Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

[Kirkhill]

Having worked with wooden rounds, the inspection requirements vary.

They can include environmental data loggers that have to be checked weekly or monthly. These can log temperature, humidity, and/or vibration. That data collected depends on the weapon and the environment. Hot can mean reduced stabilizer life, cold can mean frozen energetics and potential cracks. Temperature fluctuations can lead to condensation and cracking or corrosion.

Eryx launch motors needed monitoring later in life because they could have a cracked launch propellant pellet, which lead to the little ballistic blanket being used towards the end.
I destroyed hundreds of CRV7 motors in Afghanistan that had reached their flown hours. A few Hellfire as well.

So rounds in a PDS-70 would likely require the container to be based on the 40 ft Reefer with climate control and a plug as well as fuel in the onboard generator's tank. Together with a USB port or equivalent?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Prince Rupert Airport is on a Island and generally there is no one there overnight, easily dealt with, but each of these sites are going to need a fair bit of infrastructure.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Prince Rupert Airport is on a Island and generally there is no one there overnight, easily dealt with, but each of these sites are going to need a fair bit of infrastructure.

Define "a fair bit".

Reefer containers need "a bit". Is that a fair bit?
A vehicle compound also needs "a bit".

 

[suffolkowner]

When we had a building going in up north we had to pay the locals to guard it from themselves

Missing in most descriptions about Arctic security is the Arctic



The biggest threat to security is the locals, the same people that are best equipped to supply security.

And if you go with permanent silos then you have to maintain the silos and unload and reload them at regular intervals. Conversely, slinging in a new container every year or two will keep the rounds refreshed and the depot level maintenance will be done in a nice warm place like Dundurn or some such.

And if the discussion about ice breaking missile platforms is right then I could supply loaded Mk70 PDS systems with 2 SM6 and 8 ESSMs each at every National Airport and Port for less than the price of one of those ships. Those would provide air defence coverage to over 95% of the population if netted in with NAVCAN and NORAD in a CEC environment and, concurrently, supply coastal defence out to the "Classified but greater than 500 km" range. By parking the PDS in recognized airports and ports you are already doing a lot of the security work.

Add in a couple of pods of Maritime Strike Tomahawks Block Vb and you have national coverage against the improbable but not impossible.

If a high volume / high mass threat arrives that depletes local magazine capacity then echelon 2 is the RCAF flying in SM6s/AIM-120s/AIM9s on their F-18/F-35 wings or in more PDSs in C-130/C-17s. Or even civilian B747F freighters.

Or by rail, or road if the situation gets really dire.

The same containers and missiles could also be supplied to any of His Majesty's Canadian Ships, or Expeditionary Forces, or Allies.



View attachment 92335


Comparing this laydown to the HIMARS laydown posted previously I am leaning strongly towards this solution and leave the HIMARS strictly for the RRCA / Expeditionary Force.

All told there are 30 sites (26 National Airport System and 4 others - Prince Rupert, Churchill, Inuvik and Resolute) each with 4 cells. That equates to 120 cells or the number of cells in 5 of the 15 RCD and loaded with 60 SM6 (SAM/ABM/Anti-Shipping) and 240 ESSMs. Both rounds are used by the Navy. The ESSMs are compatible with NASAMs and the SM6s have a sister version suitable for carriage on wing pylons for the RCAF.

Add in one or two PDS loaded with Tomahawks for the Arctic and, in my opinion, you have the firm basis for a strong system of National Defence.

Guarding against the improbable but not impossible.

And it relies on increasing the number of rounds already in service which should be a priority call in any event. Effectively the proposal increases the number of rounds in inventory but warehouses them in multiple locations in ready to fire condition.

OS Info

All rounds are Active Radar rounds with autonomous onboard terminal homing.

ESSM - 50 km anti-aircraft
SM6 - 240-370 km anti-ballistic missile, up to 500 km in the anti-aircraft role and much more in the surface to surface anti-ship mode.
Tomahawk Vb MST - >1666 km in the anti-ship mode.

 

[FJAG]

Mods

I think its past time to give this 'missiles in the North' its own thread.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Define "a fair bit".

Reefer containers need "a bit". Is that a fair bit?
A vehicle compound also needs "a bit".

Taking PR for example

Ammunition storage
2x launch site
Marine off-loading site
Accommodation and offices
Fencing, monitors, security systems and long distance communications
roads, sewer, water, electricity and backup generators/fuel supply

Planning, consulting with FN and letting contracts = 3 years = 15 million
Construction + overruns and issues = 1-2 years + 1 million extras
Staffing = 1 year to find and train local staff = 1 million for the first year, likley 500,000 a year

 

[Kirkhill]

Taking PR for example

Ammunition storage Mk70 PDS functions as Ammunition Storage.
2x launch site (launch sites are storage sites - only anticipating 1 PDS per airport)
Marine off-loading site (seen - unless the container is better housed on the mainland in the container port)
Accommodation and offices (guard shack)
Fencing, monitors, security systems and long distance communications (absolutely - hardwired, perhaps with wireless backup)
roads, sewer, water, electricity and backup generators/fuel supply (stipulated)

Reference photograph of Mk70 PDS loaded with SM6 field deployed by USN/USMC.

Planning, consulting with FN and letting contracts = 3 years = 15 million (stipulate the consultation - suggest the smaller the footprint the less the aggravation)
Construction + overruns and issues = 1-2 years + 1 million extras (see comments about the nature of the infrastructure - I perceive a light touch)
Staffing = 1 year to find and train local staff = 1 million for the first year, likley 500,000 a year (see also - again I don't see local ammo techs. I see local security guards).


