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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

  • Thread starter Thread starter Sharpey
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Colin P said:
Regional impacts/Canadian contracts will be a major issue with such a large contract, regardless of what people say. Politically to spend the money and not get Canadians making money from it, makes it a hard political sell.

I'm not sure if you misread my statement... but I'm saying the same thing. The unfortunately the way that IRBs are calculated does not do justice for the quality of contracts. Basically The Canadian Aerospace industry is highly integrated with the US industry; that's how we're basically the 4th largest aerospace producer with a relatively small prime manufacturer (Bombardier). Much of our industry are sub-contractors to the US primes. Buying the Rafale probably won't lead to sustainable growth... its likely to be a one time purchase to satisfy the contract terms.

The JSF's industrial partnership might not accrue as much in gross, but their are mostly the most beneficial contracts for Canadian industries. Basically they guarantee long term work for the contract winners that extends far beyond the terms of Canada's F-35 contract. Furthermore these contracts would not happen if the GOC was not a participant in the contract. That is not assured in traditional domestic offsets with companies like boeing.
 
Without a doubt Lockheed was very smart how they went about structuring this deal. I suspect without the clauses about future contracts, likely some countries would have pulled the plug already.
 
Colin P said:
Without a doubt Lockheed was very smart how they went about structuring this deal. I suspect without the clauses about future contracts, likely some countries would have pulled the plug already.

Eh, I doubt that. These sort of contracts are much more common for other partner countries... Canada is the only one that generally eschews joint development and purchase contracts and just goes with off the shelf. The Eurofighter, Tornado, A-400M, various arms programs (IRIS, MEADS, ect), are good examples of this for European countries. The cost overrun and delays for those programs were often far in excess of what's been going on with the F-35, and they were never cancelled. Australia does a lot of indigenous development so they would be comfortable with this sort of contract.

Really the pure economics of the F-35 industrial program is what a lot of these countries clamor for in the offset realm. The opportunity to be a major subcontractor for the Pentagon's largest arms program is one they don't want to pass up. The Rafale, Eurofighter or Gripen will probably never crack 600 units built and those aircraft workshare are highly constrained. Offsets are not that attractive as a result. There are likely to be 2800 F-35s, with a competitive workshare structure.

It was such an opportunity that Japan recently announced changes to their stringent export laws in light of the F-35 program. They couldn't join the program as a partner when they would have been nearly as well placed as Canada to win a considerable workshare.

Combined all of this with the aircraft's capabilities, and it was (and remains) a no-brainer for most partner countries.
 
Just a point, but one which is a step above mere nitpicking: industrial offsets and regional industrial benefits and so on are not "free." We, taxpapyers, pay, usualy at prices ranging from 101% to 200%+, for each one.

A compoany, like Locheed Martin does, usually, need/want to 'outsurce' some work; they would like to outsource it to the lowest price, compliant contractor but they will award a contracttio a higher priced (say Canadian) supplier if we pay the difference - and that, subsidizing our industries, is what "offsets" and "benefits" are all about.

I have no objection to this form of subsidy, given that I accept, reluctantly, that everyone subsidizes damned near everything, but we should call it what it is - a domestic production subsidy.

I was near this business back in the late 1970s when we first, to my knowledge, used this term in NDHQ: regarding the CP140 contract (the prime contractor for which, Locheed, was mired in controversy about "benefits" and bribes that reached as far as the Dutch royal family) so I can confirm that it's nothing new.

Sorry for the highjack but "benbefit" and "offset" sound like we are getting a quid pro quo rather than just buying something: in this case jobs for our workers.
 
A little on Japan's decision on the F-35

http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/03/japan-tackles-perils-to-building-selling-its-own-next-gen-fight/

Japan Tackles Perils To Building, Selling Its Own Next-Gen Fighter


We offer a rare discussion of the Japanese effort to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft. Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, a Reservist in the Japanese Self Defense Force and doctoral candidate at the Australian Defense Force Academy, and his co-author Eddie Walsh discuss the hard slog Japan faces as it develops, builds and then tries to sell its own fifth generation fighter.

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Last year's decision to acquire the F-35 reinforces Japan's commitment to its strategic alliance with the United States. But it would be naive to think that Japan's interest stems solely from a desire to help Washington just when other prominent F-35 partners appear unwilling or unable to commit to the troubled program.

