• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Failing Islamic States - 2011

57Chevy said:
You mean like in the event of War.

No, I mean in the event the country completely collapsed and it looked the Islamic extremists would take over.

I would doubt that the Chinese would risk thermonuclear war with the U.S.; the USN has eight Trident SSBNs in the Pacific, each one carries a minimum of 96 MIRV'd nuclear warheads capable of laying a good portion of China to waste, and the Chinese know it.

The other thing is that the Chinese (or Indians, Russians) would be very happy about Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists; they might take action themselves.
 
Thucydides said:
The "Arab Spring" turns very cold indeed:

http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2011/11/30/flash-what-me-pessimistic-egyptian-election-outcome-is-worse-than-i-expected/?print=1

The Muslim Brotherhood winning the election wasn't a surprise, but it seems like that's immediately setting off all sorts of paranoid nonsense in the US amongst the right. It's not totally baseless, given some of the points of view that have been associated with them, but at the same time, they've made a lot of statements that sound quite reasonable. At the end of the day, this is what the people of Egypt chose, and we can't really extol the virtues of democracy and then complain about the winners when we don't like them. I doubt highly that the Muslim Brotherhood will push Egypt toward a theocracy, as they want to maintain electability and I don't see any reason to believe they have any desire to significantly alter Egypt's relationship with Israel. There's actually a great potential positive here, in that they may be able to help push Israel toward a two-state solution to Palestine, the only viable long term solution.

Egypt receives, and I'd speculate depends on American and other aid and goodwill, and I can't see any party, much less one with a fairly weak mandate, looking to squander it.
 
RAF Guy
In the case of being overthrown by islamic terrorists I agree.
That is to say if they are unable to render safe by destruction themselves.
It may be in the best interest if they were not able to.
If that were the case,
the Russians and Chinese would be throwing their "veto" strategy out the window.
 
57Chevy said:
You mean like in the event of War.
Which would then be construed as an attack on China.

Responding to reports that China has asked the US to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty in the aftermath of the Bin Laden operation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu used a May 19 press briefing to state Beijing’s categorical demand that the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan must be respected.”

According to Pakistani diplomatic sources cited by the Times of India, China has “warned in unequivocal terms that any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China.” This ultimatum was reportedly delivered at the May 9 China-US strategic dialogue and economic talks in Washington, where the Chinese delegation was led by Vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo
.
Chinese warnings are implicitly backed up by that nation’s nuclear missiles, including an estimated 66 ICBMs, some capable of striking the United States, plus 118 intermediate-range missiles, 36 submarine-launched missiles, and numerous shorter-range systems.
Full article from Eu Times and shared with provisions of The Copyright act (dated 22 May 2011)
China warns US against war with Pakistan
http://www.eutimes.net/2011/05/china-warns-us-against-war-with-pakistan/

I'm just going to put this out there: you're citing a source that is the same people who claimed that Canadian soldiers were being sent to California to put down a rebellion. (They were, in fact, there on work up training for Op Athena TF 1-10). http://www.eutimes.net/2009/12/prepare-for-rebellion-obama-orders-us-canadian-troops/

I'd take anything posted on that blog with an industrial-sized grain of salt.

In fact, a careful reading shows it's skewed. First it says that "China has officially put the United States on notice..." but then goes on to say that the source is an unnamed Pakistani diplomat. That's not "official" anything. That's rumour. In fact, pretty much everything the article claims is unsourced. Probably best dismissed. Or at least read skeptically.
 
I usually read more than one but I always have the salt shaker close by.
Google this and choose one:

"China warns US against war with Pakistan"
 
A bit more on Pakistan and the USA from Fareed Zakariah, an observer whose views often turn out to be "on target," reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Zakariah's web page and from Time magazine:

http://www.fareedzakaria.com/home/Articles/Entries/2011/12/1_Friends_Without_Benefits.html
FRIENDS WITHOUT BENEFITS

December 1, 2011

It’s time to say what we already know—America’s Pakistan policy isn’t working

By Fareed Zakaria

It is difficult to find a country on the planet that is more anti-American than Pakistan. In a Pew survey this year, only 12% of Pakistanis expressed a favorable view of the U.S. That number has probably dipped even lower in the wake of the NATO air attack on a Pakistani army post that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan’s leaders are only slightly better disposed since they continue to support militias in Afghanistan that wage war on Americans. Populist rage and official duplicity have built up even though over the past decade, Washington has lavished Pakistan’s government with praise and aid, the latter totaling $20 billion. It is time to recognize that the U.S.’s Pakistan policy is just not working. I write this as someone who has consistently supported engaging with the Pakistani government as the best of bad options. But the evidence that this engagement is working is thin—and gets thinner with every passing month.

Supporting Islamabad has been premised on two arguments. The first is that if we don’t, the Pakistani government could collapse and the country’s nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands, perhaps even ending up with al-Qaeda. This misunderstands the problem. Pakistan is not Somalia. It has been ruled by a professional military for most of its independent existence, even when there has been a nominally civilian government in charge—as there is today. There have been no Gaddafiesque colonels’ coups in Pakistan; instead, the entire military, with its command chain intact, has moved to replace the civilian government. The military remains widely admired as a national institution that works.

The second argument is the one given by businesses when they pay off the Mafia: we need to keep these guys as allies, or else they will become enemies. The problem with this protection racket is that it isn’t working. Admiral Mike Mullen finally said publicly what insiders have said privately for years: Pakistan’s army, despite getting over a quarter of its budget from Washington, funds and arms the most deadly terrorist group in South Asia.

In a forthcoming essay in Foreign Affairs, Stephen Krasner, a Stanford professor who was a senior State Department official under George W. Bush, makes the important point that Pakistan’s behavior is not a product of weakness or irrationality. It is part of a deliberate strategy to keep Afghanistan weak and India off balance. Krasner advocates cutting off all aid to the military until it changes course and delivers on a genuine anti­terrorism strategy. That would be worth trying, but a larger shift needs to take place to get real results.

The Pakistani military holds to its worldview out of an ideological conviction that combines 19th century realpolitik with politicized Islam. But it also has a strong bureaucratic interest in regional friction. After all, with a win-win scenario in which peace with India results in prosperity for the region, why would Pakistan need a vast military that sucks up almost a quarter of the federal budget? The country’s military would end up looking like India’s— noninfluential, nonpolitical and well­contained within the larger society.

Pakistan needs a civilian conception of its national interest. It can get one only from a flourishing civilian government. That was the basic thrust of the memo that Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, is alleged to have written. Haqqani’s ouster is part of a long pattern in which the military has removed anyone who proposed a new course for the country’s foreign policy. Recall that the coup that ousted the previous civilian government took place because then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif enraged the military by attempting to make peace with India. In recent days, the military has been building opposition to the effort of President Asif Ali Zardari’s government to start trade with India.

There is a fundamental tension in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. We want a more democratic country, but we also want a government that can deliver cooperation on the ground. In practice, we always choose the latter, which means we cozy up to the military and overlook its destruction of democracy. The only way to get real cooperation is by helping Pakistan move from being a military state to being a more normal country. If Washington continues to bolster Pakistan’s de?facto regime, we will get a dysfunctional nation where the?public—fed propaganda by the military establishment—vents its anger at?Washington.

The Arab Spring holds key lessons. When Washington props up a dictatorship because it needs foreign policy support, it is building up wellsprings of poison and anti-Americanism within society that, one day, will erupt.


I take issue with the comments attributed to Stephen Krasner, a Stanford professor who was a senior State Department official under George W. Bush. Krasner, correctly, I think concludes that Pakistan's policy is rational and in its own self interest but he is wrong, I believe to suggest that the US can gain leverage by cutting off aid to Pakistan's military. That will not work. Pakistan will receive the same or more aid ... from China which shares Pakistan's interests in containing India. China has, I suspect welcomed America's courtship of Pakistan; it allowed China to send scarce foreign aid money elsewhere while still keeping Pakistan strong enough to contain India in its region - a win/win situation for China.

Pakistan's support for anti-American terrorists is real, as Admiral Mullin said, but it is also a rational policy - it makes sense for Pakistan.

The best American option, in my opinion is slow, steady disengagement from the region - from West Asia and the Middle East. Those regions, along with North Africa, are problems but not real, significant, strategic threats - let the peoples there bother the Europeans, Israelis, Turks, Russians and Chinese, the first and last of whom need the oil.
 
We may have to show leadership in allowing Egyptian Copts to flee Egypt and find refuge here:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/12/24/will-desperate-egyptian-christians-seek-refuge-in-the-us/

Will Desperate Egyptian Christians Seek Refuge In The US?

As political and economic conditions in Egypt deteriorate, a new kind of refugee is beginning to appear, one that will test America’s character.  Violence against Christians is growing; bad economic times, the inability or unwillingness of security forces and police to keep order, and the growing tide of Islamist political and religious mobilizations is making life increasingly insecure for Egypt’s eight million Christians.

An article in the Wall Street Journal offers a harrowing picture of a minority that is beginning to come under siege.  Christians are being threatened with violence if they fail to convert; women who do not cover their hair are harassed, harangued and threatened on the street; churches are burned and the wall of isolation around this ancient community deepens every day.

Under US and international law, growing numbers of Egyptian Christians will qualify as refugees if these conditions continue to worsen.

For Americans, the persecution of religious believes in other countries is more than a foreign policy problem.  Russian persecution of the Jews in the 19th century led millions of Jews to immigrate to the United States between 1880 and the start of World War One.  Religious and ethnic minorities fled to the US from all over Europe and the Middle East in the old days. One reason that so few Christians remain in most of the Middle East is that the United States primarily, but other western countries as well, have allowed millions of Christian Arabs to escape — in some cases looking for security and an end to persecution, and in others for better economic opportunity and the absence of discrimination.

