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Infantry Vehicles

I'd say post 250 sums that up quite nicely. Alternative answer, fill niche 3 in post 251.
Light Units aren’t intending to fight from a vehicle. The vehicles are for admin moves, and support.
When you start to armor Light units, they are no longer light, and more of motorized/Mech units.
Counter question- If LMV allowed for two vehicles, one to provide mobility enhancement under the weight restrictions required to be useful for Airborne/Airmobile, one that is free to be heavier to provide mobility to the non-airborne/airmobile divisions, would the latter also be an open topped, open sided, dune buggy?

In other words, is a baseline level of protection truly completely valueless, or was the complete absence of protection a cost of meeting requirement?
Non Airmobile/Airborne Light IBCT units still have reasons for being light.

The Hummer was unarmored repeatedly, some even to levels exceeding what the Senator etc offer. But it still wasn’t a fighting vehicle.

As I understand the ISV lack of armor and the armor kits for the GMV 1.1, it was a weight requirement for movement. Frankly having talked with the ISV PM, it isn’t everything they wanted - but a lot of factors came into play to limit the design, cost was one, but the deployability was a major piece.




ISV is barely tolerable in the Fort Benning environment - Wet, cold and miserable.

GM-ISV-3.jpg


Pick a Canadian location anywhere - and I want a heater.
Having driven and been shuttled around in GMV Hummers, I totally get that aspect. The wind in your hair routine gets pretty sucky with cold and inclement weather conditions, but generally better than walking.

I suspect one could easily add roof/door modules. To make it a little more comfortable (think Iltis in the winter).

But again, I believe certain roles (especially winter operations) are out of the main realm of this vehicle and for the winter the BvS10 is there for that.
 
But again, I believe certain roles (especially winter operations) are out of the main realm of this vehicle and for the winter the BvS10 is there for that.

In a country defined as 9 months of winter and 3 months of hard sledding - in the habitable spaces - I don't find many opportunities to put the top down on my jeep. The heater gets an awful lot more use than the air conditioning.

And as big a fan as I am of the Bandvagons they are overkill for most operations which take place on asphalt and gravel. That isn't to say we shouldn't be buying BvS10s and spending more time operating in the areas where they are appropriate.
 
In a country defined as 9 months of winter and 3 months of hard sledding - in the habitable spaces - I don't find many opportunities to put the top down on my jeep. The heater gets an awful lot more use than the air conditioning.

And as big a fan as I am of the Bandvagons they are overkill for most operations which take place on asphalt and gravel. That isn't to say we shouldn't be buying BvS10s and spending more time operating in the areas where they are appropriate.
I had my windows open last night. 65F in Northern Virginia in January…
Global warming might make the ISV open top more palatable in Canada ;)
 
In a peer to peer fight, it's clear that you want most of your vehicles armoured to some degree, because the main killer is artillery. Protection from shrapnel and protection up to 7.62 reduces a lot of the threats. There does not appear to be much 14.5 being used, some 12.7, but more so 23 and 30mm auto-cannon, which even the much more expensive vehicles won't stop. The Ukrainians are using the Roshel aggressively, along with the Hummers and taking the risk, because it's better than the alternatives.
For us, I see it as a way to get more armour into our inventory. I don't see us buying anymore expensive high end wheeled vehicles outside of the LAV family. A vehicle like the Roshel offers a domestic alternative, which is what we should support from a political and economic viewpoint, not to mention it will continue to have export success thanks to it's prominent use in Ukraine. I also foresee modest improvements in the design from lessons learned. Buying a domestic product, saves us money and if we have the will can provide with a much larger armoured fleet and give the Reserve more armour without over taxing our piss poor logistical and maintenance systems that we currently have. In a perfect world we be buying a bunch each year and issuing them and in a decade, give the oldest to some friendly developing country to use for their armies/police, keeping our fleet fairly new and the industry chugging along.
 
In a peer to peer fight, it's clear that you want most of your vehicles armoured to some degree, because the main killer is artillery. Protection from shrapnel and protection up to 7.62 reduces a lot of the threats. There does not appear to be much 14.5 being used, some 12.7, but more so 23 and 30mm auto-cannon, which even the much more expensive vehicles won't stop. The Ukrainians are using the Roshel aggressively, along with the Hummers and taking the risk, because it's better than the alternatives.
For us, I see it as a way to get more armour into our inventory. I don't see us buying anymore expensive high end wheeled vehicles outside of the LAV family. A vehicle like the Roshel offers a domestic alternative, which is what we should support from a political and economic viewpoint, not to mention it will continue to have export success thanks to it's prominent use in Ukraine. I also foresee modest improvements in the design from lessons learned. Buying a domestic product, saves us money and if we have the will can provide with a much larger armoured fleet and give the Reserve more armour without over taxing our piss poor logistical and maintenance systems that we currently have. In a perfect world we be buying a bunch each year and issuing them and in a decade, give the oldest to some friendly developing country to use for their armies/police, keeping our fleet fairly new and the industry chugging along.
It’s not going to do much against Artillery.
I’m serious when I say it’s a SWAT Truck - the uparmor Hummers at least had some blast mitigation and protection methods.