For Japan, the F-35 delivers more than a fighter capable of facing off head-to-head with the latest Chinese and Russian-made adversaries. It also provides access to stealth and other next-generation (NGEN) capabilities that Japan's defense contractors need to advance development of their own NGEN fighter.

While the F-35 provides Japan with the means to radically shift the diplomatic and military balance of power in Asia-Pacific, Japan will need to make a risky break with its past if it hopes to produce indigenous NGEN fighters. Such an effort would simultaneously require Japan to emerge as a unilateral military superpower and major exporter of military aircraft. Although there are preliminary indications that the Japanese Government may be willing to move in that direction, the program is certainly no fait accompli. While Japan can probably overcome the technical and legal hurdles facing the developing of a NGEN fighter, it remains a serious question as to whether the country will be willing to bear the steep political and diplomatic costs required.

Core Challenge

It certainly is no secret that Japan has been actively pursuing an indigenous NGEN fighter in parallel with its efforts to import them from the United States or Europe. Japan has publicly contracted Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) to lay the foundation for this fighter under the Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD-X) project.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) recently announced it has begun assembling a full-scale ATD-X fighter test model. While this marks an important milestone in Japan's efforts to produce its own NGEN fighter, the program still has a long way to go, including overcoming some major technical hurdles.

There is little doubt that buying the F-35 will help close the gap between Japan's R&D program and established NGEN fighter programs abroad. With time, Japan's skilled workforce and manufacturing capabilities probably are sufficient to overcome the rest.

However, bringing the NGEN fighter development program to fruition requires more than technical capabilities. Although Japan remains the world's third largest economy, it is questionable whether Tokyo can unilaterally support the capital outlay required to develop a peer competitor to the Chinese Chengdu J-20 or the Russian Sukhoi PAK FA -- especially after the global economic crisis and last year's Great East Japan Earthquake. The reality is that producing competitive NGEN fighters probably requires far more funding than Japanese policymakers forecast.

As a result, Japan will need to mirror the approaches used by other NGEN producers, including offsetting development costs with foreign exports. This is the only realistic business model which proves politically and economically viable for building a true NGEN fighter. Since Japan's current laws prohibit the export of such a fighter, Tokyo therefore needs to relax or rewrite its export control restrictions. Japan's recent moves in this direction increase the likelihood that the domestic legal barriers to exports will eventually disappear.

It would be a mistake though to assume that the challenges before Japan in developing a NGEN fighter are purely technological and legal in nature. To move the program forward, Japan will need to do far more than to just design a fighter that its military and potential buyers will find attractive. It also will have to overcome the serious political and diplomatic barriers which threaten such an initiative. Nowhere is this more evident than the considerable opposition that would arise should Japan try to export them.

Economic Viability

In order to export its NGEN fighters abroad, there is no doubt that Japan would have to work hard to ameliorate concerns of major foreign powers who would oppose any move by Japan to unilaterally alter the balance of power in East Asia. This could hurt Japanese diplomatic influence, particularly its coveted soft power. Would Japan really be willing to bear such costs?

Let's assume for argument's sake that it would. Japan would need to determine whether or not the potential export market for a Japanese NGEN fighter would support the program in the first place.

On face value, the market certainly appears big enough. China's double-digit increases in military spending have unnerved many emerging and mid-tier powers in the Asia-Pacific region.

While Tokyo is unlikely to sell to clients that counter the interests of its alliance with Washington, there remain a number of countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere for whom the U.S. cannot serve as a supplier but would prefer a partner solution to be fielded over a Chinese or Russian alternative. This is not Japanese fantasy – South Korea has been eyeing some of these same markets for its KFX program.

Potential export markets include ASEAN members (ex. Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand), Trans-Pacific Partnership countries (ex. Chile and Peru), and other close regional partners in the Middle East and Central Asia. Over the life of the program, one could even imagine scenarios where more contentious buyers, including Myanmar and Taiwan, could be brought to the table.

The problem for Japanese defense planners though is that defense trade decisions are not made in a bilateral vacuum. Market dynamics must be balanced with larger strategic and political considerations. In this case, the Japanese NGEN program's potential exports present a far greater destabilizing effect than do the introduction of the fighters into the Japanese military. This is no small concern.

Export Considerations

The emergence of Japan as a major military NGEN aircraft exporter would be a serious threat to existing mid-market players, particularly European military exporters (ex. France, Germany, UK, and Sweden) and upstarts (ex. Brazil, India, and South Korea). Japanese defense planners need to understand how they would react to this challenge.