The long record of Christian-Muslim relations contains much of which people of both faiths should be ashamed.  However, while there are exceptions (such as Serb treatment of Muslim Bosnians and Kossovars in the Yugoslav wars), in general the Christian treatment of Muslim minorities has been improving in the last 100 years; Muslim treatment of Christian minorities does not show as encouraging a trend.  Many Muslims don’t see it that way; they point out that western countries have invaded and occupied Muslim lands and have backed Israeli violence against Palestinians.  They set French violence in Algeria and US wars in Iraq and elsewhere into the long and bitter list of wrongs followers world’s two largest religions have inflicted on one another.) These arguments will go on, and so will the flight of Christians from increasingly militant Islamic societies.

There are, unfortunately, reasons to believe that the worsening of intercommunal relations in Egypt is more than a flash in the pan.  While political chaos and economic distress can unleash dark forces everywhere, the rise of an Islamist political consensus among many Egyptian Muslims suggests a more ominous long term trend.  Modern Egyptian history has seen waves of expulsions and dispersion.  Like much of the Ottoman world, Egypt’s great cities were once cosmopolitan places where many religions and ethnic groups lived cheek by jowl.  Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Albanians, Jews and many others made Cairo and especially Alexandria vibrant cultural and commercial hubs.

In Egypt as in many other countries, the twentieth century saw that diversity fade.  Instead of 80,000 Jews, Egypt now has a few hundred.  Nationalist and communal feeling combined with the socialist bent of the Nasser revolution led to the disappearance of most of the country’s urban diversity.  For Egypt as for many countries, nationalism was partly about purifying the country of a foreign presence seen as reflecting imperialism.

Egyptian Copts (unlike the Greek Orthodox, the Armenians and other religious groups seen as foreign) were protected by the secular Arab nationalism of the Egyptian revolution.  Secular Arab nationalism, which developed in part under the benign eye of American missionary universities, sought to submerge the religious differences among Arabic speaking peoples in the name of Arab unity.  Sunnis, Shias, Christians, Druze, Alawi and others were all Arabs first. Iraq, Syria and Egypt all paid lip service at least to the primacy of Arab identity over religious difference, and while discrimination continued not far under the surface, Christian Arabs could reach high positions in the business world and even politics.  (Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein’s foreign minister is an Iraqi Christian though perhaps not always a very good one; former UN Secretary General and Egyptian vice foreign minister Boutros Boutros-Gali is an Egyptian Copt.)

Secular Arab nationalism died slow and it died ugly, ending more as a cover for despots like Saddam Hussein and the Butcher of Damascus than as a viable political philosophy.  In Iraq it degenerated into a veil to cover Sunni domination of the Shia and Saddam’s domination over all; in Syria it covers the domination of the Sunni by the (sort of Shia) Alawites and of the House of Assad over all.  In Egypt it was little more than a fig leaf to cover the increasingly pharaonic Mubarakracy.

As secular nationalism died in the Arab world, religious rather than ethnic identity came to the fore.  Arab Christians are no longer seen by many as fellow citizens of a minority faith (like Mormons in America); they are seen as aliens of doubtful motives and allegiance.  Because many enjoyed good jobs and privilege under the nationalist governments, they are blamed for many of the failings of the old regimes, and much of the public believes that “justice” will involve a redistribution of privilege and access away from “pampered”, foreign leaning Christians to honest Muslim sons of toil.

There is no telling how this will work out.  The restoration of stable political authority (even if Islamist) and an economic recovery could leave Christians in a diminished but livable situation. More chaos and polarization could lead to something uglier.  It is, alas, not rare for problems like this to culminate in massacres and ethnic and religious cleansing. Most likely will be a period in which Egyptian Christians must live in suspense between the two scenarios, as conditions get better in some places, worse in others, and never quite settle down.

Many Egyptian Christians will now want to follow the well worn path of emigration.  Many will have legitimate grounds to seek asylum based on well founded fears of persecution at home.

America is going to have to make up its mind: will we find room for what could very well be a significant stream of Egyptian Christian refugees with us here in the inn, or will they have to go find a manger somewhere?  We can hope that we don’t have to face this choice and that cool heads and wise counsel will prevail in Egypt, but it is time to begin to think the possibilities through.
 
If we want dictators to fail, we need to get more active:

http://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen/2011/12/25/why-tyrants-fall/?print=1

Why Tyrants Fall

Posted By Michael Ledeen On December 25, 2011 @ 1:18 pm In Uncategorized | 43 Comments

What spells the doom of dictators?  Nobody really knows, and there are so many “whats” that the whole subject defies quantification.  Coups and assassinations, revolutions, defeats in war, and even sudden collapses, are all to be found in the texts, ancient and modern.  Even those of us who have predicted the fall of tyrannies, as I did [1] in the case of the Soviet Empire, are surprised when it happens, and almost always fail to foresee how it happens.

Indeed, it’s the wrong question.  Since there are so many variations, and since one tyrant may survive a crisis that would bring down another dictator, we should ask specific questions about specific tyrants, and use historical examples of similar situations to guide our understanding.

Some years back, when I was working with Walter Laqueur, I asked him what he was reading, and he said something like “I mainly read biographies.”  A good lesson there;  some dictators will fall in crisis, while others grow stronger and more resolute.  Which sort are we dealing with in a given case?  So the question is not, what brings down dictatorships in general, but “how likely is this tyrant to fall?”  We have to look  carefully at the unique characteristics of a given dictatorship, and avoid the fruitless search for “rules.”

Finally, don’t forget that the Almighty put us on earth for entertainment value.  Most of the time we’re likely to get it wrong.  How many of us expected Qadaffi to fight to the death?  How many expected Gorbachev and his Soviet Empire to implode without a fight? We’re usually not smart enough to foresee such things.

That is why the nose, not the brain, is the greatest instrument for sensing when a regime is in danger of coming down.  The nose detects the first hints of rot, which generally attend an imminent failure of will by the ruler.  Ergo, we need to pay particular attention to the odors of the tyrant him/herself, and the nature of his/her tyranny.  While there are no general rules,  there are some patterns that might help us answer — or sniff out — the right questions.  If we even ask them.

I’m always intrigued when somebody thinks he or she can confidently predict that a tyrant is about to fall, as if it’s all a question of applying the good old manual.  I’ve been intrigued for months now, as expert upon expert tells us that Bashar Assad of Damascus is going down.  Just the other day, no less a pundit than Dennis Ross, recently retired from the Obama administration, let us know that he is quite confident [2] about it:

    This is a regime that is entirely dependent on coercion, and the coercion is failing, and when a regime is entirely dependent on coercion that is not succeeding, you know that that’s a regime that’s not going to be around for an extended period.

I wish!  Let’s take just two counter-examples from Syria’s neighbor, Iran.  In 1953, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeqh drove the shah into foreign exile, and millions marched through the streets of Tehran and other major Iranian cities to celebrate Mossadeqh’s victory. Yet the shah quickly returned, and Mossadeqh was removed, and millions marched to celebrate that event, just days after the pro-Mossadeqh parades. So regimes can fall and rise again.

More recently, in the summer of 2009, millions of Iranians took to the streets to protest the electoral fraud that retained Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the presidential office.  The regime unleashed coercion, but the demonstrations continued. Just as in Syria today, the coercion wasn’t working;  if anything, it was provoking even greater challenges to the regime’s legitimacy.  The regime cracked down harder, dissidents were arrested, tortured, and slaughtered, and the regime survived…for an “extended period.”

There are plenty of such examples, including the “Prague Spring” of 1968, where coercion failed for a while, but then succeeded. And there are other cases, such as the failed “color revolutions” in some former Soviet satellites, where it seemed tyranny had been defeated, but it came back.  Ask Putin and Medvedev how that one works.  Ask the Lebanese, while you’re at it.  Or the Egyptians.

We just don’t know, and cannot know, how Syria’s going to turn out, nor Libya, nor Tunisia.  We don’t know, and probably cannot know, how long Bashar Assad will keep slaughtering his people (right now there is no reason to think he’ll shrink from most any level of violence against them), and we don’t know and cannot even guess how many top Syrian military officers will defect to the dissidents.  Moreover, we don’t have a clear picture of the qualities of the leaders of the Free Syrian Army that is fighting Bashar’s army of some 700,000 armed men.

Most importantly, we don’t know whether, or to what extent, the Syrian opposition will get serious foreign support, which may be the crucial element in deciding Assad’s fate.  My heart sinks when I hear policy makers like Dennis Ross invoke a slogan instead of calling for action, because when such a person says Assad is doomed, I hear him saying “not to worry, we don’t have to do anything, it’s in the bag.”

That’s the sort of intellectual error that subverts good policy.  There’s a big fight in Syria, and someone’s going to win.  If we want Assad to lose, as Obama has said, it behooves us to support his enemies.  Ross’s historical law notwithstanding, it’s unlikely the Syrian opposition can win on their own (any more than Qadaffi’s enemies could have won without substantial Western military action).  Again, the next-door neighbor points the way.

Vigorous support for the Green Movement in 2009-2010 might well have brought Mousavi & co. to power in Tehran, but the West, including President Obama, in effect supported the mullahcracy, and never called for regime change.  This will certainly have encouraged the Iranians and the Assad mafia to fight fiercely in the current crisis, since they think they have learned that Obama will do nothing to bring them down.  To be sure, the president is calling for regime change in Damascus, but, so far, the Iranian “lesson” seems right:  Obama isn’t providing meaningful support to Assad’s opponents, thereby leaving the tyrant a free hand.

So I wouldn’t be so sure that Assad is doomed.  Nor, on the other hand, am I at all inclined to believe that the Iranian regime has prevailed.  These crises are determined by people fighting for power and survival, and questions of will, nerve, luck,  leadership, and unanticipated events are very much in play (earthquakes, for example, have sometimes been important in bringing down dictators, as, for example, the Nicaraguan tyrant Anastasio Somoza).

