Infanteer said:
I agree with Art in general; don't judge the campaign by its risk. Believe it or not, our mission to Afghanistan probably has the same effect of "dead Canadians" and "worsened relations with Muslims" as Iraq does considering that the militant Islam (and the mass who listen to them) aren't too keen on state borders. Whether we are in Kabul, Khartoum, or Baghdad, we are in Dar al-Islam as far as they are concerned. You're seeing this now with all the incidents in the last month now that Canada is at the center of the insurgency in Afghanistan.
I'm not judging the campaign by its risk but by its justifiability and payoff potential. Even from a realpolitik perspective, Iraq made little sense. I'd say its done more damage to Western security than Afghanistan, if only (and not only) because it's so bloody public and prolonged. If it can't even be sold to Western populations convincingly, imagine the depot of ammo it provides the insurgency (international, not just Iraqi). Don't get me wrong here, I'm not trying to make moral arguments against the war in Iraq - it's been done to death by both sides - all I'm saying is that realist foreign policies are one thing when they can be realised practically in domestic and international political fora; it's entirely another thing when neither the domestic nor international fronts are solid.
Of course, that's assuming that without Iraq, Afghanistan would have remained the relatively room-temperature potato its turned out to be.
As well, as I've said before, the "moral" side of the argument is weak. Don't view Iraq apart from the general campaign against the Islamic Insurgency that has been going on for quite some time now. The action wasn't unilateral by any sense of the word (we concluded that
here), the target was in a strategically important region for the war, and Saddam was just a bad guy in general (you'd have to be a fool to deny that he doesn't belong in jail).
You'll get no moral debates from me here, while we could bludgeon the morality of Iraq into atoms it wouldn't achieve much but to waste Mike's bandwidth.
Now, when it comes to the "strategic" dimension, I find more cause for complaint. Was unleashing the forces which were clearly unanticipated at this point in time a good thing for the war? Was it taking the "eye off the ball" strategically? That remains to be seen, although I still have my reservations.
You likely know more about this than I, given your propensity for papers and hundred-thousand-page readings on the topic, but I'm of the tentative belief that it was premature and largely unwise. Afghanistan was a necessary and, insurgency wise, logical step. The political fallout from it seems to be minimal, partially (I would suspect) because it could be convincingly sold to the domestic and international fora in the wake of 9/11. There was a clear link between the Taliban and AQ/OBL, drawing the lines for the public wasn't difficult, and new excuses didn't need to be thought up every month or so. Meanwhile, it disrupted what served as a major base of operations for the insurgency and the resident population seems, superficially, to be far less resistant and accepting than that of Iraq. I think Iraq pushed the political "capital" (god I hate that cliche, but it's apt) way too far into the red and did no favours for the strategic end insofar as its done virtually nothing, in my estimation, to further the political end which seems to be poorly articulated in whatever estimate (if any) exists for the international counter-insurgency campaign. Militarily, its succeeded in generating a quagmire in which to waste forces, money, and time with little or no discernable advantage.
I've always said that if the West wanted something of the scale and scope of Iraq, with all its political difficulties and its bloody insurgency, that we should have invaded Pakistan. Musharaff is a dictator who can barely keep the reigns. By invading Pakistan, we can hit the Taliban/AQ forces from the rear and finally hit the real base of Al Qa'ida's forces. We can seize the "Islamic nukes" which are one car-bomb away from falling into Islamist hands. We would have the support of India (can you imagine Western forces being aided by a 500,000 man Indian force?). And, best of all, we can take one of the 3 key centers of Islamic Insurgencies "center of gravity" (the other 2 being Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Saddam? We should have bought him off and brought him back onto our team (like he was in the 80s). He had just enough reason to dislike the jihadists as we do and there is no compulsion against dealing with dictators and tyrants in this war (look at some of our current "allies"). Ah well, that's just the realpolitik in me....
I'm not sure there's ever been any compulsion against dealing with dictators and tyrants. As for Pakistan, do you think the political fallout (which would likely be far worse than Iraq, methinks) would be outweighed by the strategic gain? Especially when you factor strategic success' dependency on realisation of the political end?
I think we're hijacking this thread.... :-\
I think that is generally the case - there is a reason that we have Representative Democracy, as much as we love to malign our representatives.
Indeed - and a professional bureaucracy. I'm not anti-democratic, I just feel that the number of issues that the public is really qualified to deal with (through election, etc) is limited - myself included.