In some markets, China and Russia are even bigger concerns. Since strategic and diplomatic interests regularly outweigh economic ones, the Japanese will need to determine how far those two would go (including accepting financial losses) to block Japanese exports.

Even the United States could present challenges. The U.S. could play a significant role in the host country's decision between Chinese, European, Russian, and possibly Korean alternatives. And there are serious questions as to whether the U.S. would want to undermine its NATO allies' lucrative defense trade interests at a time of economic crisis in Europe and increased tension with Japanese strategic expansion in Asia.

For these reasons, sizing up the potential export market for a next generation fighter is no easy task. In fact, it is one rank with uncertainty. This makes it all the more difficult to make a strong case for the Japanese NGEN program; exacerbating the political and diplomatic gulf between those who oppose and support the program.

Eddie Walsh is a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He also is a freelance foreign correspondent who writes extensively on diplomacy and defense issues in Asia-Pacific. He can be followed @aseanreporting.

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He also is a Reserve Specialist with Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces and a Ph.D. candidate at the Australian Defense Force Academy. The views expressed are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the Japanese Self Defense Force or the Australian Defense Force Academy.
 
HB_Pencil said:
The aircraft performed remarkably well during Unified Protector, distinguishing itself above every single other aircraft that operated during the conflict. Its a maturing combat system, with a full array of capabilities. Its also quite expensive, in part due to very low production rates and small numbers produced. Depending on the industrial effects of the IAF purchase, its still a 100 million dollar flyaway. Furthermore its Thales radar has good scanning range and definition, but pales in comparison to the AN/APG-81 in its abilities.

Finally it also lacks the sensor integration piece that is so critical for the F-35 and American aircraft in general. So if I was forced to pick a replacement, I would grugingly suggest the F-15SG/K/whatever. The F/A-18 is being removed from service. Still its almost certainly more costly to field and maintain for the RCAF, but it would provide a reasonable level of capability that allows for interoperability with US forces.

Excellent points. French TV reported one issue that came up with the Rafale over Libya and that was the pilot workload was excessive and caused problems.  The result is the next tranche of aircraft to be procured will be mostly 2 seaters so they can add a second crew to divvy up the workload on Strike missions.  The Grippen apparently had similar issues.  The F-35 gets past this problem with the sensor fusion suite and systems automation built into the aircraft.


I don't believe the whole sensor fusion aspect has been grasped yet, especially by the media and opposition.  The focus is still on the whole Stealth thingy that in some people's minds is only good for Day 1 Strike Missions and that makes us warmongering imperialist wannbes. 

Sooner or later there will be a discussion that focuses more on stealth making the  F 35 slippery rather than invisible.

 
Haletown said:
Sooner or later there will be a discussion that focuses more on stealth making the  F 35 slippery rather than invisible.

Would help if we routinely called "stealth technology" by it's actual name : Low-observable
 
In the same way camouflage paint made aircraft in WWII harder to see, and exhaust shrouds for night fighters in WWII.
 
CDN Aviator said:
Would help if we routinely called "stealth technology" by it's actual name : Low-observable

  . . . that would be a good start.  Discussions about making the F-35 harder to find, harder to lock-up, harder to keep it locked up would support a better dialogue.

Again way out of my area,  but I had  the opportunity some years ago while doing some ILS stuff to sit in as an interested observer on a whole series of high definition simulations  - using the current NORAD software of the time (mid 1990's).  The guys doing the sims were all "seasoned" USAF pilots and Air Defense guys and the one take away was how difficult it was to lock up a high speed target that didn't want to be locked up.

Given what we know about the F-35,  that will be an exponentially more difficult task for Air Defense folks and if they can't lock you up they can't kill you as one of the guys used to say.


 
Haletown said:
Given what we know about the F-35,  that will be an exponentially more difficult task for Air Defense folks and if they can't lock you up they can't kill you as one of the guys used to say.

Speaking strictly of RF tracking methods, yes.

As the F-22 found out, IRST is a real b***h.
 
CDN Aviator said:
Speaking strictly of RF tracking methods, yes.

As the F-22 found out, IRST is a real b***h.

My understanding is that IRST is quite valuable but needs to know where to look . . . it isn't very good at searching large volumes of airspace like a radar can.

Any idea of range comparisons of a modern IRST and the APG-81?