And just as the Syrian killers, working hand-in-mailed-glove with Iranian thugs, think they’ve got recent history on their side, so the Iranian people are watching Syria very carefully.  If the Syrian opposition does win — especially if the West is in the fight — the Iranians will take heart. But if we continue to betray freedom in Syria, the Iranians on both sides will conclude that the “history lesson” was well learned.  And that lesson is not that coercion fails, but quite the opposite:  he who fights best, laughs last.

Instead of reading tea leaves, our leaders would do better to try to win.  But don’t hold your breath.


Article printed from Faster, Please!: http://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen

URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen/2011/12/25/why-tyrants-fall/

URLs in this post:

[1] as I did: http://www.amazon.com/Superpower-Dilemmas-U-S-U-S-S-R-Centurys/dp/0887388914/ref=sr_1_35?ie=UTF8&qid=1324689784&sr=8-35

[2] is quite confident: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=622
 
While I am a big fan of Hernando De Soto's work, I don't think he has a very good handle on the Muslim Brotherhood's world view, I certainly would not be as optimistic about the prospects for liberal reform concerning property rights and the rule of law under their rule. OTOH, if they are able to do this, the virtuous circle could indeed raise Egypt out of poverty the same way it has done elsewhere.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/12/just_call_me_poor?page=full

“Just Call Me Poor”
Want to work an economic miracle in Egypt? Hernando De Soto has some ideas.
INTERVIEW BY CHRISTIAN CARYL | JANUARY 12, 2012

In 2004, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto and his think tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, were asked to come up with ideas for revitalizing the Egyptian economy. In an interview with FP’s Christian Caryl, he argues that those ideas remain more topical than ever.

Foreign Policy: Not many economists have been targeted by terrorists. Why did the Peruvian insurgent group Shining Path put you and your colleagues on its hit list?

Hernando de Soto: What happened in Peru at that time was like what happens in other countries that suffer terrorism. The terrorist groups identify an underclass that considers itself oppressed. They target it and offer it services. In the case of Peru what they offered this underclass was protection of assets that weren't protected by the law. When we drew up plans for bringing these unrecognized assets into law, Shining Path saw this reform would take away their constituency. Today, for example, women own close to 56 percent of the real estate assets that were previously informal in Peru. Back then it was less than 30.

So they decided to do what terrorist groups do: to resort to force. They set up a hit squad that was supposed to target me. They were unsuccessful but unfortunately some colleagues and bystanders were hurt during their attacks.

FP: When you made proposals for economic reform in Egypt back in 2004, the resistance came from rather different quarters. Can you tell us what happened and why?

HD: We determined that close to 8.2 million people were employed by the extralegal economy. In other words, these are people who don't have formal title to their property or legal protections for the assets they control. That's an awful lot of people and a lot of assets. We estimated that 82 percent of entrepreneurs operated extralegally and 92 percent of the population held their real estate assets extralegally. If you formalized the Egyptian economy you would have brought into the mainstream economy close to 400 billion dollars, more than all foreign investment since Napoleon.

So along with the Ministry of Finance, which commissioned the research, we drew up a program to formalize those rights and we submitted it to the economic cabinet of the Egyptian government. The whole program was about integrating those who were excluded and giving them a voice in their future, including specific property and business rights that would have allowed, for example, issuing shares to capture investment or protecting assets through the establishment of limited liability. It would have been a win-win for everyone. The poor would have been empowered. Investors would have had their legitimate rights protected. Governance would have been improved. The government could have improved tax collection and even reduced rates.

FP: And yet the reform package was ultimately torpedoed by people within the government.

HD: In Egypt there was a lot of open discussion about the measures, from conferences to talk shows. That was part of the strategy: Be as inclusive as you can. The idea was to stop mistakes in advance. All 11 members of the economic cabinet approved it. We expressly included a mechanism for popular consultation.

But in every system there is always a small group of people who believe that they have something to gain from the status quo. And that's what happened here. You can't conduct reforms without creating appropriate institutions. If you're going to change things, your enemy is the status quo. So we had argued that they needed an organization, right from the start, that would act as an advocate for the reforms within the bureaucracy. But that never happened, so the reforms never got off the ground. We don't know precisely who put up the resistance. They didn't show themselves.

FP: The results of the parliamentary elections suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood will control the next parliament and, more than likely, the next government as well. Will they be in position to do something about this issue?

HD: When you read the Quran there's no doubt about where it stands. It says very clear things about respecting property, recording transactions, honoring debts. It is very much in favor of the entrepreneurial class. That's why I'm quite optimistic.

You know, what we discovered was that in Egypt almost every extralegal building or business has some piece of paper authorizing its existence. The problem is that these papers rarely come from government. They usually come from neighborhood associations (quite often religious, but sometimes not) that have organized ways of certifying it. But this sort of documentation is rarely fungible. It rarely constitutes the kind of formalized right that will be recognized by everyone within the system regardless of who or where you are. It doesn't do what the formal system does with property, namely, to leverage it and turn it into capital.

But what this does mean is that in Egypt the starting point for awarding assets has already been created to a great extent at the shadow level. It's the same with property all over the world. The Domesday Book in medieval England recorded property data on a wide range of people: "John Smith owns so many barns, cattle, etc." Those records weren't titles, but as the years went by property titles were built up around them. As I like to say, historically property always starts with the king at least nodding in your direction.

FP: But that process took centuries, didn't it? Is there anything that can be done to liberate the energies of Egypt's entrepreneurial underclass right away?

HD: Well, back then, we calculated together with the Ministry of Finance that if these $400 billion of assets were brought under the rule of law, Egypt's GDP growth rate would double in the next five years.

Let me explain why it's not a miracle. The reforms that were done in Peru had the immediate effect of raising the price of the dirtiest and most neglected pieces of land. In Lima the average price of shanty property rose in average by 400 percent from 1997 to 2010. And that had a great deal to do with guaranteeing legal certainty of ownership.

Let's say you and I are in Cairo, and you want to buy a piece of property I own. I tell you that it's worth a million dollars, and that corresponds with your own estimate of how much the property is worth. But then you ask me if I have the title, and I have to admit that I don't. I know it's my property and all my neighbors know it too, but I don't have a piece of paper that says the same thing according to the rules of the legal system. Do you think you'll buy? But if you can implement the idea that you have one standard definition of property that you can compare and measure, then you free up an enormous potential.

FP: But can you really do this overnight?

HD: You can. But you have to take a political decision first. You have to make a decision to change the status quo, and then you have to put someone in charge of the program who has an interest in making it happen. The Japanese did it from 1945 to 1950. They went from being a feudal country with a per capita GDP below Latin America's to one of the world's most successful economies. Technologically it's not hard. But you have to solve that first problem: You can't change if the enemies of change lead the program.

FP: Can there be meaningful economic reform in Egypt without addressing the role of the military, which controls enormous swathes of the economy? Surely the generals know that they won't be able to compete in a genuinely open economy. Do you think they can be persuaded to play along? Or can there be no real economic progress without curtailing their role?

HD: Look, I'm not an Egyptian. That's a delicate question, and it's up for Egyptians to decide. But if it were up to me, right now I'd focus on the poor. I'd use the sorts of legal reforms I've suggested here to boost their opportunities, to empower them. Once you've improved their lives, not to mention your knowledge about the entire economy, then you can move forward in a more informed and dispassionate way. Do what's easy to do. Help Egyptians to become cognizant of the fact that they don't control most of their assets nor can they use them to raise capital and finance. Once they get that, other things become much easier to achieve. Keep your eye on the ball. Don't get sidetracked.

Let's imagine that all the electronic databases in New York City were wiped out by a virus. You'd have to create a team that goes from building to building, drawing up new titles. In most cases it's pretty easy to determine who owns what. There will be all sorts of corroborating documentation, and in more than 90 percent of the cases that will be quite clear. Here and there you'll find a case - I don't know, maybe Donald Trump got an unfair tax break - where it's a bit controversial. Here's what you do: You deal with the 94 percent really quick. Don't get hung up on the six percent.

Go to what people really care for first. It doesn't mean that these other things are not issues. Once you yourself have become an owner you'll have a better basis for making decisions. I like the idea of everybody getting their part of the action. Don't distract everyone from getting wiser.

FP: Are there some aspects of Marx's teachings that are applicable to the current economic situation of Egypt? And if so, why?

HD: Marx understood what brings certain societies or governments down. It's alienation: this sensation that you're not really part of productive apparatus, that you're marginal. I think that's very important. But what's true in Egypt is that the people who are alienated are not just a proletariat. They're an underclass that feels excluded. It's many of these people who set themselves on fire to protest their situation. They didn't tweet, they didn't use Facebook. They did the burning.

I was interviewing one of the ones who survived. He ran a small restaurant, but had to endure constant harassment. I said, "You're a businessman whose few rights have been taken away." He said, "Please don't call me that. I'm not a businessman. Just call me poor." It took me a while to understand why he insisted on this. By calling himself poor he got subsidized bread that he could put on the table in his restaurant. He had no idea that legal business tools would have improved his life far more. So what you have in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East is a badly labeled class of political upheaval. It's only by understanding this class and its needs that political leaders will be able to make the necessary reforms.
 
Not good news, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/egypt-reform-leader-elbaradei-ends-presidential-run/article2302752/
Egypt reform leader ElBaradei ends presidential run

SARAH EL DEEB

CAIRO, Egypt— The Associated Press
Published Saturday, Jan. 14, 2012


Egypt's reform leader Mohamed ElBaradei said Saturday he is pulling out of the country's presidential race to protest the military's failure to put the country on the path to democracy.

The 69-year-old Nobel laureate, who has been seen as a driving force behind the movement that forced former President Hosni Mubarak to step down, said in a statement that the conditions for a fair presidential election are not in place.

Mr. ElBaradei said the military rulers who took over from Mubarak have governed “as if no revolution took place and no regime has fallen.”

