement as to the right, or even the best, way forward.

The artillery has for quite some time relied heavily on reservists to fill roto positions. It continues to do so now that the deployment has become heavier but support for reserve force integration and training varies widely across the RegF and ARes brigades.

It sounds like 'Total Force' is working according to the Master Plan then, eh?

 

[ArmyRick]

It sounds like 'Total Force' is working according to the Master Plan then, eh?

Ahhhhh, the old grand scheme envisioned the year I joined in 1990. Embraced by both the Reg Force and at the time, P Res. Embraced as in literally brawls erupting on exercise between one of my old units, the Lorne Scots and The Canadian Airborne Regiment during Ex On Guard '90.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Ahhhhh, the old grand scheme envisioned the year I joined in 1990. Embraced by both the Reg Force and at the time, P Res. Embraced as in literally brawls erupting on exercise between one of my old units, the Lorne Scots and The Canadian Airborne Regiment during Ex On Guard '90.

Oh God 90.... what a disaster....

I gave the CAF one more chance after that, in '91, then never went back again for another Summer Schlmozzle.

Life is too short to dream about self-harming to get off yet another seriously effed up 2 week exercise