@Kirkhill posted previously as to why vehicles got heavier, such that the JLTV is the weight of a AVGP
The difference is protection levels.
1) A V Hull (or Double V) is adding more weight

2) Ballistic performance requirements beyond the original specs.

3) Blast Mitigation and Designs changed from experience and knowledge. Remember when DLR came back with the ‘fact’ the M113 was better against roadside bombs than the LAV? Someone had made a model of the blast against vehicles. - the fact that a square aluminum box with no stand-off was performing better in the model than a Steel V Shaped hull with stand off should have been a major clue that the model was simply garbage in = garbage out. The US Army parked M113’s in Afghan simply because they cracked and crumpled and allowed for significant injury (and would often burn down).

That vehicle has no business in any Military.


Buying it for the PRes would be a colossally stupid idea, and not do anything to increase capabilities.
 
If we get dragged into a peer to peer fight in the next decade, I can guarantee that we will be using stuff like this, because there will be no other options and we be short of them as well. I see this replacing softskins and G-wagons, stuff like the Milcots and LSVW's. You also need to invest in your domestic manufacturers and support them, if you want any sort of arms industry. Based on our current funding model, we are not going to buy what you suggest, there is at least a hope you can convince our political elite to buy some of these.

Given a magic wand I would give our light forces a LAV in the 17 ton range, with a variety of different variants and recce vehicle as the combat arms of a light brigade and the CV90, tanks and SPG for our heavy brigade. However I don't foresee any magic wand in the near future. So I think about what we can do with the money, political will and domestic capabilities we do have.
 
It’s not going to do much against Artillery.
I’m serious when I say it’s a SWAT Truck - the uparmor Hummers at least had some blast mitigation and protection methods.

@Kirkhill posted previously as to why vehicles got heavier, such that the JLTV is the weight of a AVGP
The difference is protection levels.
1) A V Hull (or Double V) is adding more weight

2) Ballistic performance requirements beyond the original specs.

3) Blast Mitigation and Designs changed from experience and knowledge. Remember when DLR came back with the ‘fact’ the M113 was better against roadside bombs than the LAV? Someone had made a model of the blast against vehicles. - the fact that a square aluminum box with no stand-off was performing better in the model than a Steel V Shaped hull with stand off should have been a major clue that the model was simply garbage in = garbage out. The US Army parked M113’s in Afghan simply because they cracked and crumpled and allowed for significant injury (and would often burn down).

That vehicle has no business in any Military.


Buying it for the PRes would be a colossally stupid idea, and not do anything to increase capabilities.
I'm increasingly of the opinion that due the the small size of our Army and all of the personnel/procurement issues that have we should be consolidating rather than expanding and concentrate on getting the fundamentals down.

The LAV 6.0 is a solid, armed, protected mobility platform. Our lack of adequate tank support for the LAV Battalions (as well as other key enablers) means that we're not really equipped for mounted combat against a peer enemy. So, if our Mech Battalions are essentially dismounted infantry carried in well protected vehicles then what really differentiates them from our Light Infantry Battalions other than their method of getting to the fight? Once the troops dismount from the Herc/Chinook/BvS10/Truck/LAV are they fighting significantly differently and using radically different skills? The LAV's 25mm is great to have in support but the dismounts shouldn't be relying on that as you can't always assume the vehicle will be there for you. They need their own integral fire support available.

My temptation would be to fold the three Light Battalions and use those personnel to properly fill out the six Mech Battalions to proper establishment strength with all of the important enablers that have been whittled away over the years restored (Mortars, AGTMs, VSHORAD, Pioneers, etc.). I see no reason why our LAV infantry can't deploy "Light" if the situation calls for a mobility platform lighter than the LAV.

All we'd need is to have a set of alternate vehicles available for them to use in situations where the LAV isn't suitable or greater air mobility is required. Likely something like the BvS10 for use in the North and an air-transportable vehicle that will fit in a C-130 (and possibly be slung under a Chinook). It would likely have to have some armour protection due to the risk-adverse nature of our Government.

I can't really see Canada deploying (and sustaining) any force as light as an Airborne or Air Mobile unit any time soon so something like a ULCV should probably be left to CSOR.