His decision to pull out of the race just days before the annual anniversary of the Jan. 25 uprising reflects the dilemma in which Egypt's revolutionary movement finds itself — caught between a military that they say is trying to hold on to power, and a newly-elected parliament dominated by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood which revolutionaries fear will give the generals what they want.

The military rulers have said they will transfer power after presidential elections, to be held before the end of June. But many expect a fierce struggle over the military's future privileges.

Mr. ElBaradei echoed fears that the military would not give up power to future elected rulers.

“I reviewed the best ways to serve the goals of the revolution in light of this reality, and I found none within the official framework, including (running for) the presidency,” he said.

“I had said from the start that my conscience will not allow me to run for president or any official position unless there is a real democratic framework, that upholds the essence of democracy and not only its form.”

The Muslim Brotherhood, whose associated political party looks poised to take more than 40 per cent of the seats in the next parliament, has also indicated that it might not field a candidate.

But the Brotherhood, by dominating parliament, is set to dominate the process of choosing a committee that will be entrusted with the writing of the country's new constitution — a situation that some liberals and youth groups fear will produce a bargain in which the army continues to control the executive power, but allows conservative Islamists to control the writing of the constitution.

Mr. ElBaradei had strongly advocated that the constitution be written prior to elections. Many revolutionaries say that the first free vote after decades of dictatorship is unlikely to yield a truly representative parliament, and advocated a constitutional committee made up of delegates of political parties, universities, labour unions, and other institutions.

Mr. ElBaradei admitted the protest movement was in dire straits, but blamed its current malaise on the military's failure to respond to its demands. He urged youth to continue their peaceful protests.

“The youth are the ones who will rebuild this country ... They are the dream, the hope,” he said.

Many had criticized Mr. ElBaradei's low profile in the street demonstrations since the Jan. 25 revolution, saying that he failed to seize the momentum to act as the forceful leader of an uprising that began without one, but soon found that it needed a figure to unify and guide it.

His decision to stand down from elections, and thus — in the revolutionaries' eyes — to not play the army's game, may restore some of his standing.

Presidential hopeful Ayman Nour supported Mr. ElBaradei's decision, saying it was a “positive shock” to the nation, and a new push for the revolutionary groups to demand more radical changes.

Activist and blogger Omar elhady wrote on his Twitter account: “ElBaradei's withdrawal proves he is a respectable and devoted man. I had stopped supporting him as president a while back. Now I see him as a national leader above official positions, and feared by presidents.”


I have no brief for (or against) Mr. ElBaradei, but Egypt matters in the region and the region matters to the world so: not good news.
 
                              Shared with provisions of The Copyright Act


Egypt's Islamists win 75 per cent of parliament
Associated Press, Updated: January 22, 2012
http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/egypt-s-islamists-win-75-percent-of-parliament-169308&cp

Cairo:  Final results on Saturday showed that Islamist parties won nearly three-quarters of the seats in parliament in Egypt's first elections since the ouster of authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak, according to election officials and political groups.

The Islamist domination of Egypt's parliament has worried liberals and even some conservatives about the religious tone of the new legislature, which will be tasked with forming a committee to write a new constitution. It remains unclear whether the constitution will be written while the generals who took power after Mubarak's fall are still in charge, or rather after presidential elections this summer.

In the vote for the lower house of parliament, a coalition led by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood won 47 per cent, or 235 seats in the 498-seat parliament. The ultraconservative Al-Nour Party was second with 25 per cent, or 125 seats.


article continues at link...
 
Bahrain is often overlooked:

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/pothot/articles/20120123.aspx

Bahrain, Maybe

Items About Areas That Could Break Out Into War

January 22, 2012: Bahrain, a small (population a million or so) Persian Gulf monarchy with a Sunni minority ruling a Shia majority, has been wracked by a year of demonstrations and an increasingly violent crackdown. The Shia are demanding democracy, but this would mean the end of Sunni rule and the Sunni minority are not willing to pay that high a price for peace. The violence increased on both sides for about six months and then declined. At least 40 have died, most of them Shia, and thousands have been injured or arrested. Nearly 400 are being prosecuted. The king set up a commission (in June) to study the protester's demands and offered some concessions that fell far short of real democracy after the commission report was delivered two months ago. While the Sunni government finds all this unrest bothersome and embarrassing, it's not creating enough pressure to force fundamental change. The government sees the protest movement weakening and has been finding more takers for concessions. For example, several thousand Shia lost their jobs last year because of real or suspected participation in the violence. Those men are being given back their jobs, after pledging to stay away from protests.

The Shia protest leaders do not have time on their side. All the unrest and lost income erodes enthusiasm for the cause. The government has supported the use of Sunni civilian counter-demonstrators. These groups are protected by the police but are not given a free pass when it comes to violence against Shia. But these Sunni mobs are another reminder to the Shia that being a majority is not a decisive advantage. It's not lost on the Bahraini Shia that it took an American army to remove the Sunni minority government in Iraq and that was followed by a Sunni terror campaign (unofficially supported by Sunni nations in the region) that killed over 50,000 Iraqi Shia.

The Bahrain unrest is causing the government to spend about a billion dollars more than it takes in each year. That is easily covered by borrowing, and Saudi Arabia is the ultimate source of financial and military support. The Saudis have a restive Shia minority and increasing friction between more secular Saudis and the Islamic conservative old guard. Because the Saudi family justifies its rule via its role as protector of the most holy Islamic shrines in Mecca and Medina, Islamic conservatives have a lot of clout. Technically, Shia are heretics, but the Saudis have managed to prevent much public discussion of that in Saudi Arabia. Privately, many Saudi clerics have harsh things to say about Shia and non-Moslems (infidels) in general. Saudi Arabia is actually the source of much of the Islam based hatred and radicalism. The Saudi government keeps it under control at home and blocks the larger private efforts to support Islamic terrorism abroad. But Saudi Arabia continues to supply recruits for Islamic terror groups throughout the world. The Saudis have been under growing pressure (from Islamic and non-Islamic nations) to suppress the many Islamic radical clergy and their followers in the kingdom.  But those radicals have been part of the Arab culture since the founding of Islam in the 6th century. The Saudi leadership considers themselves heroes for controlling their Islamic radicals as much as they have. For example, Saudi radicals would prefer to apply a lot of deadly force (as in mass murder) against Shia protestors. The king draws the line at that, but many other forms of physical and economic coercion are used. Same deal in Bahrain, where the Sunni minority considers the Shia ungrateful and untrustworthy.

Meanwhile, this is not the first time the Shia Arabs have rebelled against their Sunni rulers in Bahrain, and it won't be the last. The latest bit of violence has involved destroying nearly a hundred mosques and other Shia meeting places. There have been over 3,000 arrests and tighter control of the media, especially the use of the Internet. The Bahraini government blames the violence on Iran, but it appears to be more a matter of the native Shia wanting a better political and economic arrangement. The growing violence by security forces has left over a thousand dead or wounded. Meanwhile, neighboring Arab nations have agreed to provide more economic aid (the 2008 global recession hit Bahrain particularly hard). It appears that the government will be able to outlast this latest Shia outburst. It hasn't been easy.

By late February last year, about ten percent of the population (nearly 100,000 people and nearly all Shia) was out on the streets on some days. The security forces increased the force used to disperse the crowds. The king then dismissed many senior officials and made other good-will gestures. But the protests continued, and on March 3rd, Sunni civilians began forming groups and fighting with Shia demonstrators.  On March 8th, three protest organizations united to call for a republic (a democracy, and deposing the monarchy and Sunni rule).

The majority Shia are the poorest and least educated part of the Bahraini population and want a democracy so that they will be in charge. The Sunni minority in Bahrain, and the Sunni rulers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will not tolerate this. Bahraini police were eventually unable to handle the growing number of Shia demonstrations, so the foreign reinforcements and recruited mercenaries were used to suppress the unrest. In mid-March, 1,600 police and paramilitary troops arrived from Saudi Arabia and the UAE (United Arab Emirates). Eventually, over 4,000 foreign troops and police came in. On March 15, the king declared a three month state-of-emergency. This makes it easier to arrest and imprison people. The demonstrations continued, and on March 25th the government complained to the UN about the Lebanese Hezbollah groups assisting the Shia in Bahrain.  The state of emergency ended, the king offered inadequate (to Shia radicals) concessions, and the unrest continues. 

Then there's the threat from Iran, at least as far as Sunni Arabs throughout the region are concerned. Over the last few years, Iranian politicians have increasingly mentioned in public statements that Iran considers Bahrain the 14th province of Iran. That's because, well, it isn't called the "Persian" Gulf for nothing (although since all the oil money showed up the Arabs have been trying to popularize the term "Arabian Gulf," with mixed success). There have been ethnic Iranian communities on Bahrain for centuries, along with a Shia Arab majority, and Iran had a formal claim on the island until 1969 (when the claim was dropped, in order to improve relations with Arab neighbors). Iran has always been an empire and still is (only half the population is ethnic Iranian). The way this works you always have a sense of "Greater Iran" which includes, at the least, claims on any nearby areas containing ethnic Iranians or people of similar religion. Hitler used this concept to guide his strategy during World War II.

Bahrainis (both Sunni and Shia) get very upset when these claims are periodically revived, but the local Shia want an independent Bahrain run by the majority. The Iranian government officially denounces such claims but apparently many Iranians have not forgotten. Arabs are not very happy about that and have responded by pointing out that Iran was Sunni until 500 years ago and were forced to convert, on pain of death, by a Shia emperor (who killed about a million of his subjects in the process). Saudi Arabia is trying, with some success, to organize Arab resistance to Iranian expansionist moves. Iran has responded by encouraging the Shia minorities on the west side of the Gulf to demonstrate their unhappiness with their minority status. Thus the mid-March appearance of Saudi and UAE troops in Bahrain.