View attachment 92338

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The airport island is off to the upper left of the container port in that picture and no land connection.

You will still need a all weather storage for the missiles to lengthen their life span. It can be a pad, with a large climate controlled tent. With surrounding blast walls, fencing,security systems and electrical. Leave those containers out in the weather in PR and you will regret it.

 

[Kirkhill]

When we had a building going in up north we had to pay the locals to guard it from themselves

Guess what? When I was installing dairies down south we had to build secure fenced enclosures in the warehouses to control the theft of valves, pumps, pipes, sensors and tools by the employees.

 

[Kirkhill]

Copper wire stolen from street lights.

....

My point.

Theft is everywhere.
Remedial step one is a secure enclosure under observation.
Remedial step two is a security patrol.

 

[Kirkhill]

The airport island is off to the upper left of the container port in that picture and no land connection.

You will still need a all weather storage for the missiles to lengthen their life span. It can be a pad, with a large climate controlled tent. With surrounding blast walls, fencing,security systems and electrical. Leave those containers out in the weather in PR and you will regret it.

Or rotate the containers through the port more frequently. And if you want the rounds ready to launch then overhead cover would not seem to be an optimum solution.

Which is the harder environment? Prince Rupert? Or this?



This is an SM6 being launched from a Mk70 PDS on the back of an Optionally/Minimally Manned Offshore Supply Vessel in transit across the Pacific.

 

[suffolkowner]

Guess what? When I was installing dairies down south we had to build secure fenced enclosures in the warehouses to control the theft of valves, pumps, pipes, sensors and tools by the employees.

And I've never had to do the same anywhere else

 

[KevinB]

My point.

Theft is everywhere.
Remedial step one is a secure enclosure under observation.
Remedial step two is a security patrol.

There are specific security requirements for those systems.
Armed security on site, is just one of them, with a number of other requirements for the personnel and number of security, as well as capabilities, and reaction forces.

Theft isn’t the only issue in the North, the Russians have zero qualms about sabotaging things inside Canada (or elsewhere) if they think the likelihood of response is low.

 

[Kirkhill]

There are specific security requirements for those systems.
Armed security on site, is just one of them, with a number of other requirements for the personnel and number of security, as well as capabilities, and reaction forces.

Theft isn’t the only issue in the North, the Russians have zero qualms about sabotaging things inside Canada (or elsewhere) if they think the likelihood of response is low.

So, what security measures are necessary to make the north equivalent to a foreign port with a load of missiles along side? I know, OPSEC, and then you will have to kill me....

Regardless, you are going to have to go an awful long way to convince me that it is not cheaper than building billion dollar ships.

 

[markppcli]

Mods

I think its past time to give this 'missiles in the North' its own thread.

Replying so this doesn’t get lost between copper wire theft reports and comparisons between oil field camps and radar stations.

 

[KevinB]

So, what security measures are necessary to make the north equivalent to a foreign port with a load of missiles along side? I know, OPSEC, and then you will have to kill me....

Regardless, you are going to have to go an awful long way to convince me that it is not cheaper than building billion dollar ships.

The ship is a secure mobile permanently manned structure.

Throwing two companies of Infantry to guard a mobile missile launcher in the North seems like a foolish waste to me.

 

[Kirkhill]

The ship is a secure mobile permanently manned structure.

Throwing two companies of Infantry to guard a mobile missile launcher in the North seems like a foolish waste to me.

Even if they are local National Guardsmen...

 

[KevinB]

Even if they are local National Guardsmen...

You won’t get a lot of folks with Secret and TS+ clearances who are native to the North.

I really don’t know why you are going down this path when so many folks have told you it isn’t viable without a major restructure, that won’t occur unless the threat to NA dramatically changes.

 

[Kirkhill]

You won’t get a lot of folks with Secret and TS+ clearances who are native to the North.

I really don’t know why you are going down this path when so many folks have told you it isn’t viable without a major restructure, that won’t occur unless the threat to NA dramatically changes.

Perhaps because I sense that for the first time in my life, possibly a few lives, there is a possibility of change in the offing that could result in a major restructuring.

And I consider it a win if the threat appreciation dramatically changes.

....

What is the current DS solution when the citizenry asks about defences against the types of threats they are being told about in Ukraine, or for that matter in New Jersey and Langley?

 

[KevinB]

Perhaps because I sense that for the first time in my life, possibly a few lives, there is a possibility of change in the offing that could result in a major restructuring.

And I consider it a win if the threat appreciation dramatically changes.

I would suggest that Canada’s treasure be spent on a more useful defense endeavor.

NORAD and the RCN are much better tools for the Defense of Canada’s North than a few batteries of missiles that won’t be mobile due to climate and terrain.

....

What is the current DS solution when the citizenry asks about defences against the types of threats they are being told about in Ukraine, or for that matter in New Jersey and Langley?

For Canada it is currently bend over kiss your ass goodbye.

With the River class you will have the ability to track and defeat ballistic missiles, and the NORAD aircraft can and have conducted interdictions for years of Russia or unknown origin threats.

The fact that we (USA) didn’t aggressively counter the New Jersey or Langley events should be telling, as we have the capabilities. Either it was a blue force effort, or we felt that observing the red force action was more beneficial.