The Reserves right now aren't in any condition to deploy as separate units so they (until their issues are sorted in Phase 2) should focus on augmentation of the Reg Force Battalions. Only after the Reg Battalions are fully sorted and the Reserves restructured would I start looking at dedicated armoured vehicles for the Reserves.

Unfortunately I honestly can't see a tracked IFV or more tanks in our near future due to both the cost and the attitudes of our Government(s) so it's likely better to make the best use possible of what we do have available rather than wish for a miracle.
 
The CAF is caught between the pressure to consolidate to make best use of resource, and the pressure to maintain a broad range of capabilities to convince politicians it is worth resources (ie. can offer up something for just about anything politicians need to show).

The army has to be capable of "doing" light and mechanized (infantry/armour) as a brigade, with commensurate support of all arms and services (no "do without for now" shortcuts). If it can't, the conclusion is that it's under-resourced or resources have to be allocated away from other uses. I suppose the navy and air force have analogous structures. That leaves one obvious place to go to start taking things away.
 
That vehicle has no business in any Military.


Buying it for the PRes would be a colossally stupid idea, and not do anything to increase capabilities.

I'm not so sure about that...
-You'd get a lot more of them for the same price than TAPVs,
-You get a vehicle you could fit an infantry section in so it has potential to keep the PRes up to speed on mounted tactics or at least provide some mobility vs clapped out farm trucks with summer tires,
-It would also be cheaper and easier to maintain as its based on a Ford truck, and
-As a bonus you would have a bunch of vehicles you could actually use for internal security or low threat peace support operations.

I am surprised by how well it moves cross country (unless I'm mistaken it is what you see in this video at about 2:45min);


Lets face it the reserves need something and the GOC will never buy us "real" armoured vehicles... if they did the reg force would just take them away ;)
 
My temptation would be to fold the three Light Battalions and use those personnel to properly fill out the six Mech Battalions to proper establishment strength with all of the important enablers that have been whittled away over the years restored (Mortars, AGTMs, VSHORAD, Pioneers, etc.). I see no reason why our LAV infantry can't deploy "Light" if the situation calls for a mobility platform lighter than the LAV.

Reg F Infantry Regimental Mafias, right now ;)

Episode 4 Fainting GIF by One Chicago
 
The CAF is caught between the pressure to consolidate to make best use of resource, and the pressure to maintain a broad range of capabilities to convince politicians it is worth resources (ie. can offer up something for just about anything politicians need to show).

The army has to be capable of "doing" light and mechanized (infantry/armour) as a brigade, with commensurate support of all arms and services (no "do without for now" shortcuts). If it can't, the conclusion is that it's under-resourced or resources have to be allocated away from other uses. I suppose the navy and air force have analogous structures. That leaves one obvious place to go to start taking things away.


Perhaps we are going about "consolidation" wrong?

The Logistics Vehicle Modernization Project - Light
The Light Utility Vehicle Project
The Light Forces Enhancement Project
The Domestic Arctic Manoeuverability Enhancement Project

All of those projects have stalled. Perhaps due to scope creep and project overlap? Coupled with an underlying lack of sense of purpose in the institution?

What would happen if we were to specify a Ford/Chevy/Dodge chassis-cab configuration and then open the competition to companies like Roshel and Plasan and all the other small integrators and converters in Canada?


Plasan is an Israeli manufacturer that has been converting F550s into armoured vehicles since 2004.
They look a lot like the Senator.


Automotives used in all SandCat generations have remained standard Ford wherever possible, the latest fourth-generation models powered by a Ford PowerStroke 6.7-litre V8 diesel developing 330 hp and coupled to a Ford TorqShift six-speed automatic transmission. Standard F550 drive axles are retained, however the front coil and rear leaf springs plus the brakes are uprated/tuned to suit operating weight. On second-generation models, the rear leaf springs were swapped for a Plasan-designed coil spring and trailing arm set-up. Some elements of the electrical system are upgraded to suit specific requirements, with 24 V available if required.

The overall design of the SandCat is such that it can be adapted to perform a wide range of military and Police/internal security-related missions. The original SandCat featured a four- or five-seat protected crew citadel, having two doors on each side plus two rear doors in the crew citadel that open into an open-topped rear stowage area. This stowage area which could be covered if required is open-topped to save weight. First-generation ‘station wagon’ vehicles for Sweden could seat eight in an extended fully enclosed rear body. Second-generation models could seat up to five (Utility) or eight (Transport/TPV). Third-generation models seat up to 10.

Fourth-generation models, which are described by the manufacturer as having a more flexible and modular architecture, are available in three core configurations. The Troop Carrier which seats up to 10 is fully enclosed. The Utility has a fully armored crew-type cab that seats up to five, while the Single Cab option seats up to three. In both instances, the rear of the chassis is available for a variety of payload options. Given the inherent adaptability of the base platform and the modularity of the SandCat’s design, other configurations are possible.