The Iranian claim is based on Iranian control of Bahrain for a few years during the 18th century. After that incident, Bahrain, and most of the other Arab Gulf States, sought protection from Britain. During World War II the U.S. joined with Britain in offering the Arab states of the Persian Gulf protection from Iranian aggression. Iran has always resented this, believing themselves to be the regional superpower and the final arbiter of who is sovereign and who is not.

Meanwhile, Bahrain should be, on paper, an excellent place to live for all its citizens. It isn't. The Bahrani population is only about a million (lots of illegal foreign workers are not counted, which makes it possible to keep the economy going without a lot of Shia), with oil and gas providing a per-capita income of over $20,000. The oil is running out, so Bahrain has been recasting itself as an Arab playground and financial center, replacing Beirut, Lebanon (which ceased, for two decades, to play that role in the late 1970-early 80s because of a civil war). Bahrain has used a lot of their oil revenue to build infrastructure and encouraged entrepreneurs to create shopping and entertainment facilities superior to anything available in the region. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which is connected to Bahrain by a causeway bridge, Bahrain does not enforce Islamic law on visitors or residents. That's nothing new. Bahrain has, for centuries, been a port of call for ships and sailors. That means booze and women were always available. But now there are also shopping malls, a full range of hotels, brothels, clubs, and bars. Most of the business for the entertainment spots comes from Saudi Arabia, but sailors, especially those from the 40-50 foreign warships that base themselves here, come a close second. A little over half the foreign sailors are American.

While generally peaceful the country has many unhappy and violence prone citizens. The problems are many. First, there is the monarchy. Although competent many of the educated citizens would prefer a democracy. Then there's the religion angle. The monarchy is Sunni while most of the population is Shia. Moreover, about 20 percent of the population is Christian and Hindu. This offends about ten percent of the population who are Islamic conservatives. Most of these are Shia and consider all the drinking and partying to be sinful and offensive. Meanwhile, the police have a Shia majority that is often stirred up when the Islamic radicals get violent. Then more Shia villagers will take to the streets, and riot, if they feel the police are being too hard on Shia Islamic radicals. This violence rarely gets into the urban, and tourist, areas. But at times the police have to warn visitors going outside the city to avoid certain towns and villages. Because so many of the police are Shia the government cannot always depend on the cops to control large scale rioting by Shia civilians. Thus over the last year a new, entirely Sunni, security force has been created.

A long range solution to that loyalty problem is being sought elsewhere. Bahrain sent recruiters to Pakistan to hire retired military personnel to staff the Bahraini security forces. The recruiters hired more than a thousand men quickly. There was no shortage of volunteers as the money is good even with the risk of death or injury. Pakistan has been supplying such mercenaries to the Arab Gulf states for centuries. Iran has leaned on Pakistan to ban this recruiting. Pakistan said it would look into it and the recruiting went on. Bahrain has long offered citizenship (and access to generous social welfare program) to Sunni migrants (who fill many civilian and military jobs). The local Shia resent this.

Standing in the wings are thousands of U.S. military personnel but more as potential targets than as additional security forces. Over the last few years the U.S. Navy has been expanding its naval base in Bahrain. The navy has taken over the Mina Salman port, which transferred all commercial operations to the new Khalifa bin Salman port two years ago. The navy leased 28 hectares (70 acres) of waterfront space at Mina Salman. At the capital the navy has a .4 hectare (one acre) area at the port there and 17 hectares (42 acres) at a nearby base. The new port is large enough to berth the largest U.S. ships (the Nimitz class carriers). The port currently supports over a dozen American warships operating in the area.

Thus the U.S. Navy has turned a minor naval station in the Persian Gulf into one of its most crucial bases for the war on terrorism. The U.S. moved into Bahrain in 1973, when the British gave it up. The Bahrainis, like most of the other small states along the west coast of the Persian Gulf, like to have some friendly Western power in residence. This provides some insurance against Saudi Arabia to the west and Iran to the east. Before 1918 the British presence helped keep the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire off their backs as well. All the Bahrainis ask is that the foreign troops be quiet and discreet. Until 2002, the Bahraini base was a place where U.S. warships could tie up for repairs or recreation for the crews. About 3,600 American military personnel were stationed there. There was an airbase for navy and air force transports and warplanes. The Bahrainis denied much of this activity, so as to avoid getting pilloried by other Arab states. But Bahrain is a small place (a 655 square kilometer island about 20 kilometers off the Saudi coast), and it's difficult for things like warships and warplanes to go unnoticed.

In the last eight years, several hundred million dollars has gone into building more permanent facilities. The trailers and other "temporary structures" were replaced by more permanent buildings and facilities. This included a new pier just for military ships. There is a shopping center just for the military and a lot of recreational facilities for the troops. Until 2004, some troops could bring their families. But now it's all military and the brass tries to keep everyone happy on base. It's a one year tour for most, but Bahrain is pretty popular. Living conditions are good, and the local Bahrainis are pretty mellow and friendly by Middle Eastern standards, at least most of the time.
 
Following the ideas of Samuel Huntington (the Clash of Civilizations):

http://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/article/?q=MTFhZjcyZmQ1Mjc0NGRmODY2ZGMyMWNmZjE2N2IyNjQ

‘Islam Is Islam, And That’s It’
The Arab Spring was not hijacked

BY ANDREW C. McCARTHY

The tumult indelibly dubbed “the Arab Spring” in the West, by the credulous and the calculating alike, is easier to understand once you grasp two basics. First, the most important fact in the Arab world — as well as in Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other neighboring non-Arab territories — is Islam. It is not poverty, illiteracy, or the lack of modern democratic institutions. These, like anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, and an insular propensity to buy into conspiracy theories featuring infidel villains, are effects of Islam’s regional hegemony and supremacist tendency, not causes of it. One need not be led to that which pervades the air one breathes.

The second fact is that Islam constitutes a distinct civilization. It is not merely an exotic splash on the gorgeous global mosaic with a few embarrassing cultural eccentricities; it is an entirely different way of looking at the world. We struggle with this truth, which defies our end-of-history smugness. Enthralled by diversity for its own sake, we have lost the capacity to comprehend a civilization whose idea of diversity is coercing diverse peoples into obedience to its evolution-resistant norms.

So we set about remaking Islam in our own progressive image: the noble, fundamentally tolerant Religion of Peace. We miniaturize the elements of the ummah (the notional global Muslim community) that refuse to go along with the program: They are assigned labels that scream “fringe!” — Islamist, fundamentalist, Salafist, Wahhabist, radical, jihadist, extremist, militant, or, of course, “conservative” Muslims adhering to “political Islam.”

We consequently pretend that Muslims who accurately invoke Islamic scripture in the course of forcibly imposing the dictates of classical sharia — the Islamic legal and political system — are engaged in “anti-Islamic activity,” as Britain’s former home secretary Jacqui Smith memorably put it. When the ongoing Islamization campaign is advanced by violence, as inevitably happens, we absurdly insist that this aggression cannot have been ideologically driven, that surely some American policy or Israeli act of self-defense is to blame, as if these could possibly provide rationales for the murderous jihad waged by Boko Haram Muslims against Nigerian Christians and by Egyptian Muslims against the Copts, the persecution of the Ahmadi sect by Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims, or the internecine killing in Iraq of Sunnis by Shiites and vice versa — a tradition nearly as old as Islam itself — which has been predictably renewed upon the recent departure of American troops.

The main lesson of the Arab Spring ought to be that this remaking of Islam has happened only in our own minds, for our own consumption. The Muslims of the Middle East take no note of our reimagining of Islam, being, in the main, either hostile toward or oblivious to Western overtures. Muslims do not measure themselves against Western perceptions, although the shrewdest among them take note of our eagerly accommodating attitude when determining what tactics will best advance the cause.

That cause is nothing less than Islamic dominance.

‘The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism,” wrote Samuel Huntington. “It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture.” Not convinced merely in the passive sense of assuming that they will triumph in the end, Muslim leaders are galvanized by what they take to be a divinely ordained mission of proselytism — and proselytism not limited to spiritual principles, but encompassing an all-purpose societal code prescribing rules for everything from warfare and finance to social interaction and personal hygiene. Historian Andrew Bostom notes that in the World War I era, even as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Ataturk symbolically extinguished the caliphate, C. Snouck Hurgronje, then the West’s leading scholar of Islam, marveled that Muslims remained broadly confident in what he called the “idea of universal conquest.” In Islam’s darkest hour, this conviction remained “a central point of union against the unfaithful.” It looms more powerful in today’s Islamic ascendancy.

Of course, conventional wisdom in the West holds that the Arab Spring spontaneously combusted when Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, set himself ablaze outside the offices of the Tunisian klepto-cops who had seized his wares. This suicide protest, the story goes, ignited a sweeping revolt against the corruption and caprices of Arab despots. One by one, the dominos began to fall: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya — with rumblings in Saudi Arabia and Jordan as well as teetering Syria and rickety Iran. We are to believe that the mass uprising is an unmistakable manifestation of the “desire for freedom” that, according to Pres. George W. Bush, “resides in every human heart.”

That proclamation came in the heady days of 2004, when the democracy project was still a Panglossian dream, not the Pandora’s box it proved to be as Islamic parties began to win elections. Like its successor, the Bush administration discouraged all inquiry into Islamic doctrine by anyone seeking to understand Muslim enmity, indulging the fiction that there is something we can do to change it. Inexorably, this has fed President Obama’s preferred fiction — that we must have done something to deserve it — as well as the current administration’s strident objection to uttering the word “Islam” for any purpose other than hagiography. In this self-imposed ignorance, most Americans still do not know that hurriya, Arabic for “freedom,” connotes “perfect slavery” or absolute submission to Allah, very nearly the opposite of the Western concept. Even if we grant for argument’s sake the dubious proposition that all people crave freedom, Islam and the West have never agreed about what freedom means.