 
Haletown said:
Excellent points. French TV reported one issue that came up with the Rafale over Libya and that was the pilot workload was excessive and caused problems.  The result is the next tranche of aircraft to be procured will be mostly 2 seaters so they can add a second crew to divvy up the workload on Strike missions.  The Grippen apparently had similar issues.  The F-35 gets past this problem with the sensor fusion suite and systems automation built into the aircraft.


I don't believe the whole sensor fusion aspect has been grasped yet, especially by the media and opposition.  The focus is still on the whole Stealth thingy that in some people's minds is only good for Day 1 Strike Missions and that makes us warmongering imperialist wannbes. 

Sooner or later there will be a discussion that focuses more on stealth making the  F 35 slippery rather than invisible.

Well I think this are of operations is beyond the experience of most people, except those who might have seen it up close in Afghanistan or who have watched the US context. The network integration is such an integral part of US operations and its light years ahead of anything else. Even the RCAF. Really the CF-18s sit at the end of a spoke, where the hub is the US C4ISR element. The F-35 will in a way make each aircraft a mini-hub in a distributed system... gathering information and distributing it to other fighters in its network. This will have the biggest change on the fighter's Conops, not Stealth.

I agree with you that this is nowhere near as "sexy" as stealth. Stealth is something that is very apparent and identifiable by the public. Its also not a big cost driver, despite what the media would have you believe. The avionics (which generally account for over 50% of the cost of many fighters) are the real cost drivers and one of the main factor behind the F-35's delays. Really if Canada wanted F-35s with legacy fighter capability levels in avionics, we could have that by 2015. The Marines actually considered that with their B models, but have decided against it.

On stealth, I think its a huge misconception that the F-35 is for first day of war. The way that IADS are going, its going to be essential for every day of war. We've just never faced anything beyond a 1960s/70s level of SAM technology, and its not apparent what we're up against. Basically Low observable is becoming the norm, not the exception.
 
Haletown said:
it isn't very good at searching large volumes of airspace like a radar can.

With today's technology. Tomorrow...........

Any idea of range comparisons of a modern IRST and the APG-81?

Not the slightest idea. I know at what ranges i have picked up other aircraft with IR and that is with older technology so i am comfortable in assuming that things have improved with dedicated newer systems. Modern IR sensors can differentiate to 1 millionth of one degree making hiding difficult for even aerodynamic friction.
 
As several posters have mentioned, stealth is just one aspect of the F-35's capabilities. Here are a few links that go into detail about the F-35's capabilities, especially its sensor integration. The links also include PowerPoint slide presentations.

Understanding the Basic F-35: What is in the Baseline Aircraft? (Updated)

The F-35 as a “Flying Sensor Fusion Engine”: Positioning the Fleet for “Tron” Warfare

The F-35 and Advanced Sensor Fusion

An Overview of The F-35 Cockpit

F-35 and Current Weapons

 
While I think that the Canadian government(s) have seriously mis-handled the "selling" of the F-35 portfolio and I do worry about some of the project's development issues, I think that the F-35 is the right choice for Canada among the available aircraft choices.  I do wonder though about the significant reduction of aircraft types that seems to be happening in the industry.  The aircraft seem to be becoming more and more complex (and expensive) in order to replace several different role-specific airframes.  I worry that (the collective) "we" in the West may end up putting too many eggs in a single basket if the F-35 becomes THE western combat aircraft of choice.  Is there not an advantage to having multiple aircraft types each with their own strengths and weaknesses?  Perhaps there would be an advantage to Canada selecting a different, more specialized aircraft to compliment, rather than supliment, an American F-35 fleet.  The problem is that what other real choices are out there that would make sense for us to purchase?
 
I would consider passive stealth characteristics to be quite a far second to the DAS' active capabilities.  JSF's integration into the battlespace is like nothing before it.  This integration trend is happening in maritime (arguably more advanced than airborne system integration) and land systems, as well.  JSF takes the aerospace integration a quantum leap forward.

Sadly, these capabilities and the operational requirement for such, are being lost in the noise of how the JSF has been pursued....by Liberal and Conservative governments alike.


Regards
G2G
 
However, the focus in media has been on delays in flight testing; the software for the is reportedly an oder of magnitude more complex than that of the F18, and even 3x the length and complexity of the F22.

Thus, many of the key selling points of the F35 are capabilities that are under development, not in operation.  That is not in and of itself a bad thing, but it does represent schedule and therefore cost risk.
 
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