Google Ford F550 Conversions and ask if that basic commercial system couldn't accommodate the LVM(L) and LUV requirements in both armoured and unarmoured configurations.

It strikes me that armoured or unarmoured this is a useful utility configuration for any administrative vehicle. The base curb weight starts at about 3000 kg and the gross vehicle weight rises to 8500 kg with a gross combined vehicle weight (including trailer) of up to 18,000 kg.

What could be accomplished if PWGSC stipulated a single commercial cab-chassis system and asked how many variant packages could be mounted? Could the same drive train be accommodated in the DAME BvS10?


Senator-APC_456-1.jpg
 
Reg F Infantry Regimental Mafias, right now ;)

Episode 4 Fainting GIF by One Chicago
You're right. But the silly thing is there wouldn't be any change in the numbers in each Regiment....just that the remaining Battalions would be at authorized strength. Appearances over effectiveness I guess.
 
Except Reg F TEE is in excess of what's supportable, so there need to be reductions to divest low priority TEE so that the combined BTL/SUTL/ATL/SPHL/TEE all fit within the authorized ceiling.

But that would take leadership, and it's easier to kick the can down the road - "Next time the government gives permission to grow the Reg F we can address the structural imbalance!"
 
Bushmaster Interior

3fd7da1ce9cfc05a98a84c74c81c19df


You would see the same thing with the Nyalas and Mambas, licences to GDLS-Canada

 
You're right. But the silly thing is there wouldn't be any change in the numbers in each Regiment....just that the remaining Battalions would be at authorized strength. Appearances over effectiveness I guess.

But they need 9 x CO positions to give the Infantry a decent crack at CDS.

This is the only Schwerpunkt that matters!
 
It’s not going to do much against Artillery.
I’m serious when I say it’s a SWAT Truck - the uparmor Hummers at least had some blast mitigation and protection methods.

@Kirkhill posted previously as to why vehicles got heavier, such that the JLTV is the weight of a AVGP
The difference is protection levels.
1) A V Hull (or Double V) is adding more weight

2) Ballistic performance requirements beyond the original specs.

3) Blast Mitigation and Designs changed from experience and knowledge. Remember when DLR came back with the ‘fact’ the M113 was better against roadside bombs than the LAV? Someone had made a model of the blast against vehicles. - the fact that a square aluminum box with no stand-off was performing better in the model than a Steel V Shaped hull with stand off should have been a major clue that the model was simply garbage in = garbage out. The US Army parked M113’s in Afghan simply because they cracked and crumpled and allowed for significant injury (and would often burn down).

That vehicle has no business in any Military.


Buying it for the PRes would be a colossally stupid idea, and not do anything to increase capabilities.
Yet when the local PD buys them, everyone lights their hair on fire and complains about the police getting “tanks”. :rolleyes:
 
There are 100+ Reg F Infantry LCols. Somehow, only those in the ten command positions (including CO of the school, arguably the most important one) can be deployed.

A sickly season may be well overdue.
 
In a peer to peer fight, it's clear that you want most of your vehicles armoured to some degree, because the main killer is artillery. Protection from shrapnel and protection up to 7.62 reduces a lot of the threats. There does not appear to be much 14.5 being used, some 12.7, but more so 23 and 30mm auto-cannon, which even the much more expensive vehicles won't stop. The Ukrainians are using the Roshel aggressively, along with the Hummers and taking the risk, because it's better than the alternatives.
For us, I see it as a way to get more armour into our inventory. I don't see us buying anymore expensive high end wheeled vehicles outside of the LAV family. A vehicle like the Roshel offers a domestic alternative, which is what we should support from a political and economic viewpoint, not to mention it will continue to have export success thanks to it's prominent use in Ukraine. I also foresee modest improvements in the design from lessons learned. Buying a domestic product, saves us money and if we have the will can provide with a much larger armoured fleet and give the Reserve more armour without over taxing our piss poor logistical and maintenance systems that we currently have. In a perfect world we be buying a bunch each year and issuing them and in a decade, give the oldest to some friendly developing country to use for their armies/police, keeping our fleet fairly new and the industry chugging along.
Question: if it wasn’t domestic would you be suggesting it ?
 
Question: if it wasn’t domestic would you be suggesting it ?
For the Reserve, something similar, but the fact that it is domestic plays a big part. Industry is a case of use it or lose it. As you note I said buy them in batches and get rid of them at 10 years, bit by bit they be improved and we have far more options than we do currently and the Government in 10 years get to gift some to various nations or causes.
 
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