The first count of contemporary Muslims’ indictment of Middle Eastern dictators is not that they have denied individual liberty, but that they have repressed Islam. This is not to say that other grievances are irrelevant. Muslims have indeed been outraged by the manner in which their Arafats, Mubaraks, Qaddafis, and Saddams looted the treasuries while the masses lived in squalor. But the agglomerations of wealth and other regime hypocrisies are framed for the masses more as sins against Allah’s law than as the inevitable corruptions of absolute power. The most influential figures and institutions in Islamic societies are those revered for their mastery of Islamic law and jurisprudence — such authorities as top Muslim Brotherhood jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Cairo’s al-Azhar University, the seat of Sunni learning for over a millennium. In places where Islam is the central fact of life, even Muslims who privately dismiss sharia take pains to honor it publicly. Even regimes that rule by whim nod to sharia as the backbone of their legal systems, lace their rhetoric with scriptural allusions, and seek to rationalize their actions as Islamically appropriate.

If you understand this, you understand why Western beliefs about the Arab Spring — and the Western conceit that the death of one tyranny must herald the birth of liberty — have always been a delusion. There are real democrats, authentically moderate Muslims, and non-Muslims in places such as Egypt and Yemen who long for freedom in the Western sense; but the stubborn fact is that they make up a strikingly small fraction of the population: about 20 percent, a far cry from the Western narrative that posits a sea of Muslim moderates punctuated by the rare radical atoll.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the ummah’s most important organization, unabashedly proclaiming for nearly 90 years that “the Koran is our law and jihad is our way.” Hamas, a terrorist organization, is its Palestinian branch, and leading Brotherhood figures do little to disguise their abhorrence of Israel and Western culture. Thus, when spring fever gripped Tahrir Square, the Obama administration, European governments, and the Western media tirelessly repeated the mantra that the Brothers had been relegated to the sidelines. Time had purportedly passed the Islamists by, just as it was depositing Mubarak in the rear-view mirror. Surely the Tahrir throngs wanted self-determination, not sharia. Never you mind the fanatical chants of Allahu akbar! as the dictator fell. Never mind that Sheikh Qaradawi was promptly ushered into the square to deliver a fiery Friday sermon to a congregation of nearly a million Egyptians.

With a transitional military government in place and openly solicitous of the Brotherhood, there occurred the most telling, most tellingly underreported, and most willfully misreported story of the Arab Spring: a national referendum to determine the scheduling of elections that would select a new parliament and president, with a new constitution to follow. It sounds dry, but it was crucial. The most organized and disciplined factions in Egyptian life are the Brotherhood and self-proclaimed Muslim groups even more impatient for Islamization, collectively identified by the media as “Salafists” even though this term does not actually distinguish them from the Brothers, whose founder (Hassan al-Banna) was a leading Salafist thinker. By contrast, secular democratic reformers are in their infancy. Elections on a short schedule would obviously favor the former; the latter need time to take root and grow.

Egypt being Egypt, the election campaign was waged with the rhetoric of religious and cultural solidarity. A vote against a rapid transition was depicted as a vote “against Islam” and in favor of the dreaded Western hands said to be guiding the Christians and secularists. The vote was the perfect test of the Arab Spring narrative.

Four-to-one: That’s how it went. The democrats were wiped out by the Muslim parties, 78 percent to 22 percent. While Western officials dismissed the vote as involving scheduling arcana, it foretold everything that has followed: the electoral romp in the parliamentary elections, a multi-stage affair in which the Brotherhood and the Salafists are inching close to three-fourths control of the legislature; the ongoing pogrom against the Copts; and the increasing calls for renunciation of the Camp David Accords, which have kept the peace with Israel for more than 30 years.

Four-to-one actually proves to be a reliable ratio in examining Islamic developments. In a 2007 poll conducted by World Public Opinion in conjunction with the University of Maryland, 74 percent of Egyptians favored strict application of sharia in Muslim countries. It was 76 percent in Morocco, 79 percent in Pakistan, and 53 percent in moderate Indonesia. Before American forces vacated Iraq, roughly three-quarters of the people they had liberated regarded them as legitimate jihad targets, and, given the opportunity to vote, Iraqis installed Islamist parties who promised to hasten the end of American “occupation.” Three out of four Palestinians deny Israel’s right to exist. Even in our own country, a recently completed survey found that 80 percent of American mosques promote literature that endorses violent jihad, and that these same mosques counsel rigorous sharia compliance.

The Arab Spring is an unshackling of Islam, not an outbreak of fervor for freedom in the Western sense. Turkey’s third-term prime minister Recep Erdogan, a staunch Brotherhood ally who rejects the notion that there is a “moderate Islam” (“Islam is Islam, and that’s it,” he says), once declared that “democracy is a train where you can get off when you reach your destination.” The destination for Muslim supremacists is the implementation of sharia — the foundation of any Islamized society, and, eventually, of the reestablished caliphate.

Rachid Ghannouchi is swarmed by supporters in Tunis.
Nicolas Fauque/abacausa.com/Newscom

The duration of the ride depends on the peculiar circumstances of each society. Erdogan’s Turkey has become the model for Islamist gradualism in more challenging environments: Slowly but steadily bend the nation into sharia compliance while denying any intent to do so and singing the obligatory paeans to democracy. Erdogan came to this formula after no shortage of stumbles — it is now rare to hear such outbursts as “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers,” the sort of thing he used to say in the late Nineties when he was imprisoned for sedition against Ataturk’s secular order. His banned Welfare party eventually reemerged as the new and democracy-ready AKP, the Justice and Development party. Ever since a quirk in Turkish electoral law put these Islamists in power in 2002, Erdogan has cautiously but demonstrably eroded the secular framework Ataturk and his followers spent 80 years building, returning this ostensible NATO ally to the Islamist camp, shifting it from growing friendship to open hostility toward Israel, co-opting the military that was Ataturk’s bulwark against Islamization, and salting the country’s major institutions with Islamic supremacists.

The Turkish model will be the ticket for Brotherhood parties that have just prevailed in Tunisian and Moroccan elections. In Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi, a cagey Islamist of the Erdogan stripe, heads the Ennahda party, convincingly elected in October to control the legislature that will replace ousted ruler Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. In Morocco, an Islamist party whose namesake is the AKP won the fall elections, but further Islamization is apt to be slower. Far from being driven from power, King Mohammed VI remains popular, having balanced his affinity for the West with deference to sharia norms. Moroccan Islamists are making significant inroads, though, as are their neighbors to the east. Algerian Islamists are poised to accede to power this spring after being thwarted by a military coup that blocked what would have been their certain electoral success in 1991.

Egypt, by contrast, will go quickly. There, the most salient development is not the weakness of secular democrats but the impressive electoral strength of the Salafists. Their numbers are competitive with those of the better-known Brothers, and they will tug their rivals in a more aggressively Islamist direction. Vainly, the West hoped that the country’s American-trained and -equipped armed forces would serve as a brake. But the Egyptian military, from which several top al-Qaeda operatives have hailed, is a reflection of Egyptian society, especially as one descends to the conscripts of lower rank. The undeniable trend in Egyptian society is toward Islam. That trend is more blatant only in such basket cases as Libya, where each day brings new evidence that today’s governing “rebels” include yesterday’s al-Qaeda jihadists, and in Yemen, the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, where even the New York Times concedes al-Qaeda’s strength.

Led by the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic parties have become expert at presenting themselves as moderates and telling the West what it wants to hear while they gradually ensnare societies in the sharia web, as slowly or quickly as conditions on the ground permit. They know that when the West says “democracy,” it means popular elections, not Western democratic culture. They know the West has so glorified these elections that the victors can steal them (Iran), refuse to relinquish power when later they lose (Iraq), or decline to hold further elections (Gaza) without forfeiting their legitimacy. They know that seizing the mantle of “democracy” casts Islamists as the West’s heroes in the dramas still unfolding in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. They know that the Obama administration and the European Union have deluded themselves into believing that Islamists will be tamed by the responsibilities of governance. Once in power, they are sure to make virulent anti-Americanism their official policy and to contribute materially to the pan-Islamic goal of destroying Israel.

We should not be under any illusions about why things are shaking out this way. The Arab Spring has not been hijacked any more than Islam was hijacked by the suicide terrorists of 9/11. Islam is ascendant because that is the way Muslims of the Middle East want it.

Mr. McCarthy, a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, is the author, most recently, of The Grand Jihad: How Islam and the Left Sabotage America.
 
Interesting, if true. Even if it is not true, it would stil make an astounding piece of propaganda and derail the narrative the Islamic radicals are trying to impliment:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/02/12/bin-laden-gave-up-on-jihad/

Bin Laden Gave Up on Jihad

The big news today: according to family members, by the end of his life Osama bin Laden was telling his family to “Go to Europe and America and get a good education.”

What? The great Islamic umma, center of global culture and light of the world has no universities where the children of the Great Jihadi can get a decent education?  The clueless, hell-bound infidels of Europe and America make the Sons of the True Faith look incompetent and backward on the vital matter of educating the young?  It isn’t enough to sit on a dirt floor in Pakistan memorizing the Koran and learning how to wear a suicide bomb vest?

But what about the obligation to take up the cause of jihad and violence and crush the evil doers in the West?
Never mind about all that, Osama supposedly told his children and grandchildren.  “Do not follow me down the road to jihad,” he said.  “You have to study and live in peace and don’t do what I am doing or what I have done.”

All those Salafi ideologues promoting the idea of jihad against the West as a sacred obligation compulsory on all Muslims are presumably choking on their beards as they read these words.  The homosexual-hangers and the adultress-stoners are having a bad morning. No doubt they will tell themselves that this story is yet another lie from the cynical west, but they will have to wrap themselves ever more tightly in the delusions and wishful thinking that blinker their thoughts — and undermine their political effectiveness.

Beside welcoming evidence, however questionable, that a terrible sinner was exploring the path of repentance however tentatively, Via Meadia gloats. Bin Laden’s path was a dead end in more ways than one; any sign that he knew how futile his bloody deeds were and that his effort to topple American power had failed is welcome.

The information, given in an interview to the London Times by a sister of one of bin Laden’s wives, raises many questions.  Was bin Laden telling his own kids to avoid jihad while still trying to recruit misguided young people to the cause around the world?  Or, downloading porn in Abbotabad and reflecting on the consequences of his deeds, had bin Laden come to see the futility of his course? Is the sister-in-law saying whatever she thinks will give her relatives a brighter future now that bin Laden is dead and his movement is shattered?

One doesn’t know, and perhaps we never will for sure. But it looks increasingly as if America not only killed bin Laden: we are destroying his dream.
His kids should have no trouble following his advice to study in America, by the way.  Just think of the essays they will be able to write on their college applications.
 
Oh, good. Nuclear weapons delivered in flower vans:

http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-11/07/pakistan-nukes-delivery-vans?utm_source=Outbrain&utm_medium=CPC&utm_campaign=Outbrain%2BTrial

Pakistan carts its nukes around in delivery vans
By Spencer Ackerman
07 November 11

Pakistan is taking nuclear paranoia to a horrifying new low. And it's making the world a vastly more dangerous place in the process.

Freaked out about the insecurity of its nuclear arsenal, the Pakistani military's Strategic Plans Division has begun carting the nukes around in clandestine ways. That might make some sense on the surface: no military wants to let others know exactly where its most powerful weapons are at any given moment. But Pakistan is going to an extreme.

The nukes travel "in civilian-style vehicles without noticeable defenses, in the regular flow of traffic", according to a blockbuster story on the US-Pakistan relationship in The Atlantic. Marc Ambinder and Jeffrey Goldberg write that tactical nuclear weapons travel down the streets in "vans with a modest security profile." Somewhere on a highway around, say, Karachi, is the world's most dangerous 1-800-FLOWERS truck.

Tom Clancy should be suing Pakistani generals for ripping off the basic idea behind The Sum Of All Fears. You'll recall that Pakistan is home to al-Qaida, a particularly fearsome version of the Taliban, the leadership of the old-school Taliban, its friends in the Haqqani Network and a host of anti-Indian terrorist groups that the Pakistani intelligence service employ as proxies. Sometimes the Pakistani military helps these terrorist and insurgent groups attack US troops in Afghanistan. And any one of these groups would love a chance to wield a nuclear weapon.

Except that Pakistan isn't trying to safeguard its nukes from them. It's trying to safeguard its nukes from us. The Navy SEAL raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden has made important Pakistani generals think that the US military's next target is Pakistani nukes. So off the vans go, along what Ambinder and Goldberg term "congested and dangerous roads," trying to throw off the scent of the US, with little more than hope to protect them from an adventurous highwayman.

The irony is that the US isn't planning to steal Pakistan's nukes -- but Pakistan's cavalier attitude toward nuclear security is making the US think twice about whether it should revise some worst-case-scenario contingency planning.

Should any of the nukes go missing, an "Abbottabad redux" would likely occur, Ambinder and Goldberg report. An anonymous military official tells the pair that the Joint Special Operations Command "has units and aircraft and parachutes on alert in the region for nuclear issues, and regularly inserts units and equipment for prep." Seizing Pakistani nukes during or after a military coup is a much harder mission, but the reporters consider it doable. "t's wise for the US to try to design a plan for seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons in a low-risk manner," Goldberg and Ambinder advise, placing a lot of rhetorical freight on the words "low-risk."

That is, if the US actually knows where the nukes are. "Anyone who tells you that they know where all of Pakistan's nukes are is lying to you," ex-national security adviser Jim Jones allegedly said. The Econolines of Doom make that knowledge even more uncertain.

All of which points to the self-reinforcing downward spiral of the US-Pakistan relationship. US cash continues to go into the Pakistanis' pockets, and from there into the hands of anti-American terrorists. There is, for many justified reasons, absolutely no trust between either side's security services and militaries. There is also no alternative to the toxic relationship that anyone cited in the Atlantic piece is willing to contemplate. (When I recently suggested that the US cut off aid and continue the drone war until Pakistan reins in terror groups, I got blasted on Twitter as a warmonger.) "There is no escaping this vexed relationship," Ambinder and Goldberg conclude, reflecting the conventional wisdom in Washington and Islamabad.

Which sinks the US into the nadir of absurdity. It funds a terrorist-sponsoring state while conducting a massive undeclared war on part of that state's territory. It wants that state's assistance to end the Afghanistan war while that state's soldiers help insurgents wage it. And seeking a world without nuclear weapons while its "Major non-NATO ally" drastically increases the probability that terrorists will acquire a the most dangerous weapon of all.
 
Good thing Fed-Ex doesn't allow shipment of nuclear materials. ;D
 
In major reversal, Muslim Brotherhood will vie for Egypt's presidency

The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group, could end up in control of all three branches of Egypt's new government.
By Kristen Chick, Correspondent / April 1, 2012
Article Link

The Muslim Brotherhood has nominated its deputy leader as a candidate in Egypt’s presidential elections, in a reversal that upends the race for Egypt’s first post-revolution leader and could leave the Islamist group in control of all branches of Egypt’s new government.

The decision to field Khairat El Shater, a wealthy businessman who has served mostly behind the scenes, came after nearly a year in which the Muslim Brotherhood said it would not contest the presidential elections so as not to provoke fear of Islamic rule in Egypt. But in a press conference Saturday night at their new headquarters, Brotherhood leaders said they found it necessary to change course because the transition to democracy is under threat, and the group was stymied in parliament.

"We have chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties," said Mohamed Morsy, head of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Mahmoud Hussein, the group’s secretary general, cited attempts to “abort the revolution.”

Think you know the Middle East? Take our geography quiz.

The move is the Brotherhood’s trump card in a recently escalating battle for power with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military council currently ruling Egypt, say analysts. But it could cause a backlash, not only at home but also abroad, among Western governments wary of an Islamist regime in Egypt. The risky step from the conservative movement is an indication of the difficult political realities confronting the Brotherhood as it attempts to transition from a repressed opposition group to a majority power.

“This is the last-mile fight,” says Khalil Al Anani, an expert on Islamist politics at Durham University who is currently in Egypt. “After [the Brotherhood] realized that the parliament is powerless, they decided to fight until the last point that they can reach to guarantee some kind of power over the new political system…. This is a serious conflict over power with the military.”
Still seeking clout

The Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, won nearly 50 percent of the seats in parliament in recent elections. But they have since found those seats gave them less clout than they had anticipated. The military refused repeated Brotherhood demands that SCAF sack the military-appointed cabinet and allow the parliamentary majority to form a government.

This lack of power, despite what was perceived as a strong victory in the elections, was embarrassing and damaging to their credibility, says Omar Ashour, an expert on Islamist movements who is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. “They're not going to accept being marginalized with such a popular mandate,” he says.

At the same time, the movement had few good choices when considering outside presidential candidates to back. They could not endorse any of the handful of Islamist candidates already in the race for various reasons, but risked revolt if they backed a non-Islamist candidate. Not backing a candidate was not an option, says Dr. Anani, because the leadership was afraid a president elected without their support might eventually turn on them. They deliberated mindful of 1954, when Gamal Abdel Nasser turned on the organization, officially banning it and imprisoning thousands of members. The SCAF invoked that history in a recent statement, as its confrontation with the Brotherhood heightened.
More on link
 
Here is a good news story for a change; an Islamic state which embraces Rule of Law and development, and one that should serve as a beacon of hope for Islamic nations everywhere and the world. The key is cultural; Somaliland is building from the leagacy of British Colonial rule and technically could be included in the Anglosphere group of nations:

http://opinion.financialpost.com/2012/05/25/lawrence-solomon-capitalist-haven/

Lawrence Solomon: Capitalist haven

Lawrence Solomon  May 25, 2012 – 8:23 PM ET | Last Updated: May 25, 2012 8:59 PM ET

British traditions boost the de facto state of Somaliland

Second in a series. Next: Cutting Greater Somalia down to size

It’s the only African country that doesn’t rely on foreign aid from the world’s rich governments. It’s a Muslim country in Africa that has had a functioning democracy for two decades. It’s an oasis of relative peace in one of the most vicious regions of the world, with a growing free-market economy, low inflation and a currency that has been appreciating against the U.S. dollar.

This anomaly of a country, Somaliland, is unrecognized by any other country in the world, even though the World Bank’s chief economist for Africa touts it as a “success story” and the World Bank itself doesn’t formally recognize it. Somaliland’s story is all the more astonishing given that it is officially part of Somalia, a failed state best known for its piracy at sea and al-Shabaab terrorists on land, and given that it declared independence in 1991 after surviving a brutal repression by Somalia’s Marxist dictator that dispersed much of its population to the U.K., Canada and other safe havens.

While much of Somalia descended into an ungovernable anarchy over the past two decades, Somaliland miraculously found its feet. The miracle lay largely in the country’s good fortune to have been in British hands over most of the previous century, and in its good fortune to be deprived of foreign aid. Without foreign aid lavished on leaders in the central government and with a decentralized British colonial parliament, Somaliland’s local governments exercised meaningful rule, citizens were accustomed to local rule, and citizens had no choice but to be self-­reliant.

In the rest of Somalia, where foreign aid propped up a corrupt central government without benefiting the populace at large, self-reliance meant banditry on the roads and piracy at sea. In foreign-aid-bereft Somaliland, such lawlessness would have killed the country’s best hope for survival — exports from the deep-sea port of Berbera that the British left behind, coupled with roads able to carry to port local goods as well as goods from neighbouring landlocked Ethiopia.

The local clan-based governments calculated they would earn less by plundering the few merchants willing to risk the trip to port than by ensuring safe passage along the road system and sharing in growing port revenues. It was an enlightened business decision. Livestock exports of goats, sheep, cattle and camels, which account for some 60% of Somaliland’s total exports and GDP, has soared, almost tripling in the last five years alone, while Ethiopia — the dominant economy in the region — increasingly ships through Somaliland. The once-underutilized port has already undergone a major upgrade and, to keep up with the needs of its burgeoning trade, Somaliland has announced it will privatize the port.
Advertisement

Because Somaliland is unrecognized, credit has been hard to come by, the country has largely needed to rely on cash transactions, and foreign investment has been all but non-existent. Until now.

Although most of the world’s governments, fearful of encouraging other secessionist movements, are in solidarity with the central government of Somalia against Somaliland, the world’s capitalists are taking a second look. Somaliland may not have the official imprimatur of the United Nations or the backing of a major central bank, some investors ­reason, but it looks a lot more secure than a Greece, an Egypt, or many other countries blessed by officialdom.

This week, Coca-Cola opened a US$15-million bottling plant in Somaliland, the country’s first major industrial investment since independence. Others, including Toyota and foreign airlines, have announced plans to invest. And oil companies, too, are expressing interest — prior to the civil war, several oil majors were exploring in Somaliland.

But the biggest breakthrough for Somaliland may come from a sympathetic Britain, its former colonial master and present home to the world’s largest Somali Diaspora community. In a 21st-century twist on its colonial trading corporations such as the Hudson’s Bay Co. and the East India Co., the British parliament this year established the Somaliland Development Corp. as an end-run around countries that deny Somaliland the recognition, and investment, it deserves.

“The point of the corporation is to facilitate international investment in Somaliland and economic interaction for the benefit of the Somaliland people,” explained British MP Alun Michael in the House of Parliament. “As an unrecognized state, it is isolated. Despite its extraordinary achievements in stability and democracy, international donors cannot deal directly with its government, and foreign investors face uncertainty about whether contracts — the basis of secure business — can be enforced. The point of the corporation is to establish an entity to circumvent that problem.”

The Somaliland Development Corp. will be, in effect, an outsourced Somaliland ministry that will allow foreign investors to help Somaliland develop under the laws of the U.K. Fittingly, the U.K. is helping to advance the development of its former colony into a viable democratic state. The rest of what is official Somalia — a region that was Italian Somaliland, including the autonomous Puntland region, has had no such luck, not least because it lacked the British tradition of democracy. But the Somalis in the former Italian Somaliland also have a path to peace, as we shall see next week.

Financial Post
LawrenceSolomon@nextcity.com
Lawrence Solomon is executive director of Energy Probe and a founder of Probe International.

For some historical background on the Somaliland success story, click here. For economic and trade data from the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Development, click here.
 
                          From CBC News and shared with provisions of The Copyright Act


Egypt's ex-spy chief Omar Suleiman dies in U.S.
The Associated Press 20 Jul 2012
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/07/20/obit-suleiman-egypt-spy-chief.html

Democracy activists denounced plans for a military funeral honouring Omar Suleiman, Egypt's former spy chief and the closest lieutenant of Hosni Mubarak — a key pillar of the ousted president's authoritarian regime and holder of so many secrets that he was known as "the black box."

Suleiman, 76, died Thursday in a U.S. hospital. The shadowy statesman was considered Mubarak's most trusted man, handing the regime's most sensitive issues like relations with the U.S. and Israel and the fierce battle against Islamists. Suleiman's spy agency was responsible for tracking and suppressing opposition groups at home.

Tall, thin and often shown in dark sunglasses, Suleiman was also Egypt's point man in co-operation with the United States against terrorism and was involved in the post 9/11 rendition program in which terror suspects snatched by the Americans were shipped to Egypt and other countries for interrogation, sometimes involving torture.

In one case in 2002, the U.S. asked Suleiman for DNA material from the family of Ayman el-Zawahri, the Egyptian militant who at the time was al-Qaeda's deputy leader and now heads the group.

"No problem, we'll get his brother, cut off his arm and send it over," Suleiman replied.

The Americans said just a blood sample would suffice, according to the account by author Ron Suskind in his book on the rendition program, The One Percent Doctrine.

During the 18-day uprising last year, Suleiman was appointed vice-president in a last-gasp attempt by Mubarak to save his political life as hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets demanding his ouster. But the desperate measures, including talks between Suleiman and the formerly outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, were unable to stave off Mubarak's overthrow.

In the end, it was an ashen-faced Suleiman who appeared on state TV on Feb. 11, 2011, and read a terse announcement of Mubarak's resignation and the military's seizure of power.

Suleiman's sudden death came weeks after a member of his top nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood, succeeded Mubarak as president. The intelligence agency Suleiman headed for 20 years was central to the Mubarak regime's repression of the Islamist group.

Suleiman called 'an international butcher'

Now President Mohammed Morsi faces new woes from Suleiman — over his funeral.

Presidential spokesman Yasser Ali told the state news agency that Suleiman, who was a general in the military, should have a military funeral. That brought quick denunciations from activists against honouring a figure whom they consider stained by his regime role and who should have faced trial.

"Omar Suleiman is an international butcher," said rights lawyer Malik Adly. "All the time he was the pampered man of the regime, the old and the new. Even the Brotherhood is holding a funeral for him. Why? All the time he was never questioned despite so many lawsuits against him."

Activists on social networking sites Twitter and Facebook launched a campaign of "no to military funeral to Omar Suleiman." Adly said they planned a symbolic funeral for the revolution's "martyrs" would be held the same day as Suleiman's.

The Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, where Suleiman had been treated since Monday, said in a statement he died of "complications from amyloidosis, a disease affecting the heart, kidneys and other organs."

Egypt's state news agency MENA said earlier that Suleiman had suffered from lung and heart problems for months, and his health condition had sharply deteriorated over the past three weeks. It said his three daughters will accompany the body to be buried in Egypt on Saturday.

Suleiman largely vanished from sight after Mubarak's fall. But he re-emerged in April in a surprise but short-lived attempt to join the race for president. He said he was running to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from coming to power, warning that it would turn Egypt into a religious state.

But he was disqualified on technical grounds along with two Islamist candidates, including the Brotherhood's initial contender.

Testified in Mubarak trial

He also testified in the trial of his former boss, Mubarak, who was eventually sentenced to life in prison for failing to stop the killing of protesters during the uprising. Suleiman denied Mubarak issued orders to shoot at protesters, but said the president did learn about the killings when he ordered the formation of an investigative committee. Mubarak supporters blame that testimony for bringing the conviction.

But rights activists insist Suleiman should have been tried as well, for the protester deaths and for activities during Mubarak's rule. Adly said Suleiman hid information that could have convicted Mubarak for directly ordering the killings.

"Suleiman himself is deeply involved. But no one brought him to justice, why? This is the thing we never know," he said.

Suleiman was born in Qena in southern Egypt and graduated from the military academy as an infantry officer in 1955. He rose through the ranks and became deputy head of military intelligence in 1987. He became military intelligence chief in 1991 during the Gulf War, when Egyptians fought alongside other Arab forces in the U.S.-led coalition that drove Saddam Hussein's military out of Kuwait.

He indirectly saved his boss's life when he advised Mubarak to take an armored Mercedes with him on a state visit to Ethiopia in 1995. Islamic militants there sprayed his convoy with gunfire as he drove from the airport after arrival, but Mubarak was unscratched.

But his name only became known to the public in the early 2000s when Mubarak began moving the most vital issues of state to Suleiman, including relations in the U.S. and Israel and dealings with the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

Hossam Sweilam, a former general who has known Suleiman since they were in the military academy together, said Suleiman's lack of political ambition helped him keep his job so long in a paranoid regime.

"There was no intelligence chief who survived that long but Suleiman," he said. Mubarak was known to fear and get rid of politicians who rise in prominence.

Still, his power made some view him as a potential successor to Mubarak. That created silent tension between Suleiman and the president's younger son, Gamal, who was seen as being groomed by his father as a successor.
 
The Arab Spring comes to Saudi Arabia
Article Link
Peter Fragiskatos, Special to National Post | Aug 24, 2012

Of all the changes brought on by the Arab Spring, it is the ongoing unrest in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province – home to a large Shiite minority, and holding 90% of the country’s oil reserves – that could prove to be the most important in the long run.

When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, tensions over who should lead the Islamic community – by that time covering almost the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula – emerged and persisted. On the one hand were those who favoured a succession that promoted the most qualified individual on the basis of wisdom, good conduct, devoutness and competence. This group came to be known as the Sunnis. The Shiites, for their part, believed that authority could only be exercised by members of the Prophet’s family. Unlike the Sunnis, they also saw the blood relatives of Muhammad as divinely inspired and infallible.

Today, most of the world’s Muslims are Sunni (around 85%) but Shiites are the majority in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain; and sizable populations live in Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Yemen and, perhaps most significantly, Saudi Arabia.

Estimated to number between 1.5- and 2-million people, the Shiites in Saudi Arabia make up 10% of the national population, and have experienced widespread discrimination since the founding of the Saudi Kingdom in 1932. As far as the religious realm is concerned, this has included bans on practicing their faith in public, restrictions on the building of mosques, and attacks on centres of learning and other gathering places.

At the political level, Shiites have been prevented from serving as cabinet ministers, and faced exclusion from the armed forces and police while the Eastern Province has been ruled over by an administration dominated by Sunni Muslims (who form the 90% majority in Saudi Arabia). Socially, they are viewed as heretics by much of the population, an attitude that has been encouraged by the ultraconservative clerics belonging to the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam that dominates in Saudi Arabia.

Inspired by the Arab Spring, Saudi Shiite demonstrators have become increasingly vocal in demanding an end to their marginalized position. Sporadic protests that began peacefully in February 2011 have now turned violent, most recently in early August in the eastern city of Qatif after demonstrators clashed with police.

Although only around a dozen have been killed – relatively low by the standards of the violence that took place in Egypt and Libya, not to mention the ongoing massacres in Syria – the conflict could escalate, posing serious challenges for the Saudi authorities and the world economy.
More on link
 
Back
Top